

Intellectual self-knowledge in Latin  
commentaries on Aristotle's *De anima*  
from 1250 to 1320

Qualitative and quantitative analyses

Michael Stenskjær Christensen

PhD Dissertation

Saxo Institute · University of Copenhagen

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Primary advisor: David Kristian Bloch

Secondary advisor: Christina Thomsen Thörnqvist

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# Chapter 1

## Introduction

*Turpe est animam alia cognoscere et se ipsam ignorare.*  
Anonymus Chasselensis f. 104r

This dissertation presents a study of intellectual self-knowledge in the commentaries on Aristotle's *De anima* from the 13th and early 14th century. The investigation revolves around the arts masters' interpretation of two passages in *De anima* 3.4 where Aristotle is interpreted to assume some kind of intellectual self-knowledge, and their discussions on the possibility of having a science of the soul at the beginning of their commentaries. I will analyse and map the field of doctrines and identify significant connections among the included commentaries. In the study I will make use of and develop both quantitative and qualitative methods for analysis of philosophical texts.

This is a study of a philosophical subject in historical texts that are composed of a wide field of ideas and arguments. In this way it presents different types of challenges, and in this introduction I will discuss how they are each addressed. It is not only a study of a historical artefact, as the development of problems concerning self, soul, consciousness, and introspection have had a strong presence in the history of philosophy, and still do to this day. This means that to avoid some false assumptions, the creation of non-existing connections, or the influence of cognitive biases, it will be necessary to map out the philosophical playing field. The treatment of historical texts itself imports some problems of transmission, availability, and interpretation, and as the amount of material also makes an exhaustive study impossible within the present confines, a selection must be made. Finally, the composite nature of the ideas discussed and presented in the texts studied here raises some challenges of comparison, connection, and interpretation. The introduction will be closed off with a review of the existing research literature, an outline of the dissertation and a summary of formal details of terminology and references.

The problems of self-knowledge and reflexivity play a pivotal role throughout the history of the philosophy of mind. Some parts of that history have already been subjected to intense investigation, but there are still wholly or largely unexplored areas. I will here begin to map one of those. The main purpose of the study will therefore be to provide an overview of the philosophical arguments and positions that can be found within the commentaries on Aristotle's *De anima* from 1250 to 1320. I will do this in a modular way that will make it easy to

evaluate any material that is not included here in light of the present results, and to expand on them with the new results that further studies are certain to hold. On the basis of these investigations it will be possible to identify central, influential, and typical points of doctrines within the corpus, and to recommend texts that may be of particular interest, either in virtue of their degree of uniqueness, because they provide good representations of the common doctrines, or because they are of particular philosophical ingenuity or depth.

## 1.1 The object of study: Intellectual self-knowledge

Terms such as self, knowledge, reflection, awareness and not least consciousness are heavily loaded. They import a range of meanings and backgrounds that should be distinguished to avoid too much confusion. I therefore want to establish some terminological distinctions and point out some of the ambiguity of the most central terms. A most basic distinction is to be made between *self-knowledge* and *self-awareness*.<sup>1</sup> *Self-knowledge* describes knowledge about one's own mental acts, such as experiences, thoughts, beliefs, and desires. *Self-awareness* describes the identification of oneself, one's own "I", as the centre of mental acts. This definition of self-awareness does not necessarily match the existing literature, as it can be used more freely to denote a non-cognitive reflexivity. But the purpose of the distinction is to single out activities that take the mental acts of the agent as their objects from the ability of the agent to identify herself as a subject of her own activities. Such self-awareness easily leads into broader considerations of subjectivity and personhood that may not necessarily be implied by the analyses of self-knowledge that we will encounter. When I refer to mental 'acts' it is important to remember that it does not necessarily imply agency, as receptivity also plays a crucial role in Aristotelian psychology. This is preferred because Aristotelian ontology has the act-potency distinction at its core, and the psychology lies (almost entirely) within the domain of natural science as the science of things capable of change. In contemporary philosophy of mind you would instead talk about mental 'states', but we want to avoid the impression that the Aristotelian mind is merely a system of active states, because we risk suppressing the role of potentiality that we will see is crucial.

Self-knowledge centres around the concept 'self'. I can hardly try to define the term in a few lines, as it lies at the heart of an ever-growing corpus of philosophy of mind, but an expanded view of the self could circumscribe it as an overarching, coherent, and conscious subject of mental states (or acts) and agent of intentional acts.<sup>2</sup> It would possibly also include a representation of the internal state of the subject and its relation to its environment. This expansive definition clearly includes self-knowledge and self-awareness as just distinguished. But all this need not be implied by the 'self' in self-knowledge. At the other end of that spectrum we have a very deflationary idea of self where the term merely refers to the identity between the subject and object of an activity. We will see how this merely reflexive sense of self will be much more to the fore in the following analyses. This engagement with the reflexivity-relation is possibly occasioned by the restriction on *intellectual* self-knowledge. In a broader investig-

<sup>1</sup> This distinction is taken from Gertler 2011: 2.

<sup>2</sup> I can recommend Sorabji 2006 as a longer, historically based definition.

ation of self-knowledge, that would not only (and maybe not mainly) be pursued within *De anima*-commentaries, the deflationary concept of self might not suffice, but as the commentators generally talk about self-knowledge within a more restricted context they also reduce the ambit of the self that is known by the intellect, and we will see only a few cases where commentators hint at more expanded notions of the self.

In a way consciousness looms behind all of these discussions, because self-knowledge often is associated strongly with consciousness.<sup>3</sup> Without getting into the most murky question of what it means when we use that elusive word, I will say that consciousness will only play a fleeting role in this dissertation. I am ready to accept that there is no developed concept of consciousness in the works of Aristotle, although many of the components that you would include in a concept of consciousness can be found in more or less nascent forms, such as ideas of reflexivity, the identification of persistent personhood, bodily self-awareness and the like.<sup>4</sup> In medieval philosophy we have a very different situation, and reflections of something similar to our modern conception of consciousness is probably less foreign to them.<sup>5</sup> But in this study we will see that when interpreting the intricate details of Aristotle's *De anima* the commentators very rarely get into the domain of the more expansive concept of consciousness. Rather they stick to the more detailed mechanics of Aristotelian epistemology.<sup>6</sup> This means that although these accounts of self-knowledge may play into a bigger picture about consciousness, that picture is not painted out in our sources. This study therefore may provide a piece in a larger puzzle on consciousness according to the commentators, but cannot even begin to lay out the whole puzzle based on the sources investigated here.

## 1.2 Research overview

It should come as no surprise that the amount of research on ancient and medieval philosophy of mind is practically insurmountable.<sup>7</sup> When we focus on self-knowledge and related themes the literature is more limited, but still extensive. I will present the different parts of that research and highlight the works that are most important to this study. Contemporary philosophy will not play any real role in this dissertation, but I will just remind the reader that the

<sup>3</sup> Examples are *legio* but see most of the articles in Rosenthal 2005. Other examples are Nagel 1974, Zahavi, Grünbaum, and Parnas 2004, Kriegel and Williford 2006, Kriegel 2009.

<sup>4</sup> On this, see Sihvola 2007. There are highly perceptive analyses of consciousness in Aristotle, Caston 2002 being a prime example, but I would still maintain that although an idea of consciousness could be stitched together from disparate ideas, it is not developed as a subject in his works.

<sup>5</sup> Long (1991, 1999: 573–80) argues that we see a coherent self coalescing already in Stoic philosophy. Medieval research involving consciousness is not uncommon, for some examples, see Brower-Toland 2012, Brower-Toland 2013, Brower-Toland 2014, Brower-Toland n.d., Black 1993, Klima and Hall 2018, Toivanen 2009, Yrjönsuuri 2007.

<sup>6</sup> Crystal (2002: 12–7) draws some further distinctions between self-knowledge (which he calls self-intellection), self-consciousness, and personhood with several points similar to the ones made here, and which also apply to the present study.

<sup>7</sup> Some recent overview anthologies and a few books are Kaukua and Ekenberg 2016, Knuuttila and Sihvola 2014, Köhler 2008, Remes and Sihvola 2008, Heinämaa, Lähtenmäki, and Remes 2007, Lagerlund 2007, Bakker and Thijssen 2007, Pasnau 1997, L. Spruit 1994–1995.

subject of self-knowledge and subjectivity still is a major area of research and development.<sup>8</sup> The branch of philosophy of mind and consciousness known as higher-order theory-theories are also of some interest for the subjects of this dissertation, as they focus on a higher-order awareness of mental processes as a constitutive element in human consciousness.<sup>9</sup> As the subject is of great public interest, there are of course also a host of popular treatments, of which I will just recommend a few in particular.<sup>10</sup>

General introductions to self-knowledge from a historical perspective are not numerous, but a good handful are available. Introductory chapters in larger works of course often present a general overview,<sup>11</sup> but some introductory journal or anthology articles also exist.<sup>12</sup> Whole anthologies on the subject are also to be found. The most recent, *Consciousness and Self-Knowledge in Medieval Philosophy*, is mostly a discussion of Cory's *Aquinas on Human Self-Knowledge*.<sup>13</sup> The more general anthology *Self-Knowledge*, edited by Renz, also has a lot of articles concerning pre-modern philosophy.<sup>14</sup> Shields's article on self-knowledge in Aristotle, Remes's similar article on Plotinus, and Brachtendorf's on Augustine are especially relevant.<sup>15</sup> Of course Perler's article on the problem in the scholastic literature is also highly relevant, as it focuses on the same philosophical problems as we do here, and even takes the central passages in Aristotle's *De anima* as a starting point.<sup>16</sup> Disappointingly, it does not engage with any commentaries on the text, but presents the related problems from the theological sources.

When it comes the studies of self-knowledge in ancient philosophy the work of Crystal's *Self-intellection and its epistemological origins in ancient Greek thought* is notable for its wide historical scope, but also in particular because it takes the central passages that are the focus of this dissertation as its centre of attention. The earlier *Subjektivität und Selbstbewusstsein in der Antike* also has interesting points, but mostly reads as a highly stimulating philosophical essay on intellectual self-knowledge from Parmenides to Descartes.<sup>17</sup> We should also highlight

<sup>8</sup> Gertler 2017 is the place to start, but see also Zahavi 2014, Gertler 2011 and Zahavi 2005, and Gallagher and Zahavi 2015 for an introduction from a phenomenological perspective.

<sup>9</sup> Rosenthal 2005 is a central example, but see Carruthers 2016 for the big (an exceptional) overview.

<sup>10</sup> Hofstadter and Dennet 1982 and Hofstadter 2008 are both nice, although not unbiased. Sorabji 2006 is particularly strong on the historical material.

<sup>11</sup> Cory 2014: 15–39 gives a historical overview, cf. Lambert 2007: 1–30. Perler and Schierbaum 2014a presents the philosophical problems involved in self-knowledge. Perler and Schierbaum 2014b is a collection of primary texts concerning intellectual self-knowledge, although unfortunately it only contains a single excerpt of an commentary on *De anima*, namely that of John Buridan.

<sup>12</sup> Renz 2017 gives a very general introduction to the specific question of intellectual self-knowledge, Yrjönsuuri 2007 uses the debate between Ockham and Chatton as illustrative of what is assumed to be a general tendency in 14th century. Toivanen and Yrjönsuuri 2014 presents a range of related problems and a collection of relevant textual passages (Remes 2014 is the equivalent on the ancient tradition).

<sup>13</sup> Paasch (2018) has a stimulating thought experiment about the self-awareness of an information-processing machine in that volume. It is however too simplistic in my view.

<sup>14</sup> Renz 2017.

<sup>15</sup> Shields 2017, Remes 2017, Brachtendorf 2017.

<sup>16</sup> Perler 2017.

<sup>17</sup> Oehler 1997. The earlier Oehler 1974, which is only on Aristotle, is also very rich on sources.

the extensive analysis by Perkams.<sup>18</sup> Although he focuses on the late ancient period, and in particular the Neo-Platonic tradition, it is still highly interesting as the starting point is Aristotle's *De anima*, and his sources are mainly within the commentary tradition. For studies of self-knowledge in Aristotle, I refer to the literature that is included in section 2.1.3 on page 26 where that is treated more extensively.<sup>19</sup>

In-depth studies of self-knowledge in the middle ages presents us with a good handful of monograph studies along with a whole collection of article length treatments. As one might expect, interpretations of the works of Thomas Aquinas are strongly represented, as three book length studies and quite some chapters and articles are solely dedicated to self-knowledge and related matters in the works of the angelic doctor.<sup>20</sup> Aquinas will not play any particularly central role in this study, as I primarily focus on question commentaries on *De anima* that discuss the intellectual self-knowledge.<sup>21</sup> But in general we can say about this whole contingent of publications that they find in Aquinas an interpretation of self-knowledge that sticks to the Aristotelian epistemological model to a very wide extent, but also contains an idea of habitual self-knowledge that is not found in the texts of the Stagerite. The details of the internal workings, the different roles of different mental powers, and questions of development in the *œuvre* are however subjected to minute scrutiny and discussion in the literature.

Other 13th century characters that also occur among the common subjects of investigation in the literature are Peter of John Olivi and Siger of Brabant, while in the 14th century Walter Chatton and William of Ockham are commonly studied authors.<sup>22</sup> But they are not alone, as some more wide ranging as well as detailed studies of select authors also exist.<sup>23</sup> In an overview article Yrjönsuuri presents a typology of four different categories of self-knowledge, comprising the bodily self, the sensitive and emotional self, the intellectual self, and the social self.<sup>24</sup> The main attention in the literature still clusters around intellectual self-knowledge, but other types of self-knowledge have also started to come under scrutiny.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>18</sup> Perkams 2008.

<sup>19</sup> Although it is outside the Aristotelian tradition the presentation of related problems in Stoicism by A. A. Long (1991) is also highly recommended.

<sup>20</sup> Books: Putallaz 1991b, Lambert 2007, Cory 2014. Shorter texts: Putallaz 1992, Black 1993, Kenny 1993: 119–29, Brown 2001, Pasnau 2002: 330–60, Martin 2007, Sanguineti 2013, Rode 2015: 37–60, Cory 2017.

<sup>21</sup> We have one *quaestio* titled “Utrum anima coniuncta cognoscat seipsam per essentiam” which is ascribed to Aquinas. The authenticity is debated but I accept the arguments of Putallaz (1991b: 305–10) who maintains that is not by Aquinas. On the discovery of the text and literature, see Cory 2014: 40–1. It is published in Kennedy 1977.

<sup>22</sup> Olivi: Putallaz 1991a: 85–133, Rode 2010, Rode 2015: 89–123, Toivanen 2009, Martin 2007, Toivanen 2013, Brower-Toland 2013. Brabant: Putallaz 1992, Rode 2015: 61–88, Bazán 2016: 245–52. Ockham: Schierbaum 2014, Brower-Toland 2014, Rode 2015: 223–48, Gamboa 2016; Chatton: Schierbaum 2016; Chatton and Ockham: Yrjönsuuri 2007, Brower-Toland 2012, Lopez 2016. More generally Rode 2015: 131–335.

<sup>23</sup> See Brower-Toland 2017 on Buridan, and Zupko 2007 which focuses on Buridan but includes doctrines of a range of commentators. Brower-Toland n.d. may be highly relevant as a broader introduction, but it has not appeared as of this writing.

<sup>24</sup> Yrjönsuuri 2006.

<sup>25</sup> Silva 2016, Toivanen 2013, Yrjönsuuri 2008, Kaukua and Kukkonen 2007. Toivanen 2009 focuses on

We rarely find a clear distinction between texts from the faculties of arts and theology, but very often the studies present a strong emphasis on theological texts in the analysis of self-knowledge, while finding publications that incorporate material from the commentary tradition is more difficult. I know of only a few publications that primarily or only focus on that part of the tradition. Zupko's "Self-Knowledge and Self-Representation in Later Medieval Psychology" is the first of those, and aside from the shared view that a focus on the arts masters is of philosophical interest in itself, it has also had a direct influence on the present study. For the approach of analysing and categorizing the separate doctrines of a range of commentaries and to register which are used where has also been adapted as a fundamental part of the approach of the present study. Another exception to the general rule of the under-representation of the commentary tradition is found in Brower-Toland's analysis of Buridan's view on self-reflection and the science of the soul, which is based solely on his *De anima*-commentary.<sup>26</sup> The only publication that I know of this kind on 13th century material is by Bazán, his "La ciencia del alma y el conocimiento de si mismo a traves de tres textos ineditos del siglo XIII". It is an important study of the problems of self-knowledge based on three texts, two of which are also included here.<sup>27</sup> One of the sources of his study is the commentary that he later published in what is now one of the important few published texts from the period, the eponymous Anonymus Bazán. He gives a good coherent exposition of the procedure and elements of self-knowledge based on those three sources with reference to the same questions as I include in the present study. Some methods of this study are significantly different from his work, and of course the number of sources and space afforded for the study is much greater, but some of the observations of his original article, in particular the first half, will be reproduced and confirmed in the present study.<sup>28</sup>

Aside from the early article by Bazán there are thus no in-depth studies of intellectual self-knowledge in the commentaries on *De anima* from the 13th and early 14th century. There are however a few other important works on related matters that must be introduced. In the early 90's Putallaz published three important studies on intellectual self-knowledge in the 13th century. Two monographs on Thomas Aquinas and a selection of important subsequent thinkers respectively and an article on Siger of Brabant present an extensive study of the problems of self-knowledge in the latter half of the 13th century.<sup>29</sup> This is a highly important study in its extent and philosophical thoroughness, but the sources are almost exclusive from within the faculty of theology. Another study of similar extent and ambition is Rode's *Zugänge zum Selbst*. In a certain respect the present study therefore can be conceived as complementary to those two works, as I aim to cover the material within the commentaries of *De anima*. But it is also only in a certain respect complementary, as the present work differs from its predecessors in the approach to text analysis and also includes substantial amounts of yet unpublished sources.

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animal consciousness according to Olivi, but the thorough study also includes sections on general self-awareness and self-cognition. On this see also López-Farjeat 2016. On subjectivity in political philosophy, see Toivanen 2016.

<sup>26</sup> Brower-Toland 2017.

<sup>27</sup> Bazán 1969.

<sup>28</sup> The second half of his study is closer to the main focus of Boer 2013: chs. 2–4.

<sup>29</sup> Putallaz 1991b, Putallaz 1991a, Putallaz 1992.

Another important study is Boer's *The Science of the Soul*, which does actually focus solely on the *De anima*-commentaries and presents an extended analysis of what he calls the science of the soul in these 13th century texts. Several of the sources of that study are also included here, and as will be apparent there is some degree of overlap between parts of the analysis. But the focus of that study is much wider, as it concerns the science of the soul more generally and also has central analyses of the methodology of the commentators that will not be pursued in the same way here. This means that his analysis of doctrines and the mapping of the material within the tradition cannot be executed to the same degree of detail as I have the possibility of doing here.

### 1.3 Quantitative and qualitative methods

The method of textual analysis that I use does not differ in substance from the standard procedure in most works in history of philosophy. The basic approach is slow and close reading of related texts to identify points of doctrine within them. But in doing this I have used tools that are still not part of the common tool box of most medievalists. I have used elements of quantitative analyses and computation as a supplement and enhancement to the conventional close textual reading. I have also developed the underlying methodology as well as the available tools further. The theoretical basis and general approach will be presented here, so that it should be possible for the reader to follow the ideas that form the basis of my work, but also to construct a mental model of the composition of the developed tools.

Philosophical analysis relies on close and attentive reading of complex texts. By 'complex' I do not primarily refer to the often ethereal and sometimes almost incomprehensible nature of the subject matter, but rather the way a strong philosopher builds his text – not least in the Scholastic tradition of the high Middle Ages. I posit that the texts are built as trees of arguments. Presenting a single point may require a simple general argument, but each premise will be supported by arguments, which in turn will be supported by or contradicted by arguments. These can develop into extended, interconnected, and complicated trees of arguments for or against detailed points of doctrine. The format of the question commentary, the main text genre of the present study, further emphasizes this phenomenon through its surface structure. The scholarly investigation of these texts have therefore, naturally, focused on the presentation, constitution, and structure of these arguments in the endeavour to find connections, similarities, and differences in a textual tradition. That is the traditional approach that we see unfolded in classical studies of history of philosophy. The scholar who approaches a chosen text will do so with a knowledge about a range of typical problems within the tradition, and then investigate how that material handles and interacts with these problems.

Starting from the basic assumption that the texts contain a combination of doctrines I have developed a way of registering a doctrinal position of a text. In stead of considering a text as a linear string of words or sentences, constituting points presented in a given procedural order, I model the idea of the tree of arguments with *directed graphs*. A directed graph is a network of nodes (also called *vertices*) connected by edges with a start and an end node. Nodes are then used to represent *points of doctrine*, and the presence of instances of such doctrines in a specific part of a text. Relations between the different points of doctrine in a given text is indicated by




Figure 1.1: Visualization of the abstract schema used in the graph database, slightly simplified.

the direction and type of edges that connect the doctrine instances within the text. So if for instance a given point is used to support another point, that can be indicated by the types of connections that are created between the doctrines as they are used in a given text. The concept of a doctrinal point is admittedly fluid but is considered to be a single, coherent, and philosophically self-sufficient statement. ‘The soul is immortal’ would be an example, while ‘one thing cannot have two contradictory properties at the same time and in the same respect’ might be another example. Doctrinal points do not have to be self-evident, as they may be supported by other doctrinal points and attacked by yet other points.

The question commentaries included in this study have been registered within a so-called *graph database*, a database designed to handle information represented according to this graph model. The types of nodes that are central to the data model are the following: *Author*, *Text*, *Question*, *Instance*, and *Doctrine*. The relationship types are:

*Wrote*      An *Author* wrote a *Text*.

*Contains*    A *Text* contains a *Question*.

*Has*        A *Question* has an *Instance*.

*Of*         A *Instance* is an instance of a *Doctrine*.

*Attacks, Supports, and Uses*    An *Instance* of a *Doctrine* can attack, support, and use another *Doctrine*.

A graphical visualization of this schema can be seen in figure 1.1 on the preceding page. With these nodes and relations I have created representations of the doctrines present in each of the analysed texts in such a way that it is apparent how each text contains instances of a finite number of doctrines. To give an illustration of this, figure 1.2 on the following page shows a simplified version of the presence in six texts of the idea the possible intellect is similar to prime matter (= P10 in the inventory of doctrines in section A.1 on page 242). Although the text on the nodes may be too small to read, it still illustrates the structure of this part of the graph where six authors (yellow) wrote texts (rose) with questions (pink) that have an instance (green) of that doctrine (blue).

Similarly, figure 1.3 on page 11 illustrates the different relationship types between doctrines are used to register the internal structure of a group of doctrines. It is a visualization of a small part of the graph of doctrines registered in *Quaestiones in De anima I–III* by John Dinsdale concerning the possibility of having a science of the soul. The blue nodes represent points of doctrine, while the green nodes represent an individual instance of that doctrine in the present text. In some cases the type of instance is written, such as *Negative ratio* or *Refutation*, but when no instance type is indicated it is assumed to occur in the context of the main determination of a text. From the graph we see that the main doctrine that “There can be a science of the soul” is supported by two doctrine instances and attacked by one. The two supporting doctrines are that substantial knowledge can be acquired from accidental properties, and that there is a distinction between primary and secondary intelligibility. The attacking doctrine is that the soul is not available to sense perception. What is interesting to note is that each of the positive doctrines are also instantiated to refute that negative doctrine in the context of the refutation of the negative *ratio principalis*. So here we see two different uses of those two doctrines within that specific text.

With such a registration of the data the following questions become surprisingly simple to answer:

- Which doctrines support X in the commentaries?
- Which doctrines attack X in the commentaries?
- Which doctrines are used to refute any given negative *ratio principales* (= an attack) against X?
- Which doctrines are used by most commentators?
- Which doctrines are most rarely used?
- Which doctrines are most commonly used to refute negative *rationes principales*?

As the database also contains information about which commentator use which doctrines, it is also possible to keep track of more complex questions such as these:

- Which two commentators share the greatest or smallest amount of doctrine?
- Do we see any groups of commentators favouring specific groups of doctrines?




Figure 1.2: Example graph of the presence of a doctrine in six different texts.




Figure 1.3: Example graph of arguments given by John Dinsdale on the science of the soul.

- Are there some commentators who share particularly rare doctrines?
- Are there some commentators who present completely unique doctrines?

These registrations will therefore provide the raw data for further quantitative analyses of relations among the texts in the study, where further explanations and references will be provided as necessary. So, the data is kept in the graph database, but to perform the analyses I use small “notebooks” where it is possible to combine plain text explanations in a relatively rich format with program code so that I can explain the procedure of the analysis as it is developed. To this I have used a piece of software called *Jupyter Notebooks*, and all of the notebooks that I use in the study are available online.<sup>30</sup> It is therefore possible to validate my process of thought and the details of any calculations that I present. By downloading the notebooks repository it is also possible interact directly with the database by running the notebooks locally.<sup>31</sup> Any results presented in the main analyses of the study that include the database should therefore be reproducible. But aside from that the notebooks can also be consulted for further details on the quantitative data presented in the analysis, as well as a good bunch of graphs and lists that I have used as tools in those analyses but not been able to include in the body text of the study.

The fundamental point in this approach is to atomize the ideas into small chunks that can then be composed in a near-infinite number of combinations. The given combination and internal structure of a particular text then represents the doctrines used by that commentator. It is important to emphasize that these registrations are not designed to mimic, map, or closely represent the structure of the commentaries. Information about the ordering of the arguments is generally not preserved in the registration. This means that it is impossible to reconstruct the linear structure of a text based on the doctrinal graph. Needless to say, such features can of course be implemented, but that is not part of the conceived design and aim of this current solution. There are however some exceptions to this restriction, as some context and function is encoded: It is possible to register how a given instance of an argument is used, i.e. whether it attacks or supports another doctrine. Furthermore, it is also possible to register whether a given instance of a doctrine occurs as part of a *ratio principalis* (either positive or negative), or whether it refutes such a *ratio*. But aside from that kind of high-level context information the registration of doctrines only reflects what sort of ideas make an appearance in a given text. This also means that there is no encoding of the weight or importance of a piece of doctrine – all doctrines are created equal in this representation. Finally, the registration does not include any indication of whether an author endorses or accepts a given doctrine just because it is registered to appear in the text. It is therefore also not possible to deduce the doctrinal position of an author from the registered data, only what he talks about. Again, all this is technically possible, but has not been part of the design of the current database.

The idea of the graph and the powerful mathematical models that underpin the idea have been known for a long time to be a very powerful model for a myriad of domains such as

<sup>30</sup> See <https://github.com/stenskjaer/dissertation-notebooks>.

<sup>31</sup> This will of course presuppose that the user has the required skills to run a *Jupyter Notebook* and interact with the database in this way. The database is set to read-only, so it is not possible to make any changes to the registrations.

transportation and infrastructure, computer networks, financial transactions, and not least social networks. But to the best of my knowledge the approach and analyses that I develop and present here have not yet been applied to acquire this type of knowledge of philosophical texts. As my study will show, it provides a powerful tool to view and analyse the texts in ways that are difficult or impossible with conventional means.

## 1.4 Primary sources

The ambition of this study is to survey the doctrines of the commentaries without being restricted by their publication status. This means that a good portion of the included texts are yet unpublished. In this section I will outline the procedure that I have followed in the investigation and selection of material and list the included sources.

The selection of material has been conducted according to the following procedure. First I established an overview of the existing material on the basis of the most recent relevant catalogue on commentaries on book three, Mora-Márquez's "A List of Commentaries on Aristotle's *De anima* III (c. 1200–c.1400)". I registered all commentaries in that catalogue that contains one or more questions concerning intellectual self-knowledge, a total of 71 texts. From that list I compiled an overview of where the manuscript witnesses were kept for all the commentaries that were still unpublished, and on the basis of that I calculated which parts of Europe would let me see the most relevant manuscripts in as small a geographical area as possible. On that basis I planned two trips, first to Great Britain where I visited libraries in London, Cambridge, and Oxford, and then to Central Europe where I visited libraries in Vienna, Krakow, Leipzig, Erfurt, and Prague. On the first trip I inspected 32 texts in 33 manuscripts, on the second trip I inspected 39 texts in 40 manuscripts, so taking into account texts that are preserved in more than one witness, I inspected a total of 54 texts in 73 manuscripts. At that time it amounted to 76% of the texts that I deemed relevant based on the catalogue survey.

Those investigations were conducted on the basis of the knowledge I had available at that time. During the project this of course changed in ways that might have influenced the procedure of material selection. It was not until during the trips that I realized that questions on the first book of *De anima* were also highly relevant to the subject of self-knowledge. Had I known that while compiling the catalogue overview I had used a wider selection of catalogues, as Mora-Márquez's catalogue only includes commentaries that contain material on the third book of *De anima*. This means that a significant group of texts and manuscripts were not included in the initial overview. During my studies I have of course found also information about texts that are not correctly registered in the existing catalogues, or that I simply was not aware of at the time of the initial survey.

Let me give an overview of how big a proportion of the texts known to me I have been able to review. A tally of all the unpublished question commentaries on *De anima* from the 13th or 14th century or which I do not know the dating of are 84. Of this my initial survey let me inspect 54 texts. This means that of the existing material that I am currently aware of I have inspected more than 60% *in situ*. Aside from that there are also commentaries that are available in either modern or early print editions (often early print is available either online or in modern reprints). Thus, the current number of all question commentaries from the 13th–14th century

or without a dating known to me ends at 108, and to this we can add 13 texts of which I do not know the genre. This gives us 121 potential question commentaries (probably less) of which I have been able to inspect 64. If we limit this to commentaries that are certainly or possibly from the 13th or early 14th century or texts that I do not know the dating of, this number is filtered down to 68, of which I have inspected 38.<sup>32</sup> So no matter how we filter the quantities, the current survey includes around 60% of the material known to me. This of course means that the results of the study cannot claim to be exhaustive, but I will still maintain that they can give a fair view of many doctrines from the period.

I have limited the texts included to the last half of the 13th century and first part of the 14th century. The ambition was to draw a limit at or around the turn of the century, but during the investigations I have found that John of Jandun and Radulphus Brito are particularly interesting, and that it would be fruitful to include them. The study thus extends into the beginning decades of the 14th century, but the main focus still lies in the second half to the 13th century. In total I include 17 question commentaries which can be seen in table 1.1 on the facing page. Not all of them cover all three books of *De anima*, so they are not all included in all parts of the analysis. Aside from these question commentaries, section 5.2 on page 175 presents a study of a literal commentary of Simon Magister.

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<sup>32</sup> The number of texts that are not included most certainly contains a good proportion from the 14th century, as I am also often not aware of the dating of texts that I have only little information about and not have been able to inspect. So the amount of texts from the 13th or early 14th century is most certainly lower than the 30 that I have not inspected. I have collected the commentaries that I deem likely to be interesting, but which I have not had the chance to inspect in section B.2 on page 263 in the appendix.

Table 1.1: All commentaries included in the study. Dating key: ? = *uncertain*, ~ = *circa*, century quarters are indicated as follows: 13.4 = last quarter of 13th century.

Author	Title	Dating	Edition
Anonymus Assisi	<i>Quaestiones in De anima III</i>	13.4–14.1	Appendix §C.4
Anonymus Bazán	<i>Quaestiones super Aristotelis librum De anima</i>	1272–1277 <sup>33</sup>	Anonymus Bazán 1971
Anonymus Bernardini	<i>Quaestiones super librum De anima</i>	1250–1260 <sup>34</sup>	Anonymus Bernardini 2009
Anonymus Digby 55	<i>Quaestiones in De anima III</i>	13.3	Appendix §C.5
Anonymus Giele	<i>Quaestiones in Aristotelis libros I et II De anima</i>	1270–1275 <sup>35</sup>	Anonymus Giele 1971
Anonymus Mertonensis 275	<i>Quaestiones in De anima I</i>	1260~	Appendix §C.6
Anonymus Oriensis 33	<i>Quaestiones in De anima I–III</i>	1274–1289?	Appendix §C.7
Anonymus Vaticani 2170 I	<i>Quaestiones in De anima I–II</i>	13.4	Appendix §C.8
Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II	<i>Quaestiones in De anima I–III</i>	13.4–14.1	Appendix §C.9
Anonymus Vennebusch	<i>Questiones in tres libros De anima</i>	1260 <sup>36</sup>	Anonymus Vennebusch 1963
Anonymus Steenberghen	<i>Quaestiones in De anima I–III</i>	1273–1277 <sup>37</sup>	Anonymus Steenberghen 1971
Henric de la Wyle	<i>Quaestiones in De anima I–III</i>	1284–1308	Appendix §C.10
John Dinsdale	<i>Quaestiones in De anima I–III</i>	1274–1289 <sup>38</sup>	Dinsdale 2017; Appendix §C.11

<sup>33</sup> Bazán 1971a: 377.

<sup>34</sup> Bernardini 2009: xli.

<sup>35</sup> Giele 1971a: 15–6.

<sup>36</sup> Vennebusch 1963b: 85–6.

<sup>37</sup> Steenberghen 1971a: 128–9.

<sup>38</sup> Christensen 2017: 84.

Table 1.1: (Cont.) Question commentaries included in the study.

Author	Title	Dating	Edition
John of Jandun	<i>Quaestiones super libros De anima</i>	1315–1319 <sup>39</sup>	Jandun 1480; §C.12
Radulphus Brito	<i>Quaestiones in Aristotelis librum tertium De anima</i>	1290s–1320s <sup>40</sup>	Brito 1974
Siger of Brabant	<i>Quaestiones in tertium de anima</i>	1269–1270 <sup>41</sup>	Siger of Brabant 1972b
Simon of Faversham	<i>Quaestiones in De anima I–III</i>	13.4–14.1	Appendix §C.13

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<sup>39</sup> Brenet 2003: 13, Weijers 2003: 94.

<sup>40</sup> Fauser 1974b: 29–30.

<sup>41</sup> Bazán 1972a: 74\*.

## 1.5 Outline of the dissertation

The dissertation consists of four main chapters, this introduction, a conclusion and a collection of appendices. The chapters 3 and 4 make up the most substantial part of the analysis, as they survey and map the doctrines concerning intellectual self-knowledge in the commentaries of the period. The preceding historical chapter paves the way for those analyses by outlining the main relevant views on intellectual self-knowledge from Aristotle to around 1250. This means that what we see in the historical chapter does not pretend to exhaust all sources on self-knowledge, that would be an entire study in itself, but to present the main points of influence on the 13th and early 14th century texts that are the focus of our attention. Based on the doctrinal analyses I then present two studies in chapter 5 that move from the wide horizontal exposition to a deeper dive in two aspects of the tradition. These therefore flow directly from the material that is gathered in the two central chapters, but highlight a particular subject of interest. They are only two examples of the many possible in-depth studies that could be conducted on the material.

In chapter two I first present the problem of self-knowledge in Aristotle's own works and then follow the development of the idea within as well as outside the ancient commentary tradition, the reception in the Arabic sources and the further development in the medieval sources before 1250. This is not a exhaustive history of the problem of self-knowledge in the period, but an overview of the elements and ideas that will play a central role in the late 13th and early 14th century. The two main doctrines that we trace are the idea that the intellect knows itself purely by its own essence, or that it requires some external stimulus to reflect on itself.

In chapter three I present the philosophical arguments on intellectual self-knowledge as it is discussed in the commentaries on book three of *De anima*. This comprises a range of different questions and therefore also a range of slightly different topics within the domain, which is reflected in the subsections of the argument survey. This is followed by a mainly quantitative analysis of the material where significant clusters of commentaries are identified based on the degree of material they share. Finally the typical and atypical doctrines as well as particularly representative or unique commentaries are identified. In the fourth chapter I handle the question of the science of the soul in a similar procedure. The arguments are surveyed and mapped according to their presence in the different texts, and a quantitative analysis identifies significant connections among them. This is supplemented by further analyses of the most prevalent arguments and their contexts, a discussion of the different views on the science of the soul, and an identification of the most representative and original commentaries in the corpus.

In the fifth chapter I analyse the extensive and philosophically interesting commentary of John of Jandun. The aim of this chapter is to go into depth with some of the more complex and intricate parts of his commentary, and to resolve some seeming conflicts among his questions on self-knowledge, but also simply to show what it looks like when a commentator thinks long and hard about intellectual self-knowledge. This is supplemented by a closer view on the literal commentary of Simon Magister in comparison with the roughly contemporary question commentaries. That is done to cast doubt on the assumption we sometimes see that literal commentaries are inherently uninteresting in their philosophical content, but I also want to

use the occasion to cast further light on the question of authorship that engulfs that particular commentary. It has been attributed to Simon of Faversham, but I will argue that on the basis of the analysed material there are no strong reasons to believe that he is the author, and that it is more prudent to maintain the semi-anonymous Simon Magister as the author.

The appendices consist of four different types of material: My draft editions for the parts of the texts that I have analysed to the extent that they do not already exist in printed editions; question lists for some of the texts when they are relevant to parts of the study; and the details of a survey of which commentaries contain initial questions on the possibility of having a science of the soul or related material in texts that are not question commentaries.

## 1.6 Conventions, terminology, references

Bekker numbers are used in references to the Greek editions of the works of Aristotle. Titles and shorthands of classical texts are taken from *A Greek-English Lexicon* by Liddell and Scott. In quotations of Latin from already critically published sources I maintain the published orthography, but I impose my own classicising orthography and punctuation on quotations from unpublished material. References to ancient and medieval texts are terse, so when a title of a work is made superfluous by the context or the texts included, a reference to the author's name suffices. The titles and other bibliographical information on all included primary texts can of course be found in the bibliography, section 6.4 on page 219. Manuscripts are referenced with shorthands, which are all listed in the bibliography, section 6.4 on page 209. All translations of Greek and Latin are my own.

All references to the draft editions in section C of the appendix are prefixed with 'APP' followed by a page and line number. So the reference 'APP 321.27–32' refers to page 321, lines 27–32 in the appendix.

A range of different vocabularies have been used to describe the elements of a question in a medieval question commentary. Almost all of the included questions start with a presentation of the subject of a question followed by two sets of arguments, often against and for the positive answer to the question. I refer to these primary arguments as *rationes principales*, and when necessary I specify whether they are either negative or positive *rationes*. The magister then solves the problem in what I refer to as the *determination*, before he addresses problems still left by the *rationes* in what I simply call the *refutations*.

*Self-knowledge* is the fundamental term used to refer to a generic kind of insight where the soul or intellect acquires some sort of knowledge about itself. One of the main aims of the dissertation is to investigate what that means to the commentators, so the use of the term is to be understood in a generic sense and neither 'self' nor 'knowledge' are intended to import a strong or rigid meaning of either concept. Reflexivity is a fundamental component of intellectual self-knowledge and 'self-reflexivity' and 'self-reflection' are therefore used to describe an aspect of that process.

I distinguish between *accidental* and *essential* self-knowledge. The term 'accidental' does not mean that the activity is coincidental, but only that it depends on the actualization of some powers of the soul that require an external stimulus and are therefore according to an accident of the substance, in Latin they call this *per accidens*, and in Greek κατὰ συμβεβηκός.

The term 'essential' on the other hand refers to the self-knowledge as a capacity of the soul according to its essence, and hence something it can engage in without any external stimulus. Self-knowledge performed by an essential accident of the soul is still accidental as long as it involves some element or stimulus that is not always actualized as part of the essence of the soul.



# Chapter 2

## A historical overview

In this chapter I will give an overview of a part of the history of self-knowledge by focusing on the reflections of self-knowledge that are developed on the basis of *De anima*. I will not restrict myself narrowly to the context of Aristotelian commentaries, as parallel developments in other traditions of thought play an important role in the later medieval discussion of these problems. But I will maintain a restriction to material that is part of the attention of scope of the commentators. This is not a general history of self-knowledge, but merely serves to pave the way to the subsequent analysis of the text of the commentators.

The starting point will therefore naturally be *De anima* itself. After a presentation of the main problems relating to intellectual self-knowledge in Aristotle, we will see how four of his late ancient commentators, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius, Philoponus and Ps.-Simplicius, handled the problem. I will then present an alternative model of self-knowledge from the Platonic tradition based on some notes on Plotinus himself along with Augustine and the views presented in the anonymous work *Liber de causis*. We will then be able to see how these two different tracks of the problem are found in the Arabic peripatetic tradition, represented by Avicenna and Averroes. This will pave the way for a presentation of the main Latin texts on the soul until about 1250, concluding with Albert the Great.

We will see how, after Aristotle, two main branches present two basic views on self-knowledge as either immediate or mediated by an external species. Interpreters who rely mostly or wholly on Aristotle will favour a mediated and conditional self-knowledge, while interpreters with strong sympathies for the Platonic tradition will tend to prefer an immediate or essential self-knowledge. These two main branches do not engage in any real or strong conflict, neither do they intertwine in the Ancient or Arabic traditions, but when we arrive at the 13th century we find examples of both conflicts and combinations.

### 2.1 Aristotle

Aristotle does not present an actual theory of self-knowledge. Our interpretation is therefore, as often, gleaned from a handful of passages where side notes and short remarks give us something, but often very little, to run with. I shall not here try to make all the passages involving

some sort of self-knowledge come together into a coherent whole. The focus of this study lies on the medieval commentators' understanding of *De anima* 3.4, and in particular 3.4, 329b5–9 and 429b22–430a9, so that will also be the natural focus of this presentation, while I will also briefly present the other passages that have commonly been associated with self-knowledge. In this section I do not pretend to present any novel solutions to the many long-standing problems.<sup>1</sup> The focus will of course be on *De anima* 3.4, but to be able to discuss the problems of that chapter, it will also be necessary to look to other parts of the work. This section therefore contains three subsections. First I present the main points of sense perception and higher order sense perception before the discussion of intellectual self-knowledge itself. But before getting to that it will also be useful to get an impression of the other passages in the corpus that are generally considered to present some perspective on self-knowledge.<sup>2</sup>

### 2.1.1 Self-knowledge across the *corpus aristotelicum*

The discussion of self-knowledge that seems to resemble most closely the *De anima*-passage is of course the famous discussion of the divine understanding in chapters 7 and 9 of *Metaphysica*. In *Metaphysica* 12.7 Aristotle describes the unmoved mover, the intended solid basis in the causal chain of a world in change. In a longer reflection we see that this mover is eternal, actual, and a substance (ἀίδιον καὶ οὐσία καὶ ἐνέργεια, 1072a25–26), in itself good, sought for, and an object of thought (καλόν; ὀρεκτόν, ἐπιθυμητόν, βουλευτόν; and νοητόν 1072a26–30), moving by being an end but is itself unmoved (1072a30–b14). The activity of that mover consists in an eternal and unchanged state of knowing (νοῦς, θεωρία, 1072b23–24). This characterization includes an analysis of the process of thought where Aristotle explains how the process of knowledge establishes an identity between the knowing subject and the known object. The understanding understands itself by becoming the object of understanding, and in this contact it also itself becomes an object of thought such that the thought and the object are the same.<sup>3</sup> The chapter is of course highly controversial and complex but we will not delve further into its full details and their exegetical intricacies here.<sup>4</sup>

In *Metaphysica* 12.9, 1074b15–75a10 Aristotle picks up the thread from *Metaphysica* 12.7 and discusses some particular problems related to the understanding.<sup>5</sup> Although the chapter may purport to treat νοῦς in general, it is clear that it mostly concerns the divine νοῦς discussed earlier. Aristotle concludes that as it is the most perfect type of being, its essence is a perman-

<sup>1</sup> Crystal (2002: 115–52) presents an extensive and much more detailed reading of the relevant passages that we also touch upon here.

<sup>2</sup> Most of these passages are discussed in Oehler 1974 who focuses on the property of relation in his analysis (cf. also Oehler 1997: 37–75). Shields 2017 provides a more recent overview that approaches the field from an ethical perspective.

<sup>3</sup> Aristotle *Metaph.* 12.7, 1072b20–21.

<sup>4</sup> For starting points, see Laks 2000, Fazzo 2014: 301–343 in particular. Reeve 2000: 149–239 also provides an independent but stimulating treatment of this.

<sup>5</sup> Brunschwig 2000 provides a strong commentary and translation. He conjectures that *Metaphysica* 12.9 is an early draft that is later supplanted by *Metaphysica* 12.7. This is in stark contrast to the unitary reading in Fazzo 2014, another recent commentary.

ent active understanding of understanding, the famously opaque νόησις νόησεως.<sup>6</sup> But this is then challenged by the observation that normally science, sensation, belief and rationality (or maybe discursive thought, διάνοια) are only about them selves as a side effect (παρέργω). This observation seems to be drawn from the non-divine mental activities, as Brunschwig also notes.<sup>7</sup> So the problem of the *aporia* that follows is whether that also applies to the divine state of thinking.

The details of the answer are anything but straight forward.<sup>8</sup> But the general strategy is to say that in some cases of ἐπιστήμη, namely in the theoretical sciences, the *parergon*-model does not apply. In the immaterial theoretical sciences the form, the thing, and the understanding are identical, and the understanding (νόησις) and the object understood (τὸ νοούμενον) are one and the same. When that is the case, the reflexive aspect of the process is not a side-effect (παρέργον). This distinction is based on the human way of understanding, and it could probably be extended to the divine parallel.<sup>9</sup> So as these chapters clearly indicate, there are many connections to be drawn and many distinctions to be made between the workings of human and divine understanding. As the whole following investigation will focus on *De anima* we will see it from that perspective, but a much more extensive analysis of the divine side of things would of course also be possible.<sup>10</sup>

Aside from these references to intellectual self-knowledge we also find a similar strain of reflections on self-knowledge in the ethical works. In fact we find a passage in each of the three ethical works that revolves around this theme, and it generally involves the necessity of friends. In *Ethica Nicomachea* it is argued that as perception includes a sort of perception of that activity, so does thinking include a knowledge of that thinking which further supports the fact that the individual exists. Such self-reflection is deemed a good thing and as something akin to what can be experienced in the identification of oneself with a good friend, friendship among good men must also contribute to happiness.<sup>11</sup> *Ethica Eudemia* has a similar passage amounting to a very similar conclusion, but with what seems to be a stronger affiliation to the model of intellection as identification discussed in *Metaphysica* and *De anima*.<sup>12</sup> Finally there is a very similar section of *Magna Moralia*, where, like in *Ethica Nicomachea* the pleasure of self-knowledge is also emphasized.<sup>13</sup> All three passages have their own particular problems, are similar in many ways and different in different ways which are all too complicated to delve into here.<sup>14</sup> But we notice here that there are structural similarities between self-knowledge and knowledge of others, that self-reflection through friendship brings happiness, and that the knowledge of oneself as a deep self with ethical agency and an extended history is not foreign to Aristotle.

<sup>6</sup> Aristotle *Metaph.* 12.9, 1074b15–35.

<sup>7</sup> Brunschwig 2000: 291.

<sup>8</sup> Aristotle *Metaph.* 12.9, 1074b38–75a5.

<sup>9</sup> Brunschwig 2000: 295–7.

<sup>10</sup> Some starting points in the literature are Menn 2012, M. F. Burnyeat 2008, Caston 1999, Reeve 2000: especially chapters 7 and 8.

<sup>11</sup> Aristotle *EN*, 9.9, 1170a14–b19.

<sup>12</sup> Aristotle *EE*, 7.12, 1244b23–45a10.

<sup>13</sup> Aristotle *MM*, 2.15, especially §§6–8.

<sup>14</sup> For more in this see Shields 2017, Rahman 1981b: 14.

Moving on from *Metaphysica* there are a couple of small side-notes in the *Parva Naturalia* concerning reflexivity. In *De sensu et sensibilibus* he states that no one thing can perceive and be perceived at the same time.<sup>15</sup> But that passage springs from the discussion of the particular phenomenon of a visual impression of light when pressure is applied to the eye in darkness. He thus merely discusses that problem on basis of the mechanics of the eye. There is a similar discussion of reflexivity in *De somno et vigilia* 2, 455a15–22 where the question is raised whether we perceive our perception (seeing, hearing) with the same sense as the one performing the primary act of perception. This is also the subject of the famous passage in *De anima* 3.2, 425b11–25 where the same question is raised.<sup>16</sup>

### 2.1.2 First and second order sense perception

In Aristotelian epistemology sense perception is the starting point of all knowledge. In *De anima* 3.8 this is clearly stated that knowledge is said to depend on the senses through their *phantasmata* in the soul.<sup>17</sup> This is also reflected in the two famous passages of *Analytica posteriora* and *Metaphysica* sketching the process of knowledge acquisition and a corresponding epistemological hierarchy.<sup>18</sup> When a sense impression on an appropriate organ through the appropriate medium occurs, for example redness on the eye-jelly through the air, the sensory organ is affected in such a way that the structure of the relevant form is adopted, which means that the form of red is realized in the organ.<sup>19</sup>

When a form of a perceptible object is realized in one or more sensory organs, the imaginative power (*φαντασία*) may take over.<sup>20</sup> This power is not a type of perception, since it only occurs in some rather than all animals that have sense perception, and unlike perception, it is not contingent upon the presence of an external perceptible object.<sup>21</sup> While the immediate perception always is true, the *φαντασία* can be both true and false. This is so because it involves a judgement of a more general nature than the immediate single perception, namely of which object an immediate perception belongs to (for instance the ball), and because it in-

<sup>15</sup> Aristotle *Sens.* 2.437a23-b10, cf. Yrjönsuuri 2006: 155–6.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. also the note in *Metaph.* 4.5, 1010b35–36. We will get back to the *De anima*-passage below in section 2.1.2 on the facing page, but on this problem a quick reference can be made already here to Corkum 2010, Perälä 2010, Gregoric 2007: especially 174–92, Johansen 2006, Caston 2002, Kosman 1975.

<sup>17</sup> Aristotle *DA*, 3.8, 432a2–10. See also *De memoria et reminiscencia* 1, 449b31–540a13. Boer (2013: 49 n. 11) notices, with reference to Cranefield 1970, the medieval dictum that nothing is in the intellect that has not previously been in the senses (*nihil in intellectu quod non prius in sensu*) is not coined by Aristotle.

<sup>18</sup> Aristotle *APo*, 2.19, 99b34–100a14, Aristotle *Metaph.* 1.1, 980a1–981a1, cf. *APo*, 1.31, 87b28–31.

<sup>19</sup> Aristotle *DA*, 2.5, 417a9–b27, and 2.12, 424a17–b3. What exactly this means and at which stage in the process the physical form of redness disappears is the basis of the famous debate between Sorabji and Myles F. Burnyeat and their respective advocates. See Shields 2016a: supplement 3 and the extended overview in Cohen 1992 and Caston 2005. It all starts with Sorabji 1979 and the counterarguments to that in Myles F. Burnyeat 1992. On the important details of affection see in particular Crystal 2002: 116–23.

<sup>20</sup> This is mostly described in Aristotle *DA*, 3.3.

<sup>21</sup> Aristotle *DA*, 3.3, 427b17–21 and 428a5–10.

volves ascribing qualities that are perceived by several senses to a single object.<sup>22</sup> In this way *phantasia* is an effect of perception, but of a less certain and more comprehensive kind. The content of *phantasia*, the so-called φάντασμα, then carries and preserves the content of the perception in a form that makes it available to the abstract processing of the intellect. It is therefore a basic tenet of the Aristotelian explanation of knowledge acquisition that without *phantasia* and the resulting *phantasma* a material object cannot be known.<sup>23</sup>

The assumed passive nature of sense perception gives rise to a question of whether and how second-order perception is possible.<sup>24</sup> On two critical junctures in his analysis of perception Aristotle feels compelled to take up this problem. As Aristotle starts out the characterization of perception, he quickly raises the *aporia* why there is no perception of the perceptions themselves. Based on the idea that the sense organs are able to receive the form that they perceive, they cannot be that already themselves and must therefore be actualized by an external stimulus that is actualized as that quality.<sup>25</sup> In the very final chapter on sense perception (*De anima* 3.2), when the different aspects of a sensory power have been discussed, Aristotle again takes up the problem, but in a more complex variation. We shall not dive into the extended debate on the passage, but just conclude that according to Aristotle we do perceive that we see and hear, and this cannot be by another higher order sense, as that would involve the risk of an infinite regress, so the sense powers must perceive their own perception (as either their ability or activity of perception, depending on interpretation).<sup>26</sup> From this we see that Aristotle is aware of the potential problem and recognizes higher order perceptual awareness as a phenomenon.

These considerations of bodily self-perception are related to the problems of intellectual self-knowledge, but they do not overlap heavily. The medieval commentators are aware of the structural similarity between sense perception and intellectual activity, but they never hesitate to draw a sharp distinction between them based on the immateriality of the intellect. At the same time a discussion of bodily self-perception is very often to be found in the commentators, and a study of non-intellectual self-knowledge would also benefit from including those treatments. This is however not the purpose of this study, as the focus lies solely on intellectual self-knowledge.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>22</sup> Aristotle *DA*, 3.3, 428b19–25.

<sup>23</sup> Aristotle *DA*, 3.8, 432a2–10 and Aristotle *Mem.* 1, 449b31–540a13 already cited above. This ultra short sketch gives the false impression that we have a simple and uncontroversial Aristotelian set of doctrines on perception. For a more detailed overview, see Shields 2016a: §6, Shields 2016c: xxxiii–xxxix, Caston 2006: 327–35, and for some of the recent deep dives, see Marmodoro 2014, Johansen 2012, Polansky 2007: 323–433, Caston 2009.

<sup>24</sup> This is a hotly debated topic, and I will keep most of the details out of this exposition. For an influential interpretation, see Caston 2002. See also Shields 2016b: 263–74, Gregoric 2007: in particular 174–193, Polansky 2007: 380–402, Johansen 2006, Sisko 2004, Caston 2004.

<sup>25</sup> Aristotle *DA*, 2.5, 417a2–9 and 417a17–18.

<sup>26</sup> See *DA*, 3.2, 425b11–25. Two different but important interpretations are Caston 2002 and Johansen 2006, but see also Perälä 2010 and the above mentioned literature.

<sup>27</sup> I cannot give a full survey of the commentaries treating this, but of the commentaries that I have included here there is relevant material to be found in the following questions: Anonymus Ori-elensis 33 II.52: *Utrum perceptio operationis sensitivae pertineat ad eundem sensum vel ad alium, et hoc est an visus videat se videre*; Anonymus Vaticanus 2170 II II.16–17: *Utrum sensus particularis dir-*

### 2.1.3 Intellectual self-knowledge

As we have seen, the senses require the presence of an external sense stimulus to realize a sense perception. In this section we will see how that is also to some extent the case for intellectual self-knowledge. The treatment of intellectual activity stretches over the chapters 3.4–8, but the first two are most famous, partly because chapter four presents a relatively coherent exposition of the workings of the intellect, partly because of the disputed character of almost every single line of the fifth chapter that expands on the active nature of the intellect. *De anima* 3.6 seems to treat the objects of thought, namely truth and falsity of judgements and how that is related to simplicity and complexity. The two final chapters (3.7–8) contain more or less coherent reflections on perception and intellection, some of a general nature and some more specific. Whereas the two first chapters challenge the interpreter by the opaqueness of the exposition, the final three do so not least due to the fragmentary and doubtful nature of the transmitted text. Let that be the necessary opening *caveat lector* for the following analysis.

Aristotle makes the preliminary assumption in the analysis of intellective activity that it is structurally similar to sensory perception. This assumption leads to the statement that it must be impassible (ἀπαθές) but susceptible to (intelligible) forms without being itself actualized as an intelligible form.<sup>28</sup> The intellect cannot therefore be anything definite before any actual act of intellection. But since the pure potentiality is a requirement for the intellect to reflect on any conceivable thing, it must be wholly immaterial and incorporeal (429a21–24). After a comparison of the intellective power with the powers of sense perception (429a29–b5) Aristotle reflects on two levels of actuality of the intellect and the possibility of intellectual self-knowledge (429b5–10). This is followed by a distinction between the objects of perception and intellection (429b10–22) before two problems concerning the intellect are raised (429b22–4230a2). The latter of those also concerns intellectual self-knowledge.

Aristotle states that the actuality of the intellect when it becomes any given thing is similar to the actuality of one who is ἐπιστήμων, someone who has acquired a knowledge (429b5–7). We have here a hint at the two levels of actuality that is also to be found in other parts of the work. The soul is the actuality of a body capable of being alive in such a way that the living being is able to actualize any of the activities included in that form of life.<sup>29</sup> When any such activity is performed, for instance digesting, sensing or thinking, a second level of actuality is realized. This structure is illustrated in a comparison between having knowledge as being asleep and actualizing that knowledge (θεωρεῖν) as being awake.<sup>30</sup> The idea is further developed in the presentation of perception in *De anima* 2.5, and a further, more basic, level is added: Any living human is a potential knower. Before any knowledge is implanted in her, she has the mental and physical prerequisites of knowing. Through training and teaching, this potential knower comes to possess some knowledge, say of grammar, though she does not

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*ecte suam sensationem percipit* and *Utrum sensus indirecte possit percipere suam sensationem*; Wyle II.32: *Utrum sensus particularis directe cognoscat actionem suam*; Dinsdale II.48: *Utrum sensu particulariter percipimus nos sentire ut visu videre aut sensu aliquo aut sensu communi*; Jandun II.33: *Utrum sensus particularis cognoscat suam propriam operationem ut visus visionem et sic de ceteri*.

<sup>28</sup> Aristotle *DA*, 3.4, 429a15–18.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. Aristotle *DA*, 2.1, 412a27–28.

<sup>30</sup> Aristotle *DA*, 2.1, 412a21–27.

actualize that knowledge all the time. These two are potentially knowing in different ways, as the first only has the potentiality of acquiring knowledge (first potentiality), while the second possesses a knowledge, though without exercising it (first actuality). If she should wish to, she could at any time exercise the dormant knowledge, and in that case she would in the highest degree be actually knowing this particular thing, and this state of exercising knowledge is generally referred to as *θεωρεῖν* (second actuality).<sup>31</sup> The important point is that the knower can still be in a type of potentiality and become actualized when she wants. How is this possible? Because the content of the knowledge is already present in the soul in some sense, it only needs to be put into use. This is the fundamental difference between reason and perception, the independence from external stimuli.<sup>32</sup>

That is the background for one of the central passage of our study:

Whenever then it [i.e. the intellect] becomes every thing in the same way as the knower is said to be in actuality (and this is the case when he is able to exercise it through himself), then it is still in a way in potentiality, but not in the same sense as before learning or discovering; and then it is also able to know itself.

ὅταν δ' οὕτως ἕκαστα γένηται ὡς ὁ ἐπιστήμων λέγεται ὁ κατ' ἐνέργειαν (τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει, ὅταν δύνηται ἐνεργεῖν δι' αὐτοῦ), ἔστι μὲν καὶ τότε δυνάμει πῶς, οὐ μὴν ὁμοίως καὶ πρὶν μαθεῖν ἢ εὐρεῖν· καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ αὐτὸν τότε δύνάται νοεῖν.

Aristotle *DA*, 3.4, 429b5–10

We notice here that the intellect is said to be in actuality in the same way as the knower. And as per the previous discussion Aristotle explains that this is a case of the first actuality, where the knower is able to, but does not yet, exercise his knowledge (*ἐνεργεῖν*). This is at the same time a sort of potentiality from which the intellect is able to actualize the knowledge, to think, but is not yet actively thinking.

It should be noted that the text is disputed. All witnesses to the text agree that the final line (429b9) reads “καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ αὐτὸν τότε δύνάται νοεῖν”, but in 1885 Bywater suggested altering it to “καὶ αὐτὸς δι' αὐτοῦ τότε δύνάται νοεῖν”.<sup>33</sup> This change was motivated by the assumption that if the knower is able to go from potentially to actually exercising his knowledge, so should the intellect be able to move from first to second actuality by its own initiative.<sup>34</sup> Owens opposes this emendation calling for great caution when emending a text to make it “conform to one’s own understanding of the doctrine”, especially so when there has been no reason to challenge the reading in the whole history of the Aristotelian tradition.<sup>35</sup> There may be arguments in favour of both readings, but on the whole I find that Owen presents a very strong case. I therefore prefer here to retain the original reading. I see two compelling reasons for

<sup>31</sup> Aristotle *DA*, 2.5, 417a22–29.

<sup>32</sup> Aristotle *DA*, 2.5, 417b19–25.

<sup>33</sup> Bywater 1885: 40–1.

<sup>34</sup> Ross follows this emendation (cf. his note in the commentary, Ross 1961: 292), while Siwek maintains the transmitted text.

<sup>35</sup> Owens 1976: 111. Kahn (1992: 373) also calls the emendation unnecessary, while according to Miller (2012: 320 and n. 42) it makes good sense and anticipates the following *aporia* at the end. Crystal (2002: 134) follows Ross and Bywater.

that: (1) I find Owens's arguments about the location of the statement in the flow of the text convincing,<sup>36</sup> and (2) throughout the tradition Aristotelian commentators have dealt with and developed their interpretations of the text in that form. So accepting that form in this historical study seems the only reasonable approach.

With the reading “καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ αὐτὸν τότε δύναται νοεῖν” we notice a restriction on the possibility of self-knowledge. The τότε makes the addition on self-knowledge a subjunct phrase of the “ὅταν δ' οὕτως ... ἐνεργεῖν δι' αὐτοῦ)” (429b5–7) in parallel with the preceding phrase “ἔστι μὲν καὶ τότε δυνάμει πως ...” (429b8–9).<sup>37</sup> This means that only once the intellect has been actualized as any given intelligible form, is self-reflection possible. But it is unclear what the δύναται of the phrase means. If we maintain the parallel with the passages on first and second actuality in book two, this seems to imply that the initialization of the intellectual self-reflection relies upon the willful act of the intellect itself.<sup>38</sup> But that raises the question of who or what takes the initiative. I am reluctant to accept that there is here a reference to more than the intellective faculty itself, as we find no indications of that in the context. But we must admit that it is also problematic to ascribe the intellect power of volition, as we risk to ascribe different functions to one power, effectively making it two.

So we might not have an immediate answer to how self-reflection is initialized, but we are also met with further problems about the process of self-knowledge. The intellect (νοῦς) is able to know itself (αὐτὸν νοεῖν). And without speculating about the relation of the use of this term here in comparison with the other places in the corpus, I will just pose a simple question: Does this knowledge include any additional knowledge about the nature of the intellect, its objects, activities, or substance, or does the intellect merely know itself as the actualization of a representation of an external object? Once the intellect has been actualized by any given intelligible form, it becomes that form itself. Then self-reflection is just the act of reflecting on that very form, which it is actualized as at that very moment. In that sense, any and every type of intellectual reflection is also at the same time and by necessity self-reflection, and there is nothing more to it than that. Trying to put more significance into this concept of self-knowledge is then just a conflation of two different types of self-knowledge, namely the more expansive knowledge about the soul as a universal and self-knowledge as knowledge of the particular intellect when it is actualized as, and thereby is, a given form. This reading would solve the problems of volition and initialization of the process, but on the other hand it completely ignores the presence of the δύναται. These are some of the central problems that we will also find in the history of the Aristotelian tradition on this passage.

After a section on the objects of intellectual knowledge as opposed the objects of perception,<sup>39</sup> Aristotle concludes the chapter by presenting and (possibly) solving two objections to the model of the intellect that he has presented thus far. First he asks (429b22–26): If the intellect is completely impassible, and knowing is a type of reception, change or affection (πάσχειν),

<sup>36</sup> Owens 1976: 111–5.

<sup>37</sup> Owens (1976: 112–3) also argues that the parallel in syntax supports maintaining the transmitted reading.

<sup>38</sup> The expressions just mentioned are “βουληθεῖς δυνατὸς θεωρεῖν” (2.5, 417a27) and “ὅποταν βούληται” (2.5, 417b24).

<sup>39</sup> Aristotle *DA*, 3.4, 429b10–22. On this, see for instance Frede 2008.

how can it even know anything? Secondly he asks whether the intellect itself is an object of knowledge, that is, is it intelligible? For if it is intelligible in itself (essentially), it might then mean that all intelligible objects are able to reason. The reasoning here seems to be that if every  $\nu\omicron\zeta$  is  $\nu\omicron\eta\rho\acute{o}\varsigma$ , then all that is  $\nu\omicron\eta\rho\acute{o}\varsigma$  is also  $\nu\omicron\zeta$ , since those two are one in form. On the other hand, if it is intelligible by something being added to it, then it is not wholly unmixed and potential (429b24–29).

Aristotle seems to dispense with the first challenge by maintaining the impassibility of the intellect and hold that the change it undergoes is non-destructive. He explains that the intellect receives the forms in the same way as a tablet when you write on it (429b29–30a2), and although it is not further expanded, this may just mean that no qualities are lost or destroyed, but some potential merely actualized. The solution to the other objection (430a2–7) rests on a distinction between how material and immaterial objects are understood. In the case of immaterial objects of knowledge there is an identity between the knowing subject and the known object, but in the case of the material objects of knowledge, the intellect is only each of those potentially (until it receives one of them and becomes actualized). This identity is just what we saw above, that when the intellect becomes actualized as a given form, it is then able to know it. In this way an identity between the subject and object is established. Finally, he explains that the material intelligible objects do not have  $\nu\omicron\zeta$  themselves because he has made it an essential characteristic of  $\nu\omicron\zeta$  to be all things potentially, and that cannot be the case for any materially dependent object (430a7–9).

This final solution establishes two things. The material objects of reason do not have  $\nu\omicron\zeta$ , since they do not possess a power that is completely indeterminate and capable of immaterial formal reception. And the knowledge of immaterial objects of reason establishes a complete identity between the knowing subject and the known object. But we are still left none the wiser, as the question about the content of the self-knowledge still remains. Does this merely mean that the self-knowledge is nothing more than knowledge of the external object, once the intellect itself is actualized as such? Or does it mean that the intellect is able to engage in reflection on itself as an activity separate from the reception of an external form? If we answer affirmatively to the first question, then that “self-knowledge” is very thin or entirely vacuous.<sup>40</sup> But if the intellect is able to engage in self-knowledge as a separate activity, how does that take place, is it a discursive process, and does it require any further input or knowledge?

An extended analysis and discussion of the problems of this passage is to be found in Gregoric and Pfeiffer 2015, who also emphasize the point that the *aporia* is not about self-knowledge, but about the intelligibility of the intellect. They present a deep discussion of the problems of the passage that, in many respects, would not have been foreign to the medieval commentators. But they do however maintain that the intellect cannot only be known reflexively, and that the passage here does not concern itself with reflexivity at all. That line of argument might appeal to some medieval commentators, and some might even bid it welcome. When you struggle to find a good way to acquire knowledge about the intellect that does not involve or require introspection an approach that emphasizes reciprocal intelligibility

<sup>40</sup> Crystal (2002) argues for this interpretation. He does not consider the passage in 3.4, 429b5–9 to be about self-knowledge, so he does not have to worry about the problem of  $\delta\acute{\upsilon}\nu\alpha\tau\alpha\iota$  mentioned above on the preceding page.

of even the intellect may be very useful. Other commentators would reject the idea as outright impossible.<sup>41</sup>

I have here presented the two central passages on intellectual self-knowledge in *De anima*. They will be the focus of the analysis of these problems in the commentary tradition. We have seen how the basic model of formal assimilation in sense perception is also taken to describe the process of intellectual activity. In the context of sense perception Aristotle is sensitive to the problem of higher-order awareness, and he maintains the necessity of a distinction between subject and object, and the requirement of a distinction between those two, should be maintained insofar as possible. In the domain of intellectual self-knowledge we have seen how problems arise when both the subject and object of the activity are immaterial. The interpretation of the passages in chapter 3.4 on self-knowledge has shown that it is difficult to reach an indisputable conclusion with the notes Aristotle leaves us with. We are left with the question whether all we have is a deflationary view where the imagined self-knowledge has no real content aside from that of an external object, or whether self-knowledge of this sort may actually provide us with any positive content about the intellect (or maybe the soul) itself. It is also still unclear how the process is initialized, and whether it is always already actualized during any reflection on external objects. As we will see in the following sections and the rest of this study, these are also the main questions that make their way up through the tradition.

## 2.2 The Late Ancient commentaries on Aristotle

The Late Ancient Aristotelian commentators do not generally play a prominent role as direct doctrinal inspiration in the medieval discussion of self-knowledge.<sup>42</sup> Occasional references to Themistius and Simplicius do occur, while references to Alexander are rare. Themistius is for example occasionally invoked in prefatory passages for the statement that knowledge about the soul ought to help us acquire knowledge about the remaining universe, or even that lacking knowledge about the soul would be unseemly (*turpe*) when we know so many other things.<sup>43</sup> But although the Ancient commentators' direct influence is negligible, a short presentation of their position on intellectual self-knowledge is nonetheless warranted as they play a role through the adaptation or discussion of their doctrines in Averroes. The focus of this section is more determined by genre than doctrine. I will present the basic position of Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius, Ps.-Simplicius and Philoponus on intellectual self-knowledge. These authors straddle the divide between the Peripatetic and Neo-Platonic categories, but they are

<sup>41</sup> We will get back to some of these problems in section 4.4.2 on page 151.

<sup>42</sup> Kessler 2011: 17–18 also notes this.

<sup>43</sup> Faversham prologue (e.g. Vat. Lat. 2170: 63ra); Burley prologue (e.g. Vat. Lat. 2151: 1ra); Anonymus Chasselenensis f. 104r (quoted as the *motto* of the introduction to this study), cf. some later commentaries such as Anonymus Gandersheim prologue, and Lindor prologue. It goes back to Themistius *Paraphr. DA*, 1.26–2.7, cf. Themistius Latinus *Paraphr. DA*, 2.31–3.40. Hasse (2000: 13–4) finds this sentiment in the same prefatory context in Gundissalinus *De anima*, 31.6 and thinks that he is inspired by medieval authors who also present the idea (Cassiodorus I.534, Alcuin 639 and Ps.-Augustine *De spiritu et anima*, 779).

included here to the extent that their doctrines are relevant to the subject of intellectual self-knowledge.<sup>44</sup>

When we first look to Alexander, it is important to note that we do not have a commentary on *De anima* from his hand, but his own *De anima*, a more independent treatise that partially mirrors the structure of Aristotle's *De anima*, provides ample material for analysing his position on the subject.<sup>45</sup> It has also been argued that Alexander's *De anima* is based on his commentary of Aristotle's text.<sup>46</sup> Aside from that we have the so-called *De anima mantissa* (titled by J. Freudenthal and accepted by the editor Bruns, also occasionally referred to as the second book of *De anima*). Doctrinal differences between the two texts have led to a range of suggestions: The ascription to Alexander has been rejected,<sup>47</sup> to consider it a revised and reworked version of the material from *De anima*,<sup>48</sup> or to let it precede that work as a product of his youth.<sup>49</sup> With this spectrum of interpretations of *De anima mantissa*, we will here restrict ourselves to just his *De anima*.

After a discussion of the so-called material and habitual intellect (νοῦς ὑλικός and νοῦς ἐν ἑξεί), Alexander presents a discussion of intellectual self-knowledge that seems to clear up some of the ambiguous details of Aristotle's exposition.<sup>50</sup> Alexander generally follows the structure of Aristotle's *De anima* in this part of the treatise, and in the passage that is parallel to 3.4, 429b5–10 he pauses at the process and mechanics of self-knowledge of the habitual intellect. The habitual intellect is the intellect that contains representations of objects of perception and thought. It is able to think on its own accord and grasp intelligible forms in themselves, but it is also able to reflect on itself.<sup>51</sup> The habitual intellect must be a form, he says, since it becomes that which it thinks, and it thinks of forms. And if it thinks of forms and is itself a form, it must be able to think of itself.<sup>52</sup> The process of knowing then involves two aspects: The principle of formal adaptation in thinking means that the knowing subject primarily and in itself (προηγούμενως μὲν καὶ καθ' αὐτόν) becomes the form which it knows. But it also, accidentally (συμβεβηκός δέ), thinks of itself, as it belongs to it to become that which it thinks, as long as it thinks it. Before thinking is actualized, the subject and object of thought are different from each other and relative to each other, but during the activity of intellection their relation is dissolved and they are formally identical. This identity means that the intellect also clearly thinks of itself, when it thinks of its primary object of knowledge, for it becomes

<sup>44</sup> For a recent, short, and informative introduction, see Tuominen 2009: 18–40. We will not touch on reflexivity in perception in the commentators (or the following tradition in general), but see Tuominen 2009: 179–82 and Caston 2012a.

<sup>45</sup> Caston 2012b: 2–3.

<sup>46</sup> Accattino and Donini 1996: vii–x.

<sup>47</sup> Moraux 1942, see also discussion in Schroeder and Todd 1990: 6–22 (who also rejects it as a derivative work).

<sup>48</sup> Bazán 1973.

<sup>49</sup> Donini 1974: 59–62, accepted by Sharples 2008: 2.

<sup>50</sup> Alexander of Aphrodisias *DA*, 84.21–86.5, 89.9–23. On the thorny problems of his model of the intellect, see the short presentation in Tuominen 2009: 192–4, but also Sharples 2010: 152–4, Tuominen 2010, Sorabji 2005a: 104, Schroeder and Todd 1990: 6–22.

<sup>51</sup> Alexander of Aphrodisias *DA*, 86.14–18, virtually parallel with Aristotle *DA*, 3.4, 429b5–9.

<sup>52</sup> Alexander of Aphrodisias *DA*, 86.18–20.

itself that which it thinks.<sup>53</sup> The central point to notice here is how the whole explanation of intellectual self-knowledge relies on the principle of formal assimilation between subject and object. Alexander also highlights a structural parallel between science and intellect: As a science (ἐπιστήμη) and that which it is a science about are identical, so are the intellect and that which it knows.<sup>54</sup> It follows straight from these statements that any and every act of thinking also at the same time involves a type of self-knowledge. But from this also follows the proviso that the self is exactly identical with the object of thought at that very instance, and nothing more. This clearly leaves us with a very thin concept of self.<sup>55</sup> Alexander is aware of this, as he emphasizes those very characteristics in his description of the separate intellect which is thought and self-intellection because of this identity structure.<sup>56</sup>

When we look at the first proper commentary on *De anima* that we have, written by Themistius, we find a different composition of intellects. He argues that the productive intellect is present in each individual and adds an additional perishable passive intellect that is closely connected to the body to maintain the immortality of the potential intellect.<sup>57</sup> But in spite of those differences his presentation of intellectual self-knowledge is strikingly similar to Alexander's. In his parallel to *De anima* 4.3.429b5–9 he fleshes out a state of the potential intellect where it becomes able to distinguish general from particular and likens this stage to someone who has acquired knowledge but not yet actualized it. At this stage it is also able to think of itself. The intellect is nothing but the thoughts (νοήματα), so as it becomes the same as that which it thinks of, it also at the same time thinks of itself.<sup>58</sup> Just like Alexander, he also draws up the analogous structure between the intellect and its thoughts in reference to the science (ἐπιστήμη) and its subject matter.<sup>59</sup>

The paraphrase that has been attributed to Simplicius (who we will cautiously call Ps.-Simplicius) presents a radically different picture.<sup>60</sup> This lemma-based commentary offers a much more elaborate exposition, adding a lot of material of a more or less clear Neo-Platonic bend. After taking the discussion in 3.4, 429b5–9 about primary and secondary actuality to a whole new speculative level, so to speak, he gives an exposition of how the intellect knows itself. And here Ps.-Simplicius breaks decisively and explicitly with the Alexandrian interpretation we have just seen: The intellect does not think of itself accidentally as an epiphenomenon following from the identity structure of intellect and intelligible object, but it also thinks itself primarily.<sup>61</sup> His reasons for this attack on the epiphenomenal interpretation might raise some

<sup>53</sup> Alexander of Aphrodisias *DA*, 86.20–29.

<sup>54</sup> Alexander of Aphrodisias *DA*, 89.21–90.2, harking back to Aristotle *DA*, 3.4.430a2–5.

<sup>55</sup> Sorabji (2005a: 136) very fittingly presents these passages under the heading “Self-awareness as contentless” in his sourcebook.

<sup>56</sup> Alexander of Aphrodisias *DA*, 88.3–10, 89.21–90.2.

<sup>57</sup> Productive intellect: Themistius *Paraphr. DA*, 102.30–103.19; Passive intellect: Themistius *Paraphr. DA*, 105.13–33. Schroeder and Todd 1990: 35–9 and Kupreeva 2010: 408–11 are excellent starting points for the problems and literature surrounding his noetics.

<sup>58</sup> Themistius *Paraphr. DA*, 95.10–23 (= Themistius Latinus *Paraphr. DA*, 216.40–217.56), cf. Themistius *Paraphr. DA*, 97.29–98.9 (= Themistius Latinus *Paraphr. DA*, 222.59–223.75).

<sup>59</sup> Themistius *Paraphr. DA*, 95.23–32 (= Themistius Latinus *Paraphr. DA*, 217.56–218.65).

<sup>60</sup> On the authorial question, see Tuominen 2009: 35–6 and Blumenthal 2000: 1–9.

<sup>61</sup> Ps.-Simplicius *In DA*, 230.11–14.

eyebrows. For how, he continues, should Alexander or we be able to write about the intellect, when it does not know itself and its own thinking, life, and substance?<sup>62</sup> So he basically asks: How can we have a universal and substantial science about the intellect, if intellectual self-knowledge is only of the accidental kind that is void of content? This question is not raised by neither Alexander nor Themistius, so this is the first time that such problems are presented in a commentary on this part of *De anima*. When we look at his treatment of the *aporiai* closing chapter four of *De anima*, we find a remarkable characterization of the intellect.<sup>63</sup> In his answer to the second *aporia*, on the intelligibility of the intellect, he emphasizes that the ability to think itself rests wholly with the intellect itself, when it is at the first level of actuality, when the intellect has acquired some intellectual content but is not yet actively thinking of it. The intellect is able, he says, not only to initialize reflection on the external object of thought but also on itself. This is the characteristic ability of the intellect, to think of itself and initialize thought.<sup>64</sup> When he moves self-knowledge to the front and center of the activity of the intellect in this way, it is clear how he must reject the epiphenomenal interpretation of Alexander. This focus on the necessity and priority of an essential and immediate intellectual self-knowledge is a decidedly Neo-Platonic trait.<sup>65</sup>

Finally, when we come to Philoponus's *De intellectu*, we return to the epiphenomenal interpretation that is now well known to us.<sup>66</sup> The text is a lemma-based commentary on *De anima* 3.4–8, and his exposition of 3.4, 429b5–9 is quite clear: When the intellect becomes that which it knows, then clearly whenever the intellect thinks, it thinks itself.<sup>67</sup> He emphasizes the connection between the principle of formal identity and the subsequent, necessary, self-knowledge, and he also draws the same parallel between science and that which is known in relation to intellect and its intelligible objects.<sup>68</sup> That the self-knowledge is contentless is also strongly implied by his explication of the impossibility of thinking multiple things at once.<sup>69</sup> He even extends the analysis with an explanation of how this does not mean that opposite properties are ascribed to the same thing at the same time, as they are not ascribed in the same way. When the intellect knows its objects, it itself becomes those objects as a consequence of the primary act of knowing, and hence it only knows itself accidentally. He presents the following distinction: By itself (*secundum se*) it knows its external objects because the principle of formal assimilation is characteristic to the intellect, but it is not by itself, as intellect, that it knows itself, but because it is also intelligible (*viz.* after the formal assimilation).<sup>70</sup>

<sup>62</sup> Ps.-Simplicius *In DA*, 230.14–16.

<sup>63</sup> The author's reflections on the perfection are tangentially relevant to this question, but too complex to delve into here. See Ps.-Simplicius *In DA*, 229.1–230.10, 234.20–235.10 and 235.32–236.32.

<sup>64</sup> Ps.-Simplicius *In DA*, 236.18–19.

<sup>65</sup> Ps.-Simplicius *In DA*, 236.32–238.41 shows some of the philosophical consequences of this.

<sup>66</sup> Note that the commentary on book three of *De anima* attributed to Philoponus in *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca* is spurious, while the so-called *De intellectu*, which is only transmitted in Moerbeke's Latin translation, generally is accepted as his work.

<sup>67</sup> Philoponus *De intellectu*, 21.00–21.2: "Si igitur intellectus est quae intelliguntur, merito utique intellectus intelligens se ipsum intelligit."

<sup>68</sup> Philoponus *De intellectu*, 20.90–21.00

<sup>69</sup> Philoponus *De intellectu*, 21.99, cf. 19.53.

<sup>70</sup> Philoponus *De intellectu*, 21.3–18.

To sum up this section we see three of the four central ancient commentators, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius and Philoponus, present an interpretation where intellectual self-knowledge is nothing more than an epiphenomenon that attends any and every act of knowing an external object, but itself void of any content. We can even recognize some basic shared points among the three, namely the accidental nature of this self-knowledge and the parallel structure of identity between science and its object in comparison with intellect and its intelligible objects. As we have traced the commentaries here, Alexander makes the intellectual self-knowledge explicitly accidental, where Aristotle is very vague on that point, while the comparison with science also can be found in Aristotle. Philoponus also adds a discussion about how the identity of knower and known does not violate the principle of non-contradiction. In direct and explicit opposition to this we find Ps.-Simplicius. He denies that the self-knowledge is accidental and highlights that very ability of the intellect to reflect on itself as its central characteristic. This doctrine aligns him well with the general Neo-Platonic affiliation that is apparent in that commentary.

### 2.3 Outside the Aristotelian tradition

In the Middle Platonic and Neo-Platonic traditions we see a merging of Peripatetic and Platonic material in a way that cannot be found in the preceding traditions. The texts of Aristotle are a central part of the curriculum in a Platonic context, and this is also reflected in their doctrines. For instance, Alcinous' identification of the activity of the highest metaphysical principle with self-thinking seems heavily inspired by Aristotle's νόησις νοήσεως in *Metaphysica* 12.<sup>71</sup> Furthermore, the concept of self-knowledge and self-reflection is fundamental in this tradition. This makes the whole doctrine exceedingly complex, and sorting out the details of influence and development lies well beyond the scope of this dissertation.<sup>72</sup> We will therefore just highlight the two most important sources for intellectual self-knowledge in the middle ages, *Liber de causis* and Augustine, with a short sketch of their common central starting point, the Plotinian psycho-metaphysics.

With reference to Plotinus we just need to know that in his hierarchy of being the first hypostasis, which immediately springs from the One, is νοῦς, consciousness or intellect. In this noetic consciousness, whose prime and essential activity is intellection, the relation between thinking and thought, subject and object, is central, and the concept of essential and immediate self-knowledge of the whole intellect by the whole intellect lies at the heart of this process. This activity involves a looking back (ἐπιστροφή) on the origin of the intellect to get an insight into its cause and hence itself. This self-reflection and simultaneous look for one's own cause cascade down through the hypostases resulting in a similar tendency in the human soul to be able to reflect directly on itself.<sup>73</sup>

<sup>71</sup> Sharples 2010: 151.

<sup>72</sup> For a recent extensive study of this material, I refer to Perkams 2008.

<sup>73</sup> Plotinus *Enneades*, 5.3 is the core text on this (Sorabji 2005b: 139–42 is also useful). Particularly interesting are also Emilsson 2007: especially 107–23, 141–65, and 207–15 and Crystal 1998, but see also Aubry 2014 and O'Meara 2010: 306–18.

*Liber de causis* is a text with a convoluted, but well traced, history. It is written in 9th century Baghdad based on Proclus' *Elementatio Theologica*, originally titled *Kitāb al-Īdāh li-Aristūṭālīs fī al-khayr al-maḥd*, which should be translated into *The book of Aristotle's explanation of the pure good*. It was translated into Latin by Gerard of Cremona in the 12th century and is preserved in more than 237 manuscripts. We know of 31 commentaries to the text. In the middle ages it was attributed to Aristotle until 1272 where Aquinas, by the aid of William of Moerbeke's recent translation of Proclus' *Elementatio Theologica*, established that it was actually based heavily on that.<sup>74</sup> But at that time it had already become a foundational text. The many transmitted witnesses are of course a testament to that fact, but this is also apparent from fairly regular references to the text in *De anima*-commentaries.<sup>75</sup> The Latin translation has been edited by Pattin with an extensive list of textual corrections by Taylor.<sup>76</sup>

The text is structured as 219 more or less aphoristic statements sorted into 32 sections or *propositiones* of related groups. This makes the text a treasure trove of poignant Neo-Platonic sentiments for any occasion. But it also means that it is easier to identify a general theme than a sustained argument in the text.<sup>77</sup> The first *propositiones* introduce the first causes, the highest levels of being and intellect (I–IX), followed by the world of ideas and emanation of forms (X–XIII), before we focus on the soul in XIV–XV. Any being that knows itself (*viz.* all intellects above and including the human), we are there told, knows its own essence by a complete return to that essence.<sup>78</sup> This self-reflection is part of the process of intellection where the identity between known object and knowing subject is realized, but this does not mean that the self-knowing substance depends on external objects. The self-knowing return to its own essence (*reditio substantiae ad essentiam suam*) is based on the self-sufficiency and self-subsistence of the simple substance that an intellect is.<sup>79</sup>

When we move on to Augustine, his connections to the Neo-Platonic tradition are immediately apparent. Just like his predecessors he places self-knowledge front and center in his description of the human being, which is a structural mirror image of the divine order.<sup>80</sup> As we focus on the human condition here, we will only include his *De trinitate* whose whole second part could be considered an extensive philosophical anthropology with a strong psychological bend. His focus is not as narrowly on intellect but on the more general *mens*, which often

<sup>74</sup> On these details and a host of further literature, see in particular Calma 2016b: 11–5 which also includes an overview of the commentaries.

<sup>75</sup> Cf. also Schönberger 2003: ix–x.

<sup>76</sup> Pattin 1967, Taylor 1989. The Latin text of the parallel translation in Schönfeld 2003 includes Taylor's suggested improvements.

<sup>77</sup> Taylor 1992: 20–1, cf. generally Schönfeld 2003.

<sup>78</sup> Anonymus *Liber de causis*, 15.124: "Omnis sciens qui scit essentiam suam est rediens ad essentiam suam reditione completa."

<sup>79</sup> Anonymus *Liber de causis*, 15.128: "Et non significo per reditionem substantiae ad essentiam suam, nisi quia est stans, fixa per se, non indigens in sui fixatione et sui essentia re alia rigente ipsam, quoniam est substantia simplex, sufficiens per seipsam." Against this Kaukua (2015: 16–7) seems to consider this self-knowledge derivative of and contingent upon knowledge of external objects, and thus comparable with the Aristotelian model.

<sup>80</sup> On this subject Booth 1977, Booth 1978, Booth 1979 is particularly stimulating. See also Cory 2014: 18–22, Gioia 2008: 190–218, Sorabji 2006: 212–6, Boulnois 1999: 160–4.

finds a good translation in *mind*. This attention to the human psychology in a work of Trinitarian theology springs from the interpretation of the less well known through inspection of something more well known and analogous, in this case the human nature as an *imago Dei*.<sup>81</sup>

In book 8 we find arguments to the effect that knowledge about the mind is based on our own internal and immediate experience of our own mind. From there we can apparently extrapolate the existence of other minds.<sup>82</sup> This imports the idea of the natural, credible, and direct access of the mind to itself, which is explicated in an often quoted passage in book 9 where Augustine states that just as the mind acquires knowledge about perceptible objects through sense perception, it acquires knowledge about incorporeals through itself, and that it therefore knows itself by itself because it is incorporeal.<sup>83</sup> The ontological equality of mind with itself means that its self-knowledge is complete in a knowledge that is co-extensive with its being, which means that nothing is hidden or opaque to the mind's eye in its self-reflection.<sup>84</sup> Book 10 presents us with a longer meditation on the mind's way to knowledge of itself, a knowledge that covers the whole essence of the soul (or mind) wholly through its own being.<sup>85</sup> There is thus in principle nothing of the mind that is inaccessible to the mind itself, but finding this self-gaze can be challenged by the impediments of mental images and sense impressions.<sup>86</sup> Fortunately, such impediments can be overcome, and the bond that the bodily constitution lays on the soul can be broken. The mind can then also attain complete self-knowledge through self-presence, as it knows itself as soon as it understands the concepts 'know' and 'self'.<sup>87</sup> This sort of self-knowledge is neither accidental nor partial: The self-knowledge of the mind is complete knowledge of its own essence.<sup>88</sup> Gioia even endeavours to interpret these and similar passages to attest that the mind essentially is self-knowledge.<sup>89</sup>

Other things, such as the so-called Augustinian *cogito*, that the mind concludes its own existence from its ability to live, think, know, judge and other activities, are also often mentioned in this connection.<sup>90</sup> We also find a distinction between *se nosse*, as the continuous, transparent and indisputable self-identification based on the mere self-presence of the soul to itself, and *se cogitare* as a discursive reflection over one's own being.<sup>91</sup> But without diving deeper into this it should be quite clear how we find the idea of substantial and immediate self-knowledge as a very central motif in the psychology of Augustine.

This short section on self-knowledge outside the Aristotelian tradition has highlighted one

<sup>81</sup> Augustine *Trin.* 9.12.17.

<sup>82</sup> Augustine *Trin.* 8.6.9.

<sup>83</sup> Augustine *Trin.* 9.3.3: "Ergo et se ipsam per se ipsam nouit quoniam est incorporea."

<sup>84</sup> Augustine *Trin.* 9.11.16, Augustine *Trin.* 10.4.6.

<sup>85</sup> Augustine *Trin.* 10.3.5–5.7.

<sup>86</sup> Augustine *Trin.* 10.8.11

<sup>87</sup> Augustine *Trin.* 10.9.12 and 10.6.8.

<sup>88</sup> Augustine *Trin.* 10.10.16: "Quapropter dum se mens nouit substantiam suam nouit, et cum de se certa est de substantia sua certa est". In Augustine *Trin.* 10.10.13–16 he argues that this knowledge makes it possible to conclude that the mind is also immaterial, cf. Nawar 2016.

<sup>89</sup> Gioia 2008: 206–7.

<sup>90</sup> Augustine *Trin.* 10.10.14, Augustine 11.26, cf. Matthews 1992, but also Sorabji 2006: 217–21, Matthews 2002: xxvi–xxix, Boulnois 1999: 166 n. 6.

<sup>91</sup> Cory 2014: 20–2, Sorabji 2006: 216–7.

dominant and general trend: The soul, mind, or intellect knows itself directly and essentially. This self-knowledge is part of the essence of the intellect and cannot therefore be separated from its existence, nor does it depend on any external stimuli in its realization. The metaphysical basis of this doctrine is most extensively formulated by Plotinus. We have focused on two applications of that in *Liber de causis* and Augustine's *De trinitate*. In both texts we find an emphasis on the immediate availability and transparency of the soul, mind, or intellect to itself. As we will see in the subsequent sections and chapters, these ideas will have a tremendous influence on the debate concerning self-knowledge.

## 2.4 The Arabic influence: Avicenna and Averroes

In this section I will cover two different types of texts, represented by the two epitomes of Arabic philosophy in the middle ages, Averroes and Avicenna.<sup>92</sup> In Averroes, the Commentator *par excellence* in the medieval tradition, we find the proper Aristotelian commentary while Avicenna presents us with a version of the more independent genre of treatises on the soul. Although only Averroes is a commentator in the strict sense, it is important to note that all Arabic philosophers take part in the Aristotelian tradition (albeit at varying degrees), as Aristotle is one of their main philosophical masters and inspirations and several works of the Greek commentators were available to them.<sup>93</sup> As with the other sections of this chapter, I will only present a cursory overview of the positions on self-knowledge to the extent that it is relevant to my general exposition.<sup>94</sup>

Although it has been argued that Avicenna (980–1037) is a Peripatetic philosopher at his core, the function and understanding of self-knowledge that we find in him differs markedly from what we have observed in some of the late ancient Peripatetics.<sup>95</sup> We find that expressed in two central notions of his: The famous idea of the so-called flying or floating man which presents an idea of non-conscious self-knowledge, and a more reflexive self-knowledge arising from knowledge of external objects. Avicenna concludes the introductory chapter of his *De anima* by invoking a metaphor to illustrate that the soul is an immaterial substance.<sup>96</sup> Imagine a man suspended in a void who receives no perceptual impressions at all and has no experience of his limbs or body. Would he still know that he exists? Avicenna postulates that he would readily accept his own existence, but not that it is physical, as he has no impression of any physical nature, nor that physical properties are necessary to his existence.<sup>97</sup> This is presented

<sup>92</sup> Respectively Ibn Rushd and Ibn Sīnā in Arabic. As the focus of this dissertation is their reception in the Latin middle ages, I will refer to them by the names known to their Latin readers and their texts in the Latin translations.

<sup>93</sup> Ivry 2012: 1, cf. Peters 1968: 40–5, with reference to the philosophy of mind.

<sup>94</sup> A good place to start on the intellect in the Arabic tradition more generally are Black 2010, Black 2005, Davidson 1992.

<sup>95</sup> On Avicenna as a Peripatetic philosopher, see Gutas 2014. For a discussion on the scholarship of Avicennian noetics, see also Alpina 2014: 131–42.

<sup>96</sup> The literature on the flying man is of course vast. A relevant selection: Kaukua 2015: 12–103, Toivanen 2015, Cory 2014: 24–6, Black 2008, Hasse 2000: 80–91, Marmura 1986.

<sup>97</sup> Avicenna *De anima*, 36.49–37.65.

as an illustration rather than a proof with the purpose of elucidating the ontological nature of the soul as more than just the form of the physical body.<sup>98</sup> But this is done by arguing that even robbed of any perceptual input the individual would still be able to perceive her own essence or self (the Arabic *dhat* is ambiguous, in the Latin translation we find *essentia*).<sup>99</sup> Although the details of this may be contested, we do find here a testament of an essential and direct positive cognition of the soul, which is completely independent of perceptual inputs. Looking to the final and fifth part of Avicenna's *De anima* we also find an extended argument in support of immediate self-knowledge as something independent of any external instrument or stimulation.<sup>100</sup> In the later text transmitted under the title *Notes (Ta'liqāt)* we find a long discussion of self-awareness that is more complex, including both a primitive self-awareness and higher-order self-knowledge of the state and content of the intellect.<sup>101</sup> Although that is interesting, we must here maintain that the immediate, primitive, and constitutive type of self-awareness outlined above is the only one we have found to have just a slight influence in the included commentaries of this study.

In Averroes's *Long commentary to Aristotle's De anima* we find a completely different picture. Although Avicenna might have a Peripatetic foundation to his philosophy, Averroes is much more heavily bound to the Aristotelian text. This is immediately confirmed in his commentary.<sup>102</sup> In his interpretation of the *De anima* passage, Averroes is very clear about the process: When the intellect has come into the state of first actuality, it will know itself, as it is itself just the form of the things which it abstract from matter.<sup>103</sup> Again, this is all based on the principle of formal identification between intellect and intelligible object.<sup>104</sup> With a reference to Alexander he identifies this self-knowledge as accidental in opposition to the abstract forms, *viz.* the immaterial intelligences, who know themselves essentially due to the inherent identity between subject and object.<sup>105</sup> So far this is an interpretation closely aligned with the tradition from Alexander.

But he says that he also can interpret this in accordance with al-Fārābī. The intellect becomes an entity in itself ("erit unum entium") when it is actualized, and can therefore know itself by the content that it abstracts from itself insofar as it abstracts content from things that are outside the soul.<sup>106</sup> Although Averroes does not clearly acknowledge it, there is reason to

<sup>98</sup> On the nature and purpose of the passage, see e.g. Kaukua 2015: 32–4, Toivanen 2015: 66–7.

<sup>99</sup> Toivanen (2015: 67) argues for maintaining the ambiguity, Hasse (2000: 87–9) reads 'essence', Black (2008: 64–5) and Kaukua (2015: 36, and 39–42) read 'self'.

<sup>100</sup> Avicenna *De anima*, 93.60–98.45.

<sup>101</sup> Kaukua 2015: 52–4 translates and discusses a long relevant passage (see in particular the section [b]), cf. Black 2005: 64–78, along with Avicenna *De anima*, 98.65–68 and Avicenna 35.8–11. Black (2008: 78–9) traces this higher-order knowledge as a sort of certitude back to al-Fārābī. On the *Notes*, see Gutas 2014: 160–4.

<sup>102</sup> We focus here solely on the long commentary on *De anima*, as that is what our medieval readers of the 13th and 14th century knew.

<sup>103</sup> Averroes 1953: III com. 8, 420.19–21: "Idest, et cum intellectus fuerit in hac dispositione, tunc intelliget se secundum quod ipse non est aliud nisi forme rerum, in quantum extrahit eas a materia."

<sup>104</sup> For an extensive treatment of this, see Black 1999.

<sup>105</sup> Averroes *In DA*, 420.22–29.

<sup>106</sup> Averroes *In DA*, bk. III, com. 8, p. 420.29–35. Reference to al-Fārābī §§15–16, pp. 72–73.

consider this a different sort of self-knowledge. To say that when the intellect is actualized, and thus becomes a determinate entity, it can reflect on itself as if it was an extra-mental entity, sounds very much like a non-accidental, direct or attentive form of self-knowledge, as the intellect itself then becomes the primary object of reflection. He closes the section with the remark that he will later discuss whether this is possible.<sup>107</sup> When he gets to the final *aporia* in *De anima* 3.4, 430a2–9 he considers it to be concerned with whether knowledge about the intellect is acquired through itself or by the external object that actualizes it. When Aristotle says that the intellect is intelligible in the same way as other intelligible things, Averroes takes this to mean that the intellect is known through its external objects.<sup>108</sup> This indicates that he actually accepts that it should be possible to acquire knowledge about the intellect at the level of second potentiality. This means that when the intellect is actualized by some external object, it is possible to consider that actualized intellect as an intelligible object in its own right.<sup>109</sup> Although this may be a question of nuance, it is not necessarily the same contentless self-knowledge that can be found in Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius and Philoponus.

Avicenna and Averroes are among the most important influences in the Latin tradition and by far the most important voices from the Arabic tradition. Between them they represent two different positions of self-knowledge. In Avicenna we find a selection of different ideas, but the dominant, if not only, position in the Latin reception of him is the idea that the soul as a separate and immaterial substance has immediate and essential knowledge of itself. In Averroes we first see a very limited, Alexandrian, interpretation of self-knowledge where any act of intellection entails a concomitant but void self-knowledge. But his discussion develops into a position where self-knowledge is still dependent on knowledge of external objects, but which also allows for some positive content about the intellect itself. On that position the intellect is able to move its attention to itself and become its own object of knowledge, once it is actualized by a primary object of knowledge.

## 2.5 Latin tradition through Albert the Great

*De anima* is introduced as curriculum material in Paris in 1252 along with the *logica vetus* and *nova*.<sup>110</sup> But we also find Latin texts dealing with the soul before that demarcation point. Some of them are independent treatises (often called *tractatus*) that pull in material from Aristotelian as well as non-Aristotelian sources, but it is a somewhat rare genre (I know of around 12 examples from the late 12th to 14th century). We do however also have other psychological texts, including of course some commentaries. In this final section we will go through the relevant psychological texts until the middle of the 13th century that have the soul as their

<sup>107</sup> Averroes *In DA*, bk. III, com. 8, p. 420.35–36.

<sup>108</sup> Averroes *In DA*, III com. 13 and 15, pp. 427–28 and 434.

<sup>109</sup> Black (2008: 79–81) identifies an emphasis on substantial and contentful self-knowledge through knowledge of external objects in Averroes in a different context, but that lies outside our current scope.

<sup>110</sup> Already in 1255 this was supplemented with all the Aristotelian works within natural philosophy, ethics and metaphysics. See Denifle and Chatelain 1891: no. 201, p. 228, cf. Dod 1982: 73 and Lohr 1997.

primary focus.<sup>111</sup> A list of such texts until around 1250 is given in table 2.1 on the next page.<sup>112</sup> In the chapter I treat the text that contain a significant section on intellectual self-knowledge. This means that I present the main doctrines on self-knowledge in Dominicus Gundissalinus (ca. 1115/25–1190), John Blund (ca. 1175–1248), John of La Rochelle (ca. 1200–1245), William of Auvergne (1180/90–1249), Adam Buckfield (1220–1279/92), Ps.-Adam Buckfield, the figure Petrus Hispanus Portugalensis (1215–1277), Ps.-Petrus Hispanus (possibly Richard Rufus, from ca. 1200–1260), and finally Albert the Great.<sup>113</sup>

Although I focus on texts that have the soul as their proper and main topic, it is noticeable that these treatises often contain a good portion of theological material. This is probably due to the fact that Aristotle's *De anima* has not yet become an object of focused study and analysis. The texts are generally more independent treaties that deal with many of the same questions as Aristotle's work, but often structured differently and with a wider wiggle room for doctrinal variations. The format and content of Avicenna's *De anima* is therefore also very often the template for the treatises. This early period of psychological material is, maybe slightly derogatorily, sometimes referred to as a period of "Avicennizing Augustinianism".<sup>114</sup> The term is disputed, but it does reflect the general idea that this is a period where the influence of Augustine and Avicenna is particularly clear.<sup>115</sup> As we will see, there are several instances of treatments or reflections of Avicenna's flying man, and we will also see a general support for the essential self-knowledge that characterizes that part of the tradition.<sup>116</sup>

<sup>111</sup> This means that disputed questions, theological treatises, and single questions in *Sentence-commentaries* are not included here. We stay relatively close to the commentary genre and context.

<sup>112</sup> Hasse 2000 and Toivanen 2015 treat many of the texts listed here, and those works can be very useful in hunting down more research literature. See also Weijers 2005 on the structure and genre of some of these texts.

<sup>113</sup> I will not go into any detail with Anonymus Bertolensis. It is a very minuscule text used to fill out a bit more than an empty column in the bible manuscript Vat. Lat. 27: 333v. The text presents material of the Augustinian tradition (see Bertola 1966: 577), including short notes on essential self-knowledge reflecting the doctrines of Augustine.

<sup>114</sup> The term is coined in Gilson 1929–1930.

<sup>115</sup> Hasse 2000: 203–5 suggests a revised definition that focuses narrowly on the identity of the active intellect and the Christian God.

<sup>116</sup> On the flying man, see in particular Toivanen 2015, but of course also Hasse 2000: 80–92.

Table 2.1: Latin psychological texts from 1150 to 1250. Dating key:  
 ~ = *circa*, ? = *uncertain*, e.g. 13.4 = last quarter of 13th century.

Author	Title	Proximate date	Witnesses or edition
Anonymus Bertolensis	<i>Quid sit anima</i>	12.4-13.1	Anonymus Bertolensis 1966
Dominicus Gundissalinus	<i>De anima</i>	1150~	Muckle 1940 <sup>117</sup>
John Blund	<i>De anima</i>	1200~	Blund 1970
Anonymus Vaticanani 175	<i>Dubitaciones circa animam</i>	1200-1220	Vat. Lat. 175: 219r-221v <sup>118</sup>
Anonymus Gauthier 1	<i>De anima et de potentiis eius</i>	1225~	Gauthier 1982 <sup>119</sup>
Anonymus Callus	<i>De potentiis animae et obiectis</i>	1230~	Anonymus Callus 1952 <sup>120</sup>
Ps.-Robert Grosseteste	<i>De anima</i>	1230-1245~	Digby 104: 1r-19v <sup>121</sup>
William of Auvergne	<i>De anima</i>	1235-1240	William of Auvergne 1674b
John of La Rochelle	<i>Summa de anima</i>	1235-1236	Bourgerol 1995
Ps.-Petrus Hispanus	<i>Expositio libri de anima</i>	1230~-1245~	Ps.-Petrus Hispanus 1952 <sup>122</sup>
Petrus Hispanus Portugalensis	<i>Commentarius in libros De anima</i>	1240's	Petrus Hispanus Portugalensis 1944
Albert the Great	<i>De homine</i>	1242-1243	Albert the Great 2008
Adam Buckfield	<i>Sententia super librum De anima</i>	1243-1249	Many witnesses, no edition. <sup>123</sup>
Ps.-Adam Buckfield	<i>Expositio in De anima II-III</i>	1240-1250~	Merton 272: 15v-22r

<sup>117</sup>

See also Bertola 1953 who identifies another witness for this in Vat. Lat. 175: ff. 208r-218v. Aside from the text *Dubitaciones circa animam*, which is also listed in this table, that manuscript also contains two short questions on the immortality of the soul on ff. 203r-207r and 207r-v.

<sup>118</sup>

First announced in Bertola 1953, but see also Hasse 2000: 30-4.

<sup>119</sup>

Translated in Pasnau 2003: 9-34. See also Hasse 2000: 34-5.

<sup>120</sup>

Hasse 2000: 34-5.

<sup>121</sup>

Callus 1941.

<sup>122</sup>

New edition under publication where it is attributed to Richard Rufus of Cornwall, see Rufus 2018.

<sup>123</sup>

See sections 2.5.3 on page 49.

Table 2.1: (Cont.) Latin psychological texts from 1150 to 1250.

Author	Title	Proximate date	Witnesses or edition
Anonymus Gauthier 2	<i>Lectura in librum De anima. A quodam discipulo reportata</i>	1245–1250	Anonymus Gauthier 2 1985
Anonymus Bazán II	<i>Sententia super II et III De anima</i>	1246–1247	Anonymus Bazán II 1998
Petrus Hispanus Portugalensis	<i>Scientia libri de anima</i>	1250–1260	Petrus Hispanus Portugalensis 1961
Albert the Great	<i>De anima</i>	1254–1257	Albert the Great 1968

### 2.5.1 Early treatises

Our first encounter is the translator of Avicenna's *De anima*, Dominicus Gundissalinus, who had his *floruit* between 1162 and 1190.<sup>124</sup> He wrote a *Tractatus de anima*, which opens with arguments for the incorporeal nature of the soul.<sup>125</sup> Right from the start we see that he is heavily influenced by Avicenna's *De anima*, as he uses Avicenna's flying man experiment as his first of a range of arguments supporting the incorporeality of the soul. But he also takes the experiment to indicate that the soul is present to itself and that it knows and perceives (*scire* and *percipere*) itself irrespective of external or bodily inputs.<sup>126</sup> We also recognize his Avicennean influence when he presents four different types of intellect that are parallel to Avicenna's, and remarks that whenever the soul reflects on an external object, it also at the same time is cognizant of its own act of intellection.<sup>127</sup> When the intellect only reflects on itself, it is itself that which knows and the object of knowledge.<sup>128</sup> But when it knows an external object, those three roles are split up: The soul is that which knows, the intellect (*intellectus*) is that by which it knows, and that which is known (*intellectum*) is the external thing, *viz.* the similitude of the form retained in the mind.<sup>129</sup> These different roles and relations show how immediate intellectual self-knowledge is a phenomenon different from the knowledge of external objects, and that he considers the unmediated self-knowledge an essential power of the soul.

In the very beginning of the 13th century John Blund writes his *De anima*. It has been dated to between 1200 and 1209. Whether it is written in Paris or Oxford is not quite clear, but as Hunt points out, that is not terribly important as Oxford is intellectually dependent on Paris at this point.<sup>130</sup> His text shows no knowledge of Averroes but is heavily inspired by Avicenna, not least in the sections on the intellect.<sup>131</sup> But he does not reproduce the flying man experiment, and has very few thoughts about intellectual self-knowledge. In a short section on how disembodied souls communicate knowledge he argues that when the soul is disembodied and hence simple, immaterial, and separate, it sees itself (*videt et intuitur*).<sup>132</sup> This same thing can happen when one disembodied soul looks to another and acquires the knowledge possessed by that other soul. When it can do that, it can also know itself through the image of itself in another soul as a mirror image.<sup>133</sup> Here we note two things: (1) he does not really present a well-developed doctrine of intellectual self-knowledge, and (2) what he does say about it indicates an assumption of immediate and essential self-knowledge.

William of Auvergne was bishop of Paris at the time when he wrote his *De anima*, and that

<sup>124</sup> For a short entry of his life and works, see Pasnau and Dyke 2010: II.864

<sup>125</sup> On his *De anima*, see Hasse 2000: 13–8.

<sup>126</sup> Gundissalinus *De anima*, cap. 1, p. 37.17–32, cf. Toivanen 2015: 71.

<sup>127</sup> Gundissalinus *De anima*, 87.30–88.8.

<sup>128</sup> Gundissalinus *De anima*, cap. 10, p. 89.10–12.

<sup>129</sup> Gundissalinus *De anima*, cap. 10, p. 89.12–26.

<sup>130</sup> See the original introduction to the edition (Hunt 1970) along with Dunne's recent update in Callus and Hunt 2013, cf. also Hasse 2000: 18–9.

<sup>131</sup> Comparison in Hasse 2000: 20–3.

<sup>132</sup> Blund *De anima*, §375, p. 103.15.

<sup>133</sup> Blund *De anima*, §375, p. 103.23–28.

shows.<sup>134</sup> It is a much more theologically focused work than that of for instance John Blund (although he generally keeps references to Scripture at a minimum), and we find many fundamental doctrinal differences from what we are used to in the Aristotelian commentaries. The dominant doctrine for William is the immediate self-knowledge of the soul. For instance, he insists adamantly on a very unitary model of intellect where any partition into agent, material or possible, acquired or speculative intellect is attacked.<sup>135</sup> We find two different types of self-knowledge in his treatise, one occasioned by knowledge about external objects and another immediate and essential self-knowledge, both of indubitable certainty.

We find the first type of self-knowledge in an argument against the idea that the soul can know that it does not exist. He argues that when the intellect has some knowledge, it also at the same time knows with certainty about itself that it has this knowledge, and this clearly would not be the case if it could know that it does not exist.<sup>136</sup> This is a self-knowledge occasioned by knowledge of external objects, but it is more similar to the higher-order self-awareness of Avicenna, as William's point is that aside from the knowledge of the object, the soul *also* has an awareness of its own activity of knowing that object. Interestingly, he also maintains that if you want to reflect on the soul in this way, it will be both easy and profitable.<sup>137</sup> Later, in a description of the substance and properties of the soul we see a version of self-knowledge that connects closely to the doctrines of Augustine. We know nothing, he says, with greater certainty than the soul itself, and the individual knows nothing more clearly and completely than his own intelligible dispositions (which includes veridical properties such as knowledge, doubt and opinion, as well as affective properties such as joy and sadness). These properties in the individual are directly observable to the individual itself.<sup>138</sup> But this ability can be challenged, just as we saw in Augustine, by the ingrown corporeal signs and the concretion of body and soul.<sup>139</sup> So we should probably not interpret the higher-order self-awareness as an Aristotelian doctrine here, as it is probably more likely to stem from the Augustinian distinction between *se nosse* and *se cogitare*.

John de La Rochelle's *Summa de anima* is written in 1235–36 and presents a text that, in a sense, is rich in Aristotelian content as one of his main sources is Avicenna's *De anima*, but he also peppers it generously with references to Augustine, who is the most prominently quoted authority in the text (including the now pseudepigraphal *Liber de spiritu et anima*) and John of Damascus's *De fide orthodoxa*. A final central source is John's own work *Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum animae*, which is especially incorporated into the second half on the perceptual and intellectual powers.<sup>140</sup> On the preference of Avicenna over Aristotle (who he does make a few scant references to) Hasse remarks that it is perfectly in line with a trend in the period, as Avicenna's treatise contains fewer doctrinal gaps, but one also wonders whether

<sup>134</sup> About William, see the entry in Pasnau and Dyke 2010: II.987, about his treatise in particular Moody 1975, Hasse 2000: 42–7 and the introduction in Teske 2000.

<sup>135</sup> See William of Auvergne *De anima*, §§2.10–11, 3.3, 5.6–8, 7.3–5 and 7.10–11.

<sup>136</sup> William of Auvergne *De anima*, §1.4, p. 68a–b, cf. §7.11, p. 218a.

<sup>137</sup> William of Auvergne *De anima*, §1.4, p. 68b.

<sup>138</sup> William of Auvergne *De anima*, §3.12, p. 102b. All of chapter 3.12 and 13 focus on this.

<sup>139</sup> William of Auvergne *De anima*, §3.13, p. 103–4, cf. the section on Augustine on page 36.

<sup>140</sup> See Bourgerol 1995: 31–3 along with Hasse 2000: 47–51 and Cory 2014: 30.

he is easier to adapt to the requirements of a monotheist theology.<sup>141</sup>

The possibility and immediateness of intellectual self-knowledge is assumed without argument. We see this when he uses the immediate self-knowledge as a premise for the conclusion that the intellect is immaterial.<sup>142</sup> This is elaborated in a subsequent note on the objects of the intellect: When the intellect has knowledge of itself, it uses itself as the point of comparison,<sup>143</sup> Finally, in a discussion of the ontological status of the agent intellect, he presents an interesting partitioning of the agent intellect according to the content of the knowledge in something reminiscent of an emanative scheme.<sup>144</sup> In knowledge concerning divine essences and the Trinity, God himself is the agent intellect, in knowledge concerning created intelligences of the same ontological level as the intellect itself, *viz.* angels, they are the agent intellects, but when the soul is occupied with knowledge about itself, it is able to draw that knowledge directly from itself by a conversion (*conversio*) towards itself and is therefore, in that case, its own agent intellect. The same is the case when it is concerned not with its own essence but material properties that are received in the soul in the same way as its *potentia, habitus, dispositiones* and *affectiones*.<sup>145</sup>

These early treatises of Dominicus Gundissalinus, John Blund, William of Auvergne, John of La Rochelle differ in many ways, but they agree in their fundamental view of self-knowledge. The intellect or soul is able to reflect on itself at its own accord and independently of external stimuli. They do not provide much information about the content of such knowledge, but it is assumed that there is *some* content to it, and that it may yield insights into the nature of the soul. Reflections on self-awareness occasioned by knowledge of external intellects can be found, but it is not clear whether or to which extent it differs from the self-knowledge that the soul can realize independently of such stimuli.

### 2.5.2 Peter of Spain and Ps.-Peter of Spain

We have no less than three texts about the soul that are attributed to a Peter of Spain. All three texts, a treatise and two different commentaries, have been published by Manuel Alonso in the name of Petrus Hispanus, the later Pope John XXI, who he also believes to be the author of the famous *Summulae logicales*. It has been suggested to distinguish the author of the *Summulae logicales* from Petrus Hispanus Portugalensis who later became Pope John XXI by referring to the author of the *Summulae logicales* as Petrus Hispanus O.P.<sup>146</sup> The works in question here

<sup>141</sup> Hasse 2000: 50.

<sup>142</sup> John of La Rochelle *De anima*, cap. 112, p. 269.21–23.

<sup>143</sup> John of La Rochelle *De anima*, cap. 113, p. 270.16–18: “Forma ergo qua cognoscitur ipsa anima uel angelus est ipsa anima rationalis que, cum utitur se ut similitudine, cognoscit se et intelligit referende ad se.”

<sup>144</sup> This is done with references to a passage in Ps.-Augustine that he refers to several times stating that the soul knows God above it, itself within itself, the angels on par with it and the sublunary matters below it. See John of La Rochelle *De anima*, cap. 63, p. 190.1–10, cap. 113, p. 270.24–25, and cap. 116, p. 279.40–45 quoting Ps.-Augustine *De spiritu et anima*, cap. 4, p. 781: “anima cognoscit Deum supra se, se in se, angelum iuxta se.”

<sup>145</sup> John of La Rochelle *De anima*, cap. 116, pp. 270.38–280.75.

<sup>146</sup> See Meirinhos 1996, Hasse 2000: 55–60 and J. Spruit 2015.

are published under the following names by Alonso: *Expositio libri de anima*, *Scientia libri de anima*, and *Commentarius in libros De anima*.

Gauthier argues that the text published as *Expositio libri de anima* by Alonso is not written by Peter of Spain, both based on the manuscripts that preserve the text and its doctrines.<sup>147</sup> Rega Wood argues confidently that it is by Richard Rufus of Cornwall.<sup>148</sup> It is edited by Manuel Alonso with an ascription to Peter of Spain, and a new edition with Rega Wood as the main editor is under publication where it is ascribed to Richard Rufus.<sup>149</sup> The editions differ in more than merely the name of the author, as the older edition is only based on Madrid 3314: ff. 68ra–89rb, which starts abruptly in the exposition of *De anima* 2.1, 412a21–28, while the upcoming edition is based on three manuscripts that together present a more complete text. Alonso refers to this text as an *expositio* while it is the same text as what the editors of the recent edition refer to as a *sententia cum quaestionibus*. Alonso dates it to before 1245 and considers it the earliest commentary on *De anima*, as does Rega Wood as she even puts it to before 1238, while Gauthier is less convinced but does not give an alternative dating.<sup>150</sup> There is nonetheless no doubt that this is one of the very earliest commentaries on *De anima* we have. We will follow Gauthier in referring to the author cautiously as Ps.-Peter of Spain, though Wood makes a strong case for attributing it to Richard Rufus. I use and refer to the text in the already existing edition by Alonso, as the new edition is not published yet.

Aside from this we have another text under the name *Commentarius in libros De anima*, and finally *Scientia libri de anima*. These two texts are still believed to have been written by the same author, and there is also general agreement that this actually is the Petrus Hispanus Portugalisensis who later became Pope John XXI.<sup>151</sup> Gauthier considers the *Commentarius in libros De anima*, which is also a commentary properly speaking, to be written in Toulouse around 1240 (Wood dates it to after 1247), and the *Scientia libri de anima*, a much more independent treatise, to be written between 1250 and 60.<sup>152</sup>

The *Sententiae cum quaestionibus in libros De anima*, the text by Ps.-Petrus Hispanus (possibly Rufus), only deals with self-knowledge very cursorily. There is no discussion of it in the exposition of 3.4, 429b5–9. But in the exposition of the second *aporia* he presents a short discussion of the problem of the intelligibility of the intellect, focusing on the formal aspects of the argument, but leaving a laconic remark that the intellect is intelligible, and that it is not intelligible by itself but by another species in it.<sup>153</sup> He explains that the intellect is able to know itself by its own form (*per suam formam*).<sup>154</sup> This would mean that once it is actualized, the form of the intellect itself becomes available as any other intelligible species to the intellect

<sup>147</sup> Gauthier 1984: 236\*–237\*

<sup>148</sup> Wood 2001: 120 and in particular Wood 2018: 63–132. She has also found an alternative recension of the text to be preserved in Ambros. 4° 312: ff. 19rb–28vb where only the questions of the commentary are preserved. It is available in an online transcription, see Rufus 2007. She considers that as one of the most important witnesses to the works of Richard Rufus (Wood 1995: 103).

<sup>149</sup> Editions: Ps.-Petrus Hispanus 1952 and Rufus 2018.

<sup>150</sup> Alonso 1952b: 64–79, Wood 2001: 153–6, Gauthier 1984: 236\*–237\*.

<sup>151</sup> Meirinhos 1996: 68–9, cf. Mora-Márquez 2014: 210, Wood 2018: xvii.

<sup>152</sup> Gauthier 1984: 240\*–241\*, Wood 2018: 47.

<sup>153</sup> Ps.-Petrus Hispanus *Exp. DA*, in III.4, 429b22–30a9, p. 316.

<sup>154</sup> Ps.-Petrus Hispanus *Exp. DA*, in III.4, 429b22–30a9, pp. 317–18.

itself.<sup>155</sup> This would then be an example of a self-knowledge that is conditional upon the actualization of the intellect by an external species, and in this way it would be close to Averroes's view. At the same time his exposition most likely argues that the intellect knows itself by its own species, which is also in accordance with his views as expressed in other works.<sup>156</sup> Ps.-Petrus Hispanus's remarks on self-knowledge here are thus brief, but nonetheless noteworthy. As we have seen, the preceding texts on the soul argue for an immediate and essential self-knowledge, but the author here diverges from that course and returns to Averroes's interpretation that emphasizes accidental self-knowledge implying a possibility of some positive content above a mere reflection of the external object.<sup>157</sup>

Moving on to the *Commentarius in libros De anima* that is actually by Petrus Hispanus Portugalensis we find a different presentation.<sup>158</sup> He opens the commentary with an extended treatment of the principles and methods of a science of the soul. He does this in three *problemata* which contain 14, 19 and 24 questions, respectively, and stretches over 120 print pages in Alonso's edition. Questions 2–9 of the first *problema* focus on the science of the soul and self-knowledge. The discussion presented there is very interesting for two reasons. (1) He presents a wide range of problems and arguments, many of which we also find in later commentaries, and (2) he presents a double doctrine of self-knowledge where the Augustinian and Aristotelian models are sought unified. This type of unification of the two main branches of the explanation of self-knowledge is very rarely seen in later *De anima*-commentaries.

In the first three of those questions he is concerned with whether our knowledge of the soul is inborn or acquired, and whether the soul is able to know itself.<sup>159</sup> First it is argued from a Neo-Platonic perspective that knowledge about the soul is inborn, while Aristotle is used to argue that the knowledge must be acquired as the soul is born without any positive content.<sup>160</sup> His solution is to present the doctrine of double self-knowledge: The soul has an inborn knowledge from the creator of a divine and future good and of itself, but its knowledge of mundane objects is acquired through sense perception. This is thus an example of the doctrine of the two faces of the soul, one facing towards the immaterial realm and independent of sense perception, and the other facing the material world and relying on sense perception.<sup>161</sup> This second type of knowledge is what the philosophers refer to when they think our knowledge about the soul is acquired. While the first *cognitio sui* is inborn and God-given, the second is

<sup>155</sup> On the distinction between form and species in Richard Rufus, see Wood 2018: 85–8.

<sup>156</sup> This is argued by Wood 2018: 85–8.

<sup>157</sup> Wood (2018: 88–9) and Etchemendy and Wood (2011: 82) hold that this is the only author known to hold this position before 1250, but as we will see Albert the Great's *De homine* may also present considerations partly to that effect, although in a more composite and complex theory.

<sup>158</sup> See the analysis of Peter of Spain's use of the flying man argument, which is thematically related to these problems of self-knowledge, in Toivanen 2015: 75–8.

<sup>159</sup> The titles of these three questions (nos. 2–4 of the first *problema*) are: *Utrum cognitio de anima sit nobis innata vel acquisita; utrum anima se ipsam cognoscat* and *utrum haec cognitio sit innata animae aut acquisita*.

<sup>160</sup> He actually makes a Lockean *tabula rasa* argument from the passage about the empty writing tablet in 3.4, 429b29–430a2 (which is not quite the use in Aristotle).

<sup>161</sup> This stems from Avicenna *De anima*, 1.5, cf. Rohmer 1927. Wood 2018: 70 gives both these references and notes Peter as a proponent of this view, cf. also Gilson 1929–1930: 106.

the proper scientific knowledge (*cognitio scientifica*) about the soul.<sup>162</sup> This distinction is traced through the subsequent questions, where it seems important to him to emphasize the immediate and essential self-knowledge as something prior to the secondary, derived and scientific self-knowledge.<sup>163</sup> These two aspects of immediate and mediated, essential and accidental, self-knowledge are mapped to the agent and possible intellects giving them each a part of the responsibility for the different aspects.<sup>164</sup>

The commentary by Petrus Hispanus Portugalensis is remarkable in its extent and his familiarity with the Aristotelian material. But it also includes much of the standard apparatus of a full size *sententia*-commentary although it is an early text, probably from the 1240's. Finally, it also has the extended prefatory discussion of the science of the soul in 57 questions, virtually a treatise on its own. It is indeed a very learned work. But as we have seen it is also very original, at least in its treatment of self-knowledge. It is intimately familiar with the Aristotelian doctrines, but there is by no means a wholesale acceptance of them. Peter makes a conscious effort of defending and maintaining the preserved doctrines of the church fathers and other authorities by emphasizing the immediate and essential self-knowledge as prior to any derived knowledge of the soul. At the same time the Aristotelian explanation is also given credit as a proper scientific knowledge based on observation of external phenomena, and the Aristotelian division of agent and possible intellect is used to explain this double doctrine of self-knowledge. But the Aristotelian model never trumps the immediate, essential, and God-given self-presence and subsequent self-knowledge that the soul will always have of itself. In this way it shows a unique experiment in reconciling the two fundamentally different branches of self-knowledge that run through the tradition.

In *Scientia libri de anima*, which is an independent treatise, also by Petrus Hispanus Portugalensis, we recognize a picture more in line with the *tractatus*-genre. On the whole the Neo-Platonic material is much stronger represented, and although there are some elements resembling Aristotelian material, such as the distinction between the possible and agent intellect, the doctrinal adaptation of the Stagerite's philosophy does not go particularly deep.<sup>165</sup> Where we saw in his commentary that the possible intellect engages in mediated self-knowledge (together with the agent intellect), we find nothing of that in the treatise. The agent intellect on the other hand facilitates self-knowledge and makes essential self-knowledge possible to the individual.<sup>166</sup> The treatise also contains a whole chapter on self-knowledge with a clear Augustinian tendency. He explains that when done right (*ductu proprio*), the human intellect can always engage in immediate and essential self-knowledge, but when the judgement or mental focus of the individual is clouded by his bodily condition, this elevating self-knowledge will be impeded. The described process of self-knowledge is more a mystical ascension than a rational endeavour involving a connection with the true self in its purest and most elevated form, and

<sup>162</sup> Petrus Hispanus Portugalensis *Comm. DA*, quaest. pream. I.2, pp. 65-66.

<sup>163</sup> Petrus Hispanus Portugalensis *Comm. DA*, quaest. pream. I.3-5, pp. 67.19-70.27.

<sup>164</sup> Petrus Hispanus Portugalensis *Comm. DA*, quaest. pream. I.8-9, pp. 71.28-73.31.

<sup>165</sup> Petrus Hispanus Portugalensis *Scientia DA*, tr. 10, cap. 5, pp. 371-73 and tr. 10, cap. 5, p. 374.

<sup>166</sup> Petrus Hispanus Portugalensis *Scientia DA*, tr. 10, cap. 6, pp. 381.6-16 and tr. 10, cap. 6, pp. 383.7-12. The agent intellect as part of a larger system of separate intelligences, see tr. 10, cap. 7.

with truths of higher stratospheric intelligences.<sup>167</sup> So in comparison with his commentary, some Aristotelian terminology or basic ideas are present, but no real effort is made at reconciling that with the platonizing theological mysticism.

The three texts by two different authors surveyed here also present a varied picture. Ps.-Petrus Hispanus presents us with a very early literal commentary where we find a clear return to a position quite congenial with Averroes's interpretation (although no reference is made). The intellect can know itself by its own species once it has been actualized by an external species, and this self-knowledge might contain some positive content over and above the mere reflection of the external object. In contrast to this, Petrus Hispanus Portugalensis presents an Aristotelian commentary and a theological treatise (*Commentarius in libros De anima* and *Scientia libri de anima*). In his commentary on *De anima* he merges the Aristotelian model of indirect and mediated self-knowledge with the Augustinian ideal of immediate and essential self-knowledge. To do this he presents an original double doctrine of self-knowledge that comprises both aspects and also maps the different types of self-knowledge to the distinction between agent and possible intellect. In his later *Scientia libri de anima* this ambition is cast aside for a thoroughly Augustinian argument of essential self-knowledge.

### 2.5.3 Adam Buckfield and Ps.-Adam Buckfield

Adam Buckfield was a highly productive Oxonian arts master in the 1240's, but judging from the prevalence of his commentaries his work also enjoyed a high popularity during the second and third part of the 13th century.<sup>168</sup> He commented on *Physica*, *De caelo*, *De generatione et corruptione*, *Aristotelis meteorologicorum libri quattuor*, *De mineralibus*, *De plantis*, *De anima*, *De memoria et reminiscentia*, *De sensu et sensibilibus*, *De somno et vigilia*, *De morte et vita*, *De differentia spiritus et animae*, *De causis* and *Metaphysica*, mostly in the form of literal commentaries that often appear as glosses in the manuscripts of Aristoteles Latinus, but he did also use the question format. He was a cleric in 1238 and master of arts by 1243, and his period of lecturing on the Aristotelian tradition has been taken to start at 1238, but the end is uncertain. As he is known to have a clerical career from 1249, it has been assumed that this marks the end of his teaching career.<sup>169</sup>

His *Sententia super librum De anima*, a literal commentary, has been dated to between 1238 and 1249, and it may possibly be from before 1245.<sup>170</sup> It has been discussed whether there are

<sup>167</sup> Petrus Hispanus Portugalensis *Scientia DA*, tract. 10, cap. 7, pp. 398–401.

<sup>168</sup> French 1998: 13–4 describes the wide geographical spread of his works in manuscripts throughout France, Italy, Spain, Germany, Belgium, Poland, Austria and England in a wide range of hands of varying geographical origin. R. J. Long (2004) even writes that "... before the new translations of Aristotle began to make their appearance in the 1260s, Adam was by every measure the most influential English commentator on that philosopher."

<sup>169</sup> French 1998: 23–5, but also Callus 1939: 414–6, Noone 1992: 315–6 (refers this point to Steenberghen 1970: 140–3 and Callus 1963: 397, actually its 393). For more biographical information and further literature, see Weijers 1994: 24–30, R. J. Long 2004, Bakker 2010, Pasnau and Dyke 2010: II.839 but not least also Lohr 1967: 317–24, Wood 2018: 50, and of course French 1998: 21–62.

<sup>170</sup> The date 1245 is given by Pasnau and Dyke 2010: II.839. Wood (2018: 48–54) argues that it is earlier

one or several redactions.<sup>171</sup> Gauthier thinks there is only one redaction with two so-called redactions that have been mistakenly attributed to Adam but are actually not by him. One of those is the last part of the Merton 272 witness (15v–22r), the other is the full commentary in Berlin SB 906: 115a–173b.<sup>172</sup> That analysis is reflected in the presentation of the manuscripts by Weijers and Wood.<sup>173</sup> In the following analysis we will pursue that hypothesis and refer to the two texts as Buckfield and Ps.-Adam Buckfield respectively.<sup>174</sup>

We will start with Ps.-Adam Buckfield. In his comments on the first passage in *De anima* 3.4, 429b5–10 he highlights the distinction between primary and secondary actuality and notices that when the intellect is in the first actuality, it is also able to know itself.<sup>175</sup> In the later discussion of the two *aporiai* he gets back to this. As is common, he first introduces the structure of the passage, the introduction of the two challenges and their subsequent solution. He presents the second challenge, which is our main interest here, as a problem of whether the intellect knows itself through itself or by its own species. He presents the dilemma as follows: If the intellect knows itself by itself, then it would also be the case that all other intelligible objects have self-knowledge. If however the intellect knew itself by its own species it would know itself in the same way as it knows other objects of knowledge through their species. But then he thinks it will follow that the intellect would not be in a state of knowing when it is itself known, as it is the case with other objects of knowledge. Alternatively, if it is held that it is in fact in a state of knowing when it is itself known, then all other objects of knowledge would also know when they are known.<sup>176</sup> The problem thus results from a strict parallelism between the intellect and all other objects of knowledge. To avoid an infinite regress, it is argued, the solution is to hold that the intellect knows itself by itself, and not by its species. This is construed in parallel with the way the intellect knows immaterial substances without an intermediary species. The essential self-knowledge is supported by the passage where Aristotle explains that in immaterial substances there is an identity between the knower and the

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than 1245.

<sup>171</sup> Lohr 1967: 320–1 separates the witnesses into three redactions. According to him there are the following witnesses. Redaction 1: Corpus Christi 111: 252a–294d, Madrid 1067: 73r–76v, Bologna 1180: 24a–53b, Canon. Misc. 322: 1–63v, BNF Lat. 6319: 112r–114r; Redaction 2: Ambros. 2° 318: 174ra–225a (new foliation, old: 173ra–223a), Merton 272: 1r–22r, Jagiellońska 726: 1r–40v, Madrid 9726: 82v, Vat. Urb. 206: 259a–299a, Marciana Lat. VI.1: 130b–161a; Redaction 3: Berlin SB 906: 115a–173b.

<sup>172</sup> Gauthier 1984: 247\*.

<sup>173</sup> Weijers 1994: 25, Wood 2018: 59.

<sup>174</sup> There should exist an edition of Buckfield's text by Powell (1964), but it is not published, and I have regrettably not been able to get a copy of the thesis, although it surely must contain much valuable information on this question. I have therefore resorted to transcribing the text myself from the sources that I have had access to. I provide a transcription of Ps.-Adam Buckfield's text in section C.3 on page 273 and a transcription of Buckfield's text (based on Ambros. 2° 318: 216v–217v) in section C.2 on page 270. In some places of the latter one or more of the manuscripts BNF Lat. 6319: 130v, Canon. Misc. 322: 53ra, Vat. Urb. 206: 292v, and Bologna 2344: 48v–49r have been included to help solve textual uncertainties. Bologna 2344: 24r–53v has been transcribed and published online as part of the Richard Rufus Project, see Buckfield 2017.

<sup>175</sup> Ps.-Adam Buckfield *Exp. DA*, Bk. 3, lect. 2, APP 274.2–10.

<sup>176</sup> Ps.-Adam Buckfield *Exp. DA*, Bk. 3, lect. 2, APP 274.17–25.

known.<sup>177</sup>

But he is also aware of the alternative doctrine of accidental self-knowledge held by Averroes and others. Both expositions, he says, can be true and hold at the same time. Because although the intellect knows itself by itself, it is abstracted from itself, and for this process it needs an external species. Once the intellect has acquired some knowledge by a species abstracted from an external object, then that species facilitates self-knowledge, because the intellect can turn on itself and know itself. This exposition is closed with the note that this external species is not the cause for the self-knowledge, but merely a necessary condition for it.<sup>178</sup> Finally, he points to the closing of the chapter where the distinction between the immaterial intellect and the material objects of knowledge steers us around the risk of all objects of knowledge having reason.<sup>179</sup>

When we look at the Buckfield's commentary, we find a very important difference. He also argues for essential self-knowledge, but Averroes' diverging view is presented as a point of conflict. He does not seek to reconcile the two, but merely says that the commentator does not solve the problem in his suggested way, but rather follows the alternative solution where the intellect is known through its species. He finds it to be clear that his solution is correct, and supports it with reference to a certain translation of the text as well as Aristotle's view at the closing of the chapter.<sup>180</sup> Here we might inject that Buckfield is generally considered to be a very averroist interpreter of Aristotle.<sup>181</sup> Gauthier even finds that his servility to the Commentator diminishes the interest of the work as a predictable and uninteresting vulgarization that made Averroes more approachable to the masses.<sup>182</sup> And Gauthier may be right about this in most respects, but when we come to this particular conflict between the Averroist and the Avicennian traditions, he clearly sides with the Avicennian position and explicitly rejects that of Averroes.<sup>183</sup>

So according to this reading Buckfield rejects the conventional solution of Averroes and presents a doctrine of essential self-knowledge. In Ps.-Adam Buckfield on the other hand we have an arts master from around the middle of the 13th century who, much like Petrus His-

<sup>177</sup> Ps.-Adam Buckfield *Exp. DA*, Bk. 3, lect. 2, APP 275.1–8.

<sup>178</sup> Ps.-Adam Buckfield *Exp. DA*, Bk. 3, lect. 2, APP 275.9–19.

<sup>179</sup> Ps.-Adam Buckfield *Exp. DA*, Bk. 3, lect. 2, APP 275.20–27.

<sup>180</sup> The reference to some translation in support of an essential self-knowledge is highly interesting. Unfortunately the witnesses that I have had access to do not agree about the details. In some places it reads “nostram translationem”, in others “aliam translationem” and finally “illam translationem” is also to be found. I have followed my base text, the Erfurt manuscript, which has “nostram” along with two of the other five included manuscripts, but it may be wrong. See Buckfield Bk. 3, lect. 2, APP 272.16–18, where the readings are listed.

<sup>181</sup> On his averroism, see for instance French 1998: 25–6, Bakker 2010. Hasse also often clusters Buckfield together with Petrus Hispanus Portugalsensis and Thomas Aquinas in preferring Averroes over Avicenna; see Hasse 2000: 68, 75, 106.

<sup>182</sup> Gauthier 1984: 248\*.

<sup>183</sup> Another example of his ambitions of combining the preserved (mostly theological) wisdom and the challenges of an Averroistic reading of Aristotle is found in his discussion of multiple substances of the soul in the same *De anima*-exposition. This is analysed with an edition of the relevant excerpt in Callus 1939.

panus Portugalensis, presents a combined interpretation with an ambition of reconciling the essential and accidental model of self-knowledge. It is hard to determine whether the solution tends more to the essential or accidental model. It certainly seems at first that he prefers the essential model of the Avicennian tradition where the immateriality of the intellect itself is sufficient for self-knowledge. But the concession to Averroes is so strong that he actually ends up admitting that the external species may not be a cause, but it is after all a necessary condition for intellectual self-knowledge. But reading the text still gives the impression that the essential model represents his preferred solution to this phenomenon, although he cannot reject the authority of the Commentator, and that forces him into an conciliatory position.

#### 2.5.4 Albert the Great

As we move on to Albert the Great we will see that he also seeks to reconcile the Aristotelian and Augustinian models of self-knowledge, and that he also uses the duality of agent and possible intellect as a tool to this end. As we will see, Albert distinguishes between different types of self-knowledge but on the whole his solution is more sympathetic to the Aristotelian model than the medieval treatises preceding him. I will focus on the two texts on the subject that are most closely related to the Aristotelian tradition, namely his *De homine* and *De anima*.

In the section on the agent intellect of *De homine* Albert faces the challenge of whether the agent intellect always knows, perceives and thinks of itself.<sup>184</sup> He also takes up the known passages from *Liber de causis* (which he attributes to Aristotle) that profess a necessary and essential self-knowledge of immaterial intellects, as well as the known (Augustinian or Platonic) thesis that when the intellect is always and essentially present to itself, it also always and essentially has knowledge of itself.<sup>185</sup> He answers that the agent intellect only has perpetual self-knowledge in a very limited sense. Neither the possible nor the agent intellect possesses a perfected knowledge by itself, it only exists between the two in unity, and this means that the agent intellect does not have an actualized perpetual knowledge of itself.<sup>186</sup> In the indeterminate state of the possible intellect before knowing a primary object it also knows itself, but only improperly (*improprie*). In this context Albert has an interesting interpretation of the light-analogy. Before any actual intellection the agent intellect is present in the possible intellect in the same way as light is present in the eye when no colour is present. It is there, but it affects no change. This latent actuality does not, according to Albert, conflict with the indeterminate nature of the possible intellect.<sup>187</sup>

He can thus conclude that although there is this limited self-knowledge, it is indeterminate. What could be considered real self-knowledge as the intellect's knowledge of itself as a distinct intelligible object is only intermittent and contingent upon reflection on external objects.<sup>188</sup>

<sup>184</sup> Albert the Great *Hom.* 420.8–29. References to *De homine* and *De anima* are made to the page and line numbers of the Cologne edition. The sections discussed here belong under the general heading *De anima rationali*.

<sup>185</sup> Albert the Great *Hom.* 420.45–63.

<sup>186</sup> Albert the Great *Hom.* 421.41–50.

<sup>187</sup> Albert the Great *Hom.* 421.55–70.

<sup>188</sup> Albert the Great *Hom.* 421.71–422.17.

By establishing this distinction he finds the challenges of substantial self-knowledge of *Liber de causis* mitigated, and he similarly refutes the assumption of self-presence as constitutive of self-knowledge by arguing that it is not a sufficient cause, as external objects still need to actualize the intellect. But he also makes a short reference to the concomitant and necessary self-knowledge that we have already identified in the early commentary tradition. He quotes Alexander (as the author of *De anima mantissa*) for this identity doctrine. But at the same time he makes the supplementary note that it is not entirely conditioned upon external stimulation as it is still available to the intellect whenever it wants (*quando voluerit*).<sup>189</sup> This indicates that the intellect can realize a proper self-knowledge where the intellect becomes the primary object of reflection on its own accord.<sup>190</sup>

Finally, we can look to his paraphrase of *De anima*. While *De homine* is written in 1241–42 the paraphrase is around 15 years later (1254–57). In the paraphrase of 3.4, 429b5–9, on levels of actuality and possible self-knowledge, he clearly emphasizes how knowledge of external objects affects a contentless and concomitant self-knowledge akin to the Alexandrian also mentioned above.<sup>191</sup> But when we look to his discussion of the second *aporia* in 429b22–30a9 it is not entirely clear how the intelligibility of the intellect correlates with the preceding distinctions. He says that it is intelligible by its own *intentio*, which makes it similar to other intelligible objects, but that no process of abstraction is involved (unlike other intelligible objects). The abstraction is not necessary as it is already immaterial and present to itself.<sup>192</sup> It looks like this *intentio* is not the same as the one realized as the subject of external objects in the paraphrase of 3.4, 429b5–9 (actually he seems to deny that explicitly in lines 27–31), but as it is also not based on previous sense perception, we here approach an essential and immediate self-knowledge.

It should be apparent that Albert presents us with a range of different aspects of self-knowledge. In the context of a philosophical analysis of the soul he talks about an improper self-knowledge that is always somehow present in the soul, and a self-knowledge that comes from external stimuli. When the agent and possible intellect in unison realize a form of an external species in the intellect it will be able to acquire knowledge about these aspects of the intellect itself. In this way it might be argued that Albert seeks to reconcile the Augustinian and Aristotelian model by considering the Augustinian perpetual and immediate self-knowledge a foundation that enables any intellectual activity, but when it comes to real analysis of the soul and its properties, the Aristotelian dependence of external stimuli is necessary.

<sup>189</sup> Albert the Great *Hom.* 426.62–427.15.

<sup>190</sup> We find different doctrines of essential self-knowledge in a later discussion of his concept of memory. Albert the Great *Hom.* pp. 548.23–550.4. We cannot determine here whether this is in conflict with or merely a complement to the presented doctrines. Cory 2014: 35–7 finds four different, but co-existing, kinds of self-knowledge, while Lambert 2007: 20 finds them inconsistent.

<sup>191</sup> Albert the Great 199.22–69.

<sup>192</sup> Albert the Great 203.25–78, this idea is very close to what we just saw in Ps.-Adam Buckfield on page 50.

## 2.6 Conclusion

In this chapter I have given an overview of the main sources and positions on intellectual self-knowledge that pave the way for the included *De anima* commentaries. The sources that I have presented are Aristotle himself, some of his most prominent Ancient commentators, a little Neo-Platonic material, Avicenna and Averroes and finally a selection of texts focused on the soul from the Latin middle ages before the spread of *De anima* commentaries after 1252. We have seen that there are two main approaches to explaining intellectual self-knowledge, namely as something the soul or intellect can engage in on its own accord without any dependence on external stimuli, or as an activity that is contingent upon a cognition of some external body. These two positions are extremes on a spectrum, but broadly speaking interpreters of a Neo-Platonic bend prefer the former while interpreters of a more Peripatetic adherence prefer the latter.

One could say that the problem of intellectual self-knowledge is present in Aristotle, but only in embryonic form. He clearly acknowledges the existence of both perceptual and intellectual self-awareness as phenomena. But whereas he presents some discussions of the problems involved in perceptual self-awareness, intellectual self-knowledge is not investigated as thoroughly. This means that we are mostly left with a few asides along with what we can surmise from his comparison of perception and intellect as well as his short discussion of the more general problem of the intelligibility of the soul. It is not clear whether only have the thin concept of self-knowledge as an epiphenomenon of the cognitive process without any positive content on its own, or whether it actually may be possible to acquire knowledge about the intellect or soul through introspection. This need not be a binary distinction, but the answer to that possibility is also left open. There is however not much indicating that Aristotle would be ready to abandon his assumption that knowledge is predetermined by sense stimuli.

This situation leaves the Aristotelian commentators with a lot to work with. Alexander of Aphrodisias presents an interpretation that puts a strong emphasis on the epiphenomenal model: The framework of form assimilation that cognition is based on means that when the intellect reflects on an external object, it becomes itself that object, and through its reflection on the object that it has then intermittently become, it also, accidentally, reflects on itself. But this reflection yields no knowledge aside from that of the external object, and thus provides no information about the intellect or soul. In broad terms, Themistius and Philoponus follow this Alexandrian model, while the fourth author writing in the commentary genre, Ps.-Simplicius, takes a very different approach.

Ps.-Simplicius is heavily influenced by the alternative model of self-knowledge provided by the Neo-Platonic tradition. Although the idea has a longer legacy, the theoretical foundation of this approach from Late Antiquity is Plotinus. With his highly developed metaphysics of soul and being, immediate and essential self-knowledge as a property of intellect becomes very prominent. We saw how that is expressed in *Liber de causis* where the immaterial substance returns to itself and has complete knowledge of its own essence. In Augustine this idea is further developed with the view that the soul or mind is something that, at least in principle, is completely transparent and available to itself. The basic explanation of this lies in the immateriality of the soul. So although the soul can become impeded by its bond with the physical

world, it will be able to know itself immediately and completely, once it can free itself from those shackles.

In the Arabic tradition we find these two main branches represented in Avicenna and Averroes. Avicenna argues for the immediate and essential self-knowledge of the soul, while Averroes maintains that the intellect cannot know anything about itself without a preceding cognition of an external object. There are also indications in his commentary on *De anima* that such an occasioned self-knowledge actually also has some positive content over and above that of the external object. This means that such accidental self-knowledge would actually be able to provide some knowledge about the intellect or maybe the soul more generally.

Finally, we saw how the Latin medieval solutions before 1250 generally are heavily inspired by the Avicennian model until around 1240. Around that time the epiphenomenal interpretation, that has a stronger affiliation with the text of Aristotle, resurfaces. Ps.-Petrus Hispanus accepts that solution while Petrus Hispanus Portugalensis, who is also highly familiar with the model, tries to incorporate it into the Augustinian model in his commentary on *De anima*. But when it comes to his later independent work, the Aristotelian model is completely gone in favour of complete acceptance of the Platonic solution. We have found a similar pursuit in Adam Buckfield who, within the confines of an exposition of *De anima*, maintains the model of essential self-knowledge and explicitly rejects the accidental model that he ascribes to Averroes. In the related commentary by Ps.-Adam Buckfield we find a rare example of an endeavour to reconcile the two models. He tries to combine the Augustinian and Averroist approaches in a single coherent presentation, even within the narrow confines of an exposition of *De anima* 3.4. Albert the Great finally also struggles with this conflict. In general he is more sympathetic to the Aristotelian model than Petrus Hispanus Portugalensis, although he does not accept it as immediately as Ps.-Petrus Hispanus. Like Peter of Spain, Albert uses the Peripatetic model of agent and possible intellect to establish a distinction between perpetual and intermittent self-knowledge. But unlike Peter, who prioritizes the perpetual variant, Albert does not accept that as proper self-knowledge. It is nonetheless still necessary as the antropo-ontological bedrock on which any intellectual activity is built.



## Chapter 3

# Intellectual self-knowledge in questions on *De anima* 3.4

In this chapter I will (1) introduce the texts and themes concerning self-knowledge discussed in questions on *De anima* 3.4, (2) survey the different ideas and doctrines as they occur in the commentaries, and (3) analyse the network revealed by the material used in the commentaries. These three objectives cannot be realized in parallel, so the chapter consists of three main sections. In the first section I give a brief overview of the problems concerning self-knowledge, followed by a presentation of all the different doctrinal elements that are used in the commentaries, and in the third section I draw out the relations between the commentaries that can be gleaned from the composition of their arguments. This chapter will therefore not contain a detailed study of any one of the presented commentaries, but rather situate them in relation to each other based on outlines of their arguments. The first section gives an impression of the field of problems, the second maps these components to specific applications within the texts, and the third section finally gives a birds eye view of the network that makes up these texts.

Throughout the chapter I continually refer to the general inventory of doctrines that can be found in the appendix in section A on page 241. These are merely abstracted from the detailed analysis, but provided there for reference. Doctrinal points and positive elements are referred to with a prefixed ‘P’, while arguments employed to attack the accepted doctrines (mostly in the *rationes principales*) are prefixed with a ‘N’. The doctrines are also registered in a database by which it is possible to reveal sophisticated relations within the material and perform extensive quantitative analyses.<sup>1</sup> Those registrations are the basis for the appendix list as well as the analyses in section 3.3.

The Aristotelian passages that let our commentators raise their questions are *De anima* 3.4, 429b5–10 and 429b22–430a2. The first passage introduces the distinction between first and second actuality with relation to the activities of the intellect and present the possibility

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<sup>1</sup> The registration is performed according to the general principles presented in section 1.3 on page 7 in the introduction. The *Jupyter Notebook* that contains the calculations (as well as a lot of extra details and illustrative graphs) can be found at <https://github.com/stenskjær/dissertation-notebooks/blob/master/self-knowledge-book-3.ipynb>.

of intellectual self-knowledge. In the second passage he presents the two *aporiai*, how the intellect can have knowledge when it is impassive, and whether it itself is intelligible. It is of course the latter of those two that inspire our commentators. This is not least the case for the commentators who focus on the problem of essential self-knowledge, as that is also a possibility that is included in Aristotle's own discussion of the intelligibility of the intellect.<sup>2</sup>

The texts investigated in this section are a subset of all the question commentaries contained in this study.<sup>3</sup> A commentary has been included in this chapter if it contains one or more questions concerning self-knowledge in the part of the commentary that deals with the material from *De anima* 3.4. This means that this chapter comprises all commentaries within the period that I have had access to that treat of this question. There is however an exception to that statement, as Adam Whitby formally qualifies on these given principles, but has been removed from the investigation. An analysis of his text showed that in both structure and content it was so different that an inclusion of it would contribute little to the investigation of the other included commentaries while also not do justice to the nature of his text in itself.<sup>4</sup> The included question commentaries can thus be seen in table 3.1 on the next page. In this group of commentaries we find an range of different questions concerning self-knowledge. The titles of the questions can be grouped as follows:

- (1) Whether the intellect is intelligible. Anonymus Bazán, Anonymus Assisi, Radulphus Brito.
- (2) Whether the (possible) intellect is able to know itself. Anonymus Digby 55, John of Jandun.
- (3) Whether the intellect knows itself by its own essence/substance or by something else. Simon of Faversham, Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II, John Dinsdale, Henric de la Wyle.
- (4) Whether the intellect can know its own act of knowing. Anonymus Bazán, Radulphus Brito, John of Jandun.
- (5) Whether the possible intellect can know the agent intellect. Anonymus Bazán, Siger of Brabant, and Radulphus Brito.
- (6) Whether the possible intellect knows the agent intellect with an unchanged and numerically identical intellection. John of Jandun.

<sup>2</sup> Both passages are treated more extensively in the preceding historical chapter on pages 26–28.

<sup>3</sup> All the included texts and the principles of the selection of them can be found in 1.4 on page 13.

<sup>4</sup> To document this conclusion I include my edition of the relevant question in the appendix (section C.1 on page 267). The title of the question is *utrum intellectus noster intelligit se per speciem suam*.

Author	Title	Dating	Edition
Anonymus Assisi	<i>Quaestiones in De anima III</i>	13.4–14.1	Appendix §C.4
Anonymus Bazán	<i>Quaestiones super Aristotelis librum De anima</i>	1272–1277	Anonymus Bazán 1971
Anonymus Digby 55	<i>Quaestiones in De anima III</i>	13.3	Appendix §C.5
Anonymus Vaticanani 2170 II	<i>Quaestiones in De anima I–III</i>	13.4–14.1	Appendix §C.9
Henric de la Wyle	<i>Quaestiones in De anima I–III</i>	1284–1308	Appendix §C.10
John Dinsdale	<i>Quaestiones in De anima I–III</i>	1274–1289	Dinsdale 2017
John of Jandun	<i>Quaestiones super libros De anima</i>	1310–1320	Jandun 1480
Radulphus Brito	<i>Quaestiones in Aristotelis librum tertium De anima</i>	1290s–1320s	Brito 1974
Siger of Brabant	<i>Quaestiones in tertium de anima</i>	1269–1270	Siger of Brabant 1972b
Simon of Faversham	<i>Quaestiones in De anima I–III</i>	13.4–14.1	Appendix §C.13

Table 3.1: Question commentaries covered in this chapter. Dating key: ? = *uncertain*, e.g. 13.4 = last quarter of 13th century.

Context	Doctrines	Instances	Proportion
Determination	34	93	2.74
Attack	28	61	2.18
Refutation	23	62	2.70
All	74	216	2.92

Table 3.2: Number of doctrines and instances in four different context classes.

### 3.1 Overview

I here give a quantitative summary of the different doctrines of the commentaries, and an overview of the main argumentative strategies and possible challenges they present. In table 3.2 we find the quantities of doctrines and instances of those doctrines within four different contexts. From that we see that the amount of doctrines used in a determination of a question is slightly higher than the doctrines that have only been registered in the context of *rationes principales* (i.e. “Attacks” and “Refutations” in the table). We also notice that the attacking doctrines have a lower instance-to-doctrine proportion than the other two categories. This means that they are re-used less often across different commentaries than the refutation and determination doctrines. There is therefore a wider spread of doctrines in the *rationes* than in determinations and refutations.

Of course these doctrines are not evenly distributed across the commentators. Half the doctrines are only used once or twice, while 75% occur six times or less. The upper quartile (the most common 25%) has a range of 6 to 32 instances of the doctrines, with the idea that the possible intellect is completely indeterminate before actualization (P4) at the highest end of the range with 32 instances. As we will see in the following analysis, this and a small group of other doctrines are highly productive and can be used in different ways and contexts by the commentators. While we have this small group of doctrines that are very commonly used, there is also a long tail of doctrines with relatively few instances. These relations are illustrated in figure 3.1 on the facing page where the amount of instances per doctrine is plotted. When we look at the distribution of unique and shared doctrines (i.e. doctrines used by a single or multiple authors respectively), we see however that most authors have relatively few unique doctrines, as more than half the commentators have only 13.5% or less of their doctrines that are unique. But we have a small group of commentators, Anonymus Digby 55, John of Jandun, and Siger of Brabant, and Radulphus Brito, with a high proportion of unique doctrines (between 25 and 60%).<sup>5</sup>

The main problems of the commentators can be split into four different areas, three constitutive and one peripheral. The constitutive problems are:

<sup>5</sup> In fact the frequencies of doctrine instances, the proportion of unique and shared doctrines, and the absolute frequencies of unique doctrines all seem to approximate a power law of distribution (figure 3.1 on the next page exemplifies this, but there are more graphs in the online notebook). Whether this reflects a general tendency of shared and unique doctrines in these texts would be an interesting subject for a future study.




Figure 3.1: Doctrine to instance proportions of all doctrines in the chapter. Each bar represents a doctrine.

- (1) Is the intellect intelligible?
- (2) Is the intellect intelligible to itself?
- (3) How does such self-knowledge come about?

The peripheral question is (4) how is general knowledge about the intellect acquired? This last question can arise in or be affected by any of the three constitutive questions in different ways. The answer to each of the constitutive questions assumes the affirmative answer of the preceding, while the peripheral and more general question only assumes an affirmative answer of the first constitutive question. The commentaries naturally move within a spectrum which is here artificially demarcated by these presented problems. Any reader of these texts will recognize that these distinctions are not necessarily reflected in the texts, as the commentators combine discussions of these different areas of analysis in their work.

Can the intellect be an object of knowledge? This most fundamental question is the starting point of the whole analysis, but it is not rare to find it postulated or tacitly assumed. And often it is not even addressed in the part of a commentary that concerns *De anima* 3.4, as it may already have been dealt with in the commentary on book one. As we shall see in the next chapter, the initial questions of a commentary very often take up questions of method, possibility, and process of conducting a science of the soul. Some commentators also discuss whether the agent intellect is intelligible. When it is accepted that the intellect can be an object of knowledge, the next question is whether that knowledge can be acquired reflexively. That would mean that an individual intellect is both the subject and object of the act of knowledge. This is a principled question that focuses on the ontology of the intellect: Is the intellect a substance that has the

ability of engaging in a reflexive activity? It is traditionally assumed that such substances exist. The prime mover and the separate intelligences (God and the angels in theological parlance) are such immaterial substances able to reflect on themselves. But the human intellect is the first actuality of matter that is potentially alive (or a constitutive part of such a form), which means that it is closely connected with a body. Does that impose any restrictions on its ability of self-reflection?

The commentators do agree, when they address the question explicitly, that the intellect is intelligible and self-intelligible. The simple intelligibility of the intellect is established by pointing to the fact that it can become any object of knowledge. This means of course that when it becomes an object of knowledge, it is also itself intelligible. But it does not mean that the intellect is intelligible unconditionally. The intellect is only intelligible once it has been actualized by an external object of knowledge. To further support that the intellect is also intelligible to itself, a commentator may appeal to the phenomenal awareness that we seem to experience during the processing of intellection. The experience of thinking makes the intellect aware that it is disposed towards such activities and hence must have some faculty that is able to carry it out. But it can also be argued from a more focused process of self-observation where the intellect is able to reflect on its own activity. The commentators can be vague about how that self-reflection is realized, but references to Neo-Platonic doctrines of reflexivity are not rare.

If we assume or argue that the intellect is self-intelligible, we may ask how that knowledge comes about. Is it possible to describe the elements, processes, or possible steps involved in the acquisition of that knowledge? We find discussion of this especially in the question raised by many on whether the intellect knows itself through its own substance or through something else. This is a reflection of the *aporia* that Aristotle himself raises at the end of *De anima* 3.4, which is also regularly the occasion for raising the question of self-knowledge in the commentaries.<sup>6</sup> If the intellect is able to know and understand itself without any external help, either by perpetually having such a knowledge or by being able to initiate it on its own accord, the intellect may be said to have an essential self-knowledge. It is then part of the essence of the intellect to have knowledge of itself. That would be a version of the Augustinian and Avicennean model outlined in the preceding chapter.<sup>7</sup> If that is not the case, the self-knowledge will be accidental and contingent on some factors that lie partly outside the intellect's power. Such an interpretation would be more in line with what can be found in some of the Greek commentators, in particular Alexander of Aphrodisias, and later in Averroes and a few of the earlier medieval commentators.<sup>8</sup> The arts masters included here also subscribe to that solution: They all argue that the intellect knows itself through the intermediate actualization by an external species.

We may accept that the intellect can be an object of self-knowledge, but how do we acquire knowledge about the intellect? This is the more general and peripheral question mentioned above that also makes occasional appearances in this context. Such knowledge can either be acquired through pure observation of beings possessed with intellect, through introspection

<sup>6</sup> The *aporia* is also treated on pages 28–30 of section 2.1.3.

<sup>7</sup> See in particular parts of sections 2.3 to 2.4 on pages 34–37.

<sup>8</sup> See in particular sections 2.2 on page 30 and on pages 38–39 in section 2.4 as well as on pages 47–48.

of the processes of a particular intellect, or through a combination of both. The assumption that self-knowledge plays into knowledge about the intellect more generally demands that we are able to explain not only that self-knowledge is possible, but also that it can yield general knowledge about the intellect. If we want to argue that knowledge about the intellect is acquired *solely* from self-knowledge, we need to show convincingly that introspection can yield knowledge of the third level mentioned in the previous section. An alternative strategy would be to combine introspection with observation of the activities of other beings endowed with intelligence, and in a combined effort of internal and external observation produce a coherent knowledge of the intellect. Such problems will re-appear in the next chapter where such discussions in the introductory questions are analysed. As a preface to that treatment we will see here how it is also a subject within the potentially more narrow discussion of intellectual self-knowledge in the commentaries on book three.

## 3.2 Arguments

Here I map the many to the commentaries where they occur. This survey of the network will show which arguments are used in different contexts and by the different commentators. In this way some relations within the material will start to emerge. In the next section those relations will be further expanded and elaborated. The doctrines included can be found in the simplified list in section A on page 241 of the appendix. To keep the presentation of the doctrines as systematic as possible, this analysis contains many highly nested sections. Hopefully the impediment that gives on readability is made up for in our ability to reference the atomic parts of this catalogue of arguments. The material is generally organized and presented in accordance with its relative prevalence in the commentaries.

The section contains four subsections:

- (1) Intelligibility and self-intelligibility.
- (2) Process of self-knowledge: By external species.
- (3) Self-knowledge by own species.
- (4) The possible intellect knowing the agent intellect.

The first three sections constitute the core part of this section detailing the arguments of whether and how intellectual self-knowledge is possible. The last section addresses the more specific perspective of the relation between the possible and agent intellect.

In the first three sections the arguments of the commentators will be used and analysed freely across the three, as the separation of the issues into three sections is only partially reflected in the sources. The phrasings of the questions analysed in these sections and the commentators presenting them are:

- (1) Whether the intellect is intelligible. Presented by Anonymus Bazán and Brito.
- (2) Whether the intellect can know its own act of knowing. Presented by Anonymus Bazán, Brito, Jandun.

- (3) Whether the (possible) intellect is able to know itself. Presented by Anonymus Digby 55, Jandun.
- (4) Whether the intellect is intelligible in itself just as its proper object. Presented by Anonymus Assisi.
- (5) Whether the intellect knows itself by its own essence/substance or by something else. Presented by Faversham, Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II, Dinsdale, Wyle.
- (6) Whether the intellect knows itself by a species. Presented by Anonymus Digby 55.

Each question by any commentator may contain material that could pertain to any of the three first subsections, but in general the material is distributed in the following way: Items 1 to 4 contain material that is analysed in the first and second section. Items 5 mostly contain material that is analysed in the second section, while the last item almost exclusively contain material that pertains to the third section.

Finally, we will treat the more narrow topic of the relation between the possible and agent intellect in the last section. It is treated in two questions:

- (1) Whether the possible intellect can know the agent intellect. Presented by Anonymus Bazán, Siger of Brabant, and Brito.
- (2) Whether the possible intellect knows the agent intellect with an unchanged and numerically identical intellection. Presented by Jandun

### 3.2.1 Intelligibility and self-intelligibility

It does not follow by necessity from the fact that the intellect can be an object of knowledge that it can be the object of its own knowledge. Usually these two aspects are treated as one and the same question by the commentators, but two commentators, Anonymus Bazán and Brito, at least try to separate them formally.<sup>9</sup> We will also see arguments from Anonymus Digby 55, Anonymus Assisi, and Jandun.<sup>10</sup> The main conclusion is that all commentators subscribe to the same basic argument, that the intellect only can be an object of knowledge once it has been actualized by an external species (P13), which results in the similar limitation in relation to self-intelligibility (P8). As already pointed out, several of included treatments straddle both the question of intelligibility and the process of self-knowledge, so they will be covered in both this and the following subsection.

#### 3.2.1.1 Positive arguments

We will begin with the narrow case of general intelligibility and then move on to the more typical discussion that includes self-intelligibility.

<sup>9</sup> Anonymus Bazán III.9, Brito III.10.

<sup>10</sup> The questions are to be found in Anonymus Digby 55 III.11, APP 281.2, Anonymus Bazán III.9, pp. 483–85, Anonymus Bazán III.10, pp. 485–86, Brito III.10, pp. 187–191, Brito III.11, pp. 192–193, Anonymus Assisi q. 15, APP 277.2–3, Jandun III.13, APP 321.2–3, Jandun III.27, APP 324.2.

### 3.2.1.1.1 *Intelligible through external species (P13)*

- (1) Any actualized thing can be an object of knowledge.
- (2) The intellect is actualized by an external species.
- (3) ∴ The intellect can be an object of knowledge through actualization by an external species.

Anonymus Bazán and Brito present this argument. Brito explains that the intellect potentially is all intelligible objects, and therefore also itself intelligible, but only in a qualified sense. The intellect may somehow be intelligible in itself and be some sort of act, he argues, but it cannot be known unconditionally by us in this terrestrial condition, because our cognition takes its starting point in sense perception. So because the intellect and its activities are not available to sense perception, it cannot be known by humans except by its knowledge of something else.<sup>11</sup>

Anonymus Bazán gives us only a short determination where he focuses on how the intellect can become any intelligible thing, but leaves out the important qualification that the intellect only is intelligible once actualized. So although he holds that it is intelligible by an external species, it is unclear from his determination if the intellect always is actually intelligible in its state of potentially knowing all objects of knowledge. As his description of the possible intellect as intelligible is not really qualified, he owes us some stronger arguments to show that non-restricted intelligibility follows from the *potential* identity with any intelligible objects.<sup>12</sup>

In question III.13 Jandun discusses concomitant (*i.e.* non-successive) and necessary self-reflection that takes place during the process of intellection (P54). As part of that he quickly determines what he clearly considers the simple part of the question, namely *that* the intellect is intelligible to itself, but his argument actually only shows that the intellect may be intelligible. He says that as the intellect is capable of knowing any thing, and the act of the intellect is a thing (*ens*), it can know the act of the intellect (P7).<sup>13</sup> That is his laconic answer to the question of *whether* the intellect is self-intelligible, but it of course entails the necessity of an actualization by an external species.<sup>14</sup> From this he seems to assume self-intelligibility.

### 3.2.1.1.2 *Self-intelligible through external species (P8)*

- (1) The intellect is potentially any intelligible object.
- (2) When the intellect is actualized by the species of an intelligible object, it can know itself.
- (3) ∴ The intellect has the capacity to know itself.

This argument is a stronger version of the just presented P13. This provides a very fundamental argument that every commentator makes implicit or explicit use of. We should notice here that the minor of the syllogism is the knob of the whole argument and the main challenge.

<sup>11</sup> Brito III.10, pp. 187.21–188.33.

<sup>12</sup> Anonymus Bazán III.9, p. 483.28–33.

<sup>13</sup> Jandun III.13, APP 321.27–32 and III.27, APP 324.34–37.

<sup>14</sup> In the next section we will outline his further arguments for the *process* of self-knowledge, but it is also analysed in the detailed study in section 5.1.1 on page 163.

For it is not yet clear here how the intellect can actually know itself once actualized. We will here see how these commentators differ slightly in their exposition of this argument, and the next section will dig into exactly how the different commentators support the minor in this argument as we analyse their exposition of the process of self-knowledge.

Anonymus Bazán presents the following short syllogism: The intellect is somehow (*quomodo*) in potency towards all objects of knowledge; the act of knowing is somehow intelligible; hence, the intellect knows its own act of knowing. To this is added a short note on the order of these activities: First the intellect knows its primary objects of knowledge, but then, secondarily and consequently, it knows its own act of knowing (P14).<sup>15</sup>

The other commentators do not hedge their argument as Anonymus Bazán and cut out the ‘somehow’. Anonymus Assisi simply states that in itself the intellect is only potentially intelligible as it is receptive to all intelligible forms, but once it is actualized by any such form, it is also able to know itself. During that argument he makes explicit reference to *Liber de causis* (which he knows is by an anonymous author) and its doctrine of *reditio completa*.<sup>16</sup> Anonymus Digby 55 presents a very similar argument which also includes the idea of the successive order of knowledge (cf. P14).<sup>17</sup>

Brito distinguishes his question on self-intelligibility into whether the intellect can know its own powers and its own activity. He first argues that the intellect engage in an act of self-observation (P5) which gives it knowledge of its own powers through inspection of its activities. This of course requires preceding actualization and hence implies that the soul is self-intelligible through an external species (P7), but also a successive model of self-knowledge (P14), as the external species provides the required initial actualization of the intellect, although he does not spell that out explicitly.<sup>18</sup> This already implies that the intellect can also know its own activity, but he supports it further. Given that a superior faculty is more powerful than an inferior, and given that the power of perception can perceive its own activity, he concludes that this must also be the case for the intellectual power (P53). He further argues, also with reference to the *reditio completa*-doctrine of *Liber de causis*, that all immaterial powers are able to reflect on their own activity in a complete return to themselves (P5), which differentiates it from the bodily faculty of sense perception.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>15</sup> Anonymus Bazán III.10, p. 485.30–36. This distinction between stepwise or discursive and immediate knowledge may go back to Aristotle to some extent as we find him describing the non-discursive and immediate self-knowledge of the divine thought in *Metaphysica* 12.9, 1075a5–7. But it is much more developed in the later Neo-Platonic tradition, cf. the sources in Sorabji 2005a: 90–3.

<sup>16</sup> Anonymus Assisi q. 15, APP 277.25–278.8, cf. Anonymus *Liber de causis*, XV.124–125. This is based on the identity of knower and known, and it is emphasized that this self-reflective return does not require any external support or impulse (Anonymus *Liber de causis*, XV.126 and XV.128).

<sup>17</sup> Anonymus Digby 55 III.12, APP 281.7–12. On the successive self-knowledge, cf. also 3.2.2.1.6 on page 77.

<sup>18</sup> Brito III.11, ll. 34–55.

<sup>19</sup> Brito III.11, ll. 56–65. We will get back to some further details of Brito’s discussion on page 76.

### 3.2.1.2 Challenges to intelligibility

On the question of the mere intelligibility Radulphus Brito and Anonymus Bazán agree on all three of their *rationes*, so we will present those arguments first. In the next section we will see that the challenges to the more typical question of self-intelligibility have a wider spread, and are more numerous, but that Brito and Anonymus Bazán still run in parallel.

#### 3.2.1.2.1 *The possible intellect is not actualized (N21)*

- (1) All that is intelligible is actual.
- (2) The intellect is not actual.
- (3) ∴ The intellect is not intelligible.

This attack hinges on the definition of the possible intellect as indeterminate. The argument fails to qualify the indeterminacy, so that is all the commentator needs to do to refute it. Anonymus Bazán attacks the challenge by stating that the possible intellect is actualized, although not by itself, but by another species, which then makes it available for intellection.<sup>20</sup> Brito presents the similar argument that the intellect is known by its relation (*habitus*) towards the intellection (of another species) by which it is actualized.<sup>21</sup> They thus both refer to the basic idea of actualization by an external species (P7) as the basis for the refutation.

#### 3.2.1.2.2 *Identity of mover and moved (N3)*

- (1) The same thing cannot be mover and moved at the same time and in the same respect.
- (2) If the intellect knew itself, it would be mover and moved in the same time and in the same respect.
- (3) ∴ The intellect cannot know itself.

Here we see that although this is formally an argument against self-knowledge, it is also used in this context of the intelligibility, as those two problems obviously overlap conceptually for the commentators. Anonymus Bazán and Brito refute the argument in completely parallel fashion: This argument only holds when you speak of movement in a narrow sense (*proprie*), not when it is used metaphorically, as is the case with the type of non-physical movement that takes place in the process of intellection (P41).<sup>22</sup>

#### 3.2.1.2.3 *Requirement of sense perception (N4)*

- (1) Anything that is intelligible is available to sense perception.
- (2) The intellect is not available to sense perception
- (3) ∴ The intellect cannot be intelligible.

<sup>20</sup> Anonymus Bazán III.9, p. 482.5–11 and 483.34–41.

<sup>21</sup> Brito III.10, ll. 2–4 and 93–98.

<sup>22</sup> See Brito III.10, ll. 1–18 and ll. 93–118 and Anonymus Bazán III.9, ll. 1–25 and ll. 34–59.

Anonymus Bazán's answer to this challenge may raise some eyebrows: The intellect is not available to sense perception ("non cadit sub sensu") in itself, but its objects are sensible. And when it has acquired knowledge of those sensible objects, it becomes itself available to sense perception (P47).<sup>23</sup> This should mean that once the possible intellect has been informed by a species that has its origin in an object that is available to sense perception, which means that it is material, it becomes itself available to sense perception. Which again would mean that the possible intellect becomes material once actualized.

This doctrine is not mirrored by Brito. He says that the intellect is not perceptible, neither in itself, nor by its activity. Instead he refutes the initial argument with the statement that something can be intelligible by itself or by the knowledge of something else (P1). That which is intelligible secondarily need not be available to sense perception, as it is sufficient that the objects by which it is known are perceptible. Fortunately, that is exactly the case for the possible intellect, and he can therefore maintain its intelligibility as well as its immateriality.<sup>24</sup>

### 3.2.1.3 Challenges to self-intelligibility

The preceding short list of challenges to the mere intelligibility of the intellect is dwarfed by this more extensive list of challenges concerning self-intelligibility. In particular Jandun is generous with his arguments.

#### 3.2.1.3.1 *Proper objects (N16)*

- (1) The intellect knows its objects of knowledge.
- (2) The intellect is not its own object of knowledge.
- (3) ∴ The intellect is not intelligible to itself.

In their subsequent question on the self-intelligibility of the intellect Anonymus Bazán and Brito address this in parallel fashion: They both return to the distinction between primary and secondary intellection (P1), holding that the object of primary intellection is the species of external objects, but that this does not hinder the intellection of those objects in being the object of secondary intellection.<sup>25</sup> And in this way the intellect has knowledge of its own activity.

#### 3.2.1.3.2 *Analogy with sense and sensation (N12)*

- (1) As the senses stand to sensation, so does the intellect stand to knowing.
- (2) The senses cannot perceive their own sensation
- (3) ∴ The intellect cannot know its own knowing.

<sup>23</sup> Anonymus Bazán III.9, ll. 53–59.

<sup>24</sup> Brito III.10, p. 190.112–118.

<sup>25</sup> Brito III.11 ll. 3–6 and 66–70, Anonymus Bazán III.10, ll. 6–10 and 30–36, mirroring their solution to the related challenge in 3.2.1.2.2 on the previous page.

Anonymus Bazán and Brito share this challenge with Jandun, and they answer, in almost unison, that the similarity does not hold, as the reason the senses cannot perceive their own activity is their corporeal nature (P20), while the immateriality of the intellect makes it able to revert (*reflectere*) on itself and in this way have knowledge of its own activity (P5).<sup>26</sup>

### 3.2.1.3.3 Requirement of sense perception (N4)

- (1) Anything that is intelligible is available to sense perception.
- (2) The intellect is not available to sense perception.
- (3) ∴ The intellect cannot be intelligible.

Brito and Anonymus Bazán both raised the problem in the preceding question and they also both solve it in the same way as in that context. See the presentation of their solutions above in section 3.2.1.2.3 on page 67.<sup>27</sup> Jandun also presents this challenge. His answer might seem slightly confusing, but I take him to say that the intellect is not perceptible by itself, nor by its intellection of perceptible objects, but by having a relation to perceptible objects as an effect is related to its cause, and this means that it becomes intelligible. I therefore understand this as an example of the distinction between primary and secondary intelligibility (P1).<sup>28</sup> This is confirmed by his parallel refutation in the later question (III.27) that is much more in line with that of Brito.<sup>29</sup>

### 3.2.1.3.4 Infinite regress (N10)

- (1) If the intellect knows its own activity, that knowledge constitutes a second order activity.
- (2) If that new activity is intelligible, then the knowledge of that constitutes a third order activity.
- (3) From this an infinite regress arises.
- (4) Infinite regresses are impossible.
- (5) ∴ The intellect cannot know itself by a separate activity.

Brito adds this to his catalogue of challenges, and refutes it with the interesting point that in the case of the intellect the infinite regress is not a problem, because the intellect can reflect on itself and its own activity infinitely.<sup>30</sup>

<sup>26</sup> Anonymus Bazán III.10, ll. 17–21 and ll. 50–56; Brito III.11, p. 191.21–25 and 194.83–88; Jandun III.13, APP 321.4–7 and APP 322.75–78, but also Jandun III.27, APP 324.3–6 and APP 327.27–34. See also 3.2.2.1.2 on page 75.

<sup>27</sup> Brito III.11, ll. 7–12 and 71–74, Anonymus Bazán III.10, ll. 37–49.

<sup>28</sup> Jandun III.13, APP 321.8–11 and APP 322.79–323.6.

<sup>29</sup> Jandun III.27, APP 327.35–328.4.

<sup>30</sup> Brito III.11, ll. 13–20 and ll. 75–82.

3.2.1.3.5 *Simultaneous act and potency of the same thing (P49)*

- (1) The same thing cannot be in act and potency at the same time and in the same respect.
- (2) That which is able to know is potentially that which it knows.
- (3) That which knows is actually that which is known.
- (4) Thus, the intellect would be both in act and potency at the same time and in the same respect.
- (5) ∴ The intellect cannot know itself.

Jandun presents this challenge and solves it with reference to the double nature of the intellect. It is in act and potency at the same time with respect to its own knowing, but for different reasons (*rationes*). It is a receptive potency with respect to its possible nature and a active potency with respect to its active nature.<sup>31</sup>

3.2.1.3.6 *Identity of mover and moved (N3)*

- (1) The same thing cannot be mover and moved at the same time and in the same respect.
- (2) If the intellect knows itself, it will be mover and moved at the same time and in the same respect.
- (3) ∴ The intellect cannot know itself.

This similar argument was also raised in the above section on intelligibility (cf. 3.2.1.2.2 on page 67), and is here given by Anonymus Digby 55 and Jandun. Anonymus Digby 55 argues that this objection only holds for the composite act of physical movement, not for the simple act of intellection.<sup>32</sup> Jandun on the other hand argues very briefly that the intellect does not move itself by its own species, but by another species, and thus an example of the distinction between primary and secondary intelligibility and actualization (P1).<sup>33</sup>

3.2.1.3.7 *Self-movement is impossible (N28)*

- (1) What cannot move the intellect cannot be known.
- (2) Nothing can move itself.
- (3) ∴ The possible intellect cannot know the possible intellect.

This argument, that is almost identical to the preceding, is presented by Jandun.<sup>34</sup> He refutes it by holding that the mediating external species solves the problem of self-movement. As he presents it, the problem of self-movement would still hold if the intellect were held to know itself by its own species.<sup>35</sup>

<sup>31</sup> Jandun III.27, APP 328.5–11.

<sup>32</sup> Anonymus Digby 55 III.12, APP 281.13–15.

<sup>33</sup> Jandun III.27, APP 328.33–34.

<sup>34</sup> Jandun III.27, APP 324.24–29.

<sup>35</sup> Jandun III.27, APP 328.33–34.

3.2.1.3.8 *Accidents do not act on their subjects (N27)*

- (1) Knowledge takes place by an affection of the intellect.
- (2) Accidents cannot affect the subjects in which they are properties.
- (3) An act of intellection is an accident of the intellect.
- (4) ∴ The act of intellection cannot affect the intellect, and hence it cannot be known by the intellect.

Jandun presents this objection that is related to the problems of self-affection we see concerning the mover and the moved. He argues that knowing is an affectation; accidents do not act on the subjects to which they belong, and since it is implied that an act of intellection is an accidental property of the intellect, the act of intellection cannot act on the intellect. He does not give a refutation to this objection.<sup>36</sup>

3.2.1.3.9 *Multiple simultaneous objects of intellection (P49)*

- (1) Simultaneous knowledge of object and act of knowing results in multiple simultaneous objects of knowledge.
- (2) The intellect cannot have multiple simultaneous objects of knowledge.
- (3) ∴ The intellect cannot have a simultaneous knowledge of its own act of knowing.

Jandun presents this argument. He does not present a refutation but simply states that the simultaneous knowledge of multiple objects is actually what happens, so this amounts to a rejection of the minor.<sup>37</sup> He considers the question of whether multiple things can be known at the same time through different acts of intellection to be a more difficult problem which he suggests to postpone to a commentary on *Metaphysica*.<sup>38</sup>

3.2.1.3.10 *Comparison with other objects of knowledge*

Jandun collapses two arguments into a single argument in a double-edged presentation. The first argument is Aristotle's own (N18):

- (1) All intelligibles are intelligible by the same form.
- (2) The intellect is intelligible and has reason by one form.
- (3) If 2 then all intelligibles are intelligible by the same form as the intellect.
- (4) If 3 then all intelligibles have reason.
- (5) 4 is false.

<sup>36</sup> Jandun III.13, APP 321.12–15.

<sup>37</sup> Jandun III.13, APP 321.16–23 and APP 323.7–13.

<sup>38</sup> As it turns out, he cannot wait that long as he gets back to the problem in the later question III.32.

(6) ∴ The intellect cannot be intelligible.

This is presented to reject the possibility of substantial self-knowledge.<sup>39</sup> The other branch of his argument holds that the consequence of the alternative accidental self-knowledge is also absurd (N22):

(1) The intellect is known in the same way as other objects of knowledge.

(2) Other objects of knowledge are not self-intelligible.

(3) ∴ The intellect is not self-intelligible.

In the refutation the first part of the argument is addressed by the doctrine of accidental self-knowledge that requires actualization by external species (which makes the intellect self-reflexive), while the second part is addressed by distinguishing the intellect from other objects of knowledge by its immateriality.<sup>40</sup>

#### 3.2.1.3.11 *No self-reception (N38)*

(1) The possible intellect only has knowledge by reception of the species of the object.

(2) Nothing can receive its own species.

(3) ∴ The intellect cannot have knowledge of itself.

Anonymus Digby 55 presents this challenge, which holds some interesting perspectives, because it addresses the question whether the intellect knows itself by its own species or by the species of some external object. He gives it as a follow-up on the challenge about mover and moved (3.2.1.3.6 on page 70), but he barely gives an answer. His answer is simply that it is solved in the same way as the first challenge.<sup>41</sup> By this he must mean that yes, it is true that in the physical world the principle holds that only that which lacks a property can receive it, but that it does not hold for the intellect. If that is his intention, it should imply that he thinks the intellect actually receives its own species. As that is the doctrine he presents in the following question in his commentary, we will get back to that below in section 3.2.3 on page 87.

#### 3.2.1.3.12 *Essential self-intelligibility by immateriality (P23)*

(1) A species is not required to know immaterial substances.

(2) The intellect is an immaterial substance.

(3) ∴ The intellect is intelligible in itself.

<sup>39</sup> This is also used by Dinsdale, see 3.2.2.2.5 on page 84.

<sup>40</sup> Jandun III.27, APP 324.14–23 and APP 328.12–24.

<sup>41</sup> Anonymus Digby 55 III.12, APP 281.16–20.

Anonymus Assisi gives this argument, which does not actually attack the self-intelligibility, but rather the doctrine of its accidental self-intelligibility. As Anonymus Assisi phrases his argument it is a matter of whether the intellect is *separable*, not *separate*. But we also see that it effectively amounts to the same as he supports the minor, that the intellect is separable, by pointing out that it is a substance that is immaterial in itself (*substantia simpliciter immaterialis*). It is refuted by maintaining the initial potentiality of the possible intellect.<sup>42</sup>

### 3.2.1.3.13 *Essential self-intelligible by self-identity (N25)*

- (1) The intellect is identical with that which it knows when it knows.
- (2) That which is known is intelligible.
- (3) The intellect knows by its own essence.
- (4) ∴ The intellect is intelligible by its own essence.

Anonymus Assisi presents this variation on the preceding argument in support of substantial self-knowledge. He does however not succeed as he forgets the further qualification that the intellect knows (and thus actualized as its object of knowledge) by its own essence. Without this crucial point, all that follows is the transference of the intelligibility of the object of knowledge to the subject in the act (P8). We know that this is his intention of the argument from reading his refutation where he argues that the intellect is not a known thing according to its essence in such a way that it would be always possible to know it.<sup>43</sup>

### 3.2.1.4 **Summary**

In this section I have analysed the doctrines of five commentators on the intelligibility and self-intelligibility of the intellect, Anonymus Bazán, Brito, Jandun, Anonymus Assisi, and Anonymus Digby 55. The doctrines we have analysed have been spread across eight questions by these commentators. The distinction in the analysis into intelligibility and self-intelligibility reflects this distinction into two different questions in the latter two of these three.

Anonymus Bazán, Brito, and Anonymus Assisi answer the question whether the intellect is intelligible, and they all argue that it is intelligible through actualization by an external species. In the questions on self-intelligibility that are presented by Anonymus Bazán, Brito, Jandun, and Anonymus Digby 55 the same basic argument is used. Anonymus Bazán and Anonymus Digby 55 also explicitly separate the knowledge of the primary object and the intellect itself into two separate and temporally distinct activities (P14), while the same idea is a clear implication of the analysis of Brito. Unlike the other commentators Jandun emphasizes that the intellect knows itself and its primary object of knowledge by one single act of knowledge in one of his two questions, but in the other question he presents a successive model of self-knowledge.<sup>44</sup>

<sup>42</sup> Anonymus Assisi q. 15, APP 277.4–7 and APP 278.34–36.

<sup>43</sup> Anonymus Assisi q. 15, APP 277.8–11 and APP 278.37–279.10.

<sup>44</sup> Compare Jandun III.13, APP 322.50–59 and Jandun III.27, APP 326.16–25. This apparent conflict is treated in the later in-depth study in section 5.1 on page 161.

Finally, Brito and Anonymus Assisi agree in connecting the reflexive properties of the intellect once actualized with reference to *Liber de causis*.

When we turn to the challenges of the commentators we see a much wider range of material. Unique objections are the norm rather than the exception, but we see Anonymus Bazán, Brito, and Jandun share two challenges that involve sense perception (N4 and N12). The first of those, that the intellect must be available to sense perception, is the most popular argument in this group of commentaries, as it is instantiated a total of six times by the three authors (two times each, as they all have two questions on the subject). Anonymus Bazán and Brito also share among them the challenge of what the proper object of knowledge for the intellect is (N16), the challenge of the identity of mover and moved (N3), and the requirement that any object of knowledge is actualized (N21). The remaining eight challenges are only presented by one of the commentators, and in all but one case that commentator is Jandun. Anonymus Assisi differs from the others in his challenges, which are all unique within the group and they do not argue against intelligibility, but rather for substantial self-knowledge. His solutions are however not doctrinally different from the other commentators.

### 3.2.2 Process of self-knowledge: By external species

A large group of commentators make the process of self-knowledge, and namely the conflict between the essential and accidental model of self-knowledge, the very explicit focus of one of their questions. A common way to raise such a question is to ask whether the intellect knows itself by its own essence (or substance) or by something else (Simon of Faversham, Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II, John Dinsdale, Henric de la Wyle).<sup>45</sup> But treatments involving this focus are by no means limited to questions with that particular phrasing. Anonymus Assisi presents a question that places itself between the two problems of whether and how the intellect knows itself.<sup>46</sup> As his question is whether the intellect is self-intelligible by itself, it has a lot in common with the discussion in the other commentaries treated here. Similarly, it is not uncommon in questions concerning the intelligibility of the intellect or parts of it to find detailed expositions of the process that establishes such self-knowledge. The commentators that are included systematically here are thus: Simon of Faversham, Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II, John Dinsdale, Henric de la Wyle, Anonymus Assisi, Radulphus Brito, and John of Jandun.

Faversham, Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II, Dinsdale, and Wyle present many of the same points. Anonymus Assisi and Brito approach the problem from a different angle and also present a different group of arguments, but they also share material with the four other commentators. Generally all commentators support the solution that the intellect knows itself through actualization by an external species (P3), as they emphasize the potentiality of the possible intellect prior to any external stimulus.

<sup>45</sup> Anonymus Digby 55 has a very similar phrasing, but he presents a substantially different doctrine and is therefore treated separately in section 3.2.3 on page 87.

<sup>46</sup> Anonymus Assisi q. 15, as already mentioned in section 3.2.1 on page 64.

### 3.2.2.1 Solutions

#### 3.2.2.1.1 Potentiality of the possible intellect (P4)

- (1) What is known must be in act.
- (2) The possible intellect is not in act until it knows something else.
- (3) ∴ Therefore the possible intellect cannot be known until it knows something else.

Several commentators find it important to emphasize the potentiality of the intellect anterior to any particular act of knowing. For that makes them able to deny that the intellect has essential self-knowledge, because it would contradict the minor which has strong support from the authority of Aristotle. This is also a way to show under which circumstances the intellect can actually be known.

Brito, Anonymus Assisi, Dinsdale, Faversham, and Anonymus Vaticanani 2170 II all support this general principle.<sup>47</sup> But we also note some more detailed correspondences. Anonymus Assisi, Dinsdale, and Faversham connect it to a passage in *Metaphysica* 9.9, 1051a29–31 that supports the idea that intelligibility requires actualization (P31), while Dinsdale, Faversham, and Anonymus Vaticanani 2170 II also compare this to the correlated phenomenon in objects of vision (P26). Brito, in his determination to the question of the intelligibility of the intellect (cf. section 3.2.1.1 on page 64), uses this argument to refute a *dubium* that questions how the possible intellect can ever be known, as something potential cannot be known, only something actual. Finally, Jandun also uses this strategy to argue against the doctrine of essential self-knowledge.<sup>48</sup>

#### 3.2.2.1.2 Self-reflection (P5)

Some commentators report on the ability of the intellect, once actualized, to turn on itself and know its own activity. The commentators of this period do not really get into reflections on the concept of attention or mental focus, but the idea seems very close. Anonymus Vaticanani 2170 II, Dinsdale, and Wyle present this idea that the intellect knows itself through some process of self-reflection, while Faversham only makes a short aside on the reflective abilities of the intellect under its terrestrial conditions.<sup>49</sup> Anonymus Assisi and Brito also present this doctrine, and they also make direct references to the doctrine of *reditio completa* of *Liber de causis*.<sup>50</sup>

<sup>47</sup> Brito III.10, ll. 71–88, Anonymus Assisi q. 15, APP 277.25–278.2, Dinsdale III.15, APP 313.26–314.47, Faversham q. 11, p. 335, Anonymus Vaticanani 2170 II III.11, APP 301.17–24.

<sup>48</sup> Jandun III.27, APP 325.30–326.15.

<sup>49</sup> Anonymus Vaticanani 2170 II III.11, APP 301.25–37, Dinsdale 99.19–24, Wyle III.10, APP 307.33–38, Faversham q. 11, p. 336.

<sup>50</sup> Anonymus Assisi q. 15, APP 278.3–8, Brito III.10, p. 193.62–65. This tendency was already mentioned above in section 3.2.1.1.2 on page 65. For some recent analyses of those doctrines in different but related traditions, see Cory 2017. Compare also the doctrines here with those of Brito (?) *Quaest. super Lib. de causis*, q. 20, p. 374–48. Correspondences between them are consonant with the hypothesis that he is the author of the commentary, cf. Costa and Borgo 2016: 287–97, Costa 2013. See also Anonymus Erffordensis *Quaest. super Lib. de causis*, qq. 26–27, pp. 447–452.

### 3.2.2.1.3 *Knowing the substance from observation of accidents (P2)*

We regularly find an expansion of the details about how the intellect knows itself, often in connection with the above mentioned doctrine of self-reflection. Commentators point to the procedure of getting to know the essence of the intellect based on observations of its activities and objects. Aristotle presents the approach in *De anima* 1.1, 402b9–22 and 2.4, 415a14–22, and we will also see how it plays a prominent role in the following chapter on the science of the soul. The commentators presenting this doctrine are Brito, Wyle, Anonymus Assisi, Dinsdale, and Jandun.<sup>51</sup> To give an example Dinsdale explains that when the intellect knows an object through its species then it can return to its own act and from that proceed to its power, and further from that power to its essence.<sup>52</sup>

Brito also goes more into how such self-reflection takes place and seems to argue both for the possibility of a vague knowledge acquired from a general sort of self-observation, and a more detailed knowledge (albeit maybe not exhaustive) gained through the this procedure of knowing the substance through the accidents. He argues that the power (*habitus*) of the intellect can be known both by its inheritance in the subject and through the nature of the intellect itself. The first point of that distinction is made phenomenologically, arguing that anyone who perceives himself to perform some activity can immediately conclude that he is disposed towards that activity, and that also goes for the workings of the intellect. The second point is supported by something very close to the procedure of knowledge acquisition from accidents. Since any knowledge of a power depends on observations of interaction with the object of that disposition, the intellect can arrive at a knowledge about its power through its knowledge of its objects.<sup>53</sup>

This argument also includes a remark on the status and type of that knowledge. In general you cannot have a knowledge about a disposition without knowing what that disposition is. But that requirement, Brito states, does not hold in the case of the soul in general. This point is made in a similarly phenomenological way: You may know that you have a soul without having a proper grasp of what the soul is (P71). The soul is not itself the principle of its activities unless it has some powers making it able to realize the activities, and hence when someone knows of the activities of the soul, he can conclude the existence of the powers supporting those without having a clear concept of the substance of the soul itself.<sup>54</sup> This is an example of the problematic relation between the self-knowledge acquired through introspection and the general knowledge of the soul as a universal that will be the focus of the following chapter on the science of the soul.

<sup>51</sup> Brito III.10, p. 188.34–39; Wyle III.10, APP 307.33–38; Anonymus Assisi q. 15, APP 278.9–15; Dinsdale 99.24–100.1; Jandun III.27, APP 326.16–25.

<sup>52</sup> Dinsdale III.15, 99.24–27: “Secundum quod intellectus noster intelligit obiectum per speciem potest redire super suum actum, et ab actu potest procedere ad suam potentiam, et a potentia ad essentiam ...”

<sup>53</sup> Brito III.11, p. 192.34–45, cf. III.10, pp. 189.89–92.

<sup>54</sup> Brito III.11, 192.46–55.

#### 3.2.2.1.4 *Prime matter (P10)*

A point that is often, but not always, made in the connection with the argument about the potentiality of the possible intellect is the idea that the intellect is akin to prime matter, as it is pure potentiality before any active knowledge.<sup>55</sup> Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II, Favershams, Brito, Anonymus Assisi, Dinsdale, and Wyle all present this point.<sup>56</sup> Brito explains that the possible intellect cannot be known in its initial potentiality, but once it has been actualized by an intelligible object it can distinguish between the informing part (the object) and the informed part (itself as subject). So first the composite is known and subsequently they can be distinguished as with matter and form.<sup>57</sup>

#### 3.2.2.1.5 *Chain of being (P12)*

Dinsdale, Favershams, Wyle, and Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II all note, either in connection with the potentiality of the possible intellect or the comparison with prime matter, the relation between the human intellect, the separate intelligences and the prime mover.<sup>58</sup> The prime mover, they say, knows itself and all other subordinate beings by its own substance, while the immaterial intelligences know themselves by their own essence but other entities by their species (Dinsdale says *similitudines*, Wyle rejects knowledge through species), and finally that the human intellect is not in act by itself and hence only termed possible. They therefore conclude that although the intellect has the ability to know in itself, it does not have the ability to be known in itself.<sup>59</sup> Later in his determination Favershams returns to these distinctions and describes how the human soul in the afterlife may have an existence similar to that of the separate intelligences as an eternal substantial self-knowledge (P46).<sup>60</sup> Interestingly, Anonymus Assisi avoids this problem, as he considers it to lie outside the purview of natural philosophy.<sup>61</sup>

#### 3.2.2.1.6 *Successive self-knowledge (P14)*

A relevant question to raise is whether the intellect and the primary object of knowledge are known simultaneously or successively. Doctrinally this model fits very well together with the

<sup>55</sup> For a related understanding of this in the discussion about the substance of the soul according to Anonymus Bazán and Anonymus Vennebusch, see Boer 2013: 142–4.

<sup>56</sup> Anonymus Assisi q. 15, APP 277.25–278.2, Favershams q. 11, p. 335, Brito III.10, p. 189.71–88, Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II III.11, APP 301.17–24, Dinsdale III.15, APP 313.26–314.47, Wyle III.10, APP 307.16–32. Brito even gives the reference to Aristotle *Phys.* 1.7.191a7–12.

<sup>57</sup> Brito III.10, p. 189.71–88.

<sup>58</sup> Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II III.11, APP 301.17–24; Dinsdale III.15, p. 99.12–19; Favershams q. 11, p. 335; Wyle III.10, APP 307.16–32.

<sup>59</sup> For instance Favershams: “Et quod ita est, intellectus noster habet quod intelligat sed non quod intelligatur nisi per aliud.” Favershams q. 11, p. 335.

<sup>60</sup> Favershams q. 11, p. 336. Note his use of abstraction: “Et haec sunt vera de intellectu coniuncto corpori, quia cum *abstrahitur* tunc potest seipsum intelligere per essentiam suam quia ad hoc quod aliquid actu intelligatur non requiritur aliud nisi quod sit abstractum et praesens virtuti intellectivi (*sic*).” Emphasis mine, but Sharp’s addition of ‘(*sic*)’. The abstraction of the intellect is both ontological, separating the soul from its material body, and epistemological, providing the immaterial representation of the intellect. Is this a pun or a philosophical point?

<sup>61</sup> Anonymus Assisi q. 15, APP 278.16–33.

procedure of acquiring substantial knowledge from accidents. A relatively straight forward and short presentation of that point is made by Anonymus Assisi who points out that the primary object of knowledge facilitates the knowledge of the intellect itself, which is therefore known after the primary object as been known.<sup>62</sup>

In his question on the intelligibility of the intellect Brito also addresses this, but more extensively.<sup>63</sup> According to him many present the following argument in favour of simultaneous knowledge of both objects (P49): When several objects are known by the same principle of intellection they are known simultaneously, and since that is the case for the intellect and its objects of knowledge, they are known at the same time. They argue that if the thing is both principle of intellection (*principium intelligendi*) and act of both things, then they are known simultaneously (as it must be accepted that two objects actualized by numerically the same cause will be actualized simultaneously). That is proved, he says, in the case of privation and relation (e.g. father and son have that predicate by the same relation). Thus they consider the major supported, while the minor is supported by the following argument: The same act of knowing is the principle of intellection belonging to the intellect (where it is present as in a subject) and belongs to the thing in the same way as an agent.<sup>64</sup> It has not been possible to identify examples of this argument before Brito, but it might be similar to the later argument of Jandun (presented below in 3.2.2.1.8).

Bruto argues against this position by cleverly distinguishing the modes of intellection governing the two different relations. He acknowledges that what has the same principle of intellection will be known simultaneously, but only if the two objects have the same object of intellect in the same way, *eodem modo*. And this is not the case for the intellect, as the activity of knowing is the principle of intellection of the thing primarily and actively, while it is only the principle of intellection of the intellect itself secondarily and subjectively.<sup>65</sup> He does not elaborate any further on the meaning of ‘actively’ (*active*) and ‘subjectively’ (*subiective*), but in the presentation of the *dubium* he mentions that the principle of intellection is in the intellect as in a subject, while it belongs to the thing like an agent.<sup>66</sup> This must mean that the intellect contains an intellection which first and foremost is directed at an external object. Once this connection is established, it can then *secondarily* turn on itself as the subject of that intellection and from that acquire knowledge about that activity and ultimately its substance.

Finally, we have the curious case of Jandun. In his second of two questions addressing intellectual self-knowledge in the possible intellect we find an elaborate and explicit statement of this doctrine of successive self-knowledge.<sup>67</sup> In that connection he also writes that the reason some think that self-knowledge is co-occurrent with knowledge of the primary objects of knowledge is because the interval is very short.<sup>68</sup> In the earlier question on whether the possible intellect can know its own act of knowing (III.13) he actually argues that the two

<sup>62</sup> Anonymus Assisi q. 15, APP 278.16–33.

<sup>63</sup> Brito III.10, p. 188.40–59.

<sup>64</sup> Brito III.10, p. 188.46–56.

<sup>65</sup> Brito III.10, pp. 188.60–189.67.

<sup>66</sup> Brito III.10, p. 188.53–55.

<sup>67</sup> Jandun III.27, APP 326.16–25.

<sup>68</sup> Jandun III.27, APP 327.12–19.

objects (the primary object and the knowledge of that primary object) are known by a single act of knowing. Later, in section 5.1.1 on page 163, I will argue that this is a different, unconscious, type of self-knowledge, and thus not the same as he refers to when he ascribes to other commentators the idea of simultaneous self-knowledge.

### 3.2.2.1.7 *Knowing is a blocking activity (P24)*

Jandun presents the argument that if the intellect had an essential power of self-knowledge, this would block for the possibility of knowing any other objects. The assumed premise here is that an essential self-knowledge is also a permanent, uninterrupted activity. And if it were accepted that the intellect can only engage in a single act of knowing at any time, then this essential self-knowledge could be a permanently blocking state, making any other acts of knowing impossible.<sup>69</sup> This argument is also presented in the context of the challenge that the intellect might know itself through an innate species which in effect makes it close to essential self-knowledge (P60, cf. 3.2.2.2.8 on page 85).<sup>70</sup>

### 3.2.2.1.8 *Simultaneous knowledge of act of knowing and primary object (P54)*

As just described Jandun presents the doctrine that the possible intellect entertains two simultaneous objects of knowledge, its primary object as well as the act of knowing that object.<sup>71</sup> This act of knowing the primary object is known through the act itself, thus constituting a simultaneous knowledge of the object and of the act. This doctrine is presented in the first of two questions that focus on intellectual self-knowledge in Jandun's commentary.<sup>72</sup> The view presented there is that during the act of knowing the simple structure of the intellect results in a concomitant self-reflection, but that phenomenon lies outside the scope of individual awareness. As already mentioned this apparent conflict with his later doctrine of successive self-knowledge will be discussed in the later study.

### 3.2.2.1.9 *Essential self-knowledge results in no self-knowledge (P67)*

This paradoxically sounding argument is presented by Jandun who argues that if the intellect were in a constant state of self-knowledge, it could never receive a knowledge of itself, because the intellect must be stripped of the form which it shall be able to receive and thus know. This of course cannot be the case if it is in a constant state of self-knowledge and hence a constant actualization of its own form. He maintains that this must be false by presenting a radical and demanding statement: Every rational individual (*quilibet intelligens*) has a personal experience of knowing the proper substance of one's own possible intellect, its difference from its power, from the agent intellect, and from the intelligible species received in it. Notice how this argument revolves around a phenomenological description of personal observation of internal activities and elements (and a rather radical one at that).<sup>73</sup>

<sup>69</sup> Jandun III.27, APP 325.11–29.

<sup>70</sup> This is also something we will get back to in section 5.1.2.1 on page 165.

<sup>71</sup> Cf. also 3.2.1.3.9 on page 71.

<sup>72</sup> Jandun III.13, APP 322.50–59.

<sup>73</sup> Jandun III.27, APP 325.11–29.

### 3.2.2.1.10 *Necessary for a science of the soul (P72)*

Intellectual self-knowledge can be viewed as a necessary condition for the possibility of a science of the soul. Faversham only makes the very cursory remark that without introspective self-knowledge no science of the soul would exist.<sup>74</sup> This indicates that to him such intellectual self-knowledge is at least a necessary, if not sufficient, requirement for such a science.

### 3.2.2.1.11 *Different from a science of the soul (P18)*

Dinsdale, Anonymus Vaticanani 2170 II, and Jandun each in their way distinguish between immediate self-knowledge as a result of simple reflection or introspection and the much more complicated and arduous task of acquiring certain knowledge about the intellect. On the one hand we have the particular self-knowledge occasioned by the individual intellect knowing its own activity, and on the other hand we have the subtle and detailed knowledge about the nature of the intellect. The challenges of acquiring the latter is the explanation why so many go so terribly wrong in that enterprise.<sup>75</sup> Wyle makes a similar but not identical point when he says that in a particular way the soul can have knowledge of itself according to its substance. As a science consists of knowledge about the essence of an object, the science of the soul could be seen as a sort of *intellectio secundum essentiam*, but he emphasizes that such knowledge is acquired through multiple reflections, and that it does not pertain to the question at hand.<sup>76</sup> It thus seems that these authors consider the knowledge resulting from self-reflection somehow incomplete (cf. P71).<sup>77</sup>

### 3.2.2.1.12 *Threefold knowledge from one species (P52)*

Anonymus Assisi presents the very interesting point that the same species causes three different acts of intellection in the intellect: The knowledge of the object, the particular single material instantiation of it, and the intellect. The object, which must be a universal, is known through abstraction from the phantasm and representation as species in the intellect. But, he says, if the intellect traverses from the known object to its species, from there to the phantasm and further to the singular sensible object from which the whole process starts, then that particular is known. Finally, if the traversal moves from the known object, to the act of knowing, then the intellect knows itself. All three acts of intellection spring from the same intelligible species.<sup>78</sup>

## 3.2.2.2 Challenges

Two challenges are widely across the texts, but aside from those it is not uncommon to find challenges only presented by a single or few of the commentators.

<sup>74</sup> Faversham q. 11, p. 336.

<sup>75</sup> Anonymus Vaticanani 2170 II III.11, APP 302.1–9; Dinsdale III.15, APP 314.48–55; Jandun III.27, APP 327.20–25.

<sup>76</sup> Wyle III.10, APP 308.5–8.

<sup>77</sup> The relation between intellectual self-knowledge and the science of the soul will be explored further in the following chapter.

<sup>78</sup> Anonymus Assisi q. 15, APP 278.16–33.

3.2.2.2.1 *Identity of knower and known and substantial self-knowledge (N5)*

- (1) In immaterial substances the same thing is knower and known.
- (2) The intellect is an immaterial substance, and identical with itself.
- (3) ∴ The intellect knows itself by itself.

Faversham, Anonymus Vaticanani 2170 II, Anonymus Assisi, Dinsdale, and Wyle face the challenge of the identity between subject and object in the process of knowing. Faversham and Anonymus Vaticanani 2170 II present the following structurally identical argument: In the immaterial substances the same thing is knower and known; the intellect is an immaterial substance; hence, the same thing is knower and known in the intellect. Using the conclusion as a major they continue: In the intellect the same thing is knower and known; the intellect knows by its own substance; hence, the intellect knows itself by its own essence. Wyle is not as close to the two as they are to each other, but his argument is virtually the same.<sup>79</sup>

Although it might look like they beg the question by using the statement that the intellect knows by its essence as a premise, that is not actually the case. Notice the difference between the premise stating that the intellect knows by its own substance without consideration of the location or type of object. That is provided by the major, which collapses the subject and object into one entity. That makes the following reasoning possible: The intellect knows its object by its own essence; the same thing is knower and known (subject and object); hence, intellect knows the intellect by its own essence. So although the truth of the minor is only postulated, it is a valid argument.

This is more than we can say about Dinsdale's solution. He arrives at the identity of the knower and known in the intellect by the same argument as his colleagues, but he does not include the premise that the intellect knows by its own essence, and hence simply concludes: In substances separate from matter the same thing is knowing and known; the intellect is separate from matter; hence, the same thing is knower and known in the intellect, hence the intellect knows itself by its own essence.<sup>80</sup> The additional conclusion does not follow from the premises.

In their refutations Dinsdale and Anonymus Vaticanani 2170 II basically agree that although the major is true, that in the immaterial knowing intellect there is an identity between subject and object, they deny that that always is the case for the human intellect. Since the intellect need to be actualized by an external species before this identity can take place, it is not in that state by its mere substance. In his argument Dinsdale also adds a comparison with the external senses.<sup>81</sup> Wyle gives the fresh reply that the identity between knower and known actually supports the idea of self-knowledge by an external species: When the intellect becomes identical with the form of an external object it is exactly by that identity that it knows itself.<sup>82</sup> In this way they all argue that there is no identity between knower and known before the intellect is actualized by the external species (P25).

<sup>79</sup> Anonymus Vaticanani 2170 II III.11, APP 301.3–5, Faversham III.11, p. 335, Wyle III.10, APP 307.2.

<sup>80</sup> Dinsdale III.15, APP 313.9–11.

<sup>81</sup> Dinsdale III.15, APP 315.1–8, Anonymus Vaticanani 2170 II III.11, APP 302.11–12.

<sup>82</sup> Wyle III.10, APP 308.9–13.

Faversham approaches it differently. He follows the others by making the actuality of the intellect conditional upon external stimuli and that makes it able to know itself. But he actually denies the minor of the first argument, that the intellect is an immaterial substance. Because that is only the case in the sense that it does not have matter itself, but since it is the act of matter, the identity between knower and known does not follow.<sup>83</sup> If the implication of the idea of identity between knower and known is an elucidation of formal identity between knower and known, that would be a controversial thing to deny in such an offhanded fashion. But based on the way he qualifies his refutation in comparison with the mode of human intellect, Faversham probably rather understands it to describe a complete identity of the intellect with itself, and thus a complete, immediate, non-discursive self-intellection. To deny the intellect that ability is a lot less radical.

### 3.2.2.2 *Human intellect and separate intelligences (N8)*

- (1) The separate intelligences know themselves by their own substance
- (2) The intellect is similar to the separate intelligences
- (3) ∴ The intellect knows itself by its own substance.

Faversham, Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II, Dinsdale, Anonymus Assisi, and Wyle present another close variant that compares human intellect and separate intelligences. Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II and Anonymus Assisi argue that things of the same genus share the same mode of knowing, and since the human intellect and the separate intelligences belong to the same genus, they also have the same mode of knowing. But since the separate intelligences know themselves by their own substance, so does the human intellect.<sup>84</sup> Similarly, Dinsdale and Faversham connect the two types of intellects. Dinsdale focuses on the intelligibility of the two entities, while Faversham more accurately focuses on their shared intellective nature. Wyle gets back to the idea of identity of knower and known in immaterial substances (P22). Finally, Anonymus Assisi uses this to argue that the human intellect is intelligible (rather than known) by its own essence. But all five commentators use the same minor, that the intelligences know themselves by their own substance.<sup>85</sup> So although formally these five arguments may differ, as their premises differ slightly in focus and formulation, they are functionally very similar in their focus on the shared species and hence shared mode of knowing.

Dinsdale, Wyle, Anonymus Assisi, and Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II refute this by pointing out that the intellect and the intelligences are more different than they are alike: The human intellect is determined and limited by its terrestrial existence.<sup>86</sup> This means that where immaterial intelligences are always in act, the human intellect is only fully actualized once it has received an external species and hence cannot be engaged in the eternal act of substantial self-knowledge.<sup>87</sup> To this Faversham adds some further reflections on the ontological differences

<sup>83</sup> Faversham III.11, p. 337.

<sup>84</sup> Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II III.11, APP 301.6–7, Anonymus Assisi q. 15, APP 277.18–19.

<sup>85</sup> Faversham III.15, p. 335, Dinsdale III.15, APP 315.9–12, Wyle III.10, APP 307.12–14.

<sup>86</sup> That is actually all that Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II says (APP 302.13–14). From there we need to fill in the rest ourselves.

<sup>87</sup> Dinsdale III.15, APP 315.9–12, Wyle III.10, APP 308.23–27, Anonymus Assisi q. 15, APP 279.15–21.

between the human and separate intellects as well as the prime mover, and Wyle toys with the idea of essential self-knowledge in the afterlife (P46) as did Faversham in an earlier part of the question (cf. 3.2.2.1.5 on page 77).<sup>88</sup>

### 3.2.2.2.3 *Infinite regress (N10)*

- (1) If the intellect knows its own activity, that knowledge constitutes a second order activity.
- (2) If that new activity is intelligible, then the knowledge of that constitutes a third order activity.
- (3) From this an infinite regress arises.
- (4) Infinite regresses are impossible.
- (5) ∴ The intellect cannot know itself by a separate activity.

Dinsdale, Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II, Brito, and Jandun share the challenge of the infinite regress.<sup>89</sup> It is here curious that Dinsdale, Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II, and Brito refute the challenge by simply saying that it is no problem in the case of matters of the intellect (P32). To quote Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II almost in full: “De infinito concedo, quia infinitum se convertere potest super suam operationem, et hoc non est inconveniens cum sit immaterialis sed necessarium.”<sup>90</sup> As earlier mentioned Brito also says that in the intellect the infinite regress is not a problem because it can reflect infinitely on itself and its activity.<sup>91</sup> Jandun does not try to refute this as he chooses another route in his argument, accepting simultaneous knowledge of multiple objects (P49) and thereby avoiding this dilemma.

### 3.2.2.2.4 *Neither by own nor external species*

Wyle is the only author that has been registered to give this argument. He holds that the intellect cannot be known by either its own nor an external species.<sup>92</sup> Knowledge by own species is excluded because that would (probably) mean that the species is created by the power of imagination (*virtus phantastica*). He leaves out parts of the argument, but we can imagine that this would be problematic because it would need to be based on a sense impression, and since the intellect is immaterial, that cannot take place (which would make it a version of N4, and hence very close to the argument presented below in section 3.2.2.2.6). On the other hand, self-knowledge by an external species is excluded because when something is known by the mediation of a species, there must be a proportionality between the thing known and the species representing it. That requirement cannot be fulfilled if the intellect should know

<sup>88</sup> Faversham III.11, pp. 336–37; Wyle III.10, APP 308.23–27. Notice that while Dinsdale says that the intelligences know themselves through inborn species, Faversham reserves that for another discussion.

<sup>89</sup> Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II III.12, APP 301.11–14; Brito III.11, p. 191.13–20; Jandun III.13, APP 321.33–322.49; Dinsdale III.15, APP 313.16–22.

<sup>90</sup> Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II III.11, APP 302.17–18, cf. Dinsdale III.15, APP 315.17–31.

<sup>91</sup> Brito III.11, p. 191.13–20 and 193.75–94.82.

<sup>92</sup> Wyle III.10, APP 307.7–11.

itself by another species, as it would never be a representation of it (N23). Against this it is argued that the intellect knows itself by an external species, but that there is no requirement of proportionality as the content of the species is irrelevant. All that is required is some (any) species that can actualize the intellect to make it available for self-reflection.<sup>93</sup>

#### 3.2.2.2.5 *Intelligibles and intellects (N18)*

- (1) All intelligibles are intelligible by the same form.
- (2) The intellect is intelligible and has reason by one form.
- (3) If 2 then all intelligibles are intelligible by the same form as the intellect.
- (4) If 3 then all intelligibles have reason.
- (5) 4 is false.
- (6) ∴ The intellect cannot be intelligible.

Dinsdale uses the argument.<sup>94</sup> To refute this he explains that we need to distinguish between actually and potentially known. So when an intelligible species is actualized in an intellect it is actually known, and due to the formal identity in knowing the intellect is also that species, which conversely means that that species is intellect. In that case what is intelligible is also at the same time intellect. But that only holds in that particular case. Sticks and stones are potential objects of knowledge by having a species that can be abstracted and actualized in an intellect. So the physical objects can never become intellects.<sup>95</sup>

#### 3.2.2.2.6 *Intellect cannot be abstracted (N13)*

- (1) Human knowledge is based on phantasms abstracted from sense perception.
- (2) The intellect cannot be abstracted from matter
- (3) ∴ The intellect cannot be known through an abstracted species.

Dinsdale gives this argument. He counters it pointing out that the intellect does not know itself based on its own species, but based on its actualization through the species of its proper and primary objects of knowledge.<sup>96</sup>

<sup>93</sup> Wyle III.10, APP 308.14–22.

<sup>94</sup> Dinsdale III.15, APP 313.5–8.

<sup>95</sup> Dinsdale III.15, APP 314.56–63.

<sup>96</sup> Dinsdale III.15, APP 313.16–22 and APP 315.17–31.

### 3.2.2.2.7 *Self-knowledge by self-presence (N32)*

- (1) Knowledge requires presence of the known object to the knowing subject
- (2) The intellect is present to itself by itself.
- (3) ∴ The intellect knows itself by itself.

Dinsdale and Anonymus Assisi present this argument.<sup>97</sup> They both basically answer that although that may be true, the intellect is not united with or present to itself as an object of knowledge, as the proper objects of knowledge of the intellect are the species of external objects.<sup>98</sup> It might also be argued that the mere presence of the intellect to itself is not sufficient, as it also must be actualized, not merely potential, and for that it needs an external species.<sup>99</sup>

### 3.2.2.2.8 *An innate species (N17)*

- (1) Some things are known by an innate species
- (2) The intellect is one of the things that is known by an innate species.
- (3) ∴ The intellect knows itself without the need of an external species.

Faversham presents this argument in his determination while Wyle appends it to his question after the treatment of the last *ratio principalis*. Faversham presents two refutations against that idea, while Wyle makes do with a single. Faversham argues that the idea of inborn species runs counter to the principle that all knowledge has its origin in perception, which further means that all knowledge must be based on phantasms abstracted from sense data. If that principle is broken, it can be argued that the possible intellect acts independently of the agent intellect, as it has no need for its process of abstraction, and that violates the idea that the agent is more noble than the patient. They both argue that if the intellect contained an innate species by which it could know itself, the possible intellect would always know itself, but that cannot be allowed, as that would make it impossible for the intellect to know any other things, as it can only know one thing at a time (P24).<sup>100</sup>

### 3.2.2.2.9 *Diversification of act according to object (N29)*

- (1) The act of knowing is determined by the nature of the object of knowledge.<sup>101</sup>
- (2) The primary object of knowledge and the act of knowing have two different natures.
- (3) ∴ The intellect cannot know both types of objects.

<sup>97</sup> Dinsdale III.15, APP 313.16–22, Anonymus Assisi q. 15, APP 277.12–17.

<sup>98</sup> Dinsdale III.15, APP 315.13–16, Anonymus Assisi q. 15, APP 279.11–14.

<sup>99</sup> Faversham argues in that way in his discussion of self-knowledge in the afterlife. See Faversham q. III.11, p. 336.

<sup>100</sup> Faversham III.11, pp. 335–36, Wyle III.10, APP 308.28–33.

<sup>101</sup> Cf. Averroes *In DA*, ad III.4 429b10–14, com. III.9, p. 422.36–50.

Jandun presents this challenge to his own doctrine of multiple simultaneous objects of one act of intellection. He refutes the challenge by maintaining that the diversification only occurs with two objects with the same mode of being. But the act of knowing a primary object is an immaterial abstraction from that primary object, which he holds results in the merging of the knowing of that act and the reflexive knowledge of that primary act of knowing.<sup>102</sup>

### 3.2.2.3 Summary

In this section the basis of all the included commentaries has been that the intellect, in one way or another, depends crucially on a actualization by the intelligible species of an external object to engage in the act of self-knowledge. We have seen how some doctrines have been relatively prevalent while others only have singular occurrences. Some of the relations between the commentators based on those doctrines will be discussed further in section 3.3 on page 95, so here we will just sum up the main observations on dominant and rare doctrines.

As all commentators included here argue for a model where self-knowledge is conditioned by an external species, it is maybe not surprising that the point most of them share is the emphasis on the potentiality of the possible intellect (P4). While six commentators have been registered to present this point explicitly it is implied by the line of thought of all the commentators here. A good portion of the commentators also highlight that the immateriality of the intellect enables it, once it has been actualized, to reflect on its own activity (P5), and five likewise argue that it is able to acquire knowledge about its own substance through an observation of its activities and the objects of those activities (P2). Two final points of doctrine that the commentators favour are that the possible intellect bears a structural similarity with prime matter (P10), and that it takes up the lowest place in a hierarchy of intellects stretching from the prime intellect who knows itself (and possibly everything else) by its own essence, over the separate intellects who know just themselves essentially, to the human intellect which only knows itself through the mediation of an external species (P12). Both these points occur in four of the included commentators. Finally three commentators note that the process of acquiring knowledge about the substance of the intellect is a procedural and stepwise activity (P14) and that the type of knowledge acquired by intellectual self-reflection is different from the universal science of the soul (P18)

There are also a handful of points that are only found in a single of the included commentaries. Here we can highlight the idea presented by Jandun that a certain type of self-knowledge is always concomitant to knowledge of external objects (P54). Also the point Favershaw seems to make that intellectual self-knowledge is a necessary condition for the universal science of the soul stands out, as does that of Anonymus Assisi who holds that a single species can occasion three different types of knowledge – including knowledge of the particular (P52).

As in the previous section we notice briefly the more flat distribution of different points made in the *rationes principales* and other challenges of the commentaries. Only four arguments occur in more than two of the commentaries, namely the comparison of the intellect with other immaterial substances (N5), the related comparison between the intellect and other intelligences (N8) – which are made by exactly the same five commentators – and the challenge

<sup>102</sup> Jandun III.13, APP 322.66–74, cf. section 5.1.1 on page 163.

of the infinite regress (N10) which four of the commentators face themselves with. Finally, Faversham and Wyle also address the question of self-knowledge through an innate species, an idea that is basically a species based version of essential self-knowledge. The remaining nine different challenges are only presented by a single or two of the included commentaries.

### 3.2.3 Self-knowledge by own species

A more rare alternative to the idea of self-knowledge by an external species suggests that the intellect, and namely the possible intellect, is known by its own species (P30). We only find one strongly held instance of such an argument in the commentaries that have been investigated in this chapter, namely Anonymus Digby 55.

But the text itself has an atypically structure. The initial question is whether the intellect knows itself by a species (*per speciem*). He first presents two *rationes* against that position, followed by one in favour referring to the authority of Averroes. His determination is exceptionally short, as it only consists of a single clause. His refutations on the other hand is where his actual doctrinal content is to be found. It is not entirely clear when the refutation of the first *ratio principalis* ends and the second takes over, but together they present an extended discussion of the doctrinal challenges of his position with several chained arguments and counter arguments. For that reason it seems most fruitful to present his challenges and solutions together.

He presents the following initial *rationes principales* against the possibility of knowing the intellect through a species:

- (1) Based on the dictum of identity between knower and known in immaterial substances it is argued that if the intellect is known by a species, it is known by itself, which cannot be allowed (N30). As stated here the argument is invalid as the intellect does not necessarily know itself by itself if it knows itself by a species. It reflects the initial phrasing of the question, whether the intellect knows itself by a species (unspecified), but from the following discussion we can conclude that what is intended is to restrict it to its own species.<sup>103</sup>
- (2) The second *ratio* is quite deficient, as both the major premise and the conclusion are omitted, but it is not too tough to reconstruct. The conclusion should of course be that the intellect cannot be known by a species, so if we supply the major premise that a species is more simple than the thing it is abstracted from, that aligns pretty well with the minor that the intellect has no species simpler than itself by which it can be known (N35).<sup>104</sup>

To these *rationes* the commentator presents an extended argument where, in my judgement, he answers both questions together in a discussion based on arguments and counter arguments. He argues that the intellect is known by a species that is always present to it in

<sup>103</sup> Anonymus Digby 55 q. 13, APP 282.6.

<sup>104</sup> Anonymus Digby 55 q. 13, APP 282.4–5.

some sense, although it is not always actualized. Once it is actualized however, the intellect immediately (*quam cito*) knows itself.<sup>105</sup> Initially he is unclear about the nature of the species that facilitates the intellectual self-knowledge, but when he moves into the domain of the second *ratio* it becomes clear that the argument implies that the species by which the intellect knows itself is its own species. This is further supported by the answer to that challenge, namely that what is in act is more simple than what is in potency, which means that it should be possible to abstract a species from an actualized intellect that is more simple than the species of the intellect that is not yet actualized. His final note makes it clear that it knows itself through its own species. The agent intellect, he says, abstracts the species from the possible intellect which is already present in it in its state of potentiality. Hence, the intellect knows itself by a species abstracted from itself.<sup>106</sup>

So the species by which the intellect knows itself is clearly not an external species, but the species of the possible intellect that is abstracted. He does however hold that this process is not entirely independent from external stimuli, since an external species is required to actualize the possible intellect in the first place.<sup>107</sup> He does therefore clearly not support a model of essential self-knowledge. But the intellect always contains a species, no matter if it is actualized or still only in potency.<sup>108</sup> That species must in some way be its own species or a species representing itself. Because once the possible intellect has then been actualized by an external object of knowledge, its own species becomes actualized too, and the agent intellect can then abstract it. That species is then fed to the possible intellect, we must presume, and thereby enables its self-knowledge.

This is a somewhat puzzling solution. Two questions quickly arise: (1) If the intellect always contains this species that is used in self-knowledge, how can it be completely potential? (2) If the intellect always and necessarily acquires self-knowledge as soon as (*quam cito*) its own species is actualized, does that then result in (a) multiple simultaneous acts of intellection, or maybe (b) an epi-phenomenal self-knowledge concomitant to every act of intellection? To address the first question, it is not quite clear which status our commentator imagines the species has when the possible intellect is not actualized, but he explicitly says that it is (or may always be) present to the intellect *just like other intelligible species*.<sup>109</sup> But if it only contains it to the extent that it contains any other intelligible species, maybe its potentiality can still be maintained. The second question centres around the circumstances under which the species becomes the focus of the intellect's reflection. We cannot say anything about that based on the questions from the commentary that has been put under scrutiny here. We might be tempted to conjecture that the agent intellect does not abstract the species of the possible intellect unless it is somehow put into focus by a wilful act, but the text gives no indications about those details, so any explanation would only amount to speculation.

As this doctrine is related to the one described in the preceding section some notes of

<sup>105</sup> Anonymus Digby 55 q. 13, APP 282.20–23.

<sup>106</sup> Anonymus Digby 55 q. 13, APP 282.35–283.2.

<sup>107</sup> Anonymus Digby 55 q. 13, APP 282.35–283.2.

<sup>108</sup> This doctrine is similar to that of Richard Rufus and may be inspired by him, cf. Wood 2018: 86–9.

<sup>109</sup> Anonymus Digby 55 q. 13, APP 282.20–23: “[...] intellectus possibilis intelligit se, licet sit ei semper praesens *sicut aliae species intelligibiles*, tamen hoc species [...]”, my emphasis.

comparison will be in order. First one might ask whether it even makes any difference if the intellect is known by its own or another species. If we assume the model of formal identification during the act of knowing, it would be fair to point out that the species of the intellect and that of the external object of intellection become identical. Or to be more explicit: Before the act of intellection the possible intellect is indeterminate, but once it receives and becomes actualized as the species of an external intelligible object, then it is itself that species which it through that process has a knowledge of. Here we may speculate whether that is actually how Anonymus Digby 55 imagines the process of knowing takes place, as he makes a point out of distinguishing the two species. His final note emphasizes how some external species is involved in the process of self-knowledge in some derived way as that external stimulus is required for the actualization and hence abstraction of the species of the possible intellect itself.

We may also want to note some of the things that we do not find in Anonymus Digby 55. We do not find any mention of or hints at any process of reflection in his commentary. That makes it a bit more difficult than usual to imagine exactly what constitutes the self-knowledge, but maybe it is merely the actualization of the species of the intellect through abstraction. After all he says that as soon as that species is actualized, it knows itself. But this also means that we have an even fainter impression of what the content of the knowledge may be. Does it present the intellect with any sort of universal knowledge about itself, or does it merely state the fact that it is at that specific point in the middle of a process of intellection? Some of the other commentators also present the idea of the Aristotelian procedure of acquiring substantial knowledge from accidents, which gives us an impression of some possible acquisition of universal knowledge about the intellect, and some even discuss some of the challenges of acquiring a scientific knowledge about the intellect.<sup>110</sup> But such reflections are also entirely absent in Anonymus Digby 55. So although some similarities clearly seem to connect the two approaches, they also present so many differences that it is fair to conclude that there are substantial differences of doctrine between them.

### 3.2.4 The possible intellect knowing the agent intellect

Finally, we will treat this more narrow topic on the relation between the possible and agent intellect. It is treated in two questions:

- Whether the possible intellect can know the agent intellect. Anonymus Bazán, Siger of Brabant, and Radulphus Brito.
- Whether the possible intellect knows the agent intellect with an unchanged and numerically identical intellection. John of Jandun

The treatments are so different that although they nominally seem to treat the same problem they share very little material. We will see yet again that Brito and Anonymus Bazán present a rather similar text, while there are some clear doctrinal connections between the solution of Siger of Brabant and Jandun. We see that the phrasing of the questions are different, but of course that need not reveal anything about the doctrinal content, as Siger of Brabant's solution

<sup>110</sup> See sections 3.2.2.1.3 on page 76 and 3.2.2.1.10 to 3.2.2.1.11 on page 80.

has much more in common with Jandun than the other two. In the later in-depth study in chapter 5 we will get back to the solution of Jandun.

### 3.2.4.1 Solutions

#### 3.2.4.1.1 *Agent intellect is intelligible (P65)*

- The possible intellect is able to know any intelligible object.
- The agent intellect is an intelligible object.
- ∴ The agent intellect can be known by the possible intellect

The possible intellect potentially is all objects of knowledge, and if we accept that the agent intellect is intelligible, then the possible intellect should be able to have knowledge of it. Although this solution seems to beg the question of the intelligibility of the agent intellect, that is the first of two arguments presented by Anonymus Bazán.<sup>111</sup> This is almost identical to the argument he presents earlier to show that the possible intellect is intelligible.<sup>112</sup> Here, fortunately, he also elaborates a bit on the process by which the agent intellect is known in the following argument.

#### 3.2.4.1.2 *Agent intellect known through its products (P9)*

The Aristotelian principle of deriving substantial knowledge from accidents, which we have seen at work in the whole chapter, is also applied in this context. Brito and Anonymus Bazán both argue that the possible intellect arrives at a knowledge about the agent intellect by observation of its activity. The activity of the agent intellect is to abstract intelligible species from phantasms, an activity that the possible intellect is familiar with through knowledge of the products, the abstracted species. So through an analysis of the abstracted objects the possible intellect can acquire a positive knowledge about the agent intellect.<sup>113</sup> Siger of Brabant presents a similar idea, cf. section 3.2.4.1.7 on page 92.<sup>114</sup>

#### 3.2.4.1.3 *Self-reflexivity of immaterial substances (P5)*

- (1) An immaterial substance is self-reflexive.
- (2) The human intellect is an immaterial substance.
- (3) ∴ The human intellect is self-reflexive.

Siger of Brabant presents the now well known idea, but he adds a further requirement of presence of the object of knowledge to the knower. This is however always guaranteed by the unity of agent and possible intellect.<sup>115</sup>

<sup>111</sup> Anonymus Bazán III.16, p. 500.35–40.

<sup>112</sup> Anonymus Bazán III.10, p. 485.30–36, mentioned above in section 3.2.1.1.2 on page 66.

<sup>113</sup> Anonymus Bazán III.16, p. 500.40–46; Brito III.15, p. 221.11–15.

<sup>114</sup> Siger of Brabant q. 13, ll. 45–76.

<sup>115</sup> Siger of Brabant q. 13, ll. 1–11.

#### 3.2.4.1.4 *Transference of properties from agent to patient (P68)*

- (1) The efficient cause of a property possesses the property itself.
- (2) The agent intellect causes potentially intelligible objects to be actually intelligible.
- (3) ∴ The agent intellect itself is intelligible in act.

Siger of Brabant uses the light-analogy, because light itself must be visible as it makes other objects visible.<sup>116</sup>

#### 3.2.4.1.5 *Agent intellect the most suitable object of knowledge (P75)*

Jandun argues that the intellect has a natural disposition and desire to acquire knowledge of the agent intellect and other immaterial substances. Actually, he says, it would seem less apt to have knowledge about material objects, as they are not even actually but only potentially known. And so much the more should it have an aptitude to know substances that are actually known, and that is the case with the immaterial substances which are already known by themselves in their immateriality. It is only in accordance with nature, that when the intellect strives for knowledge about relatively ignoble objects, namely the material substances, it should strive so much more for and be able to attain knowledge about the more noble immaterial substances.<sup>117</sup>

#### 3.2.4.1.6 *Possible and agent intellect joined by constant knowledge (P40)*

Siger of Brabant holds that the possible intellect always knows the agent intellect, but that state of intellection never extends down to the individual humans. Together the agent and possible intellect constitute the separate intellect,<sup>118</sup> and as it is in a constant state of self-knowledge, the possible intellect thereby also knows the agent intellect.<sup>119</sup> But the separate possible intellect is only connected with the individual human during her reflection on a given phantasm, and she cannot therefore experience the perpetual self-knowledge of the separate intellect.<sup>120</sup>

Jandun presents a similar doctrine in the second part of his determination on the question. He goes into some details about the ontological structure and relation between the agent and possible intellect and presents the premise that any thing that always is conjoined or united with an knowledge of an object, also always will possess that same and numerically identical act of knowing. He argues then that the possible intellect always is united with a knowledge of the agent intellect. That is the case, he says, because the agent intellect always has a concomitant knowledge of itself. He finds support for this in both Aristotle and Averroes, pointing out the identity between knowledge and its object in immaterial substances (P22). Hence he holds that, when the agent intellect is always united with the possible intellect, the possible intellect

<sup>116</sup> Siger of Brabant q. 13, ll. 12–15.

<sup>117</sup> See Jandun III.30, APP 329.23–33.

<sup>118</sup> Cf. Siger of Brabant q. 15, p. 58.42–43.

<sup>119</sup> Siger of Brabant q. 13, p. 44.27–45.44.

<sup>120</sup> This constitutes the explanation of how intellectual states are individuated in his monopsychist model. See the full arguments in Siger of Brabant qq. 14–15, pp. 46–60 cf. q. 7, pp. 22–24.

also always has the same constant (and hence numerically identical) knowledge of the agent intellect as it does itself.<sup>121</sup>

#### 3.2.4.1.7 *Perpetual self-knowledge of agent intellect not available to humans (P29)*

Siger of Brabant argues that as the separate possible intellect is only connected with the individual human during her reflection on a given phantasm, she cannot experience the perpetual self-knowledge of the separate intellect.<sup>122</sup> Jandun most likely also takes this same position.<sup>123</sup> But Siger of Brabant does however also allow some human knowledge of the agent intellect. As the abstract universals are made available to the individual by the power of the agent intellect in the reflection on sense data, this gives the individual an experience and knowledge of the agent intellect.<sup>124</sup> This way of knowing the agent intellect therefore is similar to the explanation given by Brito and Anonymus Bazán above (3.2.4.1.2 on page 90).

### 3.2.4.2 Challenges

Several of the challenges are already familiar from the preceding material on the general intelligibility and self-intelligibility of the intellect.

#### 3.2.4.2.1 *Requirement of sense perception (N4)*

- (1) Anything that is intelligible is available to sense perception.
- (2) The intellect is not available to sense perception
- (3) ∴ The intellect cannot be intelligible.

This is given by Anonymus Bazán, Brito, Jandun and Siger of Brabant. Both Anonymus Bazán and Brito give the typical refutation of this in other contexts, that it is true that what is known primarily must have its origin in sense perception, but not when something is known secondarily. That is the case with the agent intellect which is known through its activities and products.<sup>125</sup>

Jandun and Siger of Brabant both present a version of this argument as a challenge to their doctrine of a perpetual self-knowledge of the separate intellect.<sup>126</sup> But they answer them differently. Jandun says that phantasms are required to establish an initial knowledge of an object, but the soul is also able to reflect on subjects that are entirely immaterial. He argues that such activities make up the very substance of the intellect.<sup>127</sup> Siger of Brabant does not

<sup>121</sup> See Jandun III.30, APP 329.34–330.4.

<sup>122</sup> This constitutes the explanation of how intellectual states are individuated in his monopsychist model. See the full arguments in Siger of Brabant qq. 14–15, pp. 46–60 cf. Siger of Brabant q. 7, pp. 22–24.

<sup>123</sup> This is discussed in the following case study in 5.1.3 on page 170, in particular on page 173.

<sup>124</sup> Siger of Brabant q. 13, ll. 45–76.

<sup>125</sup> Anonymus Bazán III.16, p. 499.6–11 and 500.47–56; Brito III.15, pp. 221.16–222.23 and 224.68–78.

<sup>126</sup> Siger of Brabant q. 13, p. 44.19–22; Jandun III.30, APP 329.5–14.

<sup>127</sup> Jandun III.30, APP 330.31–38.

address this challenge specifically but just says generally that it shows why the state of self-knowledge is not available to humans.<sup>128</sup>

#### 3.2.4.2.2 *Requirement of abstraction (N13)*

- (1) Human knowledge is based on phantasms abstracted from sense perception.
- (2) The intellect cannot be abstracted from matter
- (3) ∴ The intellect cannot be known through an abstracted species.

Anonymus Bazán and Brito present this, and as in the requirement of sense perception, they also both answer that this does not hold when something is known secondarily, as is the case with the agent intellect.<sup>129</sup>

#### 3.2.4.2.3 *No experience of self-knowledge (N24)*

- (1) We sense our state of sensation, so we should also know our states of knowing.
- (2) We do not experience any higher order knowledge.
- (3) ∴ Higher order knowledge does not take place.

Siger of Brabant gives this, and refutes it in the same manner as the previous by stating generally that it only goes to show that we have no access to that perpetual state of self-knowledge.<sup>130</sup>

#### 3.2.4.2.4 *Agent intellect has no knowledge (N26)*

- (1) The power of the agent intellect is abstraction of universals.
- (2) Abstraction of universals cannot be intelligible, because then the agent intellect would know the universals itself.
- (3) ∴ The power of the agent intellect cannot be known.

Anonymus Bazán argues that the power of the agent intellect is to abstract universals from phantasms, but that cannot be an intelligible process, because that would imply that the agent intellect would have knowledge of the phantasms. He will not accept this because he postulates that the agent intellect cannot contain knowledge in itself. To this he gives the confusing refutation that it does not follow that just because something has a potency towards an activity that it immediately actualizes that activity. And thus, that just because abstraction of phantasms is a potentially intelligible process, that it is also actually known.<sup>131</sup> This may be true, but it is not clear how that answers the initial objection.

This challenge is also addressed by Brito, but in a different way. It looks like he splits up the challenge into two and modifies the arguments along to way to make them more coherent. They are therefore presented separately below.

<sup>128</sup> Siger of Brabant q. 13, ll. 76–80.

<sup>129</sup> Anonymus Bazán III.16, p. 499.12–19 and 500.57–61; Brito III.15, pp. 222.24–29 and 224.79–86.

<sup>130</sup> Siger of Brabant q. 13, pp. 44.23–26 and 46.76–80.

<sup>131</sup> Anonymus Bazán III.16, pp. 499.20–500.31 and 500.62–501.73.

3.2.4.2.5 *Power of agent intellect not intelligible (N39)*

- (1) If the intellect is known, then its power is also known.
- (2) The power of the intellect cannot be known.
- (3) ∴ The intellect cannot be known.

Brito argues for the impossibility of knowing the power differently. It cannot be known, he argues, because its power is to make potential objects of knowledge actual objects of knowledge, and that would mean that the possible intellect would know all objects of knowledge simultaneously, which also is impossible.<sup>132</sup> In this way he avoids the awkward statement that phantasm abstraction cannot be an intelligible process because that would imply that the agent intellect had knowledge about the phantasms.

To this he answers that although it is true that the possible intellect can know the power of the agent intellect, that does not imply that it has a positive knowledge of the content of all possible phantasms. Just as knowing that someone has an ability of producing all things does not mean that he actually produces all things.<sup>133</sup> This is a very elegant solution because it distinguishes between a power and the products of that power. This is then further accentuated by also emphasizing the difference between having a knowledge of a power and realizing the products of that power.

3.2.4.2.6 *Simultaneous knowledge of all phantasms (N37)*

- (1) If the possible intellect could know the agent intellect, this would be through its abstraction of phantasms.
- (2) The agent intellect abstracts all phantasms.
- (3) ∴ The possible intellect cannot contain all phantasms at the same time; hence, the possible intellect cannot know the agent intellect.

This is the second leg of Brito's split of Anonymus Bazán's confused argument.<sup>134</sup> In his refutation he again puts his finger on the exact point that is relevant in both these challenges, the relation between potential and actual by distinguishing a power from its product. Having knowledge of the agent intellect is possible by the presence of all and any phantasm in the *phantasia*, and because the possible intellect has a higher order knowledge of itself knowing an abstract object, it can move into a knowledge of the abstraction ("potest discurrere in cognitionem abstractionis"). To acquire this knowledge, there is no requirement that all phantasms are present in the *phantasia* at the same time, but only that any phantasm is. Because a reflection on the abstraction of any phantasms by the agent intellect provides an insight into the nature of that power and the entity that exercises it. We notice here that the crucial link is the process of intellectual self-knowledge or introspection of the possible intellect: When it knows that it has a knowledge of an abstract object, it is able to reflect on the process or activity that brought this object about.

<sup>132</sup> Brito III.15, pp. 222.35–223.43.

<sup>133</sup> Brito III.15, p. 225.88–92.

<sup>134</sup> Brito III.15, p. 222.30–34.

### 3.2.4.3 Summary

Anonymus Bazán and Brito present two very similar arguments, but we see that the latter finds some more elegant formulations and solutions of some of the challenges. Both the positive doctrine and the challenges make use of points that are also known from the other questions on the intelligibility of the intellect and the process of self-knowledge. Jandun and Siger of Brabant on the other hand present a very different case. They hold that the agent intellect is in a constant state of self-knowledge, and that the possible intellect is always connected with the agent intellect through that act of knowledge. This means that the possible intellect always has one and the same knowledge of the agent intellect. They both hold that this perpetual state of self-knowledge in the separate intellect never reaches the level of human knowledge. Siger of Brabant does however also allow for the possibility of knowing the agent intellect, not in this absolute and perpetual way, but in a way similar to the one found in Anonymus Bazán and Brito.

## 3.3 Clusters and analysis

In the preceding section I have given a detailed exposition of the different doctrines across the included commentaries. In this section we will use that data to move to a high-level analysis of general clusters and relations among the texts. I will also give an overview of the most common doctrines that we find in the material. The main points of this section are already present in the preceding section, but as the level of detail is so high that they are difficult to identify, we will here analyse the material differently and pull out connections that are only opaquely present there.

### 3.3.1 Clusters

This presentation is more abstract than the preceding, as it does not take into view the content or philosophical implications of each of the doctrines, but view them summarily and compare which commentators share a smaller or larger proportion of the doctrines. Two types of visualizations are used, the *proportional clustermap* and the *binary doctrinal matrix*, and they both deserve some introduction. The proportional clustermap shows how big an overlap there is between the doctrines used by any two authors included. This is done by calculating the proportion of shared to non-shared doctrines that any commentary has with any other commentary. This results in an array of proportions that can be viewed as a signature of that particular commentator within the corpus, as the array of proportions will be unique to his particular combination of doctrines.<sup>135</sup> To give an example, see the proportional shared material for John Dinsdale in table 3.3 on the next page. Such an array gives an indication of how close a commentator may be to any of the others. These different arrays are then plotted in a matrix where each field represents the commonality between the two correlated commentators by the hue of the colour. The matrix is mirrored along the top left to bottom right diagonal

<sup>135</sup> If any other commentator contains exactly the same doctrines, they will also have exactly the same signature.

Name	Proportion
John Dinsdale	1.00
Anonymus Vat. Lat. 2170 2	0.63
Henric de la Wyle	0.40
Simon of Faversham	0.38
Anonymus Assisi	0.35
Radulphus Brito	0.24
John of Jandun	0.16
Anonymus Bazan	0.15
Siger of Brabant	0.04
Anonymus Digby 55	0.04

Table 3.3: Relative distribution signature of all doctrines of John Dinsdale.

and can therefore be read vertically as well as horizontally. This of course means that the left-right diagonal shows the complete identity of each commentator with himself. The rows and columns of the matrix are arranged in such a way that the commentators that have the most similar proportional signature are clustered together. This is illustrated further by the so-called *dendrogram* that is to be found at the top and left edges of the matrix. At the leaf ends of the dendrogram we find each unique commentary (or a combination of two or more, if they have completely identical profiles). At the higher levels of the dendrogram groups are compared. The shorter the branches are before a split, the closer the relation is. Figure 3.2 on the facing page is an example of such a clustermap, and as soon as we have explained the binary doctrinal matrix, we will move on to the interpretation of that particular map.

The binary doctrinal matrix shows which doctrines each commentary contains, and is therefore simpler to interpret and explain. This matrix does not compare the commentators in the same way, but rather shows which commentators has been registered to use which doctrines. This is also presented in a matrix where the commentators are clustered according to the relative proximity of their shared doctrines. Figure 3.5 on page 101 is an example of this matrix type. Aside from showing the clustering of commentators, the matrices can also be used as complete indices of which doctrines are used by which commentator. A detailed comparison of the two diagrams will reveal that they do not create identical clusters. This is because the proportional values of the commentators does not map directly to the doctrinal points possessed by each commentary but is a more condensed (less detailed) representation of how big a *proportion* of material each commentary shares with each other. I present two binary doctrinal matrices, one of the determination doctrines and one of the *rationes* and refutation doctrines.

Let us have a look at the proportional clustermaps. In the first map in figure 3.2 on the facing page we immediately notice the very deeply coloured group in the top left corner, consisting of Faversham, Anonymus Vaticanus 2170 II, Wyle and Dinsdale. The strong hues of the coloured fields indicate that these four are closely related, which in particular is the case for Wyle, Dinsdale and Anonymus Vaticanus 2170 II. The other main group contains some subgroups. An-




Figure 3.2: Proportional clustermap of determination doctrines.




Figure 3.3: Proportional clustermap of *rationes* doctrines.




Figure 3.4: Proportional clustermap of all doctrines.

onymus Assisi and Brito cluster together, with Anonymus Bazán as a weaker connection, and Anonymus Digby 55 as a connection to that three-person group (mostly due to similarities with Anonymus Bazán). Jandun and Siger of Brabant also cluster together, although rather loosely. In the second map in figure 3.3 on page 98 we find both continuities and differences from the determination distributions. Aside from the big group of five commentators in the left side and the more loose cluster in the right side, we notice that the two radical outliers, Anonymus Digby 55 and Siger of Brabant, who clearly have almost no *rationes* and refutation doctrines in common with the others. The biggest group consists of Anonymus Vaticanus 2170 II, Dinsdale, Anonymus Assisi, Wyle and Faversham, and the smaller consists of Brito, Anonymus Bazán, and Jandun. This means that in this part of the texts Jandun is grouped closer to Anonymus Bazán and Brito, while Anonymus Assisi has moved into the distinct group of four closely connected commentators in the determination material.

These changes are maintained when we cluster the texts across the different contexts of the doctrines in figure 3.4 on the preceding page. Anonymus Digby 55 and Siger of Brabant remain distinct outliers, while Anonymus Bazán and Brito maintain a strong connection in a group that also loosely includes Jandun (notice how the leg of the dendrogram reveals that he is almost as distinct from all the others as Anonymus Digby 55 and Siger of Brabant). In the other corner we have the big group of five commentators where in particular Dinsdale and Anonymus Vaticanus 2170 II form a strong cluster, while Wyle and Faversham are a bit closer to each than Anonymus Bazán and Brito, and finally Anonymus Assisi is the outlier within that group.

The binary doctrinal matrices contain more information, and we cannot dive into an extensive analysis. But in the matrix of determination doctrines (figure 3.5 on the next page) we see a good hand full of longer “rows” across the matrix where four or more commentators share a piece of doctrine, which constitutes a major group in the central columns from Faversham to Brito.<sup>136</sup> In particular the connections between Faversham, Dinsdale, Anonymus Vaticanus 2170 II, and Wyle confirm the close connection between them in the clustermaps. But we also notice a few rows of unique doctrines, in particular with Jandun and Brito, but the correspondences between him and Anonymus Bazán are also worth noticing. When we look at the matrix of *rationes* doctrines (figure 3.6 on page 102) the overall impression is different, as the doctrines are more spread out. In this way the two binary matrices also confirm the general introductory observation on page 60 that the commentators have a stronger tendency to re-use the same doctrines in the determinations than in the discussion of *rationes principales*. Here we find two groups of shared doctrines in the top right and bottom left corner which reveal the connections we have already seen in the proportional clustermaps. But it is also interesting to note the longer “columns” of unique doctrines by Jandun, Brito, and Anonymus Digby 55. This explains why in particular Jandun ended up as a relative outlier in the proportional maps, in spite of the fact that he also presents the most typical doctrines used by some of the others.

<sup>136</sup> Some labels may seem to belong to the wrong category, this is partly because the *rationes* matrix also registers refutations, and they are registered in the inventory of positive doctrines. Furthermore, it does occasionally occur that an author uses a doctrine that is registered in the appendix as a *rationes* doctrine within a determination context.




Figure 3.5: Binary doctrinal matrix of determination doctrines.




Figure 3.6: Binary clustermap of rationes doctrines.

### 3.3.2 Typical material and representative commentaries

Having thus identified the different clusters of commentators, we will continue the summary of the most important tendencies within the material in this final section. I will identify the commentators that may occupy a central position in the corpus and have another look at the most striking outliers. This will lead us to a survey of the most commonly used doctrines in the context of determinations and *rationes*, and finally we will also have a look at which commentators tend to present a high proportion of unique doctrines.

Table 3.4 on the following page contains the most popular doctrines (i.e. top one third) and the number of times they are used. Based on this list it is relatively easy to present an approximation of a standard explanation within this tradition. The intellect can be known, but it does not have immediate, essential, or perpetual self-knowledge. Just like prime matter, the possible intellect is completely indeterminate before it is actualized, and this provides the main premise for the universally accepted doctrine of self-knowledge through the actualization by an external species. The requirement of an actualization by an external species is what leads a lot of the commentators to describe the self-intelligibility of the intellect as a secondary or indirect self-intelligibility. This means that the intellect is also self-reflexive by virtue of its immateriality, but not unconditionally or essentially, but only once actualized, and in this way it differs from all other intellects. The human intellect therefore takes up the lowest position of the immaterial and self-reflexive substances in the chain of being, and is the only one that does not possess essential self-reflexivity and hence essential self-knowledge. As the intellect is not its own proper object of knowledge it must however know itself according to the same principles as it knows its primary objects of knowledge. So, according to many, this reflexivity enables the intellect to reflect on its own objects, activities, powers, and hence acquire knowledge of its substance. And this is also often described as a successive process, as the intellect does not acquire immediate and full self-knowledge once actualized. Notice that this is not a question of transparency or opaqueness, as that is rarely discussed by the commentators, but rather a question of whether it is an instantaneous or procedural phenomenon.

As this list also includes doctrines that are used in discussions of *rationes principales*, we might also want to quickly highlight some of the most commonly used. The most often invoked doctrine is used by Anonymus Bazán, Jandun, Wyle, Siger of Brabant, Faversham and Brito in 12 different invocations. The doctrine holds that the intellect is not available to sense perception, and is generally used to attack the intelligibility of the intellect in different variations.<sup>137</sup> The two other most commonly used attacks are different versions of the same idea of comparing the human intellect with immaterial substances or intelligences that have essential self-knowledge (N5 and N8). They are both used by five different commentators, who actually happen to be exactly the same for both doctrines, namely Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II, Anonymus Assisi, Dinsdale, Wyle and Faversham. Finally we find two other doctrines which each are invoked four times, the first of which is the point that the same thing cannot be mover and moved, which would be violated if the intellect could know itself (N3).<sup>138</sup> And finally, we find the often interesting argument that intellectual self-knowledge implies a risk (or even a

<sup>137</sup> See 3.2.1.2.3 on page 67, 3.2.1.3.3 on page 69, and 3.2.4.2.1 on page 92 for the main uses.

<sup>138</sup> See 3.2.1.2.2 on page 67 and 3.2.1.3.6 on page 70.

Count	Description	Label
13	An immaterial substance is self-reflexive	P5
12	Primary and secondary intelligibility	P1
12	Intellect not available to sense perception	P77, N4
11	Possible intellect completely indeterminate be...	P4
11	Self-knowledge through external species	P3
9	Substantial knowledge from accidents	P2
7	Intellect intelligible through external species	P8
6	Possible intellect similar to prime matter	P10
6	Great chain of being and the intellect	P12
5	Similar to separate intelligences	N8
5	Identity of knower and known impossible	N5
4	Bodily senses are not reflexive	P20
4	Knowing a blocking activity	P24
4	Self-knowledge different from the science of t...	P18
4	Identity of mover and moved impossible	N3
4	Intellect not its own proper object of knowledge	P43, N16
4	The intellect is self-intelligible	P7
4	Successive self-knowledge	P14
4	Knowing the act of the intellect risks infinit...	N10
4	Analogy with sense and sensation	N12
3	Self-knowledge by innate species	P60, N17
3	The intellect has essential self-knowledge	P23, N40
3	No abstraction of the intellect	N13
3	Perpetual self-knowledge of agent intellect no...	P29
3	Self-knowledge by own species, once actualized...	P30
3	Agent intellect known through its products	P9
3	Intelligibility requires actuality	P31, N33
3	Infinite regress not a problem in the intellect	P32
3	No identity of knower and known before actuali...	P25
3	Analogy with vision: Only things visible in ac...	P26
3	The intellect is intelligible	P13

Table 3.4: Top one third of determination doctrines according to popularity.

necessity) of an infinite regress (N10).<sup>139</sup>

As we can see with these different reiterations of the doctrines that are spread across the corpus, the same names seem to pop up all the time. It is therefore also very tempting to ask, who gives the most representative presentation of this selection of common doctrines. Or to put it differently, are there some commentators that would be good exemplary sources for the most common doctrines within the corpus? Of course that is easy to calculate when information about which doctrines each commentator uses. We do this by combining two measurements, (1) how big a proportion of the most popular doctrines a commentator presents, and (2) how high his concentration of those doctrines is. The first measurement indicates the proportion between the intersection of the popular doctrines and the total doctrines of a commentator and the total amount of popular doctrines. The second measurement indicates the proportion between the same intersection of popular doctrines and total doctrines of the commentator and the total number of doctrines used by the commentator. So the first measurement indicates the representation of popular material, while the second indicates how strong their concentration is in the commentary. The Venn diagram in figure 3.7 on the following page can help illustrate the two measurements. Let  $X$  represent the set of popular doctrines,  $Y$  the set of doctrines used by a commentator, and  $X \cap Y$  the intersection between the two sets. Then the first measurement indicates the size of  $X \cap Y$  in relation to  $X$ , while the second indicates the size of  $X \cap Y$  in relation to  $Y$ . This combination is intended to counteract high outliers caused by low numbers of registered doctrines.


In table 3.5 on the next page these measurements are presented along with the average of the two. We see that the four commentators with the highest mixed score are Anonymus Vaticanus 2170 II, Dinsdale, Wyle, and Brito. This also shows how the average of the two values balances extremes in the measurements, as Anonymus Vaticanus 2170 II only contains the doctrines that are among the most popular and thus has a concentration of 1, while he only has a lower proportion of them than some of the others and therefore ends around the same averaged score as them. Brito is an example of the opposite tendency, as he is the one with the highest proportion of the popular doctrines, but since he also has many other, less common or unique, doctrines, his average score is a bit lower. We also notice that aside from Jandun, Siger of Brabant, and Anonymus Digby 55 all the commentators are relatively close in their scores, and are therefore all more or less good places to start for a reader who wants to get a relatively concentrated but representative impression of the doctrines of the tradition. Furthermore, a low score on this measurement is not indicative of an uninteresting text, as this is also partially a measurement of to how high a degree a text lies at the doctrinal average of a corpus. This means that a commentator might provide an unrepresentative example text, although he actually has a high proportion of popular doctrines, as the popular doctrines may be spread more thinly. The prime example of this is Jandun. So to investigate that phenomenon more, we can return to the distribution of unique doctrines in the commentators.

In the first section of this chapter we had a prefatory view on the distribution of doctrines and noted that generally most commentators have relatively few doctrines that are not shared with any other commentators (half the commentators have 13.5% or less unique doctrines). On the other hand there is a small group of commentators with much higher proportions of

<sup>139</sup> See 3.2.1.3.4 on page 69 and 3.2.2.2.3 on page 83.

Name	Popular	Concentration	Average
Anonymus Vat. Lat. 2170 2	0.39	1.00	0.69
John Dinsdale	0.52	0.84	0.68
Henric de la Wyle	0.45	0.88	0.66
Radulphus Brito	0.61	0.68	0.65
Simon of Faversham	0.39	0.86	0.62
Anonymus Bazan	0.48	0.75	0.62
Anonymus Assisi	0.42	0.81	0.62
John of Jandun	0.52	0.50	0.51
Anonymus Digby 55	0.16	0.50	0.33
Siger of Brabant	0.13	0.50	0.31

Table 3.5: Proportion of most popular doctrines by commentator.

Figure 3.7: Venn diagram of  $X$ ,  $Y$ , and  $X \cap Y$

	Unique	Shared	Sum	Proportion
Anonymus Digby 55	6	4	10	0.60
John of Jandun	14	18	32	0.44
Radulphus Brito	7	21	28	0.25
Siger of Brabant	2	6	8	0.25
Anonymus Bazan	3	17	20	0.15
Anonymus Assisi	2	14	16	0.12
John Dinsdale	2	17	19	0.11
Simon of Faversham	1	13	14	0.07
Henric de la Wyle	1	15	16	0.06
Anonymus Vat. Lat. 2170 2	0	12	12	0.00

Table 3.6: Unique, shared, total and proportion of unique and shared doctrines.

unique doctrines. Anonymus Digby 55, Jandun, Siger of Brabant, and Brito all have 25% or more unique doctrines. The values for the whole corpus are apparent in table 3.6, and from that we immediately notice that the reason Anonymus Digby 55 has such a high proportion of unique doctrines partly is that relatively few doctrines have been registered for him. However Jandun and Brito would be candidates for some interesting reading as they both seem to present more elaborate texts and have a good chunk of unique doctrines (based on the amount of registered doctrines). As we have already investigated the texts, we know some of the reasons for this. An inspection of the binary doctrinal matrices (figures 3.5 to 3.6 on pages 101–102) will reveal how both have a small handful of unique determination doctrines and in particular Jandun has a large chunk of unique doctrines used in discussion of *rationes principales*.<sup>140</sup>

In figure 3.8 on the next page we see this data in a different visualization, a scatterplot where each commentator is located in the plot according to his degree of uniqueness and proportion of common doctrines. We see how Jandun and Brito both have a high degree of uniqueness and commonality (in different proportions), while some concentrate around the lower middle, as they share a lot and have a relatively low degree of unique material. Finally we see Siger of Brabant and Anonymus Digby 55 have high and very high degrees of uniqueness, but a very low proportion of common doctrines. From this a reader could navigate according to interest to identify the kind of commentator he is looking for.

Finally, the attentive reader will have noticed long ago that there are also a couple of commentators who seem to be at the low end or in the fringe of every calculation we execute. These commentators are of course Siger of Brabant and Anonymus Digby 55. In the proportional clustermaps we have seen how they consistently have become the outliers who had none or only very weak cluster partners. This is partly due to real doctrinal differences, at least on the part of Anonymus Digby 55. In section 3.2.3 on page 87 I have analysed his text separately

<sup>140</sup> Counting the number of doctrines in the matrices will not necessarily fit with the number of unique doctrines, as the same doctrine can have more than one instance, but will still be registered as a unique doctrine when it is only used by a single author (which is exactly the case for Jandun).




Figure 3.8: Scatter plot of uniqueness and commonality of commentators.

as I interpret him to be the only one who actually gives a strong and unambiguous presentation of the idea that the intellect knows itself by its own species, and in such a way that the species is not necessarily completely indeterminate before actualization. On the other hand we have seen how Siger of Brabant actually has quite some doctrinal similarities with Jandun on the relation between the agent and possible intellect and their perpetual occupation with intellectual self-knowledge. This also explains why he clusters together with Jandun in the clustermap of determination doctrines (figure 3.2 on page 97). And although he also has connections with many of the other commentators (see figure 3.4 on page 99) they are still so weak in comparison with the other close connections that we have seen in this chapter that he ends up as the outlier.

### 3.4 Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to (1) introduce the texts and themes of self-knowledge discussed in questions on *De anima* 3.4, (2) survey the different ideas and points of doctrines as they occur in the commentaries, and (3) analyse the network revealed by the material used in the commentaries. This has been undertaken in three sections, one corresponding to each partial aim. 10 texts comprising a total of 17 questions on self-knowledge have been investigated. They span a range of different subjects within the domain from the intelligibility and self-intelligibility of the intellect, the self-knowledge of the intellect (often explicitly the possible intellect), whether the intellect has essential or accidental self-knowledge, to questions of whether the agent intellect can be known and in which way the two intellects are ontologically related.

After an initial quantitative and qualitative overview of the main doctrines I presented the detailed survey of all the different registered doctrines. This was done in a way where the abstract arguments were not disconnected from the exposition of their use by the commentators. We investigated the problems involved in the intelligibility and self-intelligibility of the intellect as it is presented in eight different questions by the five commentators Brito, Anonymus Bazán, Anonymus Digby 55, Anonymus Assisi and Jandun. We saw there the first presentation of the fundamental guiding principle of these commentaries: The intellect is indeterminate before an actualization by an external species, which means that it is both intelligible and self-intelligible through an actualization by the reception of an external species. We saw how this discussion of intelligibility involves other doctrinal points such as the idea of reflexivity of immaterial substances and the self-intelligibility as a successive procedure. And finally we saw how Jandun presents a rather different view in one of his questions, as he holds that the intellect always and necessarily has some sort of self-knowledge as soon as it represents an external species by being actualized by it. The main objections to these questions revolve around the requirement of sense perception in the Aristotelian epistemology, the impossibility of self-movement or simultaneous act and potency of the same subject, and other similar challenges of subject-object identity.

The second, and major, subsection sketched the treatments of the seven commentators Faversham, Anonymus Vaticanus 2170 II, Dinsdale, Wyle, Anonymus Assisi, Brito, and Jandun, who go into the details of intellectual self-knowledge, very often by refuting the idea of es-

sential self-knowledge directly, and always with an endorsement of the idea that the intellect knows itself through actualization by an external species. The process is often explained as the Aristotelian acquisition of knowledge about a substance through observation of the objects of its activities, which yields knowledge about its powers which in turn reveal what kind of substance they belong to. In this way the intellect, it is argued, knows itself in the same way as it knows other things. There is however the difference that the dependence of sense perception is only indirect, as the intellect can engage in self-reflection, provided that it is actualized by a primary object of knowledge. So it differs from the other types of intellects that can engage in essential self-reflection, and it therefore occupies the lowest tier of intellects on the big *scala naturae*. Some therefore also emphasize the successive nature of the procedure in this context as well. Challenges are often either presented as a general challenge of the intelligibility of the intellect, as already presented, as arguments in favour of essential self-knowledge, or as challenges focusing on the impossibility of an identity between subject and object of an activity. The argument of the risk of an infinite regress is also regularly presented, but most commentators do not consider such regresses a problem in the domain of the intellect.

In opposition to this big central group of commentators, we have the most significant outlier in this corpus, Anonymus Digby 55. He argues that the intellect knows itself through its own species. The difference consists in the idea that although the intellect is not actualized it is still not completely indeterminate, as it has some sort of species of its own. This conception of the species clearly imports features from the idea of a substantial form that lets Anonymus Digby 55 struggle with the question of how the intellect can have a form if it is completely indeterminate. Unlike the majority of commentators he further argues that the intellect knows itself immediately once actualized by the reception of an external species, although it takes place through a process of abstraction of its own form-species. This idea of self-knowledge therefore involves two species, the proper species of the intellect, which cannot be abstracted and known before it is actualized by a species of a primary object of knowledge.

Finally, we saw how a smaller contingent of commentators, Anonymus Bazán, Siger of Brabant, Radulphus Brito, and John of Jandun, also tackle the problem of whether and how the possible intellect knows the agent intellect. Their solutions differ, as Jandun and Siger of Brabant present the monopsychist idea that the agent intellect is perpetually engaged in an act of self-reflection which is then reflected in the possible intellect by virtue of their eternal connection in the separate intellect. However, this type of knowledge of the eternal activity of the intellect never extends down to the level of human intellection, although they are ready to accept that human also get knowledge of the agent intellect, but in a more indirect way through observation of its activities. That procedure is the only solution presented by Anonymus Bazán and Brito.

The final section of the chapter investigated connections and tendencies within the texts that all these different points of doctrine reveal in a combined quantitative and qualitative approach. The registration of all the doctrines, and some details of their contexts, makes it relatively simple to identify doctrines used by two or more commentators. Based on such correlations I presented two types of visualizations to highlight clusters and give an overview of the distribution of doctrines in the texts. Those analyses clearly revealed a strong group of five commentators, Anonymus Assisi, Anonymus Vaticanus 2170 II, Dinsdale, Wyle, and Faversham

who have an overwhelming tendency to share a big proportion of their doctrines. In particular Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II and Dinsdale as well as Dinsdale and Wyle were found to be closely connected. But it also showed that Anonymus Bazán and Brito bear a strong likeness to each other, while Anonymus Digby 55 and Siger of Brabant are the most distinct outliers in the corpus. Finally, Jandun was also somewhat of an outlier, not so much due to his difference in fundamental doctrines, but rather because of a wide spread of doctrines and a higher degree of unique material that means that he has relatively less in common with any one of the other commentators.

Not all connections can be investigated fully within the limits of this study, but some further connections can be suggested for further study. In the texts of Brito and Anonymus Bazán there is an asymmetric relation between the two where almost all of the doctrines presented by Anonymus Bazán were also to be found in Brito's text without the inverse being the case. The connection and historical relation between those two texts is interesting and an interesting subject for further studies. The two texts share the subject and general structure of each their three questions concerning self-knowledge. A hypothesis for further investigation would be that Brito used the commentary of Anonymus Bazán (or another very closely related text) in the development of his own commentary, but I also showed how he uses it productively. When the material present in his source of inspiration is more or less unproblematic it can be taken over without many changes, but when he notices philosophical problems or incoherent arguments, he does not hesitate to develop the material into a stronger and more coherent form.

Finally, the registration of doctrines across the texts made it possible to make some well founded suggestions for good commentators to read to get a representative and relatively concentrated impression of the common doctrines of this corpus. Based on those analyses I would recommend the texts of John Dinsdale, Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II or maybe Wyle as good starting points for the interested casual reader or maybe a class curriculum. If a reader on the other hand is looking for a rich commentary that includes the standard doctrines of the tradition but also presents a high degree of originality (or at least uniqueness), Radulphus Brito or John of Jandun would be the place to start.



## Chapter 4

# The science of the soul and self-knowledge

Is intellectual self-knowledge the same as knowledge of the soul as a universal? Does acquisition of knowledge about the soul take place in a way different from intellectual self-reflection? If they are different, what sort of endeavour is the so-called science of the soul? Those questions will be the focus of this chapter. The question ‘can there be a science of the soul’ or an equivalent is almost universally present in question commentaries of the 13th and early 14th century. In this chapter we will see some different treatments of that question with intellectual self-knowledge as the central point of attention. This will show how the commentators viewed the relation between intellectual self-knowledge and the science of the soul.

We could imagine a distinction between (1) the knowledge of the soul as a universal, and (2) the process that takes place when an individual intellect reflects on itself. Given such a distinction, the first point provides the content of the science of the soul, that is, the soul as the defining form of any sort of living being. This may only be considered self-knowledge in the sense that it tells something about the kind of thing the individual intellect is just as any other intellect. Since the particular soul is an example of the universal concept of soul, knowledge of the soul as a universal also provides knowledge of the individual soul, but it tells nothing about any distinctive features of that particular soul. Whether there can be a science of the soul is of the most general nature, and it therefore has a natural place in the prefatory sections of a commentary on *De anima*. On the other hand, the particular intellectual self-knowledge that is introduced in *De anima* 3.4 might represent a more restricted aspect of the complete soul, as it only concerns the self-reflexivity of the intellect. The relation between these concepts of self-knowledge will be the subject of this chapter.

The procedure followed in this chapter is similar to the preceding chapter. I give an overview of the doctrines used by the commentators, which is followed by a detailed exposition of the doctrines and counter arguments as they occur in the commentaries.<sup>1</sup> After that I will draw some general connections based on quantitative analyses of the material, before the chapter is closed by three shorter analyses on selected subjects within the material.

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<sup>1</sup> All doctrines listed in the appendix, section A on page 241.

The science of the soul is normally the main subject of the commentaries on book one, as the historical parts of the book are often discussed cursorily or skipped entirely. Interesting questions will therefore have to be left aside, as we keep a clear focus on the main subject, the relation between intellectual self-knowledge and the science of the soul. I therefore only analyse the initial question on whether there can be a science of the soul, as that regularly includes reflections of self-intelligibility, reflexivity, and occasionally the relation between self-knowledge and scientific knowledge. Other questions on particular aspects of this subject would be relevant places to expand this study further. Examples of that could be questions on acquisition of substantial knowledge through observation of accidents, or discussions of the difficulty and certainty of the science.<sup>2</sup>

The chapter will show that most commentators explicitly accept Aristotle's suggested approach of starting from an analysis of the objects, activities and powers of the soul. They also generally present the idea that a science is defined by a group of formal principles that must be fulfilled, and that indeed they can be fulfilled in the case of the study of the soul. But they do not agree on how big a role intellectual self-knowledge and introspection can play in the science of the soul. John of Jandun is an example of a commentator who tries to keep introspection to a minimum, while Simon of Faversham on the other hand may even consider it a necessary condition for a scientific knowledge about the soul. Most commentators are however to be found between those two extremes, and it is generally difficult for the commentators to keep intellectual self-knowledge completely out of the picture.

The overview of the arguments presented also reveals some interesting connections among the commentators. The most striking connection is between John Dinsdale and Anonymus Oriensis 33 who present two texts that are doctrinally virtually identical. We will also see that Simon of Faversham, Radulphus Brito, John of Jandun and Anonymus Vaticanus 2170 II present texts that have many shared points of doctrine, although they also differ on central points. I argue that they present a group of representative commentators to read to get an impression of the most commonly used arguments in the tradition. The connection between Anonymus Mertonensis 275, Anonymus Vennebusch, and Anonymus Bernardini, which is already known in the literature, will also be confirmed here. Finally there are some commentaries, such as that of Henric de la Wyle, that stand out in comparison with the remaining corpus.

Every question commentary from the 13th or early 14th century that I have inspected raises the possibility of having a science of the soul among its very first.<sup>3</sup> I selected a subset of those commentaries for further study in the following way: When a commentary that is included in the preceding chapter has been available, it has been included. Aside from that I have chosen commentaries of which I already had made partial studies, and often transcriptions, as well as some already published commentaries. I have sought to cover the period from around 1250 to the early 14th century. When questions cover more subjects than just the question of the science of the soul, I only focus on the relevant part in the analysis (this is in particular the case for Anonymus Mertonensis 275 and Anonymus Vennebusch). The texts included in the chapter are listed in table 4.1 on the next page.

<sup>2</sup> Boer 2013: 92–121 in particular contains an interesting and relevant study of some of these points, including some of the same commentators as I study here.

<sup>3</sup> See the documentation of the survey in B.1 on page 257.

Table 4.1: Question commentaries covered in this chapter. Dating key: ~ = *circa*, ? = *uncertain*, e.g. 13.4 = last quarter of 13th century.

Author	Title	Dating	Witnesses or edition
Anonymus Bazán	<i>Quaestiones super Aristotelis librum De anima</i>	1272–1277	Anonymus Bazán 1971
Anonymus Bernardini	<i>Quaestiones super librum De anima</i>	1250–1260	Anonymus Bernardini 2009
Anonymus Giele	<i>Quaestiones in Aristotelis libros I et II De anima</i>	1270–1275	Anonymus Giele 1971
Anonymus Mertonensis 275	<i>Quaestiones in De anima I</i>	1260~	Appendix §C.6
Anonymus Orielensis 33	<i>Quaestiones in De anima I–III</i>	1274–1289?	Appendix §C.7
Anonymus Vaticani 2170 I	<i>Quaestiones in De anima I–II</i>	13.4	Appendix §C.8
Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II	<i>Quaestiones in De anima I–III</i>	13.4–14.1	Appendix §C.9
Anonymus Vennebusch	<i>Questiones in tres libros De anima</i>	1260	Anonymus Vennebusch 1963
Anonymus Steenberghen	<i>Quaestiones in De anima I–III</i>	1273–1277	Anonymus Steenberghen 1971
Henric de la Wyle	<i>Quaestiones in De anima I–III</i>	1284–1308	Appendix §C.10
John Dinsdale	<i>Quaestiones in De anima I–III</i>	1274–1289	Dinsdale 2017; Appendix §C.11
John of Jandun	<i>Quaestiones super libros De anima</i>	1315–1319	Jandun 1480; §C.12
Radulphus Brito	<i>Quaestiones in Aristotelis librum tertium De anima</i>	1290s–1320s	Brito 1974
Simon of Faversham	<i>Quaestiones in De anima I–III</i>	13.4–14.1	Appendix §C.13

Context	Doctrines	Instances	Proportion
Determination	21	67	3.19
Attack	16	69	4.31
Refutation	18	63	3.50
All	47	213	4.53

Table 4.2: Number of doctrines and instances in four different context classes.

## 4.1 Overview

From table 4.2 we see that I have identified 21 different determination points of doctrine in the context of determinations. The determination doctrines have been registered to be used a total of 67 times in the texts, yielding a mean frequency around 3.2 uses per doctrine. When we look at the attacking and refuting *rationes principales*, we generally find fewer doctrines with more or less the same frequency of use. I have registered 16 attacking and 18 refuting doctrines, and we notice how the attacking doctrines have a higher instance-to-doctrine proportion than the other contexts. But also how all the proportions here, and the attacking doctrines in particular, have a higher proportion than in the preceding chapter (see table 3.1 on page 60). This indicates that the collection of arguments used is smaller here than in the preceding chapter. This is probably mostly an effect of the smaller range of problems raised than in the preceding chapter where the questions cover a wider range of themes.

As in the preceding chapter we see a very unequal but similar distribution. Half of the doctrines are used only once or twice, while 75% are used less than six times. The upper quartile on the other hand has a high frequency with an average of almost 15 instances, and the challenge that the soul is not available to sense perception and the distinction between primary and secondary intelligibility are the most frequently used doctrines.<sup>4</sup> Unique points do occur among the commentators, as half the commentators have 10% or more of their doctrines that are unique. But in particular Jandun, Anonymus Mertonensis 275 and Wyle have four unique doctrines each and a relatively high proportion of around 25% of their complete doctrines. The amount of unique doctrines is however slightly lower than in the preceding chapter.

At the beginning of *De anima* Aristotle is very conscious about the methodological challenges of the projected science. He discusses where to start the scientific investigation of a subject and suggests looking at the activities and objects of the substance under investigation to get to know it better.<sup>5</sup> He does not there state explicitly the problem that maybe the soul is not directly or fully available for sense perception. But later, in book two, that seems to be part of his motivation for considering the approach based on activities and objects necessary, as the objects and activities precede the powers.<sup>6</sup> In the introduction this leads him to state that not only is knowledge of an essence important in knowing the accidental attributes of a sub-

<sup>4</sup> This is aside from the base doctrine that there can be a science of the soul, which is registered a high amount of times, but disregarded in the numbers as it carries no particular interest.

<sup>5</sup> Aristotle *DA*, 1.1, 402b9–16.

<sup>6</sup> Aristotle *DA*, 2.4, 415a14–22.

stance, but it also works the other way around: The accidents can be very helpful in knowing the essence of a substance, because statements about properties also give us information about their substance.<sup>7</sup> A hypothetical definition of an essence can then be tested and confirmed to be good when it is able to explain satisfactorily the accidents of the substance. He also treats of how the intellect can be known, as it is unclear whether it is a proper attribute of the embodied soul or something separate. Averroes is interested in the problem because of his attention to the separability of the material (later termed ‘possible’) intellect.<sup>8</sup> But neither of the two really get into the methodological challenges it involves. Albert the Great on the other hand goes more into it, but also his discussion is not particularly elaborate. The power of the intellect, he says, lies in its ability to not limit its conclusions to the sensible objects, but rise above those to the realm of the immaterial comprising the first cause, the separate substances as well as its own essence.<sup>9</sup>

That view, that the essence of the soul can be revealed through an investigation of its powers, expressed in its activities and their objects, is a fundamental part of the explanation the medieval commentators give. We are already familiar with the approach from the preceding chapter, where it was also found to be a central part of how the intellect acquires knowledge about itself through self-reflection.<sup>10</sup> But they also appeal to one or more points that we have not seen in the preceding chapter. Typically they will argue that a science is established by a subject with properties that can be ascribed to the subject according to established principles, and that the definition of the soul works as this principle of ascription.<sup>11</sup> They might also want to discuss different definitions of science, whether the knowledge of the soul qualifies as one of those, or whether it can answer one or more of the four types of scientific questions that Aristotle lists in *Analytica posteriora* 2.1. Some also doubt whether the knowledge that we have about the soul can be considered a science strictly speaking, while others may even claim that it is a fully demonstrative science. But one thing that they almost all accept is that intellectual self-knowledge plays a part in the acquisition of this science, but some ascribe it more importance than others.

The challenge that they most commonly raise is how there can be a science about that which cannot be the object of sense perception. The credo of the Aristotelian empiricism makes them raise this fair challenge to which the solution generally is that although we cannot perceive the soul directly, indirect perception is possible through the effects of the soul, its activities. The commentators may also present other related problems revolving around the problem of the immaterial nature of the soul, and the intellect in particular. The intellect may be presented as the most difficult thing to get knowledge about for those exact reasons. Another strain of challenges focuses on the problem of potential self-identity that may arise when the subject and object of the science are identical, but solutions to that often point out

<sup>7</sup> Aristotle *DA*, 1.1.402b10–3a2. Boer (2013: 46, n. 4) refers to an article on this titled *Knowing Substances through Accidents. Aristotle’s De anima I.1, 402b17–22, in the Medieval and Renaissance Commentary Tradition* by P.J.J.M. Bakker, but it is nowhere to be found.

<sup>8</sup> Averroes *In DA*, bk. 1, cap. 12, pp. 17–18, ll. 36–70.

<sup>9</sup> Albert the Great *Lib. 1*, tract. 1, cap. 1, pp. 2–3, ll. 36–5.

<sup>10</sup> With the inventory reference P2, analysed in section 3.2.2.1.3 on page 76.

<sup>11</sup> This stems from *Analytica posteriora*, in particular chapters 1.10 and II.3.

how the soul is known through an intermediate knowledge that establishes a distance between the two entities. Finally they may also argue that some of the requirements of a proper science are not fulfilled, which may either be refuted or conceded with a modification of the extent to which our knowledge about the soul is a science.

## 4.2 Arguments

In this section we will see document in detail how the individual doctrinal points are used by the commentators, which commentators use which arguments, how they differ and who are similar. We will also present their negative *rationes principales* and their refutations. As in the previous chapter there is a full registry of the doctrines included here in section A on page 241 where each number is prefixed with either a ‘P’ for positive doctrines or ‘N’ for negative doctrines. In the next section (section 4.3) we can then see which relations and tendencies these different compositions of doctrines reveal.<sup>12</sup>

### 4.2.1 Positive points

#### 4.2.1.1 Subject, properties, principles (P6)

A science requires (1) a subject, (2) properties ascribed to the subject, and (3) the principle according to which the properties are ascribed to it.<sup>13</sup> The investigation of the soul fulfills all these three requirements. The definition of the soul can be used as the principle by which the properties are ascribed to the subject.<sup>14</sup> This is presented by Wyle, Faversham, Brito, Anonymus Vaticani 2170 I, Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II, Anonymus Mertonensis 275, Jandun, Anonymus Oriensis 33, and Dinsdale.

Dinsdale provides us with a great example of how such an argument can look like:

Dicendum quod cum scientia sit habitus acquisitus per demonstrationem, et ad demonstrationem tria requirantur (scilicet subiectum, passio, et principium per quod ostenditur passio de subiecto), ubi est invenire ista tria, ibi contingit ponere scientiam. Nunc autem anima quoddam subiectum est cuius sunt multae proprietates et passiones, ut patebit inferius. Sunt etiam principia per quae istae passiones probari possunt de anima. Si enim accipiatur quod quid est animae pro

<sup>12</sup> Boer (2013: 48–57) also gives an high level categorization of some of the doctrines of this corpus, presenting arguments of imperceptibility, simplicity, and potentiality, mostly with reference to Anonymus Vennebusch, Anonymus Bazán, and Brito. He also gives (pp. 58–65) a comparison of the doctrines of Brito and Jandun where it is possible for him to go into a bit more detail about those connections that I can do here.

<sup>13</sup> This is based on Aristotle *APo*, I.28, 87a38–87b4.

<sup>14</sup> The assumption of these three elements stems from Aristotle *APo*, 1.10, 76b13–22 where what I refer to as ‘subject’ is the γένος, the ‘properties’ are πάθη, and the ‘principles’ are ἀξιώματα. The terminology used here is modelled on the medieval terminology, where the three elements are called *subiectum*, *passiones* (or *proprietates*) and *principia*.

medio, per ipsum concludi potest propria passio eius de anima, et ita de anima potest aliquid sciri sive esse aliqualis scientia.

It should be argued that when science is a state acquired through demonstration, and three things are required for a demonstration (namely a subject, an attribute, and a principle by which the attribute is ascribed to the subject), where those three are present one can hold there to be a science. But now the soul is some subject to which belongs several properties and attributes, as we will see below. There are also principles by which those properties can be proven to belong to the soul. For if the definition of the soul is accepted as the middle term, then the proper attributes of the soul can be ascribed by that, and in this way we can know something or have a some sort of science about the soul.

Dinsdale I.1, APP 310.18–24.

In his determination Dinsdale is relatively brief as he outlines how the soul is a subject with several properties which are ascribed to the soul by using the definition of the soul as a middle term.<sup>15</sup> But his argument lacks any further specification of which attributes he refers to or a demonstration of how the definition can act as this middle term in the ascription. He also does not flesh out what the principles by which the properties are ascribed are. In their determination of this question Anonymus Oriensis 33 and Dinsdale are very similar, also on these points, but although Anonymus Oriensis 33 is a bit more verbose, he leaves no notes about how the definition is used as a principle for property ascription.<sup>16</sup> But he explains that the subject is something intelligible with properties such as knowing and reflecting (*intelligere, speculari*). The principle is another certain definition by which those properties are ascribed to the subject.<sup>17</sup>

Anonymus Vaticani 2170 I Includes this as one of three ways in which a science can be obtained.<sup>18</sup> The other two are by definition and division.<sup>19</sup> Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II briefly notes that the soul can be known when it is in act and thus has parts and properties. He seems to argue that the intellect has a principle in itself according to which the properties are ascribed to the subject. He singles out the principle of passivity and activity in the intellect as the cause of many of its activities, and thus such a principle of ascription.<sup>20</sup> Although Faversham only gives this argument as his positive *ratio principalis*, he provides more details in an outline of how each part of the soul has different parts and activities.<sup>21</sup>

Jandun adds more details, but he also shifts the requirements slightly. He adds that the subject is a thing that can be known as a universal, and that it has parts, properties, and principles according to which the properties are ascribed. The soul is an intelligible thing as it is

<sup>15</sup> Dinsdale I.1, APP 310.18–24.

<sup>16</sup> There is a problem with the text, and a possible lacuna, in that exact passage where some details may be given.

<sup>17</sup> Anonymus Oriensis 33 I.1, APP 291.21–33.

<sup>18</sup> Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II.2, APP 295.29–33.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. section 4.2.1.6 on page 125.

<sup>20</sup> Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II I.1, APP 299.13–24.

<sup>21</sup> Faversham I.1, APP 332.25–36.

in act, and because of the intellect's ability to become anything. This, he holds, shows that it is intelligible as it itself is part of the class of all things. The argument must be that everything the intellect can know is intelligible; it can become all things by knowing them; it is then itself included in that class; hence it is itself intelligible.<sup>22</sup> The soul contains parts and properties, he continues, through its activities, namely vegetation, sensation and intellection. Finally the principle according to which they are ascribed to the subject is the definition of the subject itself, and the soul even has a general definition as well as subordinate definitions according to its special activities.<sup>23</sup>

Just like Jandun, Brito makes the point that the soul in itself is intelligible as it is a thing in virtue of being in act.<sup>24</sup> Further, the vegetative and sensitive parts of the soul are easier to get to know through immediate observation of their effects. But it is different with the intellect, because that is known after its actualization by another object of knowledge. Here Brito gives a smaller presentation of his doctrine of intellectual self-knowledge, including a presentation of the question of simultaneity of the different objects of knowledge.<sup>25</sup>

Wyle uses this doctrine as his only constitutive argument for the science of the soul, and includes an interesting distinction in his presentation. As is generally held, he announces that the definition of the soul will be the medium by which properties are ascribed to the subject of investigation. But he then distinguishes between the definition considered as a simple form without reference to the hylomorphic composite that it actualizes. This leads him to conclude that there can be a science of the soul considered in itself and another science of the animated body, which considers the form in a composite.<sup>26</sup>

In one of his positive *rationes principales* Anonymus Mertonensis 275 argues that there can be a science about that which has causes. That is a paired down version of this present argument, as the ascription of properties to the subject by the definition gives causal explanations of the properties.<sup>27</sup>

#### 4.2.1.2 Substantial knowledge from accidents (P2)

Knowledge about accidents can lead to knowledge of that to which they belong. Many accidents of the soul (operations and their objects) are evident to us. This position is held by Anonymus Giele, Anonymus Bernardini, Anonymus Mertonensis 275, Anonymus Oriensis 33, Anonymus Vaticani 2170 I, Anonymus Vennebusch, Dinsdale, Jandun, Brito, Faversham.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>22</sup> This is the same argument as he uses later to establish the intelligibility of the intellect, cf. the preceding chapter on page 65, and on page 163 in the following chapter.

<sup>23</sup> Jandun I.1, APP 318.7–24.

<sup>24</sup> Brito I.1, p. 269.18–21.

<sup>25</sup> Brito I.1, 269.22–70.23.

<sup>26</sup> Wyle I.1, APP 305.6–15. This is an interesting intermediate position in the question of the subject of the science as either the soul as form or the enmattered soul. Boer 2013: 71–92 delves into debate.

<sup>27</sup> Anonymus Mertonensis 275 q. 1, APP 285.30–31.

<sup>28</sup> Curiously enough Anonymus Bazán does not include this doctrine in this context, but in a later question (Anonymus Bazán I.5, ll. 39–49) he outlines this doctrine from both an *a priori* and *a posteriori* perspective. Starting from the essence of the soul and from there analyzing its powers, activities, and objects is the former and more difficult, but includes an idea of internal experience

Anonymus Orielensis 33 provides us with a good example:

Accidentia, eo quod non sunt entia nisi in alio, ipsa praecognita manuducunt in cognitionem eius cuius sunt. Sed multae sunt operationes artificiales nobis manifestae quae non possunt procedere nisi a potentia intellectiva. Haec enim immediate fluit a substantia animae, propter quod huiusmodi operationes nobis manifestae statim ducent in cognitionem animae.

Preconceived accidents, insofar as they are not anything except in something else, lead to a knowledge of that to which they belong. But many artistic activities are evident to us which cannot have any other origin than an intellectual power. For they flow directly from the substance of the soul, and because of that such activities, which are evident to us, immediately lead to a knowledge about the soul.

Anonymus Orielensis 33 I.1, APP 291.34–292.2.

Accidents must belong to a subject, he explains, and the soul exhibits a range of activities as accidents that are readily available for observation. These must be caused by an intellectual power and thus lead directly to a knowledge about the soul. This means that the knowledge of the soul is indirect, as it is derived from the observation of its accidents. This then also constitutes one of the most common ways of solving the problem of the imperceptibility of the soul and the intellect in particular.<sup>29</sup>

Dinsdale is very similar to Anonymus Orielensis 33 in wording and details of this argument.<sup>30</sup> Anonymus Giele states that as accidents belong to a subject, they cannot be known in themselves but through knowledge of them we get knowledge about the subject. The accidents that Anonymus Giele points out are sensation (vision and hearing specifically) and intellection.<sup>31</sup> Faversham includes this explanation of the science in an extended exposition of the mechanics of an introspective process completely along the lines of the procedure of substantial self-knowledge in the previous chapter ( 3.2.2.1.3 on page 76).<sup>32</sup> The presentation of Anonymus Vennebusch is similar in his presentation.<sup>33</sup> Finally, Jandun also gives an extended discussion of how the intellect can be known through its accidents, which includes a distinction between accidental and essential perceptibility.<sup>34</sup> Anonymus Mertonensis 275 and

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(“de illis quae sunt experimenta in nobis”), while the procedure starting from the objects is easier, as it starts with what is most apparent. Boer 2013: 107–8 describes this.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. 4.2.2.3 on page 129.

<sup>30</sup> Dinsdale I.1, APP 310.25–311.2.

<sup>31</sup> Anonymus Giele I.1, ll. 19–32. He adds the highly interesting note that intellects which do not reveal themselves in activities available to the senses cannot be known according to this procedure (*logica nostra*) of empirical observation and must remain hidden by nature, *naturaliter occulta* (I.1, ll. 33–37).

<sup>32</sup> Faversham I.1, APP 333.18–334.5. It is curious to note it in his question on self-knowledge he does not outline this process, although that is a very typical point to include in that discussion.

<sup>33</sup> Anonymus Vennebusch I.1 [2], p. 94, ll.60–68.

<sup>34</sup> Jandun I.1, APP 319.1–27.

Anonymus Bernardini embed the argument into a discussion of the different ways in which something can be intelligible.<sup>35</sup>

Anonymus Vaticanani 2170 I discusses this procedure extensively. He declares there to be two ways in which substantial knowledge can be obtained. When the intellect observes that some operations proceed from a thing, it makes conjectures (*coniecturatio, coniecturare*) about which sort of substance these operations belong to and differentiates the different substances based on their operations. Through such a hypothetical procedure and observation of accidental properties the intellect distinguishes different objects and arrive at a definition of their essence.<sup>36</sup> This looks like a discussion of how empirical inferences are made in the psychological science, and might be an expansion of what he imagines to take place during the acquisition of knowledge from accidents, which is presented immediately after those reflections.<sup>37</sup>

As part of Jandun's discussion of this doctrine he raises the challenge that if the intellect is only intelligible accidentally (once actualized), then the science is also only accidentally possible. His answer to that is that when something is known through the knowledge of something else, and that mediating object of knowledge is known according to its own species, the direct relation propagates back to the causing subject. So the powers of the soul, such as perception and nutrition, are themselves available to sense perception through their proper objects and acts, not accidentally but by necessity. And since the knowledge acquired through the necessary perceptibility leads to knowledge about the imperceptible essence of the soul, the knowledge is not accidental.<sup>38</sup> This is an interesting point, as it shows how Jandun may argue that the knowledge that is based on introspection may have a weaker scientific grounding than the empirical observation of accidental activities. Because unlike sensation and nutrition the activities of the intellect are accidental as they rest on the condition of its actualization by an external stimulus.

#### 4.2.1.3 Proper and improper science (P15)

Knowledge acquired through observation of effects is not a proper science because it does not proceed according to causes. There is a contrast between this doctrine and the arguments that a science is constituted by a subject, its properties (which include effects) and a principle for ascribing the properties to the subject in P6. Anonymus Mertonensis 275, Anonymus Oriensis 33, Wyle, Dinsdale, and Faversham present the doctrine.

Anonymus Oriensis 33 and Dinsdale also mirror each other closely on this point, when they argue that the knowledge acquired in that way is not a science properly speaking, because it does not analyse the substance according to its causes (but rather, we infer, from effects).<sup>39</sup> Dinsdale also adds that this was the reason Aristotle refers to the knowledge about the soul as

<sup>35</sup> Anonymus Mertonensis 275 q. 1, APP 287.12–19, Anonymus Bernardini I.1, ll. 35–64. We will get back to this again in section 5.2.2 on page 180.

<sup>36</sup> Anonymus Vaticanani 2170 II.2, APP 295.37–296.15.

<sup>37</sup> Anonymus Vaticanani 2170 II.2, APP 296.16–22.

<sup>38</sup> Jandun I.1, APP 319.1–27.

<sup>39</sup> Anonymus Oriensis 33 I.1, APP 291.34–292.2, Dinsdale I.1, APP 310.25–311.2.

a *historia* rather than *scientia*.<sup>40</sup> That point about *historia* is also made by Faversham.<sup>41</sup>

Wyle makes this point in his distinction between three types of science (see section 4.2.1.6 on page 125) and makes it clear that the proper science is one that provides knowledge about a subject, but he does not go into how it is realized.<sup>42</sup> Finally, Anonymus Mertonensis 275 presents this point of doctrine in one of his *rationes principales*.<sup>43</sup>

#### 4.2.1.4 Soul known through self-reflection (P11)

An incorporeal thing can reflect on itself, and by virtue of that we can have a science of the soul (although it may not be a sufficient requirement). The argument is presented by Anonymus Mertonensis 275, Anonymus Bazán, Anonymus Vaticanani 2170 I, Brito, and Faversham.

Faversham argues that the soul is immaterial and hence self-reflective, and it is important for him to emphasize that the immateriality excludes the risk of knowing some parts of the soul while not knowing others. A possible implication would be that the self-reflecting soul acquires a complete knowledge of itself during the process and thus might be completely transparent to itself.<sup>44</sup> He does however make it very clear that the soul's self-reflexivity is still conditional upon the preceding actualization of it by an external species. The procedure through which the knowledge is then acquired is the well-known acquisition of substantial knowledge through observation of accidents (P2).<sup>45</sup> And one might fairly raise the question whether this procedure does not exactly fall prey to the challenge he presents of knowing some parts while not knowing others.

Similarly Anonymus Mertonensis 275 bases his exposition on this doctrine. The simplicity of the soul means that it is essentially equipped with an ability of knowing itself through self-reflection.<sup>46</sup> It is however not a power that it can realize on its own accord, as it is dependent on an external intermediary species, at least in this terrestrial existence. In the separate existence of the afterlife, essential self-knowledge may be a possibility (without a requirement of externally occasioned actualization).<sup>47</sup> In a similar vein Anonymus Bernardini notes that the identity of knower and known should facilitate a science through self-reflection.<sup>48</sup> The bulk of his determination is however spent analysing types of intelligibility and arguing that the soul is known through observation of its effects. Still, some of his refutations of initial challenges seem to imply an emphasis on an introspective science of the soul.<sup>49</sup> Both commentators also present a version of this argument in their positive *rationes principales*, and Anonymus Bernardini even makes an explicit reference to the 15th proposition of *Liber de causis* on the complete return to

<sup>40</sup> See Aristotle *DA*, I.1, 402a4.

<sup>41</sup> Faversham I.1, APP 336.15–18.

<sup>42</sup> Wyle I.1, APP 304.34–305.5.

<sup>43</sup> Anonymus Mertonensis 275 q. 1, APP 285.18–21, covered in section 4.2.2.16 on page 138.

<sup>44</sup> Faversham I.1, APP 333.1–17.

<sup>45</sup> Faversham I.1, APP 333.18–334.5.

<sup>46</sup> Anonymus Mertonensis 275 q. 1, APP 287.9–11.

<sup>47</sup> But the note about self-knowledge in the afterlife is made in the following sub-question on innate self-knowledge. See Anonymus Mertonensis 275 q. 1, APP 288.2–7 and APP 288.30–33.

<sup>48</sup> Anonymus Bernardini I.1, ll. 32–34.

<sup>49</sup> See 4.2.2.4 on page 130 and 4.2.2.11 on page 135.

itself of the immaterial substance.<sup>50</sup>

A final example of a commentator who relies primarily on this is Anonymus Bazán, who includes this in his only argument. The self-intelligibility of the intellect once actualized supports the minor premise of his argument that the intellect is intelligible. With the major premise, that there can be a science about everything intelligible, this establishes the possibility of the science of the soul.<sup>51</sup> What we notice here is that this might entail that self-reflection is sufficient for establishing a full science of the soul according to this commentator.

Brito includes this point, but unlike Anonymus Bazán who uses this as part of his only argument, Brito mentions it as a side note addressing some details of the intelligibility of the intellect. Subsequently he moves on to arguments about the soul as a subject with parts and properties.<sup>52</sup> Similarly, Anonymus Vaticanani 2170 I makes this his third point in an explanation of the procedures of the science of the soul. He argues that the intellect is dependent on external stimulation to acquire a first actuality (although he does not use that term), but once that is the case, he explains, it is able to realize activities that are unavailable to it before actualization, because then it acquires a reflexive ability and can thus turn and iterate on itself and thus acquire knowledge about itself.<sup>53</sup>

#### 4.2.1.5 The intellect especially difficult to know (P19)

Knowing the intellect is particularly difficult, as it not intelligible through observation. De Boer argues that the seed of this distinction is to be found in Anonymus Bazán's treatment of the difficulty of the science, which is developed further by Brito and will set the agenda for the 14th century.<sup>54</sup> But in our selection we see that Brito is by no means alone in developing this idea, as it is used by him as well as Anonymus Vaticanani 2170 II, Faversham, and Jandun.<sup>55</sup>

Anonymus Vaticanani 2170 II is possibly the commentator who has the most focus on this with two mentions of it in his determination and one in the discussion of the *rationes*.<sup>56</sup> His solution is to point to the mechanics of the possible intellect: Once it is actualized by an external species, it can be the object of knowledge. In a short section of his determination Brito is rather close to Anonymus Vaticanani 2170 II on this point, referring to the mechanics of the intellect and raising a problem about its intelligibility. But he also raises the problem of simultaneity, which is not at all mentioned by Anonymus Vaticanani 2170 II.<sup>57</sup> Faversham, who is often doctrinally close to Anonymus Vaticanani 2170 II, also notes this difficulty, but in a much less emphatic way, as he just includes a short note on it in his positive *ratio principalis*.<sup>58</sup> Finally, Jandun makes this point in his discussion of how knowledge about the soul can be drawn from observation

<sup>50</sup> Anonymus Bernardini I.1, ll. 20–24, Anonymus Mertonensis 275 q. 1, APP 285.32–33.

<sup>51</sup> Anonymus Bazán q. I.1, ll. 30–35.

<sup>52</sup> Brito I.1, pp. 269.25–70.12.

<sup>53</sup> Anonymus Vaticanani 2170 I I.2, APP 296.23–31.

<sup>54</sup> Boer 2013: 109–12.

<sup>55</sup> From De Boer we also learn that Anonymus Bazán also presents this doctrine in his later question on the difficulty of the science of the soul (I.5, ll. 74–78).

<sup>56</sup> See Anonymus Vaticanani 2170 II I.1, APP 299.13–16, I.1, APP 299.25–36, I.1, APP 299.8–11.

<sup>57</sup> Brito I.1, pp. 269.25–70.12.

<sup>58</sup> Faversham I.1, APP 332.25–36.

of the accidents of the soul.<sup>59</sup>

#### 4.2.1.6 Three meanings of science (P21)

The term ‘science’ can refer to the knowledge about a subject, a conclusion of a demonstration or the properties ascribed to a subject. Anonymus Vaticanus 2170 I and Wyle present this point. Wyle holds that the proper meaning of science is the first of those three meanings which represents knowledge about a subject, as that is the proper object of knowledge.<sup>60</sup> Anonymus Vaticanus 2170 I argues that science can be by definition, division or demonstration. He does not designate one of these as a proper or more accurate meaning of science, but explains how the soul can be known in all three ways.<sup>61</sup> According to his presentation the knowledge through a definition is the knowledge obtained by the definition of the essence. There can also be a science of the soul based on its parts, and finally based on a demonstration. The demonstration is the familiar approach from section 4.2.1.1 above based on the ascription of properties to a subject according to the principles dictated by the definition of the substance.<sup>62</sup>

#### 4.2.1.7 Four questions of a science (P61)

There are four questions of a science, namely *si est*, *quia est*, *quid est*, and *propter quid*, or in English the whether, that, what and why a thing is.<sup>63</sup> There is a science for any thing to which there can be given an adequate answer to all these four questions. Jandun thinks that this can be done for the soul and outlines how each of the four questions are answered.<sup>64</sup>

#### 4.2.1.8 Form and perfection (P80)

The idea is that there can be a science about the form and perfection of a natural thing; as the soul is the form of a living body, it should be possible to have a science about it. This point is made by Wyle in his positive *ratio principalis*.<sup>65</sup>

#### 4.2.1.9 No science of the separate soul (P45)

Brito raises the challenge in his determination that since the human soul is an actualization of a body, can there ever be a science about the soul in itself? This he accepts as he says that although truth, faith and the Philosopher hold that the intellect is separable from the body, a

<sup>59</sup> Jandun I.1, APP 319.1–12.

<sup>60</sup> Wyle I.1, APP 304.34–305.5.

<sup>61</sup> Anonymus Vaticanus 2170 II.2, APP 295.18–20 for the distinction.

<sup>62</sup> Anonymus Vaticanus 2170 II.2, APP 295.18–36.

<sup>63</sup> Those are of course from Aristotle *APo*, II.1, 89b23–25, but cf. also Aristotle *APo*, I.13, 78a22–23. The questions *quia* and *propter quid* are τὸ ὅτι and τὸ διότι in Greek. The remaining two are εἰ ἔστι and τί ἔστιν, which the Latin tradition knows as *si est* and *quid est*. Barnes translates these as ‘the fact’, ‘the reason why’, ‘if something is’, and ‘what something is’ in his second edition of the translation of the *Analytica posteriora*: Aristotle 1993: 48.

<sup>64</sup> Jandun I.1, APP 318.25–40.

<sup>65</sup> Wyle I.1, APP 304.29–33.

study of the soul as a separate substance falls within the purview of the divine science. The natural science of the soul only observes it insofar as it is an actualization of a body.<sup>66</sup> This should however not be a problem as he seems willing to accept that all the activities of the soul, including the intellect, can be studied through the ensouled body.<sup>67</sup>

Anonymus Vennebusch presents a distinction between the soul viewed from the perspective of its separation compared to its role as the perfection of the body. Under the first viewpoint the soul, or rather the intellect, is on par with the separate intelligences, and that perspective does not concern the natural philosopher but rather the metaphysician.<sup>68</sup> But when viewed as the perfection of the body the natural philosopher can investigate the soul through an analysis of its accidents and their effects (P2).<sup>69</sup>

#### 4.2.1.10 Four requirements for a science (P79)

Anonymus Steenberghen is unique in presenting the view that four requirements must be fulfilled for there to be a science about a thing. (1) The subject must be a universal, (2) which, as such, is incorruptible, (3) and has its own parts and properties, (4) and that it constitutes a knowledge that has an intellectual immediacy in the reflection on the subject. He of course argues that all these requirements are fulfilled with respect to the soul.<sup>70</sup>

Some of these requirements can also be found in other commentaries, in particular in the discussion of the *rationes principales*. The assumption that a science is about a universal is raised in the challenge that there can be no science of the soul, as any soul is a particular and any science is about universals (N11 covered in section 4.2.2.2 on page 128). The main point used in the refutation of that challenge is that a particular can serve as the exemplary instance of a universal (P16). Similarly, we find the argument about incorruptibility in challenge N14 which is treated in section 4.2.2.9 on page 134. Finally, the idea that the subject must contain its own parts and properties is treated in challenge N7, which is treated in section 4.2.2.15 on page 137. But it is also part of the argument presented in the positive doctrinal point P6, the most wide-spread idea that a science is constituted by a subject which is ascribed properties according to its definition.<sup>71</sup>

The fourth point, that the knowledge of the science must have an intellectual immediacy with respect to the subject, has not been registered in this chapter, and warrants a note. The commentator writes:

[...] item cognitio subiecti est principium cognitionis propriae passionis, cum subiectum ponatur in ratione eius : ideo subiectum debet esse tale quod eius cognitio primo occurrat intellectui in scientia illa.

<sup>66</sup> Brito I.1, 270.24–71.7.

<sup>67</sup> Cf. Boer 2013: 87–8.

<sup>68</sup> This goes against the view of Boer (2013: 87) that Anonymus Vennebusch is unconcerned by the question of the subject of the science.

<sup>69</sup> Anonymus Vennebusch q. 1[2], ll. 54–62.

<sup>70</sup> Anonymus Steenberghen I.1, ll. 16–34.

<sup>71</sup> See section 4.2.1.1 on page 118.

[...] further, the knowledge of the subject is the principle of knowing the proper attributes, when the subject is possessed in its definition. The subject therefore ought to be of such a nature that knowledge of it immediately presents itself to the intellect in the science.

Anonymus Steenberghen I.1, ll. 25–28.

The phrasing and meaning is difficult to parse, but I interpret this to mean what I have already suggested, that the definition of the subject presents itself immediately or easily to the intellect in the process of knowing the subject. This implies that the definition includes a natural or intuitive appeal to the natural philosopher.

The commentary of Anonymus Steenberghen is interesting in virtue of this idea that the definition of a subject must be intellectually meaningful and immediate. But as we have seen it also collects a range of points that are mostly presented as general assumptions about the nature of a science in the *rationes principales*, and presents these in the determination proper.

#### 4.2.1.11 The stronger principle of attribution (P44)

That which is the reason of a property possesses that same property to at least the same degree, and because the soul facilitates science about everything other than itself, a science of it must also be possible. This doctrine is rooted in the passage on the demonstrative syllogism in *Analytica posteriora* where it is said that we ought to know the premises better than the conclusion, because that which causes a property to inhere in a subject itself inheres in it to a higher degree.<sup>72</sup> Anonymus Vennebusch and Anonymus Mertonensis 275 give us this argument in their positive *rationes principales*, holding that since the soul is that by which we know other things, so much the more ought we to be able to know it.<sup>73</sup>

#### 4.2.1.12 Identity of knower and known (P22)

Nothing is more certain than when the knower and known are identical, and as that is case for the soul and its knowledge of itself, there must be a science of it. The idea of identity of knower and known can be used to support as well as attack the possibility of the science of the soul, as we will see in a following section.<sup>74</sup> Anonymus Bernardini and Anonymus Mertonensis 275 give us this argument in each one of their positive *rationes principales*.<sup>75</sup>

#### 4.2.1.13 Certain science about simple subject (P57)

The science about a simple subject must be certain, and as the soul is simple, the science about it must be certain, and from this Bernardini seem to conclude that it must be possible to have a science about it.<sup>76</sup>

<sup>72</sup> Aristotle *APo*, I.2, 72a29–30.

<sup>73</sup> Anonymus Vennebusch I.1 [1], 15–19, Anonymus Mertonensis 275 I.1, APP 285.28–29.

<sup>74</sup> Cf. 4.2.2.6 on page 131.

<sup>75</sup> Anonymus Bernardini I.1, ll. 27–30, Anonymus Mertonensis 275 q. 1, APP 286.1–3.

<sup>76</sup> Anonymus Bernardini I.1, ll. 25–26.

### 4.2.2 Negative points

In the previous section I have presented and discussed the ways in which each commentator makes use of the range of positive doctrinal points. We will now proceed to the challenges presented by the commentators, and how they deal with them.

#### 4.2.2.1 Soul not intelligible to us (N1)

- (1) The subject of a science must be intelligible.
- (2) A soul is not intelligible.
- (3) ∴ There cannot be a science about the soul.

As is clear from the general argument, this can be a catch-all for a range of different arguments to the effect that the intellect cannot be known. Five authors present this as a independent argument, but as their way of supporting the minor generally corresponds with one or more of the other existing negative arguments, we will register them here as well as in one of the relevant following sections. Often they will give two or more arguments to support this overall claim. Commentators presenting this argument are Dinsdale, Anonymus Bazán, Anonymus Orielensis 33, Brito, Wyle, and Jandun.<sup>77</sup>

Like the others Wyle of course delivers refutations of the three challenges, which are treated below, but he also presents a counter point to the general challenge. He argues that the thing that you can raise a question about (*dubium*) is intelligible, otherwise you could not reflect on it (P55).<sup>78</sup> For this to not be tautological we will have to distinguish dubitable from intelligible, so that he basically says that “whatever you can doubt about is intelligible.” It is however still hard to see the strength in the argument unless we understand intelligible in a more liberal way than ‘that which can be known’.

#### 4.2.2.2 Soul is a particular (N11)

- (1) A science must be about universals.
- (2) A soul as the form of a body is a particular.
- (3) ∴ There cannot be a science about the soul.

The discussions of Anonymus Giele, Favershaw, and Jandun are rather close on this point, arguing that as the soul is the form of a specific being it is also itself a particular, and hence cannot be the object of a science.<sup>79</sup> They also agree in the refutation that there is nothing standing in the way of the same form being both the actualization of a given substance and the subject of a study of the form considered as a universal (P16).<sup>80</sup>

<sup>77</sup> Jandun I.1, APP 317.17–29, Anonymus Bazán I.1, ll. 6–11, Anonymus Orielensis 33 I.1, APP 291.3–6, Brito I.1, 268.3–17, Wyle I.1, APP 304.7–8, Dinsdale I.1, APP 310.4–7.

<sup>78</sup> Wyle I.1, APP 305.26–32.

<sup>79</sup> Anonymus Giele I.1, ll. 9–17, Favershaw I.1, APP 332.11–12, Jandun I.1, APP 317.6–10.

<sup>80</sup> Anonymus Giele I.1, ll. 54–58, Favershaw I.1, APP 334.37–335.2, Jandun I.1, APP 319.29–34.

Wyle supports the minor differently by saying that universals are abstracted from multiple singular sensibles, but as the soul is not sensible, there can be no universal about it.<sup>81</sup> This support for the minor makes it quite similar to the sense perception argument in section 4.2.2.3. He refutes the argument by pointing out that just like in the case of genus and species, the soul can be considered as a universal without being sensible itself (P36).<sup>82</sup>

#### 4.2.2.3 No sense perception (N2)

- (1) Science can only be about that which can be known, and scientific knowledge can only be acquired through sense perception.
- (2) The soul is not available to sense perception.
- (3) ∴ There cannot be a science about the soul.

Jandun, Anonymus Oriensis 33 and Dinsdale use this as one of their three arguments to support the challenge that the intellect is not intelligible (cf. section 4.2.2.1 on the preceding page).<sup>83</sup> Also Anonymus Bazán presents this as a supporting doctrine to the main point about the unintelligibility of the soul, but without the three-in-one structure of the other mentioned commentators.<sup>84</sup>

Anonymus Mertonensis 275, Anonymus Bernardini, Anonymus Vennebusch, Anonymus Giele and Anonymus Vaticanus 2170 I do not use this as an embedded argument about the unintelligibility of the soul, but effectively it amounts to the same conclusion.<sup>85</sup>

A significant group of the commentators sharpen this objection by stating that not only is the intellective soul imperceptible, but so is any of its activities. We find this in Anonymus Giele, Anonymus Vaticanus 2170 I, Anonymus Vaticanus 2170 II, Faversham, and Brito.<sup>86</sup>

A solution to the challenge is to distinguish between that which is perceptible in itself and that which is so indirectly through something else. Colours, sounds and other perceptible phenomena are of course examples of the first, while privation and the soul is held to be examples of the latter. As the activities of the soul can be available to sense perception, the soul is thereby also perceptible, albeit indirectly.<sup>87</sup> This refutation is of course a reflex of P2 (substantial knowledge from accidents).

A similar approach is based on the distinction between primary and secondary intelligibility (P1). Brito provides us with an example (with a similar parallel in Anonymus Bazán)

<sup>81</sup> Wyle I.1, APP 304.3–6.

<sup>82</sup> Wyle I.1, APP 305.16–25.

<sup>83</sup> Jandun I.1, APP 317.17–29, Anonymus Oriensis 33 I.1, APP 291.3–6, Dinsdale I.1, APP 310.4–7.

<sup>84</sup> Anonymus Bazán I.1, ll. 611.

<sup>85</sup> Anonymus Mertonensis 275 q. 1, APP 285.8–10, Anonymus Bernardini I.1, ll. 3–5, Anonymus Vennebusch I.1 [1], ll. 4–6, Anonymus Giele I.1, ll. 6–8, Anonymus Vaticanus 2170 I I.2, APP 295.4–8.

<sup>86</sup> Anonymus Giele I.1, ll. 8–10, Anonymus Vaticanus 2170 I I.2, APP 295.4–8, Anonymus Vaticanus 2170 II I.1, APP 299.8–11, Faversham I.1, APP 332.17–21, Brito I.1, 268.3–9.

<sup>87</sup> Anonymus Bernardini I.1, ll. 66–68, Anonymus Mertonensis 275 q. 1, APP 287.21–22, Anonymus Vennebusch I.1 [2], ll. 69–82, Anonymus Oriensis 33 I.1, APP 292.3–11, Dinsdale I.1, APP 311.3–9.

when he argues that the intellect need not be perceptible, because when it becomes intelligible through its own knowledge of something else, it is only required that that primary object of knowledge is perceptible.<sup>88</sup> This is a version of the argument for the intelligibility of the intellect (P8) that we have already seen in the commentaries on book three.<sup>89</sup> Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II and Faversham also seem to follow this approach, but they just argue briefly that it is sufficient that the object or mover of the intellect is perceptible. As we have seen in the previous chapter this structure of indirect intelligibility is a basic component of intellectual self-knowledge. Although these commentators choose a version that implies the possibility of self-knowledge, it is still important for them to maintain the reference to the perceptibility of the objects.<sup>90</sup>

We find a slightly different focus in the solution of Anonymus Vaticani 2170 I, who simply argues that the intellect is a reflexive power, and can therefore observe itself by something else.<sup>91</sup> This still involves the same structure of secondary knowledge, which is especially clear in the closing of his determination as well as the refutation of the objection itself.<sup>92</sup>

Anonymus Giele shares the point about secondary intelligibility, but he is also more careful in his refutation to address that specific challenge of the imperceptibility of the activities of the intellect. He argues that the activities of the lower faculties, such as the productive activities, reveal the existence of a directing intellectual faculty.<sup>93</sup> He thus incorporates both approaches. In a similar vein, Brito notes that this concept of secondary cognition does not apply for the vegetative and sensitive parts of the soul, as their activities can be readily observed (and are thus primarily intelligible).<sup>94</sup>

#### 4.2.2.4 No science without phantasms (N2)

- (1) All knowledge is based on phantasms.
- (2) The soul is not a phantasm and phantasms are not produced from it.
- (3) ∴ There cannot be a science about the soul.

This very close relative of the argument about sense perception is presented by Anonymus Mertonensis 275, Anonymus Bernardini, and Wyle. The two arguments are so alike that they have been registered under the same main doctrine of imperceptibility (N2), but are however presented separately here as Anonymus Mertonensis 275 and Anonymus Bernardini actually give both arguments. To Wyle, who does not present the argument of sense perception, it may very well just be his version of that argument. The minor is supported by the fact that the soul

<sup>88</sup> Brito I.1, 271.21–72.1, Anonymus Bazán I.q, ll. 36–44.

<sup>89</sup> Cf. section 3.2.1.1.2 on page 65.

<sup>90</sup> Faversham I.1, APP 335.7–9, Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II I.1, APP 300.6–8.

<sup>91</sup> Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II I.2, APP 296.33–35.

<sup>92</sup> Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II I.2, APP 296.23–31, cf. I.2, APP 297.16–24.

<sup>93</sup> Anonymus Giele I.1, ll. 38–53.

<sup>94</sup> Brito I.1, 272.1–3.

is simple and hence does not produce any phantasms,<sup>95</sup> or by the fact that the soul does not present itself in phantasms.<sup>96</sup>

As in the argument about sense perception a possible solution is to refer to knowledge acquired from accidents (P2): As the activities of the soul can produce phantasms, so can the soul.<sup>97</sup> It is here curious to note that although this would also be the obvious solution for Anonymus Bernardini, he actually rather argues that the challenge does not apply to the soul, as it is not known through phantasms.<sup>98</sup> This of course implies a stronger emphasis on a science based on intellectual self-knowledge rather than observations of the perceptible effects of the soul. But this does not fit his main determination, where that is exactly the preferred approach.<sup>99</sup>

Another solution to the challenge that we saw in the above sense perception argument was based on the distinction between primary and secondary intelligibility (P1). That is the solution chosen by Wyle.<sup>100</sup>

#### 4.2.2.5 Act and potency (N20)

- (1) The same thing cannot be in act and potency at the same time and in the same respect.
- (2) The object of knowledge is in act with respect to the knowing subject, and the knowing subject is in potentiality with respect to the object of knowledge.
- (3) ∴ The intellect cannot know itself.

Brito presents this objection, which is really an argument about self-knowledge.<sup>101</sup>

The challenge is obviated by denying that the intellect is potency and act in the same respect (P64). Brito argues that the intellect knows by the potency of the possible intellect, while it is intelligible through the actualization of the possible intellect by the knowledge of an external object. This means that it is in act and potency in different ways. We may accept that, but might also want an explanation of how the possible intellect can be in potentiality with respect to knowing itself while it is in act by an external species.<sup>102</sup>

#### 4.2.2.6 Knower and known (N5)

- (1) No thing can be known by itself because there must be a difference between the knower and the known.
- (2) In a science of the soul the same thing would be knower and known.

<sup>95</sup> Anonymus Mertonensis 275 q. 1, APP 285.15–17, Wyle I.1, APP 304.14–18.

<sup>96</sup> Anonymus Bernardini I.1, ll. 16–18.

<sup>97</sup> Anonymus Mertonensis 275 q. 1, APP 287.25.

<sup>98</sup> Anonymus Bernardini I.1, ll. 78–79.

<sup>99</sup> Cf. section 4.2.1.2 on page 120.

<sup>100</sup> Wyle I.1, APP 306.8–12.

<sup>101</sup> Brito I.1, 268.10–17.

<sup>102</sup> Brito I.1, 272.4–10.

(3) ∴ There cannot be a science about the soul.

This is presented by Anonymus Vaticanus 2170 I.<sup>103</sup> He refutes it by the distinction between primary and secondary act of knowing (P1), and the secondary act of knowing is explained to be the act of self-reflexion.<sup>104</sup>

Jandun presents the following close relative of the argument:

- (1) In immaterial substances there is identity between the science (*scientia*) and the thing known.
- (2) The substance and the science of the soul cannot be identical, as one is a substance and the other is a quality.
- (3) ∴ There cannot be a science about the soul.

This is not completely identical, but can be considered under the same heading. The minor is supported by the passage in the end of *De anima* 3.4 where Aristotle points out this identity in immaterial substances.<sup>105</sup> Jandun argues that since at least the intellective part of the soul is immaterial, this challenge holds.<sup>106</sup>

In his refutation Jandun gives us an interesting small *Forschungsbericht* on this problem. He only addresses the challenges raised by the major about the identity of knower and known in immaterial substances, which can be qualified in a couple of different ways. What he wants to show is that in the human intellect a complete identity between the knowing subject and the known object does not occur (making it an example of P1). Some argue, he says, that it only holds for separate intellects who primarily know themselves and subsequently other things, such as God and the intelligences, and since the human soul is not one of those, it does not apply to it. He gives two reasons why that is not a valid argument which both focus on the identity of a science about a subject and that subject: (1) The knowledge exposed in *Metaphysica* 12.7 and 12.9 is not identical to God, and similarly (2) knowledge about the agent intellect is not identical to the agent intellect. Others have argued, he continues, that the identity between science and the separate substance only holds for the substances that are in act, which again should solve the problem regarding the intellect. But as the potentiality of the intellect only applies to the possible intellect, that does not work either. He therefore modifies the first solution to hold that the identity of subject and science only holds for the science that the separate intellects have about themselves (since they know themselves primarily), but it does not hold for the science we humans have about them. This solves the problem with the identity of God and the knowledge exposed in *Metaphysica* 12.7 and 12.9. And since the soul does not know itself primarily (cf. P1), we avoid the necessary identity.<sup>107</sup>

He also adds another argument to show that the problem of identity does not arise for the human use of the intellect. He argues that unlike the separate substances, which are completely

<sup>103</sup> Anonymus Vaticanus 2170 I I.2, APP 295.12–15.

<sup>104</sup> Anonymus Vaticanus 2170 I I.2, APP 297.16–24.

<sup>105</sup> Aristotle *DA*, III.4, 430a4–5.

<sup>106</sup> Jandun I.1, APP 317.35–318.4.

<sup>107</sup> Jandun I.1, APP 320.14–28.

separate in both their substance and activities, the agent intellect is only separate in substance, while the human utilization of the agent intellect relies on the body.<sup>108</sup>

#### 4.2.2.7 Mover and moved (N3)

- (1) The same thing cannot be mover and moved at the same time and in the same respect.
- (2) That which is known is mover with respect to that which knows it.
- (3) If there were a science about the soul the same thing would be mover and moved.
- (4) ∴ There cannot be a science about the soul.

This is presented by Anonymus Oriensis 33 and Dinsdale.<sup>109</sup> Jandun and Wyle both use this as one of their three arguments to support the thesis that the intellect is not intelligible (cf. section 4.2.2.1 on page 128).<sup>110</sup>

Dinsdale, Anonymus Oriensis 33, and Wyle refute this with a distinction between movement as the act of an imperfect thing and a perfect thing. The movement of the imperfect thing must be known to be physical movement, where the mover and moved cannot be identical (except if one of the properties is accidental, such as the sailor moving the ship and himself at the same time). The movement of the perfect being, which we must assume is immaterial, is however not a physical movement and therein lies the solution, as the immaterial substances are recognized as self-movers without any problem of identity.<sup>111</sup>

Both Anonymus Oriensis 33 and Dinsdale connect this point with the reflexivity of the intellect, they also draw a distinction between the essential self-knowledge of the separate intelligences (including the prime mover) and the human intellect, which requires the actualization through an external species before it is able to reflect on itself.<sup>112</sup> As it is presented in the short note by Anonymus Oriensis 33, it may look like self-reflection is a necessary (concomitant) consequence of the primary act of knowing, but as it is at the same time couched in a language implying awareness (*percipit, apprehendens*), there is no indication that he considers it an unconscious process.

Wyle distinguishes between reflecting on the intellect of somebody else and on one's own intellect. To avoid the problem of self-movement in that case he refers to the distinction between primary and secondary act of knowing and the discursive nature of this self-knowledge.<sup>113</sup> Jandun also refutes this (and the other two objections that he uses to argue against perceptibility) in a blanket argument pointing to the distinction between primary and secondary knowledge (P1).<sup>114</sup>

<sup>108</sup> Jandun I.1, APP 320.29–38.

<sup>109</sup> Anonymus Oriensis 33 I.1, APP 291.15–18, Dinsdale I.1, APP 310.8–11.

<sup>110</sup> Jandun I.1, APP 317.17–29, Wyle I.1, APP 304.9–13.

<sup>111</sup> Anonymus Oriensis 33 I.1, APP 292.31–293.4, Dinsdale I.1, APP 311.10–21, Wyle I.1, APP 305.33–39.

<sup>112</sup> Dinsdale I.1, APP 311.10–21, Anonymus Oriensis 33 I.1, APP 292.31–293.4.

<sup>113</sup> Wyle I.1, APP 305.40–306.7.

<sup>114</sup> Jandun I.1, APP 319.40–320.6.

#### 4.2.2.8 Knowing things most manifest (N9)

- (1) The things most manifest by nature cannot be known by the intellect.
- (2) The soul is among the things most manifest by nature.
- (3) ∴ The soul cannot be known by the intellect.

The argument generally involves a reference to the passage in *Metaphysica* where the sight of the night owl in daylight is compared to the powers of the intellect in relation to the things most evident by nature.<sup>115</sup> Some things may be evidently true (*φανερώτατα*) by their nature, but it can be very difficult for our system of knowledge acquisition to verify that truth.<sup>116</sup> This is presented by Anonymus Mertonensis 275, Anonymus Bernardini, Anonymus Oriensis 33 and Dinsdale.<sup>117</sup>

The argument is countered by modifying the major to hold that these things most manifest are not inaccessible to the intellect but merely more difficult to access (P17). The analogy to the night owl is maintained by saying that like the owl cannot perceive the sunlight directly, it can however perceive its effects, the light of the moon. And similarly with the intellect, it cannot have direct knowledge of these imperceptible objects (including separate substances) but only indirect knowledge, through their effects. And among these unavailable objects the soul is the one most adequate for human knowledge and hence the best known in this class of things most manifest in nature but least manifest to us.<sup>118</sup>

#### 4.2.2.9 Soul is corruptible (N14)

- (1) There is no science about corruptible things.
- (2) The soul is corruptible as the form of a corruptible body.
- (3) ∴ There cannot be a science about the soul.

This argument is related and similar to 4.2.2.2. Jandun and Anonymus Vaticani 2170 I argue that the corruption of the body is the result of the corruption of the form, which should then reveal the soul to be an inappropriate object of scientific knowledge. Much like in 4.2.2.2 this challenge is handled by saying that although the soul of a particular person is corruptible, it can be analysed as a universal (P16).<sup>119</sup> For Jandun this includes the point that the corruption of the soul is only accidental and irrelevant to the definition of the universal.<sup>120</sup>

Anonymus Steenberghen establishes the minor of the argument in a similar way by arguing that the corruption of the body results in the corruption of the form.<sup>121</sup> He refutes it by

<sup>115</sup> Aristotle *Metaph.* II.1, 993b9–11.

<sup>116</sup> Cf. also Aristotle *Phys.* I.1, 184a16–23.

<sup>117</sup> Anonymus Mertonensis 275 q. 1, APP 285.25–27, Anonymus Bernardini I.1, ll. 11–15, Anonymus Oriensis 33 I.1, APP 291.10–14, Dinsdale I.1, APP 310.12–14.

<sup>118</sup> Anonymus Mertonensis 275 q. 1, APP 287.32–34, Anonymus Bernardini I.1, ll. 71–77, Anonymus Oriensis 33 I.1, APP 292.20–30, Dinsdale I.1, APP 311.22–312.4.

<sup>119</sup> Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II.2, APP 297.3–15.

<sup>120</sup> Jandun I.1, APP 319.35–39.

<sup>121</sup> Anonymus Steenberghen I.1, ll. 12–14.

arguing that the soul is only partly an actualization of matter. The intellect, he points out, is not the actualization of any part of the body, and in virtue of this immateriality the soul is not corruptible, and hence a possible subject for a science (P66).<sup>122</sup> If he maintains a strict formal unicity, this of course raises the problem of what happens to the powers that are realized in the body (perception, nutrition) in the unenmattered state. But that unicity is one way to avoid the otherwise inconvenient consequence that the science of the soul can only concern itself with the intellectual part of the soul. Another possibility would of course be to simply reject or modify the major of the argument.

#### 4.2.2.10 Denudation of the intellect (N15)

- (1) The intellect ought to be stripped of its object of knowledge before knowing it.
- (2) Nothing can be stripped of itself.
- (3) ∴ There cannot be a science about the soul.

Jandun uses this as his second of three arguments to support the thesis that the intellect is not intelligible (cf. section 4.2.2.1 on page 128).<sup>123</sup> All three are refuted with reference to the same distinction between primary and secondary act of knowledge (P1).<sup>124</sup>

#### 4.2.2.11 Continuous and temporal (N6)

- (1) All human knowledge is a continuous and temporal process.
- (2) The soul is neither continuous nor temporal.
- (3) ∴ The soul cannot be intelligible.

This is presented by Anonymus Mertonensis 275, Anonymus Bernardini, Wyle Anonymus Oriensis 33 and Dinsdale.<sup>125</sup>

Anonymus Oriensis 33 presents two arguments to refute this.

- (1) The intellect may start its investigations from what is continuous and temporal, but from there it can proceed towards atemporal matters such as the substance of the soul itself (P34).
- (2) Although the object of the knowledge may not be temporal, the analysis of it is still temporal as human intellection is a discursive process (P42).<sup>126</sup>

<sup>122</sup> Anonymus Steenberghen I.1, ll. 56–66.

<sup>123</sup> Jandun I.1, APP 317.17–29.

<sup>124</sup> Jandun I.1, APP 319.40–320.6.

<sup>125</sup> Anonymus Mertonensis 275 q. 1, APP 285.11–14, Anonymus Bernardini I.1, ll. 6–10, Wyle I.1, APP 304.19–23, Anonymus Mertonensis 275, Anonymus Oriensis 33 I.1, APP 291.7–9, Dinsdale I.1, APP 310.15–16.

<sup>126</sup> Anonymus Oriensis 33 I.1, APP 292.12–19.

Here Dinsdale makes the same point as Anonymus Orielensis 33's first, but much more briefly by simply stating that not all objects of knowledge need be continuous and temporal.<sup>127</sup>

Anonymus Mertonensis 275 on the other hand presents a single argument similar to Anonymus Orielensis 33's second, holding that the activity of the intellect is continuous and temporal although its essence may not be (P42).<sup>128</sup> Anonymus Bernardini differs, as he argues that it only applies to things known through a species, which is not the case for the soul (P38).<sup>129</sup> This implies a more introspective approach to the science of the soul.

Wyle also presents a variant of Anonymus Orielensis 33's first argument along with his own unique argument that the soul itself is atemporal but it is also the actualization of something temporal (P34), and in that respect it can be studied in the same way as other material objects of knowledge.<sup>130</sup>

In each their way we see here that the commentators expose the weakness of the initial challenge, namely the confusion of the objects of the soul's knowledge and the process through which it acquires this knowledge.

#### 4.2.2.12 No universal about the soul (N19)

- (1) A science is about a universal.
- (2) Universals are abstracted from sense perception, but the soul is not available to sense perception.
- (3) ∴ There can be no universal (and hence no science) about the soul.

Anonymus Vennebusch and Wyle present this argument, related to N11, where it is argued that that there can be no science about the soul because it is a particular and a science must be about a universal. The argument takes the same major, but the minor differs as it focuses on the role of sense perception in the formation of universals, and is therefore very similar to the minor of N2 about the imperceptibility of the soul.<sup>131</sup> The refutation given by Wyle holds that not all universals have to be abstracted directly from material objects (P36). Anonymus Vennebusch's refutation is identical to that presented against the argument about sense perception: Although the soul is not directly perceptible, it is perceptible in virtue of its accidents, its powers and activities (P2).<sup>132</sup>

#### 4.2.2.13 The soul does not exist (N36)

- (1) There cannot be a science about that which does not exist.
- (2) The soul does not exist.

<sup>127</sup> Dinsdale I.1, APP 312.5–7.

<sup>128</sup> Anonymus Mertonensis 275 q. 1, APP 287.23–24.

<sup>129</sup> Anonymus Bernardini I.1, ll. 69–70.

<sup>130</sup> Wyle I.1, APP 306.13–19.

<sup>131</sup> Anonymus Vennebusch I.1 [1], ll. 7–12, Wyle I.1, APP 304.3–6.

<sup>132</sup> Anonymus Vennebusch I.1 [2], ll. 83–91.

(3) ∴ There cannot be a science about the soul.

Jandun gives this (we must admit, slightly odd) argument, and supports the minor by holding that everything that has existence is either in the soul or outside it. But as he astutely points out, nothing can be neither inside itself nor outside itself, hence the soul cannot exist.<sup>133</sup> He refutes this by accepting that the soul is in a certain sense outside itself. Not in such a way that it is different from itself, but because its being does not depend on its own operation (P51).<sup>134</sup> The point must thus be that the soul (or parts of it) have independent subsistence regardless of the activity of the embodied soul, and can therefore be considered to be outside itself in a restricted sense (P51).

#### 4.2.2.14 Indeterminacy entails unintelligibility (P4)

This presents a negative use of the indeterminacy thesis of the possible intellect:

- (1) There cannot be a science about that which does not have an intelligible form or species.
- (2) The intellect does not have an intelligible form because it is nothing in act before it knows.
- (3) ∴ There cannot be a science about the intellect.

This is presented by Faversham and Anonymus Bazán with reference to the potentiality of the possible intellect.<sup>135</sup> They refute this as if it were a question on intellectual self-knowledge, arguing that once the intellect has been actualized by a primary object of knowledge, then it can be an object of knowledge. This is of course an example of the distinction between knowledge by primary or secondary act of knowledge (P1), and in this argument it is considered enough to support a proper science of the soul.<sup>136</sup>

#### 4.2.2.15 Parts and properties (N7)

This is the negation of the idea that a science is based on the ascription of properties to a subject according to established principles:

- (1) A science must be about a subject with properties which are ascribed according to a specified principle.
- (2) The soul is simple and hence does not have any specific parts or properties.
- (3) ∴ There cannot be a science about the soul.

<sup>133</sup> Jandun I.1, APP 317.30–34.

<sup>134</sup> Jandun I.1, APP 320.7–13.

<sup>135</sup> Faversham I.1, APP 332.4–10, Anonymus Bazán I.1, ll. 12–17.

<sup>136</sup> Faversham I.1, APP 334.17–36, Anonymus Bazán I.1, ll. 45–51.

The argument takes as its starting point the principle most widely used in the determinations.<sup>137</sup> Brito argues that the major does not hold for the soul with four arguments: (1) The soul has no specific parts, as all activities are a product of the whole.<sup>138</sup> (2) The soul is simple and cannot have parts. (3) To say that the soul becomes angry is similar to saying that the soul weaves and builds, which is not true as it is the whole composite, the human, hence it also does not become angry.<sup>139</sup> (4) Finally, that which has properties is the subject of those, but such subsistence is only possible through matter, and as the soul is immaterial, it cannot be the subject for any properties.<sup>140</sup> The challenges are countered by the point that although the soul might not have any properties when considered as a separate substance, it does in virtue of constituting the form of the body soul composite, and although some activities of the soul have no connection to matter, others do. And it is this complete composite that makes it a possible object of a science (P27).<sup>141</sup> That the soul is here known by its activities in virtue of it being the form of the body makes it an example of the doctrine of knowledge acquisition from accidents (P2).

Faversham, Anonymus Bazán, and Anonymus Vaticanani 2170 II make the same point, but present it as a single argument, that the soul is simple and hence cannot be the subject of any parts or properties.<sup>142</sup> Anonymus Steenberghen is similar to these as he does not include any reflection of the idea of ascription of the properties through the definition of the subject. Like Brito he refutes this by arguing that the soul has parts in virtue of its embodied activities.<sup>143</sup> The refutation of Anonymus Bazán is simple enough, as he argues that although the soul may be simple in its essence and integral parts, it is composed of different powers, which satisfy the requirement of the objection (P63).<sup>144</sup> The refutations of the two others are a bit more murky. But a comparison of the language and structure of the two passages indicates that they present the same basic argument. They argue that it should not be a problem that the intellect is simple for there to be a knowledge about its essence, and further that for there to be a knowledge about the essence of a subject, it does not have to be a subsisting subject, as long as it still is the subject of properties (P39).<sup>145</sup>

#### 4.2.2.16 Science proceeds from causes (N31)

- (1) All science proceeds from causes.
- (2) The soul is not known through its causes.
- (3) ∴ There cannot be a science of the soul.

<sup>137</sup> See section 4.2.1.1 on page 118.

<sup>138</sup> Cf. Aristotle *DA*, I.1, 403a7–12.

<sup>139</sup> Cf. Aristotle *DA*, I.4, 408b1–15.

<sup>140</sup> Brito I.1, 268.18–69.4.

<sup>141</sup> Brito I.1, 272.11–73.2.

<sup>142</sup> Anonymus Vaticanani 2170 II I.1, APP 299.4–7, Anonymus Bazán I.1, ll. 18–27, Faversham I.1, APP 332.13–16.

<sup>143</sup> Anonymus Steenberghen I.1, ll. 5–11 and 44–55.

<sup>144</sup> Anonymus Bazán I.1, ll. 52–60.

<sup>145</sup> Anonymus Vaticanani 2170 II I.1, APP 300.1–5, Faversham I.1, APP 335.3–6.

Anonymus Mertonensis 275 invokes the doctrine of substantial knowledge from observation of accidents (P2) to support the point that the intellect is not known through an investigation of its causes. This is therefore an example of the distinction between proper and improper science (P15) discussed above in section 4.2.1.3 on page 122.<sup>146</sup> He refutes the argument with the point that the description of a science proceeding from causes answers the *propter quid*-question, while the procedure starting from observation of accidents answers the *quia*-question, and it is therefore just a different understanding of science, but a science nonetheless.<sup>147</sup>

#### 4.2.2.17 Self-knowledge (N34)

- (1) If there were a science of the soul the intellect would be able to know itself.
- (2) The intellect cannot know itself.
- (3) ∴ There cannot be a science of the soul.

Anonymus Mertonensis 275 supports the minor through the analogy with sense perception, which is not self-reflexive. The solution to this challenge is of course to reject the analogy with reference to the material nature of sense perception in opposition to the intellect, which hence can be reflexive (P11).<sup>148</sup>

### 4.3 Clusters

In the preceding section we have seen how each of the positive and negative doctrinal elements are represented in the different commentaries. In this section we will draw out the tendencies of the composition of doctrines and analyse them from a quantitative perspective. This will be based on the general assumptions and methods sketched in section 1.3 on page 7 and section 3.3.1 in the preceding chapter. I have already given an overview of the general quantities on page 4.1 on page 116, and here I present more detailed identifications of likely clusters of commentators based on the relative amount of shared doctrines among them. In doing so the distinction into positive doctrines and negative doctrines in the inventory is maintained, but as we have seen of course the positive doctrines can also be used as refuting points for the challenges, so double entries across the divide will occur. This will not have any influence on the quantitative conclusions.<sup>149</sup>

The two primary arguments (P6, P2) make up the standard explanation of how the science of the soul is known, while the other arguments rather apply different perspectives on the presentations. That goes for the points concerning proper and improper science (P15), that the science implies self-reflection (P11), and that the intellect is particularly difficult to know (P19).

<sup>146</sup> Anonymus Mertonensis 275 q. 1, APP 285.18–21.

<sup>147</sup> Anonymus Mertonensis 275 q. 1, APP 287.29–31.

<sup>148</sup> Anonymus Mertonensis 275 q. 1, APP 287.26–28.

<sup>149</sup> The *Jupyter* notebook can be found on <https://github.com/stenskjaer/dissertation-notebooks>, where the calculations can be verified in all their detail, and extra data and graphs can also be found.




Figure 4.1: Proportional clustermap of determination doctrines.

The challenge that it is impossible to obtain knowledge about immaterial substances from sense perception is the dominant doctrine in the *rationes*. But we also often see challenges to the basic idea that a science is about a subject ascribed properties by an established principle (N2 and N7).

As in the preceding chapter we will make use of the *proportional clustermaps* and the *binary doctrinal matrix* to visualize the connections between the commentators.<sup>150</sup> The map based on positive doctrines in figure 4.1 only reveals one very strong cluster and some other more loose groups. Anonymus Orielensis 33 and Dinsdale are completely identical in their determination profiles, which means that they have an identical relation to the remaining corpus. In the map they therefore only have a single leg of the dendrogram. They are clustered with Wyle

<sup>150</sup> As mentioned it is explained in section 3.3.1 on page 95.




Figure 4.2: Proportional clustermap of *rationes* doctrines.




Figure 4.3: Proportional clustermap of all doctrines.

with whom they constitute a small group. Anonymus Bernardini and Anonymus Mertonensis 275 make up one of the three high level groups of the corpus along with Anonymus Giele and Anonymus Vennebusch. The other main group contains Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II and Jandun, and Faversham and Brito who together make up two small groups of relatively close commentators. These four also clustered together with Anonymus Vaticani 2170 I. Aside from Anonymus Orielensis 33 and Dinsdale, Brito and Faversham have the closest connection in this selection of doctrines. Finally, Anonymus Steenberghen and Anonymus Bazán make up a distinct group that shares the least with the other texts.

A comparison of that map with the map of *rationes* doctrines in figure 4.2 on page 141 as well as the sum of all the doctrines in 4.3 on the preceding page is however very interesting, as we see that only few of the clusters are maintained across the two contexts. This indicates that we have a collection of commentators who differ relative little in their composition of doctrines. That general impressions is also confirmed when we look at the map of all the doctrines (figure 4.3 on the facing page), which generally gives a bland and undistinguished impression. The clustermap of all doctrines in particular makes it difficult to distinguish any groups. This reveals a relatively high similarity, all things considered, across the questions investigated here. The interesting exception is Dinsdale, Anonymus Orielensis 33, and Wyle who constitute a stable group across all three sets of doctrines, and also here group together with Anonymus Bernardini and Anonymus Mertonensis 275. The only other stable character is Anonymus Steenberghen who remains an outlier in all the maps.

We can get a bit more detail to these clusters by looking at the doctrinal matrix in figure 4.4 on the next page. First of all we notice the spread of the two most prevalent pieces of doctrine, claiming the acquisition of substantial knowledge from accidents (P2) and the requirements of a subject ascribed properties according to an given principle (P6). Further we see that the distinction between proper and improper science (P15) and the distinction between primary and secondary intelligibility (P1) are the next two most common arguments. Finally we see two “rows” at the top of commentators who share the idea of a science acquired through self-reflection (P11) and that the intellect is particularly difficult to know (P19). Between these dispersed chunks there is a collection of doctrines with only a single or few instances. The map of *rationes* doctrines shows a bit more coherence, but also some tendency towards unique “columns” of doctrines. By far the most common doctrine in that context is the objections that the soul is not available to sense perception (N2) and the two most common modes of refutation which again are the doctrine of acquiring substantial knowledge from observation of accidents (P2) and the distinction of primary and secondary intelligibility (P1).

To close this section of quantitative analysis, we can also apply the identification of central and representative commentaries that closed the preceding chapter. There I showed how a combined frequency of the most common doctrines used by a commentator and how highly concentrated those doctrines are in his set of doctrines gives us an impression of which text is the most representative of the material of the corpus.<sup>151</sup> In table 4.3 on page 146 we see from the column ‘Popular’ that Dinsdale, Anonymus Orielensis 33 and Wyle are the commentators with the highest proportion of the most common doctrines (the top 33%), while we find the highest concentration of the popular doctrines in Dinsdale, Anonymus Orielensis 33, and Anonymus

<sup>151</sup> See the description on page 105.




Figure 4.4: Binary doctrinal matrix of determination doctrines.



Figure 4.5: Binary doctrinal matrix of rationes doctrines.

	Popular	Concentration	Average
John Dinsdale	0.60	0.92	0.76
Anonymus Oriel 33	0.60	0.86	0.73
Henric de la Wyle	0.60	0.67	0.63
John of Jandun	0.55	0.69	0.62
Anonymus Vat. Lat. 2170 1	0.45	0.75	0.60
Simon of Faversham	0.45	0.75	0.60
Radulphus Brito	0.40	0.73	0.56
Anonymus Giele	0.25	0.83	0.54
Anonymus Bernardini	0.35	0.64	0.49
Anonymus Mertonensis 275	0.45	0.53	0.49
Anonymus Bazan	0.25	0.71	0.48
Anonymus Vat. Lat. 2170 2	0.20	0.67	0.43
Anonymus Vennebusch	0.20	0.50	0.35
Anonymus Steenberghen	0.15	0.43	0.29

Table 4.3: Proportion of most popular doctrines by commentator.

Giele. But because Anonymus Giele only has a low proportion of the popular doctrines, he scores lower than about half of all the commentators. When the figures are averaged out, we find that the commentators with the highest combined proportion and concentration of the popular doctrines are Dinsdale, Anonymus Orielensis 33, and Wyle, but Jandun, Anonymus Vaticanani 2170 I, and Faversham are right behind them.

We can of course also plot the commentators in a scatter plot according to their degree of uniqueness and commonality (how big a proportion of the common doctrines they have). The scatter plot in figure 4.6 on the facing page shows us some distinct outliers. The most distinct of those has already been identified above, as Anonymus Steenberghen gives us the text with the highest degree of uniqueness and also the lowest degree of common doctrines (15% as we see in table 4.3). We also notice the three dots at the bottom of the plot with no uniqueness and a spread on a spectrum of commonality representing five commentators where Anonymus Orielensis 33 and Dinsdale have the highest commonality among them. This confirms that they may be representative of the whole corpus. Jandun on the other hand stands out as the one with highest combined uniqueness and commonality, which may make him interesting as a commentator who reflects a high proportion of the common doctrines, but also shows a high degree of originality. Anonymus Mertonensis 275 and Wyle are similar to him in that respect.

## 4.4 Analyses

The categorization of doctrines that leads to these quantitative groupings of the preceding section are good for revealing high level tendencies and relations between the commentaries.




Figure 4.6: Scatter plot of uniqueness and commonality of commentators.

They can therefore be very useful starting points for further in-depth studies of the separate texts or groups of texts. But as the high level clustering is based on general points of doctrine, they do not reflect the detailed differences that may hold between different presentations of the doctrines. But what is more important to note is that this general comparison also does not take into account which philosophical implications a specific combination of doctrines may entail. This is what this final section will delve into.

We cannot go into all the areas of interest that the range of commentaries opens up, but in the three following subsections I will pursue some of the most striking and relevant relations and observations. First I will of present four general categories of challenges that we find in the *rationes*, as well as the most prevalent doctrines used in refuting the different types of challenges. This will include an articulation of which challenges are the most interesting to the problem of intellectual self-knowledge. Subsequently I will lay out the spectrum of how big a significance the commentators ascribe to introspective self-knowledge in the science of the soul. The final and third subsection will summarize the range of different views on the status and type of science we can have about the soul.

#### 4.4.1 Types of challenges

The overview of challenges in section 4.2.2 provided a long and somewhat unwieldy list of points. In this section I will present some general observations that can be made based on the material. I will outline which types of arguments have been found, which doctrines we have found to be most prevalent in the refutations of the challenges, and which arguments involve particularly interesting points on self-knowledge.

As the list of challenges is ordered by relative prevalence, it can be difficult to spot doctrinal connections between them. One way to analyse these challenges is to sort them into the following four general fields of problems:

**Identity problems** The challenges concerning identity of knower and known (N5), act and potency (N20), and mover and moved (N3).<sup>152</sup>

**Problems of perception** The challenges concerning the imperceptibility of the soul (N2) due to its unintelligible nature (N1) and its correlate that it does not occasion phantasms, that it is simple and atemporal (N6), and finally that it belongs to the things most evident by nature but most obscure to us (N9).<sup>153</sup>

**Scientific method** A science is knowledge acquired by causal explanations of a thing (N31), or by analysis of part and properties belonging to a subject (N7). A science must also be about incorruptible universals, but that does not include the soul, as it is either a particular (N11) or corruptible (N14).<sup>154</sup>

<sup>152</sup> See sections 4.2.2.5 (N20), 4.2.2.6 (N5), and 4.2.2.7 (N3).

<sup>153</sup> See sections 4.2.2.3 on page 129 (N2), 4.2.2.1 on page 128 (N1), 4.2.2.11 on page 135 (N6), 4.2.2.8 on page 134 (N9).

<sup>154</sup> See sections 4.2.2.16 on page 138 (N31), 4.2.2.15 on page 137 (N7), 4.2.2.2 on page 128 (N11), 4.2.2.9 on page 134 (N14).

**Ontology of the soul** The soul must be stripped of that which it is about to receive (N15), it does not exist (N36), it is only in potentiality before having any knowledge and thus not a possible object of knowledge (P4), and a science assumes the possibility of self-knowledge, which is not possible (N34).<sup>155</sup>

The most obvious of these groups is the first concerning problems of identity. Sometimes the argument of that category seem so close that it is difficult to determine whether they are different arguments or different statements of the same basic argument. In such cases a comparison of the refutations can be helpful. For instance the answer to the challenge about mover and moved can be addressed by a disambiguation of the term 'movement' with respect to different types of beings. In Jandun's solution to the challenge about knower and known, on the other hand, we find a discussion of different types of intellects, which is quite different from distinguishing all intellects from all material things. Finally, the challenges of act and potency compared with knower and known may both be solved by reference to direct and indirect knowledge, but in that case it is not clear enough to say that they are actually identical.<sup>156</sup> It is therefore clear that although the challenges all put pressure on the identity of subject and object, they present different aspects of that structure.

The objections based on problems of perception are the most widely used. Among them the main argument on the imperceptibility of the soul must be considered the standard argument in these questions, as everybody use that or a close variant based on phantasms. The argument may also be considered one of the strongest arguments against the science of the soul, as it looks like a violation of the empiricist ambitions of the Aristotelian philosophy of science. There are however, as our commentators demonstrate, ways to handle this that either involve a reference to knowledge acquired from accidents or by a distinction between primary and secondary knowledge. The objections that focus on the methods of scientific knowledge could present some strong challenges. This aligns well with the tendency of arguing that knowledge of the soul may not qualify as a proper science, and it would be possible for commentators to raise problems about the necessity of a *propter quid* knowledge.<sup>157</sup> The connection to that type of knowledge is however not made, but many rather find different ways to support the possibility and sufficiency of proceeding from accidents to substances. Finally, the group of questions focusing on the ontology of the soul are neither common nor particularly strong. Each of them are only presented by a single commentator, and are also each in their own way dispensed with in relatively simple ways.

If we take a step back from the thematic groups, we can also see which doctrines are most often used in refuting the objections across the board. The two points that must be considered standard solutions are:

- (1) The acquisition of substantial knowledge from accidents (P2).
- (2) The distinction between primary and secondary act of knowing (P1).

<sup>155</sup> See sections 4.2.2.10 on page 135 (N15), 4.2.2.13 on page 136 (N36), 4.2.2.14 on page 137 (P4), 4.2.2.17 on page 139 (N34).

<sup>156</sup> See the mention of Brito's solution of the simultaneous act and potency in section 4.2.2.5 on page 131.

<sup>157</sup> On the proper science, see section 4.2.1.3.

The first is mostly used in the context of problems relating to perception.<sup>158</sup> But it is also used to address problems concerning the methods of the science as we find it included in the arguments refuting both the idea that only *propter quid* science is a real science, and the challenge that the soul does not have parts or properties.<sup>159</sup>

The latter of the two has a more diverse application. It is found to refute objections about the problems of perception and the absence of phantasms,<sup>160</sup> as well as the identity problems of knower and known and mover and moved,<sup>161</sup> but also the ontology of the intellect, namely potentiality of the possible intellect and denudation before knowing.<sup>162</sup> Only the challenges about the methods of scientific knowledge have not been refuted with this argument.

The first of these two points is also one of the most used in the positive doctrines, while the latter is not really present in quite the same way in that part of the commentaries. But it is a correlate to the argument about the intellect's self-reflexivity once actualized, as the main point is how the act of knowing is the consequence of a preceding act of knowing. One doctrine from the positive doctrines that is almost entirely absent in the *rationes* is the view that science is characterized by the ascription of properties to a subject according to a certain principle. This is only seen as the starting point arguing that this principle does not hold for the soul, and that is refuted by reference to knowledge from accidents.<sup>163</sup>

When we turn our attention to objections that have a strong tendency to include special material on intellectual self-knowledge the attention centres around the first category about problems of identity. In their nature they all focus on the potential pain point of a doctrine involving reflexivity in a framework that considers sense perception the starting point of knowledge production. Two of the three are solved by a reference to the difference between primary and secondary acts of knowing, which is strongly connected to intellectual self-knowledge in this context.<sup>164</sup> But it is more interesting to note that they also give the occasion, as already mentioned, to include reflections on the place of the human intellect in relation to other types of intellects. These are not reflections that we would normally expect in such methodological discussions, but some apparently cannot resist the temptation that these problems of self-identity raise.

The commentators who include such reflections are Jandun, Anonymus Oriensis 33 and Dinsdale, the latter of whom also raises the point in his questions to book three.<sup>165</sup> Wyle also presents similar arguments in his commentary on book three, but he draws a clear distinction between what takes place when a person reflects on his own intellect and what happens when he reflects on any other intellect. There is no conflict of mover and moved when Socrates thinks about the intellect of Plato, but when he thinks about his own, the problem occurs. He does however not dwell long on it as it is solved by a reference to the primary and secondary act of

<sup>158</sup> See the examples in sections 4.2.2.3 on page 129 and 4.2.2.4 on page 130.

<sup>159</sup> See sections 4.2.2.15 on page 137 and 4.2.2.16 on page 138.

<sup>160</sup> Sections 4.2.2.3 on page 129 and 4.2.2.4 on page 130.

<sup>161</sup> Sections 4.2.2.6 on page 131 and 4.2.2.7 on page 133.

<sup>162</sup> Sections 4.2.2.10 on page 135 and 4.2.2.14 on page 137.

<sup>163</sup> Section 4.2.2.15 on page 137.

<sup>164</sup> See sections 4.2.2.6 on page 131 and 4.2.2.7 on page 133.

<sup>165</sup> Dinsdale III.15, p. 99.12–19, cf. section 3.2.2.1.5 on page 77.

intellection.<sup>166</sup>

To summarize, a general view at the different objections reveals four different categories of challenges. The two most common categories concern the problems of sense perception and self-identity. The objections based on problems of sense perception are by far the most widespread, as every commentator included here uses at least one of those objections in his discussion. The problems of self-identity stand out because they are very similar in structure and argument, and because they give some of our commentators the opportunity to present some rare discussions on self-reflection and self-knowledge that we have seen to be more typical in the commentaries on book three. Finally we have observed how the two doctrines focusing on the acquisition of substantial knowledge from accidents (P2), and the distinction between primary and secondary act of knowing (P1) are the most common ways of refuting the challenges raised in the *rationes principales*. What is particularly interesting is how they both (but especially the latter) can be applied in quite different arguments across the categories.

#### 4.4.2 Self-knowledge in the science

As only some parts of the soul are available to sense perception (those that have necessary properties that put them in a causal relation with physically observable phenomena) we need to explain how parts of the soul that do not have such properties can still be objects of knowledge. Facing that challenge, a commentator might resort to using intellectual self-knowledge, but it is not the only possible solution. In this section I will present three approaches ranging from the what seems to be the effort by John of Jandun to keep self-knowledge to a minimum, over a balance between regular proceedings of a science and self-knowledge in a smaller group of commentators to a very strong focus on self-knowledge by Simon of Faversham.

##### 4.4.2.1 Keeping self-knowledge to a minimum

In his analysis Jandun seems to make an effort to show how there can be a science of the soul that does not directly involve intellectual self-knowledge. Although he gives three different explanations for how it must be possible to have a science of the soul, it is difficult to find any explicit mentions of introspection. We find similar tendencies in Dinsdale and Anonymus Oriensis 33's solutions where intellectual self-knowledge is also kept to a minimum in the determination. It does however come out slightly stronger in their discussion of the *rationes principales*.<sup>167</sup> In this comparison we will keep the focus on Jandun.

First he presents the now well known doctrine P6 (treated in section 4.2.1.1 on page 118), that there can be a science about a subject with properties ascribed to it according to specified principles.<sup>168</sup> But his second point is unique among the commentators, as he argues that there can be a science about that which can be given a satisfactory scientific explanation.<sup>169</sup> This can

<sup>166</sup> Wyle I.1, APP 305.40–306.7.

<sup>167</sup> See Anonymus Oriensis 33 I.1, APP 291.15–18 and APP 292.31–293.4 as well as Dinsdale I.1, APP 310.8–11 and APP 311.10–21.

<sup>168</sup> Jandun I.1, APP 318.7–24.

<sup>169</sup> Doctrine P61, registered in section 4.2.1.7 on page 125.

be done, he holds, when the four different types of scientific questions can be answered, namely the that, why, what and whether (*quia est, propter quid, quid est* and *si est*).<sup>170</sup> Jandun argues that it is possible to give a convincing demonstration of all these questions with respect to the soul, and that there therefore must be a science of the soul.<sup>171</sup> But the problem of course still remains about the parts of the soul that have no apparent physical manifestations. The intellect is neither available to sense perception by itself, nor by being the cause or some activity that is available to sense perception (unlike nutrition, growth, and perception). That is, he says, except if we would say that it is available to sense perception by having a relation (*habitus*) to something that is sensible by itself. If we grant that, we might consider the intellect among things available to sense perception, as it has a stable relation to the phantasms.<sup>172</sup> It is however unclear whether he himself accepts that solution, and he also expands and supports his position it with reference to the distinction between primary and secondary intelligibility (P1). That distinction is a fundamental component in the self-intelligibility of the intellect, and hence in intellectual self-knowledge. So although he does not explicitly refer to intellectual self-knowledge, the constitutive doctrine is present.

In the *rationes principales*, where the question of self-knowledge also creeps up, he tackles it in the same way. As part of his third *ratio* he includes the argument about the mover and the moved as a potential challenge for the science of the soul (N3).<sup>173</sup> This is a typical problem of self-knowledge as the challenge of self-movement only applies in the case of reflexivity. But in his refutation he simply reverts to the distinction between primary or secondary intelligibility without making it explicit whether that actually involves introspection on the part of the intellect.<sup>174</sup> Finally, his fifth *ratio* also includes a problem of self-identity (P22) which is closely connected with problems of self-knowledge.<sup>175</sup> But he refutes the question with a distinction between the separate intelligences and the workings of the human intellect to show that self-identity does not play a role in the process of scientific knowledge acquisition that he has laid out.<sup>176</sup>

In Jandun's solution to this problem we notice how he shies away from tackling the question of self-knowledge head on. This looks like a way of avoiding what may seem difficult to avoid, that the science of the soul has to include some activity of introspection. He presents an argument that puts its main emphasis on the formal requirements for a science and shows how those are fulfilled in the case of the soul. According to his argument the science can primarily be acquired through observation of the activities and effects of the soul and from that arrive at conclusions about its essence. When he gets into the area of self-knowledge, namely when it comes to acquiring knowledge about the intellect, he merely states that this is done through a secondary and indirect act of knowing, but does not take the final step in determining whether that involves an act of introspection. This same strategy of toning down these aspects of the

<sup>170</sup> Cf. Aristotle *APo*, 2.1.89b23–25 and section 4.2.1.7 on page 125.

<sup>171</sup> Jandun I.1, APP 318.25–40.

<sup>172</sup> Jandun I.1, APP 319.1–12.

<sup>173</sup> Treated in section 4.2.2.7 on page 133.

<sup>174</sup> Jandun I.1, APP 319.40–320.6.

<sup>175</sup> Treated in section 4.2.2.6 on page 131.

<sup>176</sup> Jandun I.1, APP 320.14–28.

science is also applied in his discussion of the *rationes principales*. The reader may therefore easily be tempted to wonder whether he actually wants to keep points about self-knowledge out of the analysis insofar as possible.

This does however not mean that Jandun rejects self-knowledge as a phenomenon, which should be apparent from the preceding chapter and the following in-depth study in section 5.1. But he establishes a clear distinction between the intuitive version of self-knowledge that introspection yields and a fully developed science of the soul.<sup>177</sup> He is optimistic about how strong the science of the soul can be, and even holds that it can be considered demonstrative when executed properly.<sup>178</sup> So what he probably tries to do is to keep the influence of the less secure introspective self-knowledge to a minimum in order to maintain the rigour of the science of the soul.

#### 4.4.2.2 A necessary or sufficient requirement

In another group we find a mixture of well established principles of a demonstrative science and elements of reflexivity. Brito, Anonymus Vaticanani 2170 I, and Anonymus Vaticanani 2170 II are examples of this. These commentators present the argument about subjects, properties and principles (P6), but they also emphasize how the process involves intellectual self-knowledge. Some argue that some elements of the soul are readily available to observation and thus to scientific study through the accidents of the substance in conventional fashion (P2), but as that is not possible in the case of the intellect we see the idea that the intellect is more difficult to know than any other parts of the soul.<sup>179</sup> This problem of the intellect is then solved by the aid of intellectual self-knowledge, and references to the central elements of Aristotle's presentation in book three are often included. Both Brito and Anonymus Vaticanani 2170 II go into each their exposition of how the intellect is known, and their procedures closely reflect the doctrines of intellectual self-knowledge that we have seen in the preceding chapter.<sup>180</sup>

Faversham is another commentator who notes the particular difficulty of knowing the intellect, but his solution shows a different point of focus. It does include a reference to P6 about the subject, its properties and the principles of ascription. But it is put into his positive *ratio principales* where he, unlike most commentators, allows himself to expand a bit on the possibility of having the science in this context. This is also the place where he includes the note about the difficulty of knowing the intellect.<sup>181</sup> But his complete determination, which is longer than that of most commentators, focuses entirely on intellectual self-knowledge. His exposition starts with a reference to Proclus holding the reflexivity of immaterial substances. This leads him to establish how the soul must be immaterial itself, and thereby he can conclude that due to the reflexivity of the intellect we can acquire knowledge about the soul through our

<sup>177</sup> Jandun III.27, APP 327.20–25. We get back to this in the following section 4.4.3 on the following page.

<sup>178</sup> Jandun III.27, APP 327.20–25.

<sup>179</sup> Brito gives a very succinct statement of this view in Brito I.1, 269.22–26, but see also Anonymus Vaticanani 2170 I I.2, APP 295.37–296.15 and Anonymus Vaticanani 2170 II I.1, APP 299.13–16.

<sup>180</sup> Brito I.1, pp. 269.25–70.12, Anonymus Vaticanani 2170 II I.1, APP 299.25–36.

<sup>181</sup> Faversham I.1, APP 332.25–36.

own soul.<sup>182</sup> It may look controversial when Proclus is invoked to guarantee the possibility of the science. But he immediately emphasizes that this self-reflexivity is based on the preceding actualization of the intellect by an external object of knowledge. Once the soul has acquired a knowledge about sensible objects, it knows of itself that it has this knowledge, which leads to a knowledge about its powers and ultimately its essence, a process of which he gives a lengthier exposition.<sup>183</sup>

Self-reflection here stands front and centre in his explanation of how the science of the soul is achieved. Although he also mentions acquisition of knowledge through observation of accidents,<sup>184</sup> it plays no central role in the description of the science. It is rather a procedure that is incorporated into the introspective approach, as we have already seen that the soul acquires knowledge about itself through observation of its own activities and powers. Unlike some of his colleagues he does not imply that any part of the science is acquired through observation of other ensouled beings. That would be a good approach in getting knowledge about the faculties of nutrition and sensation and seems to be the implication of the reference to some powers of the soul as available to sense perception. But in Faversham's text it is very hard to see how he would not consider intellectual self-knowledge acquired through introspection as a sufficient requirement in acquiring a universal knowledge about the soul. In his discussion of intellectual self-knowledge in the questions to book three he even says explicitly that introspection is a necessary condition for the science of the soul.<sup>185</sup>

A sceptic might ask Faversham whether the reflection of the intellect on its own activity also gives information about the other parts and aspects of the soul. He might also ask whether intellectual self-knowledge is a sufficient requirement for establishing a universal science. Is the knowledge demonstrative, and is there any ideal of it being so according to Faversham? But actually Faversham is ready to concede that our knowledge of the soul is not a science in the strict sense, but merely a *historia*.<sup>186</sup> He may on the other hand ask Jandun whether he imagines that it would be possible to have knowledge about the soul without any kind of introspection. Faversham would argue that without that we could hardly attain any knowledge about the internal life and activity of the intellect that never is expressed in any external activities such as mathematics or first philosophy. This is the challenging balance that these commentators need to strike, and as we see here, it is difficult not to include some concept of reflexivity in that endeavour. This question of the status of the science will be the focus of the final section.

<sup>182</sup> Faversham I.1, APP 333.1–17, which finishes: “Et ideo per animam nostram possumus habere cognitionem de anima.” (“And thus by our soul we can have a science of the soul.”)

<sup>183</sup> Faversham I.1, APP 333.18–334.5.

<sup>184</sup> Faversham I.1, APP 332.25–36 and APP 336.4–14.

<sup>185</sup> Faversham q. 11, p. 336, cf. section 3.2.2.1.10 on page 80. The focus has here been on Faversham, but Anonymus Bazán would be another example of a commentator with a very clear emphasis on the role of intellectual self-knowledge. Anonymus Bazán I.1, ll. 30–60. The two questions are doctrinally very close.

<sup>186</sup> Faversham I.1, APP 336.15–18.

### 4.4.3 Is there a science about the soul?

Having looked at the commentators' different answers to whether there can be a science of the soul in these different ways, a question still remains. What sort of science is the science of the soul? Do the commentators give us any information on this, and if so, do they agree about the answer? Is the science demonstrative? That will be the topic of this section. Some talk about demonstrative science explicitly but may either reject or accept that our investigation of the soul is of that sort. And their reason for accepting or rejecting the power and procedure of the science also present a range of different view. They do however all agree that there can be some sort of science about the soul.

As we have already seen, almost all commentators present us with one or both of the following doctrinal points: (1) The soul is a subject which we ascribe properties by use of the definition of the soul, and (2) we get to know the substance of the soul through observation of its accidents. By these two points they argue that there can be such a science, but they rarely stop at this.<sup>187</sup> Some will reflect on different types of science, others on more specific requirements of a scientific knowledge, or whether what we get to know about the soul qualifies as a science properly speaking.

The distinction between knowledge from observations of effects of a substance, namely the accidents, and knowledge of the causes resulting in such effects can be distinguished as *scientia quia* and *scientia propter quid*, respectively. This distinction is made clear in a short refutation by Anonymus Mertonensis 275 to the objection that there can be no science of the soul, as a real science is based on a knowledge of the causes resulting in the properties of a substance, and that is impossible with regard to the soul. He accepts that assumption, but notes that a *propter quid* science is only one type of science. The soul can therefore be known through its effects, and this *scientia quia* also qualifies as a science.<sup>188</sup> These distinctions of course go back to the beginning of *Analytica posteriora* where four types of questions in a science are identified.<sup>189</sup> We therefore readily see that the knowledge starting from observation of accidents is the *scientia quia*, but it is not always made clear whether the first procedure of ascription of properties through the definition establishes a *propter quid* science. The sentiment can however be found to be strongly implied in some commentaries, and yet others make the connection explicit.<sup>190</sup>

Five commentators have been registered to mark out a distinction between proper and improper science, often with the point that the knowledge about the soul may not be considered a science in the proper sense.<sup>191</sup> Dinsdale and Anonymus Oriensis 33 find that a knowledge acquired from accidents cannot be considered a science in the strict sense. They both argue that proper knowledge is a knowledge of the causes, and that is not fulfilled by the mentioned approaches.<sup>192</sup> That is why, as Dinsdale and Faversham see it, Aristotle rather calls the investigation of the science a *historia*. Dinsdale does also accept that it can be considered a science

<sup>187</sup> The only really good example in this collection is Anonymus Mertonensis 275 I.1, APP 287.12–19.

<sup>188</sup> Anonymus Mertonensis 275 I.1, APP 285.18–21 and APP 287.29–31.

<sup>189</sup> Aristotle *APo*, 2.1, 89b23, cf. also 4.2.1.7 on page 125.

<sup>190</sup> See Anonymus Vaticanus 2170 I I.2, APP 295.29–33.

<sup>191</sup> Cf. section 4.2.1.3 on page 122.

<sup>192</sup> Dinsdale I.1, APP 310.25–311.2.

by extension (*extensive*).<sup>193</sup> We notice here how both Dinsdale and Anonymus Oriensis 33 argue that knowledge producing demonstrations can be made by ascription of attributes to the subject. But this procedure does not imply to them a *propter quid* science, nor that the science can be considered scientific in the more strict sense.

Wyle also draws the distinction between proper and improper science in a separation of science as either a knowledge about a subject, about conclusions in a demonstration, or about properties of a subject. He identifies the first kind of science as the proper science. But he also argues that our knowledge about the soul is an example of such a proper science. And he furthermore argues that this is acquired through exactly the procedure of attribution of properties to a subject by use of its definition as the principle of the attribution.<sup>194</sup>

It is not clear in Dinsdale and Anonymus Oriensis 33 whether there is a conceived difference between knowledge acquired in this way and the knowledge of a substance through observation of its accidents. But it may be that they consider the two approaches to go together, as the accidents observed to belong to a substance are ascribed to it by its definition, thus effectively combining the two. But if that is the case then they must have a different idea of what qualifies as a proper science than Wyle, as that is exactly the procedure that warrants the proper science according to him. It is thus also curious how Dinsdale and Anonymus Oriensis 33 argue against a proper science of the soul while they both make it clear that a science is acquired through demonstrations (this implies that the use of demonstrations in a science is not all it takes for it to be a fully demonstrative science). Anonymus Oriensis 33 is most explicit as he says that a knowledge (*cognitio*) of the soul is possible, both properly speaking an extensively (*proprie dicta et extensive*), and most properly speaking a science is acquired through demonstration. He also accepts that the process of that demonstration is the ascription of properties to the subject with the definition as the middle term. And he thus states that this makes it possible to have certain knowledge (*certa cognitio*) about the soul.<sup>195</sup>

With Jandun we see that he also presents a further specification of the science, as he addresses the four types of scientific questions directly. And he actually argues that each of these four types of questions can be answered in an investigation of the soul. What is maybe most interesting is that the *propter quid* question, the explanation from causes, which was rejected by Dinsdale and Anonymus Oriensis 33 to be found within psychology is entirely possible according to Jandun. The *propter quid* question describes the cause of a property inherent in a subject, as he puts it (*causa inhaerentiae passionis ad subiectum*). And that is done through the ascription of properties to a subject by means of its definition. So where Wyle does not explicitly draw this connection but still holds that this process is what supports a proper and robust science of the soul, Jandun holds that this process leads to *propter quid* science. In a passage in his commentary on book three he even goes as far as saying that the substance of the soul is known demonstratively (*demonstrative*).<sup>196</sup>

That passage, where Jandun refers to the knowledge as demonstrative, is however also interesting because we find a connection to Dinsdale. Jandun's point in that paragraph is that

<sup>193</sup> Anonymus Oriensis 33 I.1, APP 291.34–292.2, Favershaw I.1, APP 336.15–18.

<sup>194</sup> Wyle I.1, APP 304.34–305.15.

<sup>195</sup> See Anonymus Oriensis 33 I.1, APP 291.21–33, cf. Dinsdale I.1, APP 310.18–24.

<sup>196</sup> Jandun III.27, APP 327.20–25.

there is a difference between the sort of knowledge that the intellect gets about itself through mere self-reflection (which is even called intuitive, *intuitiva*) compared to the psychological science properly speaking. And that exact point is also made by Dinsdale and Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II.<sup>197</sup> Although they do not call the introspective self-knowledge intuitive (but Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II calls it confused), it is also important for them to point out that the scientific endeavour is much more arduous, time-consuming and complex than mere self-reflection.<sup>198</sup>

This need not be a direct conflict on the part of either commentator here. Jandun is the only one who says that the knowledge is acquired demonstratively, and is thus clearly different from the mere result of introspection. Dinsdale draws a similar distinction, but that may not mean that the science is as robust as it is according to Jandun, as it is not a *propter quid* science in his view. So although he does try to separate the merely introspective and more thoroughly scientific investigation of the soul, the distinction is not as sharp as in the later Jandun. This might also reflect the mention we made in the previous section that where Jandun seems to make quite a bit of effort of keeping introspection out of the practice of a science of the soul, the same tendency can be seen in Dinsdale, although it is realized less stringently.<sup>199</sup>

In these different perspectives on the status, type and procedure of the science of the soul we see some tendencies and a puzzle. The commentators want to confirm that there can be a science about the soul, but they may modify the concept of science in different ways. And although they do not often reflect on whether that science is demonstrative, we find reflections on the strength of the science. Some hold that the investigation of the soul can be a demonstrative science properly speaking, mainly by holding that the knowledge is a *propter quid* knowledge describing the causes for which the soul has the properties it does. This is often supported by the ascription of properties to the subject by use of the definition as the middle term. Jandun and Wyle take this position. Dinsdale and Anonymus Oriensis 33 on the other hand hold that as we can only get knowledge about the soul from observations of its accidents or effects, it is not a science properly speaking. But it is unclear what exactly that means as they argue, at the same time, that the procedure of property ascription by the definition (and thus the *propter quid* science) is also possible with regards to the soul. Anonymus Vaticani 2170 I is similar to these two in the sense that he accepts that there can only be a *quia* science about the soul, but he still considers that a science. Finally, Faversham seems content to reject this idea of *propter quid* science and even maintains that although we may have a *cognitio* or *historia* about the soul, it is not really a *scientia*.

## 4.5 Conclusion

In this chapter I have investigated different answers to the question whether there can be a science of the soul in 14 commentaries. The investigation has been structured in four main sections. First I have given an overview of the most common problems and points of doctrine

<sup>197</sup> Cf. section 3.2.2.1.11 on page 80.

<sup>198</sup> Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II III.11, APP 302.1–9, Dinsdale III.15, APP 314.48–55.

<sup>199</sup> See section 4.4.2.1 on page 151.

in the commentaries followed by an inventory of all the positive and negative doctrinal points. The threads from all the data were then gathered in the more general section on clusters and connections among the texts, based on the doctrinal content of them all. Finally I have given three small topical analyses that focus on specific philosophical or structural details of the chapter.

When we look at the view of the commentators, we see two doctrines that will be found in the majority of the commentaries. They both focus on the procedure of the science and argue that there can be a science about a subject to which properties can be ascribed according to an established principle, the definition of the soul. This is pulled from the Aristotelian characterization of the demonstrative science in *Analytica posteriora*. They will also very often accept that it is possible to attain knowledge about the substance of the soul based on observation of its accidents. Only two commentators do not mention either of these two. One is Anonymus Bazán who gives a very short determination, the other is Anonymus Steenberghen, who gives a more extensive determination along a different trajectory which indicates that he might agree with these principles although he does not mention or incorporate them.

Two other main positive points have been found in a bit less than half the commentators. One argument holds that the soul is indirectly available to sense perception, which is cognate to the thesis that substantial knowledge about the soul is acquired through observations of its accidents. The other argument holds that self-knowledge or reflexivity is a constitutive component in the science about the soul, either because it proves the intelligibility of the soul or because it provides a way of attaining the knowledge itself. Finally there are some doctrines that occur between one in every third or fourth but in such a way that it looks like a tendency. They focus on problems of the science with a distinction between proper and improper science and the point that the intellect is particularly difficult to know. Finally there is a handful of ideas that are only presented by one or two commentators.

What is then the position of self-knowledge within this somewhat varied field of commentaries commentators? The main problem of the possibility of the science asks how we can know anything about something that is not available to sense perception. The problem is solved by reference to knowledge of a substance through its accidents, which can be available to perception. But even if this ambition is maintained and an approach based on sense perception is advocated, it may still be unclear whether the will suffice. Some commentators raise the point explicitly that the intellect is more difficult to know than the rest of the psychological powers. They may present the argument that neither its activities nor its products are available to sense perception. And it is certainly hard to see whether it would be possible within this framework to give a full description of the powers and workings of the soul, and in particular the intellect, without employing introspection. The commentators do not agree on the solution to this problem. I have argued that we find a spectrum in the texts spanning the texts that limit the extent of intellectual self-knowledge to a minimum in their description of the science to those who consider it a necessary or maybe even a sufficient condition for the science. At the one end Jandun was used as the main example of the ambition to reduce the influence of intellectual self-knowledge as far as possible, while Faversham occupied the opposite end of the spectrum.

When we looked at the different challenges that the commentators present themselves with I found four different categories, where two mostly deal with what could be considered

theory of science (perceptibility and scientific methods), while the two others are related to problems about self-identity and other details about the ontology of the soul in particular. The problems of self-identity are interesting as they inherently address a variant of the problem of self-knowledge. And in this context of a discussion of the science it is notable that the challenge sometimes gives the commentators the chance to reflect on the position of the human soul in the chain of being based on the different types and conditions for self-knowledge across different types of intellects.

Finally, the analysis of the concept of science that we find the commentators to present also gives some of the same indications. In different ways a group of commentators discuss whether the science of the soul is a proper science, what type of science it is, and whether it is demonstrative. Some may even argue that it is not a proper science, but merely a *historia* based on introspection, although they still strive to maintain that in some ways that may be particularly difficult, good, solid, and substantial knowledge can be had about the soul. Others will argue that there can be a demonstrative, or *propter quid*, knowledge about the soul. Jandun is again interesting, as he is a proponent of that view, and also seeks to reduce the role of self-knowledge in the definition of the proper science of the soul. It should thus be clear that to most of the commentators the problems of self-knowledge and the question whether there can be a science of the soul are intimately connected.

The doctrines revealed a range of interesting relations among the commentaries. The most notable is between Dinsdale and Anonymus Oriensis 33 who share virtually every single doctrine. Further studies of those texts would be highly interesting. Another group, that of Anonymus Mertonensis 275, Anonymus Vennebusch, and Anonymus Bernardini was already known in the literature, and here it has been confirmed that they also tend to follow each other doctrinally. I believe that a closer comparison of the three would however reveal that although Anonymus Mertonensis 275 may be closer in structure to Anonymus Vennebusch, it shares more doctrinal material with Anonymus Bernardini in their first question. That demonstration has however not been pursued here. In the clusters we have also noticed a few outliers, namely Anonymus Steenberghen and Wyle who do not fall into any clear or strong groups and who also not share many of their doctrines with other commentator. We therefore also see that both commentators present unique doctrines in both the positive and negative points.

Finally, one of the quantitative analyses indicates that the group of Faversham, Brito, Jandun present us with three commentaries that together contain the highest concentration of doctrines that are most commonly used. They therefore provide us with three good exemplary commentaries for studying this tradition, as they present us with the most important doctrines and problems. But they are also all three strong commentators and thinkers who try to give fulfilling, coherent, and often also original answers to the problems they discuss. There is no indication that there is any particularly strong connections among those three, as they happen to discuss the same central problems, but often reach different results. Each in their way they therefore provide interesting starting points of views on these problems of intellectual self-knowledge and the science of the soul.



# Chapter 5

## Selected studies

In this chapter I will present two smaller studies of selected topics within the material laid out in the preceding chapters. Where the preceding chapters have provided at high level overview of the selected tradition, the following two sections are examples of in-depth studies that can be done on the basis of the presented results. We will see the doctrines that have been laid out and analysed in the preceding chapters reappear, but in this section we can take the liberty of going into more details and draw connections that the survey chapters must suppress.

### 5.1 Jandun's three ways of knowing oneself

John of Jandun's extended and complex reflections on intellectual self-knowledge contain a wealth of interesting philosophical points, problems, and perspectives. He presents three questions that may seem similar in some respects, but I will argue that they present three different cases of self-knowledge. Each of these cases responds to a particular aspect of Jandun's model of the intellect. The three perspectives on self-knowledge that we will see are: (1) a self-knowledge that is part of the process of human knowledge but never rises to the level of human awareness, (2) a self-knowledge that is a conscious and attentive procedure, and finally (3) an unchanging state of self-knowledge in the agent intellect that is reflected in the possible intellect. Where the first case lies below the level of human awareness, the last lies above and outside the reach of the human condition, at least insofar as it concerns the philosopher.

The *Quaestiones super libros De anima* of Jandun is a long text. It contains a total of 92 questions with 13 on book one, 37 on book two, and 42 on book three, where virtually every question on book three is concerned with the intellect. Three full questions are entirely dedicated to the problems of self-knowledge, and are phrased as follows:

- Question 13: Whether the possible intellect can know its act of knowing when it exists in the intellect.<sup>1</sup> This question is prefaced with the lemma “Cum autem sic singula fiant et cetera” from *De anima* 3.4, 429b5.

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<sup>1</sup> *Utrum intellectus possibilis possit intelligere suam intellectionem existentem in eo.* Transcription on page 321.

- Question 27: Whether the possible intellect can know itself.<sup>2</sup>
- Question 31: Whether the possible intellect always knows the agent intellect with a numerically identical intellection.<sup>3</sup>

Right before the big question on the necessity of the agent intellect, Jandun inserts a short note. He quotes the lemma “someone might raise the question” (“dubitabit autem aliquis”) from *De anima* 3.4, 429b22 and writes that this is an appropriate context to discuss whether the possible intellect can know itself. That question, he says, belongs to the section in 3.4, 429b5–9 where Aristotle declares that once in a certain state of activity the intellect becomes able to know itself. But Jandun finds it to be more practical and clear to postpone that discussion until the agent intellect and its relation to the human soul have been presented.<sup>4</sup> And sure enough, question 27 is found after the general analysis of the nature and role of the agent intellect. The question on the self-knowledge of the agent and possible intellect concludes the questions on chapter five.<sup>5</sup>

Since Jandun connects these questions of self-knowledge to the nature of the intellect, I will briefly outline his more general model of intellect before we move into the details of self-knowledge. He does not accept that the intellective soul (*anima intellectiva*) is the substantial form of the human being, because that would make it extended and thus corruptible. The intellect does therefore not give existence to the human soul, but it realizes the act of intellection within the soul. It thus provides the essential activity without providing it being.<sup>6</sup> There is thus one intellective soul that is actualized in the so-called cogitative soul of every individual human during the act of knowing, but the act of knowing will be diversified according to the phantasm that occasion the act.<sup>7</sup> The separate intellective soul is composed of the agent and possible intellect which function analogously to matter and form respectively as a single, separate substance.<sup>8</sup> The two components that make up the individual human are thus the cogitative soul which places it in the species of human, and the intellective soul which makes it capable of knowing.<sup>9</sup> The two components are present in the same subject and are united in being but different in essence.<sup>10</sup> Because of this separation of both the possible and agent intellect

<sup>2</sup> *Utrum intellectus possibilis possit intelligere seipsum*. Transcription on page 324.

<sup>3</sup> *Utrum intellectus possibilis semper intelligat intellectum agentem eadem intellectione numero*. Transcription on page 329.

<sup>4</sup> Jandun 1480: p. 243a–b: “‘Dubitabit autem aliquis.’ Hic potest quaeri utrum intellectus possibilis possit seipsum intelligere, et haec quaestio habet locum super illam partem ‘Cum [p. 243b] autem sic singula fiant.’ ubi Philosophus dicit ‘et ipse autem seipsum tunc potest intelligere.’ sed commodius et clarius poterit expediri postquam visum fuit de esse intellectus agentis et quomodo intellectus agens se habet ad animam humanam. Ideo usque tunc differatur.”

<sup>5</sup> For a complete list of the questions of the commentary, see table D.7 on page 375.

<sup>6</sup> All of his question III.5 deals with this, but see in particular Jandun 1480: pp. 171a and 173b–75a.

<sup>7</sup> Jandun 1480: q. III.7, especially p. 190a.

<sup>8</sup> Jandun q. III.26, especially pp. 263a–265a.

<sup>9</sup> On this see in particular Brenet 2009.

<sup>10</sup> This is of course superficial, and does not do justice to the complexity of the subject, but more information can be found in Kuksewicz 1968: 204–19, which of course is more superficial but also more approachable than Brenet 2003, but see especially particular pp. 41–59 and 340–71 of that

into a single, separate substance shared among all humans, Jandun is traditionally referred to as an "Averroist". Especially Brenet attacks the idea that this merely means that he is a direct representative and loyal reporter of the doctrines of Averroes in the early 14th century, and thus expresses significant and justified warnings against ascribing the predicate of "Averroism" based on a binary evaluation of the ontological status of the possible intellect.

### 5.1.1 Knowledge and concomitant self-knowledge

When we start with question III.13 the first determination contains five sections. First Jandun declares how he thinks the intellect can be an object of knowledge. He then presents what looks like two equally unpalatable solutions to the problem, followed by his positive answer, before he finally addresses the challenges raised by the two alternative solutions. The doctrine he presents basically holds that the possible intellect realizes one act of knowing through which both the primary object of knowledge and that act itself is known.

First Jandun declares that the intellect can know its own act and generally any act belonging to it, regardless of whether it is primary or secondary. This is shown by the simple syllogism that the intellect can know any *ens*; the intellect itself is an *ens*; therefore the intellect itself can be known by the intellect (P74).<sup>11</sup> Jandun thereby seems to find it sufficiently supported that the intellect can be an object of knowledge.

Jandun raises a challenge by presenting two scenarios which seem to be mutually exclusive and both result in unacceptable consequences. The basic question is "If I know an act of knowing a stone, does that constitute a new act of knowing?" Given a positive answer, it conflicts with the idea that the act of knowing is determined by the nature of the thing known (N29).<sup>12</sup> But this would mean that since the stone and the knowledge of a stone are two different natures, the knowledge of them should also be different. And then you cannot know the stone and your knowledge of it as one and the same act. On the other hand, if the knowledge of the stone and the higher order knowledge of that act are different, then we risk running into an infinite regress of acts of knowing (N10). If the higher order knowledge is a separate act, that act could then again be known by another separate act, and so on ad infinitum. Both these possibilities seem completely absurd to Jandun.<sup>13</sup> So the dilemma Jandun sets up here is the conflict between the potential risk of an infinite regress, if the acts are separate, and two different objects of knowledge for the same act of knowing, if it is unitary.

Jandun openly admits that he considers this a tough question. He has only found very few who have delved properly into the problem, and he is in doubt if he can give a definite answer. So for the moment he says that he will proceed according to what seems most probable, but be at liberty to change his mind and say something else, if he gets a better idea at some later point. He ends up answering the problem in favour of the idea that a single act contains both

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work too.

<sup>11</sup> Jandun III.13, APP 321.27–32.

<sup>12</sup> Jandun finds support for this in Averroes's commentary on *De anima* 3.4, 429b10–22 where distinctions are drawn between a material thing and the knowledge of it. See Averroes *In DA*, comm. III.9, p. 422.36–50 (ed. Crawford).

<sup>13</sup> Jandun III.13, APP 321.33–322.49.

a knowledge of the primary object and a reference to or knowledge of that act itself (P54). He says:

Possem itaque dicere quod intellectus intelligit intellectionem lapidis existentem actu in eo, sed non alia intellectione simpliciter sed eadem, ita quod intellectio lapidis existens in intellectu est intellectio lapidis et intellectio sui ipsius, et intellectus ista intellectione denominatur intelligens lapidem et ipsammet intellectionem.

I could then say that the intellect knows the act of knowing the stone existing in the intellect, but not by a completely different act of knowing but by the same, such that the act of knowing the stone existing in the intellect is a knowledge of the stone and a knowledge of itself, and by this act of knowing the intellect is said to know the stone and the knowledge itself.

Jandun III.13, APP 322.50–59

What makes something else know is also itself known, and it is known by itself, not by something else superimposed on it. So the knowledge of the stone is itself also at the same time knowledge of that very act of knowing.

We return with Jandun to the first horn of the presented dilemma. Can we maintain a single act that knows more than one nature? First he points to the accepted doctrine that an act of knowing is itself known.<sup>14</sup> This leads him to the diversification of knowledge according to the thing known. He concedes the truth of the doctrine when it concerns objects of knowledge that share the same mode of being. So when two material objects, or two immaterial objects, are known, this will result in two different acts of knowing. But when two objects are of different modes or being and one is an abstraction of the other, this is not the case. So the knowledge of the object and the knowledge of that act are a single act. This happens because the knowledge is abstracted from and caused by the primary object of knowledge, through its phantasm (P62).<sup>15</sup>

Jandun does not give us much more, so how can we use that to keep the number of acts on exactly one and still maintain a knowledge of the primary object as well as some reflexive knowledge of that act itself? It may help to remember the basic model of the possible intellect. Once the intellect receives an intelligible species, it becomes that species. This also means that when the possible intellect becomes what it knows, it also in a certain sense knows itself when the external object is known. In this way the knowledge of the primary object and the knowledge of the intellect itself are in effect one and the same act. In knowing a material object there will therefore never be more than a single act, which has the external object as its primary knowledge. But because knowing is to be the thing known, and an act is always identical to itself, the act of knowing an object will also always know itself. So formally any act of knowing also knows itself. The possible intellect actualized by a species is therefore not only intelligible but also known and knowing.

With this solution Jandun does not consider the problem raised with the infinite regress relevant because it was raised in the alternative horn of the dilemma where you have two

<sup>14</sup> Jandun III.13, APP 322.60–65.

<sup>15</sup> Jandun III.13, APP 322.66–74.

different acts of knowing. The challenge of the infinite regress took as starting point the production of separate acts of knowing in an infinite chain. But his single act model remove that risk? If a knowledge of an external object always results in a simultaneous knowledge of that very act, why then would a knowledge of that knowledge not arise? Is it any different if an act of knowing one object automatically engenders another object of knowledge? One strategy to address this would be to point to the single object of knowledge. The knowledge of the external object is not an object, but only a secondary relation resulting from the mechanics of the intellect knowing the external object. The self-reference that the identity of subject and object is does not entail any new acts or objects, and the regress therefore never even begins.

We notice a couple of distinct features of the self-knowledge in this solution. According to the analysis I have presented here, the possible intellect knows itself as part of the process of knowing any other external object. This means that the intellect always acquires this type of self-knowledge or self-reflection as a concomitant feature of all knowledge. It is also notable that the knowledge is not characterized, in Jandun's presentation, by any kind of discursion, procedural analysis, or reflection, nor is there any hint of it being an act of volition. Based on that it would also seem natural that the process is not part of the scope of mental awareness. Consciousness is a volatile and elusive idea in these texts, and referring to it without warrant from the texts may even be anachronistic. But based on the analysis of the concomitant self-knowledge, one would expect that this is a wholly unconscious process, and that expectation is also reflected in the presentation, as Jandun gives not hints that the process should entail any kind of mental awareness of the reflexivity.

### 5.1.2 The process of intellectual self-knowledge

In question III.27 Jandun presents a completely different view on self-knowledge. There he argues that the intellect can be an object of knowledge, and that it cannot know itself by its own substance but rather by the aid of an external species which facilitates self-knowledge through observation of accidents. Jandun determines the question in three sections. First he establishes how, in his view, the intellect can be an object of knowledge. Secondly he argues that it cannot know itself by its own substance, and finally he presents the way in which it actually does know itself. The first point is the one we have already seen in the other question, namely that the intellect has the ability to know anything within its primary object, which is anything that has being, *ens*, and since the intellect itself qualifies for that, it is a possible object of its own knowledge (P74).

#### 5.1.2.1 Self-knowledge requires external species

Jandun's overall claim is, as is completely common in the tradition, that self-knowledge requires the actualization of the intellect by an external species.<sup>16</sup> He argues that the intellect cannot know itself by its own essence as follows: If the intellect knew itself by substance, then it could not receive anew a knowledge of itself; the intellect must be able to receive anew a knowledge of itself; hence the intellect cannot know itself by its own substance. The argument

<sup>16</sup> See the survey of the views in section 3.2.2 on page 74.

is not presented in exactly this syllogistic form, but I will maintain that it is the basic argument of his text. Both the major and minor premise in this argument need some expansion.<sup>17</sup>

The major premise is supported by a more elaborate argument. First he will show that if the intellect were known by itself without any sort of intellection added to it, then it would follow that this intellection would be the same as its substance.<sup>18</sup> He supports this by arguing that it is accepted that in the form of a syllogism the consequence is closer to the extremes than the extremes are to each other. Here extremes must mean the subject of a major premise and the predicate of a minor premise, which constitute the unconnected extremes of an argument of the form A is B; B is C; thus A is C. Now consider the intellect and the object of knowledge to be extremes in such an argument. If the intellect and intelligible object are completely one and the same, and the possible intellect in itself is knowing and that which is known, then it follows, according to Jandun, that the self-knowledge of the intellect is the substance of the intellect.<sup>19</sup> If that were the case, then the intellect would not be receptive to a knowledge of itself, because nothing can be receptive to something of the same species as it already is (N38). So this means that if the intellect knew itself by its own substance, it would not be able to receive or initiate a knowledge of itself.

The minor, holding that it must be possible for the intellect to receive or initiate a new knowledge of itself, is supported by an interesting appeal to experience. He says that anyone who is in the act of knowing (“quilibet intelligens”) experiences in himself that he in some way knows the proper substance of the possible intellect and its difference from its power as well as from the agent intellect and the intelligible species received in the intellect.<sup>20</sup> To expect this type of experience, with such a demarcation of the different constitutive elements of the process, seems very optimistic. With the complete and extensive model of Aristotelian epistemology and psychology, this may be what Jandun experiences when he reflects on the process of intellection, but to suppose that it reflects the phenomenology of any thinking subject seems excessive. Nevertheless, this appeal to experience looks like Jandun’s main argument to show that the intellect must be able to initiate a new act of self-knowledge.

But the doctrine that the intellect must be able to initiate anew the act of self-knowledge includes an important and more well known corollary.<sup>21</sup> He raises the question whether the possible intellect engages in an act of self-knowledge independently of the human condition. In his monopsychist model the possible intellect is a substance completely separate from the human soul, that is then utilized by the human during the act of cognition. So does that mean that

<sup>17</sup> The argument is an instance of P60, and this particular argument is also registered in P24 on page 244.

<sup>18</sup> “[...] si intellectus possibilis esset intellectus per seipsum sine quacumque intellectione sibi superaddita, sequeretur quod in ipso sua intellectio esset idem cum sua substantia.” Jandun III.27, APP 325.4–6.

<sup>19</sup> Jandun III.27, APP 325.11–29: “Medium est propinquius extremis quam extrema inter se – hoc bene manifestum est; cum ergo intellectus et intelligibile se habeant sicut extrema, et intellectio sit sicut medium inter ea, sequitur quod si intellectus et intelligibile sint omnino unum et idem, sequitur quod intelligere fit idem cum eis, et sic si intellectus possibilis secundum seipsum est intelligens et quod intelligitur, necesse est quod intellectio sua sit substantia sua, et sic patet consequentia.”

<sup>20</sup> Jandun III.27, APP 325.11–29.

<sup>21</sup> Jandun III.27, APP 325.30–326.15.

the possible intellect knows itself in this separate state? No, he answers, because the possible intellect still needs the input from phantasms to evaluate its own activity. He acknowledges that the separate possible intellect may be a substance in some sort of act before engagement with human phantasms, but that is not sufficient for its self-knowledge. This then highlights the potentiality of the possible intellect and the priority of external sense data.

A counter argument presents a compromise between the two models where the intellect can be in act by itself but not known by itself due to the restriction on a reception of an external species. It seems that Jandun sees an epistemological conflict in this suggestion. He probably finds this indefensible because it would result in two different sources of actualization of the intellect, itself and the external species. Here the counter argument holds that the reception of the external species should condition the intellect towards having a knowledge of itself as well as the external object. But when the intellect is already actualized, the most obvious object of its knowledge would be itself. Jandun does not spell this out but the idea must be that all that is required for the intellect to know something is that it is itself actualized as a form of the object. And if, somehow, the intellect is actualized – probably as itself in some indeterminate way – then it is itself a much more obvious object of knowledge than any other external species. How should an external species be able to dispose it more towards self-knowledge than it already was in the prior state of act? So in this way he returns to the classical doctrine that if any external species should dispose the intellect towards self-knowledge, it can only happen if the intellect is completely potential and indeterminate before the reception of that species.

In summary, we see that in his refutation of essential intellectual self-knowledge Jandun presents the doctrine that the intellect can only engage in self-knowledge once it has been actualized by an external species. We recognize this as the doctrine that is universally accepted in the preceding commentaries on *De anima*. But the arguments used have not all been seen before. The main argument, that the intellect needs to be able to initiate or receive anew a knowledge of itself, is known.<sup>22</sup> But the inclusion of the phenomenology of introspection that supports this idea has not been found in any of the preceding studied commentaries. In the discussion of the corollary, Jandun also digs deeper into the doctrine of the potentiality of the possible intellect before the act of intellection. This gives him the opportunity to address a model that seeks to maintain the act of the intellect, in some way or degree, but still makes the self-knowledge rely on external stimuli. That argument has not been registered in the preceding commentaries treated in this study.

### 5.1.2.2 Discursive process of self-knowledge

How does the intellect then actually know itself? Jandun gives an extended version of the acquisition of substantial knowledge from accidental properties. This is also a very common piece of doctrine in the preceding commentaries.<sup>23</sup> But as we have just seen in the preceding section he also includes significant observations from experience and gives them high authority. This exposition stands in clear contrast to the idea of concomitant self-knowledge that is presented in the earlier question III.13.

<sup>22</sup> Faversham touches on this problem too, cf. 3.2.2.2.8 on page 85.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. section 3.2.2.1.3 on page 76.

The initial presentation is clear and explicit, so in stead of paraphrasing I prefer to quote him:

Nunc videndum est modus per quem intellectus possibilis perveniat ad intelligere seipsum, et breviter credo quod modus est quod prius intelligat aliquod intelligibile per eius speciem receptam, quodcumque sit illud, deinde considerat istam speciem in se receptam de novo, et postmodum considerat potentiam receptivam illius speciei, et tandem considerat substantiam subiectam illi potentiae et illi speciei receptae;

We should now consider how the possible intellect arrives at a knowledge of itself, and stated briefly I believe that it first knows some object of knowledge (whatever it could be) by its species, and then it considers that received species in itself anew, subsequently it considers the power receptive of that species, and then it considers the substance underlying that power and received species;

Jandun III.27, APP 326.16–25

This is a clear but complex example of the acquisition of substantial knowledge from accidents. It contains the following steps: (1) An external object of knowledge is known by the reception of an intelligible species in the possible intellect; (2) the possible intellect reconsiders that species in a way that is probably different from the original reflection; (3) it can then turn its attention to its own power of species reception; (4) and this finally leads to a consideration of the substance that has that power.

At the second step we note that the *ens* under investigation is not the intellect actualized by the species, but rather the species itself. This gives a more sophisticated presentation, because it means that it is not merely the intellect that can be observed by itself once it has been actualized. It is rather the species that actualizes the intellect that gets under scrutiny at first. From there the Aristotelian induction is the standard procedure to arrive at substantial knowledge, which is then applied to the intellect itself here. In the subsequent discussion Jandun makes it clear that the agent intellect is the efficient cause behind the act of knowing, but the species that represents the external object is also used – although in a different way – to acquire knowledge about the intellect.<sup>24</sup>

This focus on the species means that the move between point one and two must result in a change in the epistemic role of the intelligible species. It moves from being a representation of the external object under investigation to becoming itself the object of investigation. We also see that the normal model of knowledge by actualization of the intellect through a species is here suspended, so although the intellect changes its view on the species this does not result in a new species. This must be because the intellection by species assumes a material object as the primary object of knowledge, and that is then represented through a phantasm and finally the intelligible species. When the representation of external object becomes itself the starting point of the investigation, the requirement that the primary object of intellection is material is not upheld anymore. So it looks like the actualized intellect is available to the intellect in a much

<sup>24</sup> Jandun III.27, APP 326.26–35.

more direct way than the external objects of sense perception, because once it is actualized there is no need for a representation, it is just there and available for reflection.

Right after the above quote, Jandun continues:

[...] nec oportet dicere quod simul intelligat omnia illa, sed cognitio rei cuius species informat intellectum continuabitur per aliquod tempus, et in fine illius temporis incipiet considerare speciem illam receptam, et illa consideratio erit per aliquod tempus, deinde in fine illius temporis incipiet intelligere potentiam susceptivam illius specei, et postea continget ut intelligat substantiam subiectam illi potentiae et specei et sic intelliget seipsum.

[...] and it is not fitting to say that it knows all these things simultaneously, but the cognition of the thing whose species informs the intellect persists for some time, and at the end of that time it [*i.e.* the intellect] begins to consider that received species, and that consideration endures for some time, and then at the end of that time it begins to know the power receptive of that species, and then it holds that it knows the substance underlying the power and species and thus it knows itself.

Jandun III.27, APP 326.16–25

Here he makes an important point of saying that (1) self-knowledge is constituted by a stepwise procedure, and (2) each step in the process constitutes a temporally separate activity. But how this actually works is still not clear. Like all of the preceding commentators studied here, Jandun does not delve into the language of attention or mental focus. But reading his exposition of this process of the steps the intellect takes towards a knowledge of its own substance, it is difficult not to get the feeling of a mental spotlight that is moved from one aspect of the intellect to another. Finally, we must assume that Jandun considers these acts to be conscious states of the subject of the intellect, as parts of his analysis are based on reports on the experience of the process.

In the subsequent discussion he spells out the process further. The species that the intellect turns its view on conforms to the *quiditas* of the object represented, and this disposes and actualizes the possible intellect towards knowing that *quiditas*. The species is in the intellect in the same way as a form that inheres in and perfects a subject or matter, and that is also what disposes the intellect towards knowing itself.<sup>25</sup> He emphasizes, with reference to Averroes, that this means that the self-knowledge is only accidental and contingent upon external stimulus, but also that this does not mean that the external species is the essence of the intellect considered absolutely. Only once the intellect receives the species does it become able to know of its own workings.<sup>26</sup> But even given these extra details the answer to the questions on attention and mental focus are still left unanswered.

### 5.1.2.3 Two answers, two phenomena

In question III.13 Jandun reflects on the conditions under which two different objects of knowledge result in a single act of knowledge with two different aspects. The idea seems to be that

<sup>25</sup> Jandun III.27, APP 326.26–35.

<sup>26</sup> Jandun III.27, APP 326.36–327.11. He refers to Averroes *In DA*, comm. III.8, p. 420.19–24.

an act of knowing also always knows itself. This partly follows from the dictum of the identity of the knower and the known in the process, but also from how knowing is actualized: When the knower becomes that which it knows, it also *ipso facto* knows itself when it knows the primary object of knowledge. One single act of knowing knows the primary object, but also includes a self-reference constituting the knowledge of the act itself. This might just be a product of the ontology of the intellect. And in that case, it may be asked whether it is just an epiphenomenon of the act of knowing that always takes place, but never includes any sort of conscious awareness of the structure. Jandun certainly does not make any hints of a mental presence when this phenomenon takes place.

His second treatment of the problem is quite different. In a longer answer he first shows how he thinks the intellect can be intelligible to itself. He then argues that the intellect cannot know itself by its own substance. And finally he argues that it rather knows itself through a stepwise process starting from the primary object of knowledge. He outlines this process that begins from the primary objects of knowledge, and by progressively higher levels of abstraction the intellect moves towards a knowledge of its own substance. During this turning from the primary knowledge to higher order knowledge, the temporal and epistemological difference is underlined. The movement from the primary object of knowledge will always require the presence of some external object. The self-reflection, on the other hand, is only occasioned by the external thing and could never be initialized entirely on its own, and does not involve a species representation of the intellect as object.

We see that the two answers are fundamentally different. The first answer presents what amounts to an epiphenomenal and unconscious self-reflexivity. The second answer however presents us with a self-knowledge that is an introspective and attentive process through which the intellect can acquire a knowledge of itself, and which has a definite and positive content that goes beyond the mere content of the primary object, as it informs the intellect about its own activities and working. It may be argued that the first answer presents a version of self-knowledge that is a mere artefact of the ontology of the intellect and how it interacts with its primary objects of knowledge: In the act of knowing the knowing subject and the known object become identical. If this is all the self-knowledge amounts to, then is the content of that intellection anything aside from that object? Does that reflect our intuitions about what it means for the intellect to know or reflect on itself? Maybe not. And that might be part of the explanation why he gives a different answer in the second of the two questions. That treatment gives a stronger case for the type of self-knowledge that actually provides the intellect with some positive information about itself. The second treatment may therefore better reflect the experience of self-knowledge that is a conscious and attentive act.

### 5.1.3 The possible intellect knowing the agent intellect

In this section we will see how Jandun explains the connection between the possible and agent intellect and which influence that have on knowledge and self-knowledge of the two. The elements of the argument are already surveyed in section 3.2.4.1 on page 90, but here we can relate that better to the remaining part of the commentary. Basically he argues that (1) the possible intellect ought to have even better knowledge of the agent intellect than any other objects of

knowledge, as that is a more noble object and more suited to its own nature. (2) Further, the agent intellect is in a constant state of self-knowledge and the possible intellect is united with the agent intellect through that act of knowing.<sup>27</sup>

Like in his other questions on intellect and self-knowledge, Jandun first presents the structural circumstances on which he finds that he can present his doctrine, and then he dives into the more detailed exposition of its content. He therefore first argues: the possible intellect is suited to knowing forms realized in matter through the mediation of the agent intellect; the agent intellect is already actually known, as it is an immaterial substance; hence, the possible intellect ought to be so much more suited to know the agent intellect, as it is at a higher state of perfection than its normal objects of knowledge.<sup>28</sup>

He then elaborates that idea. First he establishes that the possible intellect knows the agent intellect through a kind of strong connection with it:

Illud cui semper est coniuncta vel unita intellectio alicuius intelligibilis eadem numero semper intelligit illud intelligibile intellectione eadem numero – haec est omnino manifesta; sed ipsi intellectui possibili semper est unita intellectio intellectus agentis, quia ipse intellectus agens est suamet intellectio sui ipsius secundum Aristotelem et Commentatorem hic: “In ipso enim scientia est eadem rei scitae.” Cum igitur intellectus agens sit semper unitus intellectui possibili, sicut perfectio naturalis suo perfectibili, ut patet ex praeostensis, sequitur quod semper est unita intellectio intellectus agentis, et per consequens semper ipsum intelligit.

That to which a knowledge of some intelligible object is always connected or united always knows that intelligible object with the numerically identical knowledge – this is entirely obvious; but a knowledge of the agent intellect is always connected to the possible intellect, because the agent intellect is its own very knowing of itself according to Aristotle and the commentator on this passage: “For in it scientific knowledge is the same as the thing known.” Thus when the agent intellect always is united with the possible intellect, just as a natural perfection with that which is perfectible, as is apparent from the preceding, it follows that the knowing of the agent intellect always is united [with it], and consequently that it [*i.e.* the possible intellect] always knows it [*i.e.* the agent intellect].

Jandun III.30, APP 329.34–330.4

From this initial paragraph I want to highlight three things: (1) The agent intellect apparently contains some knowledge, *intellectio*, as a perpetual knowledge of itself, (2) the agent and possible intellect are always united, and (3) the self-knowledge of the agent intellect rubs off on the possible intellect. We also note that the knowledge that the possible intellect acquires is not of itself, but of the agent intellect.

<sup>27</sup> See sections 3.2.4.1.5 to 3.2.4.1.6 on page 91.

<sup>28</sup> Jandun III.30, APP 329.23–33.

The self-knowledge of the agent intellect is established by the connection made at the end of *De anima* 3.4 between the science and the thing known.<sup>29</sup> Jandun does not connect the agent intellect here with the supreme intellect in *Metaphysica* 12.9, but it is clearly accepted that the agent intellect is in a perpetual state of self-thinking. Further, it is also taken to be evident that the agent and possible intellect are always united. When we accept those two assumptions, we can consider the idea that the possible intellect somehow takes over the self-knowledge of the agent intellect. The argument for this is found in the first part of the quote and states that a unity with an act of knowing transmits that knowledge to the united subject. This must be very similar to the doctrine of knowledge as form reception. That unity between the two types of intellect is clearly the basis. But we may still raise some questions. Which relation holds between the agent and possible intellect in this unity? And what consequence does this purported knowledge of the agent intellect have on the indeterminacy of the possible intellect?

Jandun goes into further detail in the following paragraph. In a somewhat wrinkled sentence he concludes the corollary of the stated doctrine, *i.e.* that the possible intellect does not know the agent intellect by an intellection that is different from that by which the agent intellect knows itself. He gives two reasons: First, that would mean that *one and the same thing* had two simultaneous and different intellections of the same object. Secondly, it is also hard to imagine how the possible intellect, which is primarily potential, should realize a lasting activity on its own accord without any external informing act or cause.<sup>30</sup> The first remark is the most interesting, because that includes some of the familiar problems of simultaneity and the subject and object in intellection. It reveals two things: (1) He considers the agent and possible intellect to be one and the same thing, *unum et idem*. (2) The doctrine he rejects is that one subject knows one object through multiple, or diverse, acts of knowing. This is elaborated at the end of the paragraph where Jandun decides that the possible intellect is always united with an intellection of the agent intellect by which the agent intellect knows *itself*. So the possible intellect knows the agent intellect by always being united with the very knowledge by which the agent intellect knows itself. Here we notice that what is known by both the agent and the possible intellect is the agent itself. To put it differently, the possible intellect does not have a knowledge of the act of self-knowledge that the agent intellect is engaged in. We can see that because it is maintained that there only is a single object, and a higher-order knowledge of the act of self-knowledge of the agent intellect in the possible intellect would probably constitute a new and separate object.

The ontology of the two intellects is still not quite clear. At the end of the paragraph he says that the intellection of the agent intellect that is united with the possible intellect is not the substance or essence of the possible intellect. This may serve to maintain a separation between the two, and maybe also the indeterminacy of the possible intellect. Because it would be hard to accept that the possible intellect essentially is a reflection on the essence of the agent intellect. In the following paragraph we learn a bit more about this structure.

Some might argue, Jandun says, that aside from the knowledge of the agent intellect that is conveyed on the possible intellect by its ever conjoined intellection of the agent intellect, the unity of agent and possible intellect also sprouts another intellection which does not belong

<sup>29</sup> Aristotle *DA*, 3.4, 430a19–20.

<sup>30</sup> Jandun III.30, APP 330.5–12.

to the substance of the agent intellect, but follow from the union of the two. We should then inquire, he says, why the existence of that intellection should be necessary, when the possible intellect has a sufficient knowledge of the agent intellect from its substance. He does not give an answer but leaves it up to the student to fill in that blank himself.<sup>31</sup> From the challenge we learn that the act of self-knowledge in the agent intellect is its essence, and that that essence perfects the possible intellect. The perfection of the possible intellect is certainly what leads to the knowledge of the agent intellect in the possible intellect. This then reveals that there is only a single object, the essence of the agent intellect itself, which is known.

As Jandun works with a monopsychist model of intellect, this all takes place in a separate, unitary intellect. The agent intellect is always engaged in a knowledge of its own essence, and because the two are connected in the way they are, that knowledge, which is the essence of the agent intellect, also takes place in the possible intellect. This all sounds somewhat mystical, and almost has a smell of essential self-knowledge. The possible intellect always has an immediate knowledge of the agent intellect, and since we are at this immaterial level no external stimuli or phantasms are involved. It is therefore hard not to ask how this process is related to human knowledge.

The final paragraphs of Jandun's question gives us some ideas. First he remarks that the perpetual knowledge in the possible intellect of the agent intellect does not apply to (*denominat*) any individual human being. The activity does not depend on a phantasm belonging to any particular human being, or any phantasm in general. In the monopsychist model of intellect this means that the connection between a thought and my experience of myself having that thought is established through the phantasm in the individual human who then connects with the separate intellect. Both the possible and agent intellect are not part of the substance of the human soul, but they are present as an aggregate in the human soul during an act of knowing. Jandun's point is now that this does not take place in this particular type of knowing; the possible intellect does not need the input of a human phantasm to engage in this. But since these phantasms supplied by the individual is what makes a given thought personal, this must also mean that it is a process that takes place without any interference from or awareness in a human being.

It therefore looks like the human beings are barred from this type of self-knowledge, but Jandun leaves a backdoor open for the possibility of such experiences. He does this with an enigmatic comment that it does not befall us completely at the onset or in the middle of philosophy, but maybe as a complement.<sup>32</sup> This is also hinted at in the refutation of the only *ratio*

<sup>31</sup> Jandun III.30, APP 330.17–24: “Si quis autem diceret quod non solum intellectus possibilis intelligit intellectum agentem intellectione qua ipse intellectus agens intelligit seipsum, et quae est substantia intellectus agentis perficiens intellectum possibilem, sed etiam quadam alia intellectione quae sequitur immediate unionem intellectus agentis ad possibilem, quae quidem intellectio non est ipsa substantia intellectus agentis, sed consequens unionem intellectus agentis cum possibili, tunc inquirendum est quae esset necessitas essendi huiusmodi [huius MSS] intellectionem, cum intellectus possibilis sufficienter intelligat intellectum agentem per eius substantiam. Hoc autem tibi perficiendum relinquo.”

<sup>32</sup> Jandun III.30, APP 330.25–30: “Immo etiam intellectio similis huic intellectioni, scilicet qua intelligit intellectus agens, non contingit nobis perfecte in principio generationis philosophiae nec in medio, sed forte in complemento, et de hoc debet inquiri in consequentibus.”

*principalis* to the question. The *ratio* argues that knowing the agent intellect cannot be possible because that would imply a human knowledge that does not require any sense data. He acknowledges that doctrine, but also says that Aristotle does not deny that the human intellect might have some incorporeal and eternal activity, and that it be some essential activity, and that is what this is actually about. Although he does not admit so himself, we are clearly now moving into the domain of theology. And the conclusion of this analysis must also be that yes, maybe in some way such self-knowledge may be available to the human intellect in some state of being, but under normal circumstances, it is not part of the human experience.

### 5.1.4 Conclusion

In this section we have found three different types of self-knowledge in the questions of John of Jandun. First we saw a self-knowledge that I have argued is tightly connected with the structure of the possible intellect. The possible intellect is completely indeterminate before it knows anything, and when it is actualized it then knows the form that it has been actualized as. This means that when the possible intellect knows an external object by being that object itself, it also in a way knows itself. This self-knowledge always takes place during the act of knowing of any external intelligible object. This may be considered a fundamental consequence of the mechanics of the human intellect.

The second treatment is quite different. Here we find, I argue, his reflections on how it is possible to engage in an attentive and conscious reflection on the workings of the intellect. Once the possible intellect has received and been actualized as a species of an intelligible object, it is somehow possible for the intellect to focus on the species, not as a representation but as the type of thing that the intellect itself is receptive to. This gives the intellect an impression of its own receptive power, which again yields some knowledge of the subject of this power. This finally gives rise to a knowledge of the substance of the intellect itself. This is not itself sufficient to constitute scientific knowledge, as it is more akin to an intuitive self-knowledge than to the analytical investigation of the essence of the intellectual soul in science. But it does provide the intellect with some knowledge about itself.

Finally we have seen a discussion of how the possible intellect can know the agent intellect. Here the focus moves yet again to a different phenomenon, namely a relation between the possible and agent intellect independently of the human individuals that may engage with them intermittently. The possible intellect and the agent intellect are always intimately and inextricably connected, and the agent intellect is always engaged in a perpetual self-intellection. This state of self-intellection and the perpetual entanglement of the two intellects mean that the self-intellection of the agent intellect is also realized or delegated to the possible intellect, which thereby acquires a knowledge of the agent intellect. This state of perpetual self-knowledge may be available to humans, but the analysis of the circumstances of that experience is rather a theological than a philosophical endeavour.

So we have seen three very different views on self-knowledge. The first presents the omnipresent but unconscious self-knowledge that the mere mechanics of the intellect entails, the second is an analysis of conscious and attentive self-knowledge that humans can engage in, and the third presents a mostly supra-human self-intellection that the ontology of the possible

and agent intellect together realize. Despite these differences we have also seen how some problems seem to lie at the heart of the concept of self-knowledge across this spectrum. The doctrine of the identity of the knower and the known, and the structure of the intellect invariably leads to questions of the subject and object of knowledge. We have seen in this section how the number of both subjects and objects can be difficult to keep under control. But the possibility of distinguishing between the object and the act of knowing means presents another vector of problems within this field. In all three questions we have seen how these three dimensions of subject, object and act have been at the heart of Jandun's investigations.

## 5.2 Simon Magister, a literal commentary

It is commonly noted that whereas question commentaries generally discuss specific philosophical problems, the literal genre aims to present and interpret the Aristotelian text more fully.<sup>33</sup> This may even include the notion that that literal commentaries are downright boring, that they add little of value to the interpretation of the works of Aristotle, and that they do not reveal the doctrinal position of the commentator himself.<sup>34</sup> In this section I will take a look at these presumptions by comparing a literal commentary with the roughly contemporary question commentaries.

So far the prime focus of attention in this study has been the question commentaries. This was where the whole idea for the investigation started, and the format of the question commentary also yields very well to a doctrinal study due to the manner of presentation and the relative separation from the details of textual exposition. But the exclusion of the literal commentaries has also had some practical reasons. Spanning both literal and question commentaries in the main analyses would have been too time consuming to execute successfully within the framework of the project. Nevertheless, I did inspect and evaluate quite a large selection of literal commentaries in the course of the study, and it would seem lopsided to pretend that they do not exist as an alternative approach to the analysis of Aristotelian texts. In this section I will therefore give a single example of a highly interesting commentary. I will present the literal commentary of Simon Magister in light of the doctrines that have already been analysed in the question commentaries. This gives us the opportunity to ask how the two types of texts are related, and see some examples of what can be found in a literal commentary. As there is some dispute about whether the author of the literal commentary ascribed to Simon Magister actually is Simon of Faversham, this will also be an opportunity to investigate that problem further and see if a doctrinal analysis of this material, that we now have a relatively good contemporary overview over, can help move the discussion further along.

<sup>33</sup> Weijers 2002: 24, Wolf 1966: 38–9.

<sup>34</sup> All three assertions are made in Flüeler 1999: 503.

### 5.2.1 Simon Magister and his text

In the manuscript Leipzig UB 1359 we find two commentaries that are explicitly ascribed to a Simon Magister, preceded by a single anonymous commentary and followed by a commentary on *De generatione et corruptione* by Giles of Rome. The content thus looks as follows:

- ff. 1r–23ar: Anonymus, *Expositio in Analytica Posteriora*.
- ff. 24r–43ar: Simon Magister, *Expositio in Topica*.
- ff. 44r–77v: Simon Magister, *Expositio in De anima*.
- ff. 78r–93v: Giles of Rome (unattributed), *Expositio in De generatione et corruptione*.

The first anonymous commentary may also be by Simon, but there is no explicit ascription, so it must be considered only a possibility so far. The name Simon Magister is also mentioned as the author of the works *Quaestiones super secunda parte Doctrinalis moderne* and *Notabilia de art dictandi*, both preserved in other manuscripts, but whether this has any connection to the Simon of this manuscript is uncertain.<sup>35</sup>

Grabmann first attributed the text to Simon of Faversham along with the other commentaries of the manuscript.<sup>36</sup> Glorieux, Markowski, and Wolf follow that attribution.<sup>37</sup> Longeway is a bit hesitant, but reasons as follows: Wolf argues convincingly that the *De anima*-commentary is by Faversham, and if that is true, the *Topica* is most likely by him too. The base premise that Wolf presents convincing arguments for the ascription is however not true, as he gives no arguments but merely takes over the attribution of Grabmann.<sup>38</sup> Mora-Márquez lists the *Topica*-commentary as Faversham's, but makes no reference to either of the other two in her article about him.<sup>39</sup> Köhler is also inclined towards attributing it to Faversham.<sup>40</sup>

Lohr on the other hand suggests to withhold judgement on the question as the attribution is ambiguous, and there is some partial overlap in sources between the commentary on *De anima* and some other commentaries (on Petrus Hispanus' *Summulae logicales*, on Martin of Dacia's *Tractatus de modis significandi*, and a *Quaestiones super II minoris Prisciani*).<sup>41</sup> Weijers follows this recommendation, as does Mora-Márquez in her catalogue of commentaries on book three of *De anima*, as mentioned above.<sup>42</sup> This cautious attitude seems initially wise, and

<sup>35</sup> Weijers 2012: 94–5.

<sup>36</sup> He shows no doubt about the authorship, see Grabmann 1933: 21–3. It has later been shown, according to Weijers (2012: 94), that the final commentary on *De generatione et corruptione* is by Giles of Rome (although she does not list it in among his works in Weijers 1996).

<sup>37</sup> Wolf 1966, Glorieux 1971: 358 (in a mistaken reference to the manuscript signature as 1559, and a similarly mistaken reference to the text as a question commentary), Markowski 2012: 83.

<sup>38</sup> Longeway 2012: §2. Wolf includes small parts of Simon Magister's text in his study of Faversham's theory of intellect.

<sup>39</sup> Mora-Márquez 2018: §2. In Mora-Márquez (2014: 215, DA16) the *De anima*-commentary is however ascribed to Simon Magister.

<sup>40</sup> Köhler 2008: 47, n. 154.

<sup>41</sup> Lohr 1971: 135–6, Lohr 1973: 139–40.

<sup>42</sup> Mora-Márquez 2014: 215, Weijers 2012: 94–5.

as the following analysis will show, the text contains a connection to Faversham's text, but no conclusive evidence in favour of the attribution has been found. We will therefore keep referring to him as Simon Magister.

Dating the text involves one challenge in particular. There is no real catalogue registration of the manuscript, but a short registry entry has been made. That note presents no description of the content, but it dates the manuscript to between 1301 and 1315.<sup>43</sup> That dating may be done on palaeographical grounds, or based on the date that is found in the explicit that closes our commentary. It reads as follows: "Expliciunt dicta magistri Simonis super librum De anima scripta anno Domini m<sup>o</sup>ccc<sup>o</sup> [erasure]". The erasure contains the last part of the date, but it is difficult to establish for certain what it says (see figure 5.1 on the following page). It might read "iiii<sup>o</sup>" (*quarto*) followed by some final material that does not belong to the date (a suggestion could maybe be "amen"). The problem is however that it might look like the final chunk is closed by an "o", making it a ordinal number too. This would mean that the preceding number cannot be "quarto", as it must be in the tens rather than the ones, which the final chunk would be. In that case the first erased number could be "xx<sup>o</sup>", although that seems like a stretch considering what is still readable. When the text is dated in the literature it is however put at or before 1304. This probably goes back to Grabmann who reads the date as 1304 with some confidence, but he also (as the only one I have seen) notes the erasure and admits that he cannot read the final material.<sup>44</sup> Grabmann also finds it most likely that the text itself was dictated in 1304, and most certainly by Faversham. The fact that the explicit mentions 'dicta' that are 'scripta' at the given date could suggest the date of the dictation, but I do not find that wording strong enough to consider that to be certain (regardless of what the date might be). So given only this explicit the existing conclusions about the date of the manuscript, and certainly the text, seem to me to rest on assumptions that are not that solid. In my view that explicit gives us only a very uncertain *terminus ad quem* for the text, but not necessarily the exact time at which the commentary has been taught.

I do however find that we can say something about the period of the text. The text is most certainly from the later part of the 13th century or slightly later. We will see that the commentator routinely refers to *Liber de causis* as an anonymous text and knows that it is different from Proclus's *Elementatio Theologica*. This puts it after 1372 when Aquinas discovered the relationship between those two texts.<sup>45</sup> We also find, on folio 44vb, a reference to a commentary on *De anima* by Giles of Rome. If that commentary is Giles' *Expositio in libros De anima*, then the *terminus post quem* is around 1274, where that text has been dated to.<sup>46</sup> This aligns well with the later observations that I will present that the commentary incorporates material from commentaries from that same period. Theoretically it could be from any time after 1274, but I find it unlikely to be from a later part of the 14th century, as we find no reflexes of the

<sup>43</sup> See <http://www.manuscripta-mediaevalia.de/dokumente/html/obj31577679>.

<sup>44</sup> Mora-Márquez 2014: 215: 1304. Lohr 1973: 139: 1277–1304. Weijers 2012: 95 prints the explicit with 1304 as the year. See Grabmann 1933: 24.

<sup>45</sup> His commentary on *Liber de causis* is dated to the first part of 1272 in Weisheipl 1983: 284. For a discussion of the proliferation of those two texts in a Parisian context in the 13th century, see Porro 2014.

<sup>46</sup> Del Punta, Donati, and Luna 1993: 320–1.




Figure 5.1: Explicit of Simon Magisters Simon Magister, Leipzig UB 1359: 44r, in infrared light. Photo: Michael S. Christensen.

philosophical developments that take place after the early 14th century.

How can we describe the *De anima*-commentary itself? The text is long, has a wide ambit of references to authorities, and the author has most likely had good access to several of the important philosophical authorities in direct copies or good reference works. The extent of the text is obvious when one looks at the manuscript. It measures 355×260 mm with a text area of 290×220 mm. The text is set in two columns of 78 lines each in a condensed and richly abbreviated hand (see the image of the first folio in figure 5.2 on the next page). A preliminary estimate based on the transcription of some columns of the manuscript indicates that one column takes up about 1250 words. So the 132 columns may run 165.000 words, which means about 330 pages of print text (excluding all apparatuses).

Simon also shows knowledge of a broad spectrum of authorities. The range of references found in a prooemium could be expected to be broader than those of the exposition proper, as the genre of prologues warrants broader remarks and general references to the known corpus of philosophy and literature. We thus find Simon to make the following references to some of the expected authorities within the Aristotelian tradition: Aristotle, Themistius, Alexander, Averroes, and Albert the Great, as well as *Liber de causis* and Proclus (separately). But aside from these, he also refers to the following authors: Alain of Lille (*De planctu naturae*), Ps.-Augustine (*Liber de spiritu et anima*), ibn David as the translator of *De anima* from Arabic to Latin, Boethius (*De consolazione philosophiae*), Seneca (*Epistulae morales*), Ovid (with a mistaken attribution of a quotation actually from Juvenal), Isaac Israeli ben Solomon (*Liber de Definitionibus*), and Ptolomy. Not only are several of these not standard Aristotelian authorities, but also authorities that I have rarely or never seen references to by the commentators.

A quick look at the notes on *De anima* 3.4, 402a4, where Aristotle describes the enterprise he is engaging in as a *ἱστορία τῆς ψυχῆς*, indicates that Simon may have had direct access to the commentaries of Themistius and Averroes. He raises the question why Aristotle refers to the practice as a *historia*, and makes the argument that it is not a *scientia*, as it is not based on knowledge of the causes of the essence, but merely observations of its effects. He then notes the following.




Figure 5.2: First folio of Simon Magisters Simon Magister, Leipzig UB 1359: 44r. Public Domain Mark 1.0.

Unde ubi littera Philosophi habet ‘historiam’ ibi, littera Themistii habet ‘negotium’, Commentator autem ibi habet ‘narrationem’.

Hence, where the text of the Philosopher has ‘presentation’ here, the text of Themistius has ‘occupation’, but the Commentator here has ‘recounting’.

Simon Magister bk. 1, lect. 1, Leipzig UB 1359: 45ra.

This parallel comparison of the different translations of the authorities gives some reason to consider whether he had copies of the commentaries at his elbow.

A *lectio* is generally structured as follows: The main lemma first introduces the initial words of the text of the lecture. The text is then put into the larger context of the work by a description of the purpose of the preceding and the current text. A detailed, and at times somewhat complex, *divisio textus* is then presented, followed by the exposition proper of the separate subsections of the text, which may also contain further divisions of the text.<sup>47</sup> A *lectio* can contain inlaid *dubitaciones* which are not necessarily postponed to the last part of the *lectio*.

### 5.2.2 The science of the soul in the *prooemium*

The commentary opens with a longer prooemium of a bit more than three manuscript columns. It first presents the general outline of the projected science within the general context of the Aristotelian network of sciences as it is related to other activities, such as that of the metaphysician and the medical doctor. Typical tropes on the goodness, nobleness and utility of the science in comparison with its relative difficulty are also touched upon.<sup>48</sup> The remaining half of the prooemium presents a longer discussion of the procedure and basis of the science of the soul. In this section I will present the doctrines of that discussion and put them in relation to the material that we have already surveyed in the question commentaries. The discussion given by Simon basically contains two sections, first a shorter analysis of different ways of intelligibility, secondly a longer *dubitatio* on the intelligibility of the intellectual soul.

The analysis of intelligibility presents us with a set of different ways something can be known. The main distinction is between intelligibility by privation or affirmation (*positio*). Intelligibility by privation is then split into that which is known through a negative relative property, such as the point as a non-extended part of a line, and that which is defined wholly negatively, with God as the prime example. Intelligibility by affirmation is divided into those things which are known through some essence, and those which are known through a species. Human experiences and knowledge can be found within both these sub-categories, but the most typical is intelligibility by an acquired species and by effects and activities (2.2.2. and 2.2.4. in the following listing). The knowledge by acquired species can either be by the proper species of an object (such as the species of the stone in our knowledge of it), and the non-proper species (such as knowledge of one thing through likeness to another). Finally, knowledge by effects and activities it stated to present both how humans acquire knowledge about the soul and the separate substances. As both phenomena are not immediately available to sense perception,

<sup>47</sup> For an example of what a *divisio textus* can look like, see Simon Magister bk. 3, lect. 1, APP 346.4–21.

<sup>48</sup> Leipzig UB 1359: f. 44ra–b.

they must instead be known through observation of their effects, which yields knowledge about their activities.<sup>49</sup>

Simon's full schema looks as follows:

1. Privation
  - 1.1. Part of something through which the privation is understood
    - 1.1.1. Point in relation to the line
  - 1.2. Thing defined absolutely different from that which its compared to
    - 1.2.1. God who is impassible, immortal, immaterial, unchangeable, without magnitude, simple by lacking any composition.
2. Affirmation (position)
  - 2.1. By essence
    - 2.1.1. Something essentially known through its own essence
      - 2.1.1.1. God, who knows himself by his own essence and all else through that.
    - 2.1.2. Something essentially known through something else
      - 2.1.2.1. Something known essentially by sense (e.g. light)
      - 2.1.2.2. Something known essentially by intellect (e.g. pain, joy, hope)
  - 2.2. By species
    - 2.2.1. By co-created species (separate substances)
    - 2.2.2. By acquired species.
      - 2.2.2.1. By same species: material objects of knowledge
      - 2.2.2.2. By other species: Father through species of son if he looks like him, or Hercules through the statue.
    - 2.2.3. By proper and immediate cause, i.e. conclusions of demonstrations, *propter quid* knowledge.
    - 2.2.4. By effects and activity, *cognitio quia* (separate intelligences, the soul)

This distinction into types of intelligibility is by no means unique to Simon. In the texts included in this study, five examples have been found of this, along with one peripheral mention of something similar.<sup>50</sup> All other observed examples also contain the distinction into privation and affirmation, and there are also some categories that they all share, but none of them are as extensive as Simon in their outline. Anonymus Mertonensis 275 identifies negative intelligibility as the point on a line (= 1.1.1.) and the non-existent, such as the first cause among

<sup>49</sup> See Simon Magister bk. 1, prol, APP 339.73–340.27.

<sup>50</sup> The peripheral note is made by Wyle, who mentions the possibility of knowledge through privation, but without the type of intelligibility that we recognize in the other commentaries. See Wyle q. I.1, APP 305.26–32.

created things, which Simon does not mention. In the category of affirmative intelligibility he presents intelligibility by a species, by effects (= 2.2.2., 2.2.4.), or by presence, which is also not mentioned by Simon. It is however most likely implied by the self-knowledge of the separate intelligences by their own co-created species (which is always actualized and always present to themselves).<sup>51</sup>

The prologue and first question of the anonymous Merton commentary has been described as a reworking of Anonymus Bernardini.<sup>52</sup> Depending on what 'reworking' implies it might be an overstatement, when it comes to the first question. The Merton commentary certainly shares some material with Anonymus Bernardini, both in *rationes principales* and the determination, but not to a degree so striking that it can be concluded to be inspired by the Sienese commentary with certainty. I suspect that a comparison of the structure and content of the commentaries will actually reveal that the Anonymus Mertonensis 275 is closer to Anonymus Vennebusch in structure, but closer to Anonymus Bernardini in content.<sup>53</sup> The remaining part of the Merton commentary is however closely related to (or possibly a witness to) the commentary of Anonymus Vennebusch. The Anonymus Bernardini and Anonymus Mertonensis 275 are completely parallel on this point, although Anonymus Bernardini is more extensive, and we see that they both contain versions of Simon's 1.1. and 1.2. as well as his 2.2.2.1., 2.2.2.2., and 2.2.4., and they also agree with Simon that the soul knows itself by its own effects (2.2.4.). We find exactly the same distinctions in Anonymus Vennebusch, but his presentation of the material is ordered differently from the other two. Anonymus Mertonensis 275 however differs from the others by holding that soul also knows itself by self-presence, while that is reserved to the separate intelligences according to the others. Despite those minor differences the three are doctrinally identical and present the listed similarities with Simon's analysis.<sup>54</sup>

We also have the two commentaries of Dinsdale and Anonymus Oriensis 33. Their outline is the most sparse in this group, as they only recognize intelligibility by privation generally with examples of the point, unity, the indivisible and shadows. Affirmative intelligibility is only identified as knowledge through species, either the proper species of the object or another species. According to them the soul is intelligible through its effects, just like Simon argues.<sup>55</sup> But with all these commentaries two things are worth noticing. Simon's analysis shares some material with all of the others (as they also share material among each other), but is not obviously close to any of them. And furthermore, Simon's analysis is by far the most extensive in the group. He includes more reflections of the status and intelligibility of objects that might fall within the theological domain (in particular of course God), but he also includes categories that are not found in any other commentators, such as the knowledge of mental phenomena such as joy, fear and hope. It is difficult, based only on the material we have presented here to

<sup>51</sup> See Anonymus Mertonensis 275 q. I.1, APP 287.12–19.

<sup>52</sup> Gauthier 1984: 261–63\* and Bernardini 2009: xv–xvii. Also mentioned by De Raedemaeker 1968–1970: 194–95.

<sup>53</sup> I have not investigated the prologue, which however may be inspired by Anonymus Bernardini, as there is no prologue in Anonymus Vennebusch.

<sup>54</sup> Compare Anonymus Vennebusch q. 1 [2], ll. 69–82, Anonymus Bernardini q. I.1, ll. 31–64, Anonymus Mertonensis 275 q. 1, APP 287.12–19.

<sup>55</sup> Dinsdale q. I.1, APP 311.3–9; Anonymus Oriensis 33 q. I.1, APP 292.3–11.

make any conclusions about the direction of influence or relative chronology of the different texts. But it is of course tempting to wonder whether Simon's presentation is the latest in the group, with its broader as well as deeper analysis.

After the discussion of intelligibility Simon gives a longer *dubitatio* on how the intellectual soul is intelligible. The *dubitatio* has a structure similar to that of the questions of this study with a couple of negative *rationes principales*, one positive *ratio principalis* with reference to the authority of the Philosopher, a determination, and finally a refutation of the negative *rationes* that contradict the determination. In the following paragraphs I will outline how the two main sections of the determination relate to different parts of some of the question commentaries included in this study. First we will see how the first part of the determination is conspicuously close to that of Anonymus Vaticanus 2170 I, and then how a section of the second part shows a similar closeness to that of Faversham.

In the first part of the determination Simon concerns himself with the general requirements of any science. According to him, science can refer to the knowledge that is acquired through definition, division, or demonstration. Something is intelligible by definition when an intellectually meaningful definition (*quidditas*) can be given for it. Intelligibility by division applies to that which can be divided into powers and so-called subjective parts (*partes subiectivae*). The example of powers of the intellectual soul are of course the possible and agent intellect.<sup>56</sup> The subjective parts must signify the existence of multiple instances of the same substance across separate subjects, as he argues that it is fulfilled by the existence of the intellect of Socrates, Plato and others. Finally, something is intelligible by demonstration when we have a subject which has parts and properties that can be shown to belong to the subject by the definition of the subject. When Simon has argued that all three types of intelligibility applies to the intellectual soul, he adds that this is actually also how Aristotle himself proceeds in his presentation of the science in *De anima*.<sup>57</sup>

We have already seen some other examples of such a distinction into three concepts of science and three types of intelligibility in section 4.2.1.6 on page 125. There we find that two other commentators present variations on this theme, namely Anonymus Vaticanus 2170 I and Henric de la Wyle. A comparison of the texts quickly reveal that the presentation of Wyle bears no clear connection to that of Simon Magister as the three types of intelligibility he identifies are slightly different.<sup>58</sup> The text of Anonymus Vaticanus 2170 I does however bear a striking resemblance with Simon's text.

Like Simon, the determination by the anonymous commentator also contains two sections. The first of those two contains the same tripartite specification of the science based on definition, division, and demonstration. He explains what is meant by each of these three categories in much the same way as Simon, and he even presents the same point about knowledge by division that the subject must have both different powers and the concept of subjective parts.

<sup>56</sup> The reason he does not single out some of the lower faculties of the soul, such as sensation and vegetation, might just be to defend the more challenging thesis that the intellectual faculty of the soul itself is also available to the science. I does not have to imply that accepts multiple substances in the same subject.

<sup>57</sup> Simon Magister bk. 1, prol., APP 342.1–29.

<sup>58</sup> See Wyle q. I.1, APP 304.34–305.5.

Finally, he also makes the same concluding point that this triple view of science reflects the procedure of Aristotle in his analysis of the soul. But the comparison of the two texts also clearly reveals that although the two commentators share both the outline and the details of the argument, Simon gives a more rich and verbose presentation.<sup>59</sup>

A comparison of the *rationes principales* also reveals a connection with the commentary of Anonymus Vaticanus 2170 I. Simon only presents two *rationes* where the anonymous commentator gives three, but both of Simon's *rationes* are also to be found in the anonymous commentary. This may not be important with regard to one of the two, as that is the most common objection included in virtually every commentary (N2). They do however also share the less typical specification that this challenge is particularly pertinent with respect to the intellectual soul, but it may not reveal much in itself, as it is not particularly rare.<sup>60</sup> The other argument, which they also share, is however much more interesting, as the only other place where that occurs is in the commentary of Jandun. The argument holds that there can be no science of the soul because there has to be a real difference (*differentia realis*) between the knowing subject and the known object of the science, and that this principle would be violated if there were a science about the soul (N5).<sup>61</sup> And also in this case are the points made by Simon Magister and Anonymus Vaticanus 2170 I closer to each other than that of the other party, Jandun in this case. The two commentators solve both their *rationes* in the same way, with reference to the distinction between primary and secondary or reflexive knowledge.

As already mentioned above, Simon of Faversham has been suggested as the author of the commentary. Whereas the first section on the division of the elements of the science and the *rationes principales* are conspicuously close to the commentary of Anonymus Vaticanus 2170 I, we find a paragraph that seems just as closely connected to the text of Faversham. After the tripartite division of the science, Simon announces that he wants to describe in which way the intellectual soul is known. That analysis also falls in two parts, as he first describes on which grounds the intellect is able to reflect on itself, and subsequently he goes into some detail about what actually happens during a process of intellectual self-reflection. The first of these two is shared with Faversham.

With a reference to Proclus they argue that every incorporeal intelligible substance is capable of self-reflection. That explicit inclusion of Proclus is to Simon Magister and Simon of Faversham among the texts investigated in this study. But aside from that they also share a slightly curious supportive argument. They hold that the intellect must be immaterial from the impossibility of the opposite. If it were material, they argue, then during the process of knowing, which is held to be successive and temporal, some parts of it would be in contact with the object while other parts would not. This would mean that the intellect would both know and not know the same thing at the same time, which obviously violates the principle of non-contradiction. It also violates the idea that the intellect knows an object instantly, a view that Simon ascribes to Aristotle. Not only is the argument a little puzzling, but it is also odd

<sup>59</sup> Compare Anonymus Vaticanus 2170 I q. I.2, APP 295.18–36 and Simon Magister bk. 1, prolog, APP 342.1–29.

<sup>60</sup> Anonymus Vaticanus 2170 I q. I.2, APP 295.4–8 and Simon Magister bk. 1, prolog, APP 341.3–22, cf. 4.2.2.3 on page 129.

<sup>61</sup> Presented in section 4.2.1.12 on page 127.

that they do not use the perfectly fine reason that Aristotle himself gives for why the intellect must be immaterial, namely that it must be able to know every conceivable object of knowledge, and hence must be wholly indeterminate and therefore immaterial.<sup>62</sup> Simon Magister and Faversham are the only two commentators to present this argument of immateriality.<sup>63</sup>

Finally, the last part of Simon Magister's determination presents material that we can also recognize in the other included commentaries, but which does not show any obvious close connection to any of them. He refutes the idea that the intellect should know itself by its own species, which includes a discussion of the also well known problem of the infinite regress that the investigations of self-reflection often involve.<sup>64</sup> But he also makes a rare reference to Averroes' discussion of *Metaphysica* 12.8 where Aristotle declares that the intellect know itself as a side-effect (ἐν παρέργῳ) when it knows other things.<sup>65</sup> This he compares to the divine intellect, where the inverse is the case, that it knows itself essentially and all other things as a consequence of that.

We can summarize the different relations that have been outlined between the prooemium of Simon Magister and the question commentaries. The second half of the prooemium shows how this particular literal commentary shows no inferiority to the question commentaries in terms of extensiveness or philosophical ambition. The comparison of the identifications of types of intelligibility clearly showed how Simon's outline was the most extensive that the included commentaries have been able to present. The other commentaries contain different sets of the points that we can also find in Simon's commentary, but there are a couple of categories that are found across all the commentaries. They all distinguish between privative and affirmative intelligibility, and within the category of privative intelligibility they all present the point on a line as the standard example of something known by a negative property. In the category of affirmative intelligibility they all include the idea of intelligibility by species, which they agree can either be by the object's own species or by another species. Simon Magister has a stronger tendency than any of the others of also including material that might lie within the theological or metaphysical domain such as the intelligibility of God and the separate intelligences, as well as how human knowledge of those comes about.

The analysis of Simon's determination showed that the first part of it has a strong and close parallel in the commentary by Anonymus Vaticani 2170 I. But where both commentaries also contain a second section in their determination on how the science of the soul is acquired, there is no clear or close connection to be found between those. We do instead recognize the first part of Simon's second section in the commentary of Faversham. The material shared between the two is not only very close, but also unique to the two among the investigated commentaries. But as with Anonymus Vaticani 2170 I, the second half of that part of the determination does not correspond to the second half of Faversham's determination. The last part of Simon Magister's analysis has some doctrinal parallels in the other commentaries, but no clear parallels in language, argument, or structure.

<sup>62</sup> Aristotle *DA*, 3.4, 429a15–27.

<sup>63</sup> Simon Magister bk. 1, prol., APP 342.30–343.17, Faversham q. I.1, APP 333.1–17.

<sup>64</sup> Simon Magister bk. 1, prol., APP 343.18–31, cf. sections 3.2.2 on page 74 and 3.2.3 on page 87. Some other variations on the infinite regress are discussed in section 3.2.2.2.3 on page 83.

<sup>65</sup> Averroes *In Metaph.* XII, com. 51, p. 336B–C, cf. Aristotle *Metaph.* 12.8, 1074b36.

### 5.2.3 Intellection and self-knowledge in book three

When we go to Simon's commentary on book three we also find a whole range of interesting notes. Some of these have been seen in the question commentaries, while others show a content or focus that we have not yet seen in this study. In this section I will outline Simon's general presentation and highlight these connections and differences with the related commentaries. We will see how Simon is highly attentive to some of his preceding authorities, not least Thomas Aquinas. We will also see that he shares some material with Faversham, but also presents points that might be in conflict with the doctrines of Faversham. In the following section I will thus argue that there is not yet sufficient evidence to conclude that Simon Magister is actually Simon of Faversham, and that he might just as well be an separate magister pulling in material from Faversham as well as many other commentators. We will do this with a focused analysis of a selection of his treatment of *De anima* III.4, which stretches over three *lectiones*.

Simon opens the first *lectio* of the third book by putting it into the context of the whole work and notes the main purpose of the preceding and following material. The very first part of his *divisio textus* leads him into a discussion of the meaning of the term 'intellectus' where he singles out eleven different meanings. The meanings listed are (1) reason in general, (2) the meaning of a statement, (3) a whole person, (4) the immediate knowledge of principles, (5) *phantasia*, (6) a thing known, (7) a concept as the combination of species and genus, (8) the substance or form of the soul, (9) the intelligible species actualized in the intellect, (10) the act of knowing, (11) and finally the intellective power of the human soul. There are different sources for these different meanings, and Simon himself points to al-Fārābī as the authority who notes that there are many different meanings of the term.<sup>66</sup> But al-Fārābī does not present all eleven meanings listed by Simon, and some of them might be of his own observation (drawn from the authorities that he indicates), while some also may be reflexes from Philoponus.<sup>67</sup> Although this might just look like a meaningless semantic exercise, it will actually turn out to be a useful tool for Simon. We will see an example of that in the following paragraphs.

Before moving into the analysis of the lemmata of the first *lectio*, Simon presents three general methodological considerations drawn from two of his most often used authorities, Philoponus and Themistius. The first two ask what the best order of procedure in the science of the soul is, and how receptivity and change applies to the intellect. These are not irrelevant to our analysis, but the third is particularly interesting, as it focuses on a fundamental connection between intellection and self-knowledge.<sup>68</sup>

In the beginning of his commentary on chapter four Philoponus raises the question how the intellect can have knowledge about its own substance, if it is supposed to be stripped of the object of knowledge before it receives it (as of course the intellect cannot lose its own substance before a reflection on it). Here it is explained in short but clear terms that it would only be a problem if intellection were a reception of the substance of the object of intellection in the intellect. But as the receptivity of the intellect does not mean that it is able to become

<sup>66</sup> See the translation of his *De intellectu* in McGinnis and Reisman 2007: 68–78.

<sup>67</sup> See for instance Philoponus *De intellectu*, p. 2.33–4.69 and *De intellectu*, ad 429a22–25, p. 13.00–14.26.

<sup>68</sup> The first two are not transcribed, but the last is to be found in Simon Magister bk. 3, lect. 1, APP 346.24–347.2.

any substance, but rather that it is able to receive the species of any substance, the problem does not apply. This means that the intellect can be receptive to its own as well as any other species without having to lose any substantial properties before the act of intellection. It cannot merely be actualized as that species.<sup>69</sup> Simon mirrors this discussion closely.<sup>70</sup>

This shows us three things: (1) Simon's use of Philoponus is true to his source, as a comparison with the passage in Philoponus reveals a similarity of structure and argument, but also wording, which in turn might support the theory that he had direct access to a copy of Philoponus' text. (2) The doctrine presented reveals that he does not believe that the potentiality of the intellect involves a completely void, and effectively non-existing, concept of intellect before the act of intellection. The intellect does have substantial content before intellection, the possible intellect is just not actualized as an object species yet. (3) Finally, it looks like his concept of self-knowledge entails a knowledge of the species of the intellect itself. But as he says himself, the details of the doctrine will be outlined in the following discussion.<sup>71</sup>

When we look at the first of the two main passages on self-knowledge in *DA*, III.4, 429b5–9, we find some details about how he conceives the process of intellection and self-knowledge. With references to Aquinas and Philoponus he expands the meaning of the structure of potentiality and two levels of actuality. When the possible intellect has received the intelligible species of an external object, it reaches the first level of actuality, which is also the second level of potentiality. This highlights two of the different meanings of 'intellectus' (numbers 9 and 9 above): First there is the acquired power and ability to react on existing knowledge, the first actuality, which is a kind of *scientia*, and then follows the act of reflection itself which takes place during engagement with an already acquired intelligible species, the second actuality. Simon puts a special emphasis on the first level of actuality as the level at which the intellect can engage in reflection of its object according to its own volition.<sup>72</sup> Simon also explicitly castigates an Avicennian doctrine that the intelligible species only exists in the intellect during the act of reflection on that object.<sup>73</sup> This implies that the intellect contains (probably in memory, although that is not specified) a store of intelligible species that it can engage with after their initial abstraction and reception in the intellect. The similarity between Simon's exposition and that of Aquinas of the same section of the text is striking. The emphasis on the free will of the intellect to engage in reflection and the following critique of Avicenna run parallel in the two commentaries.<sup>74</sup> This analysis paves the way for Simon's notes on the conditions of intellectual self-knowledge. Once the intellect has acquired its first level of actuality it is also able to have knowledge about itself. The details of that are outlined, he adds, in the following

<sup>69</sup> Philoponus *De intellectu*, ad 429a15–16. p. 9.1–21.

<sup>70</sup> Simon Magister bk. 3, lect. 1, APP 346.24–347.2.

<sup>71</sup> In Simon Magister bk. 3, lect. 1, APP 346.24–347.2.

<sup>72</sup> Simon Magister bk. 3, lect. 1, APP 347.23–348.4. Notice his use of the expression 'absque omni doctore extrinseco'. Although this has an Augustinian ring to it, it is actually borrowed from the commentary of Philoponus on this exact passage, cf. Philoponus *De intellectu*, III.4, ad 429b5–7, p. 18.45.

<sup>73</sup> Cf. Avicenna *De anima*, V.6, p. 147.16–148.39.

<sup>74</sup> Compare with Thomas Aquinas *Sent. DA*, III.2, ad 429b5–10, ll. 20–42. This is of course significant because the ideas are not immediately apparent from a reading of the Aristotelian text.

section of the two *dubitaciones* that close off the fourth chapter of Aristotle's text.<sup>75</sup>

Simon's spends his whole third *lectio* on those two *dubitaciones*. We will therefore have to leave the analysis of many details, especially on the first *dubitatio*, as an exercise for the reader.<sup>76</sup> I just want to focus on two points related to this part of his commentary, the location of the human intellect in the greater chain of being, and the order of intellectual self-knowledge in the process of intellection. This will lead us into some final considerations on the sources and doctrines of his commentary.

As we have also seen in the prooemium, Simon is not afraid of including considerations of a theological nature in his psychological analysis. There we found reflections on the self-knowledge of separate substances and God in the analysis of different types of intelligibility (page 181). We also see several examples of this in his treatment of the second *dubitatio*. The first reference is made after his outline of the challenge itself, as he says that immaterial substances have a different kind of intelligibility than material objects. Whereas material objects can only be known through a process of abstraction of the intelligible species, the separate substances are known in themselves and by themselves. The intellect is said to take up an intermediate place between these essentially self-knowing substances and the material objects which are neither known in themselves nor by themselves. With reference to *Liber de causis* he situates the intellect at the lowest grade of the intelligent beings and the highest level of the material beings. He says that this particular position provides a good reason to discuss the intellection and self-knowledge of the intellect, as too great similarity with either of the two classes result in different types of problems. If the soul is too much like the separate substances it will result in essential self-knowledge, which is hard to reconcile with Aristotelian empiricism, while too high similarity with the material objects gives them powers of reason too, which is of course also problematic.<sup>77</sup>

His following analysis of the solution to the second challenge goes directly into a discussion of the same point. There are three types of intellects, Simon says, divine, human, and the intermediate form of the intelligences. The first, pure, divine intellect, which Aristotle describes in *Metaphysica* 12, is the first cause of everything, itself an uninterrupted act, it knows itself by its own essence, and this knowledge results in a knowledge of all other beings, of which it is itself the first cause. The human intellect is at the other end of the spectrum, as it is pure potentiality. It primarily knows the external material objects through their intelligible species, and from the actualization that yield this knowledge it is able to reflect on and know itself. Finally, the separate substances take up the intermediate position, as they have essential self-knowledge but only know other objects through innate species, and thus in a somewhat indirect or intermediate way.<sup>78</sup> We have already seen that this is no unique idea, as four of the analysed question commentaries present a similar line of reasoning.<sup>79</sup> But Simon makes an ingenious move when he situates the human self-knowledge on the intersection between materiality and immateriality, and uses that as a way to explain the necessity raising the second

<sup>75</sup> Simon Magister bk. 3, lect. 1, APP 348.14–26.

<sup>76</sup> The whole *lectio* is edited on pages 349.3–354.26.

<sup>77</sup> Simon Magister bk. 3, lect. 3, APP 350.14–32.

<sup>78</sup> Simon Magister bk. 3, lect. 3, APP 351.32–352.25.

<sup>79</sup> See 3.2.2.1.5 on page 77, cf. 3.2.2.2.2 on page 82.

*dubitatio* that closes *De anima* 3.4. It may partially be a question of differences between the *quaestio* and *expositio*-genres, but in this study we have not seen any other commentator do this.

In the preceding analyses we have also seen several discussions of another problem, namely whether intellectual self-knowledge and knowledge of external objects is simultaneous or successive.<sup>80</sup> Simon seems to argue that during knowledge a single species results in the knowledge of two objects. The species of the primary object of knowledge of course yields a knowledge of that object through the process of abstraction, but the intellect also knows itself by that same species. That knowledge is, as he writes, “modo informationis” by way of information. This means that when the intellect is actualized, *i.e.* informed, by the species, it also knows itself.<sup>81</sup>

This raises some questions, as we might ask whether these two objects are known simultaneously in a single act of knowing, and whether this doubling of objects always takes place during the act of knowing. Unfortunately, Simon does not answer any of these clearly, but this paragraph might imply that this duplication of objects always takes place, as it is a consequence of the way the intellect works as an actualization of the species of the object. If that is the case, then it would be easy to see this as an example of a self-knowledge that in effect is vacuous, as it always occurs as an epiphenomenon occasioned by the knowledge of the primary object.<sup>82</sup> However, this does not fit well with his previous remarks on the volitional nature of reflection and self-knowledge that he makes in his commentary on *DA*, 3.4, 429b5–9 (see on page 187). And in the paragraphs on the human intellect in the chain of being that have just been discussed, he also describes the process of self-knowledge further. He says that once the intellect has received the intelligible species, it is in act, but it is also still in an active potency (“*potentia passiva*”), which clearly matches the first level of actuality. He continues:

[...] et quia virtus est incorporea ideo potest reflectere super suum actum, et ita potest se intelligere quoniam intelligit. Sed intelligere sive quod intellectus intelligat est propria operatio intellectus. Propria autem operatio manuducit in cognitionem essentialem, ideo ex speciebus aliorum a primo ad ultimum potest intelligere se ipsum

[...] and because the power is incorporeal, hence it can reflect on its own act, and thus it can know itself when it knows. But knowing or that the intellect knows is the essential activity of the intellect. However, an essential activity leads to essential knowledge, and hence from the species of other things from the first to the last the intellect can know itself.

Simon Magister bk. 3, lect. 3, APP 352.4–19

The quote is not entirely clear, but it should at least show that Simon thinks the intellect can engage in a act of self-reflection once at the stage of first actuality. This then gives the intellect

<sup>80</sup> See 3.2.2.1.6 on page 77 on successive self-knowledge, 3.2.2.1.8 on page 79 on concomitant higher-order knowledge, and 5.1.1 on page 163 as a detailed analysis of a version of the problem in Jandun.

<sup>81</sup> Simon Magister bk. 3, lect. 3, APP 352.26–353.6. Some parts of the text are problematic and emendations have to be made, but a consideration of the whole argument support the suggested changes.

<sup>82</sup> This would make it similar to what I have seen Jandun argue for in 5.1.1 on page 163.

knowledge about its own essential activity which results in knowledge about its essence. He does not here address the question of simultaneity explicitly, but it is implied to be a separate activity.<sup>83</sup> So although Simon's discussion is not without difficulties on this point, such an interpretation seems to be most consistent with the ideas about self-knowledge that we have analysed in this section.

#### 5.2.4 Simon's sources

I will conclude this section with a short note on Simon's sources and the question of authorship. One of the first things that strikes a reader of Simon's commentary is his extensive references to authorities. In the prooemium alone I have found numerous references to fifteen different authorities, in some cases to different works by the same author. Some of these lie well beyond the traditional confines of Aristotelian material, such as Alain of Lille's *De planctu naturae*, Boethius's *De consolazione philosophiae*, and Seneca's *Epistulae morales*.<sup>84</sup> But his use of the Aristotelian authorities is just as remarkable. I have presented some initial indications that he may have had copies of the commentaries of Themistius, Averroes, and Philoponus at his elbow during composition of his own work. In particular in the last *lectio* we have also seen how he makes multiple references to Albert and not least Aquinas, both of which he seems to be intimately familiar with (down to a level of subtle differences in terminology).<sup>85</sup> And in the analysis of the prooemium we have seen how he might also have pulled in material from other roughly contemporary commentaries on *De anima*.<sup>86</sup> Finally, we also see a strong familiarity with Proclus and *Liber de causis*, which he knows very well are two different things.

This leads us to the question of authorship, as the inclusion of Proclus was found to be unique to Simon of Faversham and the present Simon Magister and could thus be seen as an indication of shared authorship. Such a hypothesis is difficult to maintain based on what has been seen in this part of the commentary on book three. While we keep finding regular references to Proclus as well as *Liber de causis* in Simon Magister's commentary, there are no clear parallels to be found in Faverham's text. They both present the idea of the location of the human intellect in the greater chain of being, but that is by no means a doctrine unique to those two. In the preceding sections, which are referenced in the above discussion, four commentators have been registered to present such ideas.

Nothing can be concluded from the absence of correspondences, but we might also consider good possible cases for correspondences, between the two. A good candidate for such a shared unique doctrine could be found when Faversham suggests that the human intellect

<sup>83</sup> This would fit with all the other similar cases we have seen of essential knowledge acquired from analysis of the activities and objects of the intellect through a process of self-reflection. This is analysed in section 3.2.2.1.2 to 3.2.2.1.3 on pages 75–76. The connection between these doctrines and self-knowledge as a successive procedure is connected to the other commentaries in section 3.2.2.1.6 on page 77. The relevant points in the doctrinal inventory are P2, P5, and P14.

<sup>84</sup> Grabmann (1933: 25–6) presents some of the same points.

<sup>85</sup> Grabmann (1933: 26–9) also discusses his doctrinal connections to these two, and in particular Aquinas, at some extent, which may also provide a useful starting point for any further analyses.

<sup>86</sup> In the first *lectio* of book one he also includes material from Giles of Rome with an explicit reference (f. 44vb).

might engage in essential self-knowledge in the afterlife. That idea is not completely unique to Faversham as also Wyle speculates about its possibility, but had Simon and Faversham shared the idea, it would present a striking correspondence.<sup>87</sup> Similarly, Simon of Faversham's analysis includes a longer refutation of the idea that the human intellect knows itself by an innate species. Simon Magister clearly knows that this model is possible, as that is how he explains the self-knowledge of the separate substances, but he finds no occasion to go into a discussion of whether or not the human intellect might also know of itself in that way.

Although the absence of such connections does not provide any positive evidence against an identical author, they support the general picture that we do not find as many strong connections between the two as we would like if we were to argue in favour of an identical author. There is thus a tendency that Simon and Faversham may present material that is shared, but not unique to the two, and without any distinguishing features of doctrine, argument, or language that might indicate a particularly close connection between the two. This is also confirmed in a comparison of their critique of the Avicennian idea that the species is only present in the intellect during an active process of knowing. This subject is shortly mentioned by Simon Magister in the third *lectio* (mentioned on page 187), and Faversham devotes a whole question to this problem (which is not rare).<sup>88</sup> His analysis is of course much more extensive than that of Simon Magister, but although they share the same overall viewpoint, no shared distinguishing features stick out. In that case Simon Magister actually seems rather to rely on Aquinas.

Finally, there is a single example of a possible conflict of doctrine. In the analysis of types of intelligibility Simon Magister is quite clear that the intellect is only known through a knowledge of its effects and activities, while other commentators have also found to include the idea of self-presence as a contributing factor in self-knowledge.<sup>89</sup> Simon of Faversham's discussion of self-knowledge in the afterlife may imply that he also subscribes to that idea of self-knowledge by self-presence.<sup>90</sup> This is however only a weak indication, as it does not follow that Simon Magister would deny this idea just because he does not mention it explicitly himself. The same goes for the difference that Simon of Faversham does not find it relevant to his question of self-knowledge whether the separate intelligences know their objects through inborn species, while Simon Magister has no problem answering that question affirmatively in his commentary.<sup>91</sup>

These small possible differences do not provide a refutation of the identity of the author, but my analysis has shown that the connection between the two authors is associated with many uncertainties and few strong connections. The composite character of Simon Magister's commentary and the close as well as more loose connections to the different parts of the existing tradition indicate that we have a commentator who has an intimate knowledge of a big cross-section of the tradition. It is possible that he had direct access to the commentaries of Averroes, Themistius, and Philoponus during his work, and it also looks like he might have had access to a range of contemporary commentaries from which he liberally drew material. One of the commentaries that he also incorporates into his analysis is that Simon of Faversham, who

<sup>87</sup> Faversham III.11, 336–37; Wyle III.10 ad 1.3, APP 308.23–27, cf. section 3.2.2.2.2 on page 82.

<sup>88</sup> Faversham III.9.

<sup>89</sup> On this, cf. section 3.2.2.2.7 on page 85.

<sup>90</sup> Faversham q. III.11, p. 336.

<sup>91</sup> Compare Simon Magister bk. 3, lect. 3, APP 352.20–25 with Faversham q. III.11, p. 336–37.

is nothing more than a colleague with whom he shares his first name. The material presented here at least suggests that as a much more economic hypothesis than the identity of the two Simons.

This will have to be just a preliminary conclusion. The relation between the two texts, as well as the location of the commentary of Simon Magister within the larger network of late 13th and early 14th century commentaries is yet to be determined more clearly. But these first steps towards a better knowledge of Simon Magister have at least shown him to be a rich, deep, and very knowing commentator. The combination of an extensive use of the whole existing historical and contemporary tradition as well as what looks like occasional strong lights of originality bode well for any future studies of the text. And I have at also had the opportunity to show how a literal commentary need neither be boring, unoriginal, nor inferior to some of its best contemporaries.

# Chapter 6

## Conclusion

In this dissertation I have investigated the doctrines on intellectual self-knowledge in the commentaries on Aristotle's *De anima* from 1250 to 1320. This has been done with a double focus on the questions concerning the possibility of having a science of the soul in the introductory parts of the question commentaries, and the questions concerning intellectual self-knowledge that often occur in the commentary pertaining to *De anima* 3.4. The doctrines present in the commentaries have been analysed and their variations within the corpus has been mapped, philosophical and quantitative analyses have identified interesting groups and tendencies within the tradition, and two in-depth studies have put a spotlight on two particular areas of interest. I will now draw out the main results of the study within three areas of attention, the methods applied in the analysis, the main philosophical observations, and connections and tendencies within the tradition.

### 6.1 Methodological improvements

Distinguishing one complete position or argument from another is a daunting challenge when the commentators present what at first encounter seems to me almost identical views. By decomposing a text into smaller constitutive philosophical parts, which I call doctrines, it is possible to compare and distinguish the texts at a more granular level. This basic assumption and the consequent procedure has been part of the foundation of this study. Although the approach is not fundamentally different from how philosophical analysis is commonly conducted, I have developed the approach conceptually to extend the reach and power of my own mind. By registering these atomic doctrines as separate, free-floating ideas that can be connected in a countless number of ways in the registrations of a given text, it is possible to represent my interpretation of the doctrinal composition of any text.

The mode of registration has made it possible to interrogate the material in ways that are only theoretically possible with just pen and paper. Answering which doctrines are most commonly used for different purposes, which ideas are most popular or rare, who has a high proportion of the most popular material, or which commentators are good representatives of a tradition are all feasible with the aid of such systematic registrations. We commonly see this

done in history of philosophy as it has been conducted for ages. But the registrations of the interpreter's reading of the texts in this way ensures that the reading of each text is persisted once the reader takes a step back from the individual text to reach higher level conclusions. This means that the interpreter's general impressions and intuitions about the corpus are supported, or maybe corrected, by a procedure that makes an objective representation of the readings possible. This enables the study notes of the reader to speak with each other across an incredible number of dimensions. In this way the notes gain a voice and power that far surpasses what they can tell you when they are made in the linear format of a notebook. It has been an enormous help for me to outsource some of this heavy lifting to the responsibility of the computer. With the expression of a good friend, we can thus use the strengths of modern data processing as a forklift for the mind. But it is still fundamentally mind-work, and if the basic readings of the texts, the annotation of the material, the chosen models of analysis, and their execution are misdirected or wrong, we will still miss the mark just as much as always.

One of results of the present work has been the development of a basic approach to how to represent and analyse the content of medieval scholastic material in this mind-enhancing way. I have developed a terminology and model to register and represent authors, texts, structural sections such as questions, doctrines and instances of doctrines to enable a flexible and highly granular registration of the presence of doctrines in the different parts of a text. I have also started the development of a semantic for describing the use a given instance makes of a doctrine, and ways to register its context within a traditional question. Finally I have developed ways of analysing and representing the registered data in ways that supports and enhances the analysis of the texts. All calculations used in the dissertation, along with a good portion of additional material, have been made available through an online software repository on the address <https://github.com/stenskjær/dissertation-notebooks>. Many of the technical details have only been indirectly available to the reader, as it has been the basis for the quantitative analyses. The mental model and the view of the texts that the analysis is based on is however outlined in the introduction and in the relevant parts of the dissertation, while more details on the data model and calculations is documented in the online notebooks.

Although this work is methodological in nature, I still consider it a significant result from the work, as the theory and approach can be applied more or less directly on any similar texts. But it can also be generalized for use in countless other contexts where text analysis based on abstract composite material is a core activity. Such generalizations and further developments of the approach, both technically and methodologically, surely remain interesting and alluring avenues of further work.

## 6.2 The philosophy of self-knowledge

In chapter two present the problem of self-knowledge in Aristotle's own works and follow the development of the idea within as well as outside the ancient commentary tradition, the reception in the Arabic sources and the further development in the medieval sources before 1250. We find two fundamental ways of explaining how intellectual self-knowledge comes about. The soul can either depend on external stimuli to engage in self-knowledge, or it can be able to initiate it independently of any external factors, which I refer to as accidental and

essential self-knowledge respectively. The Neo-Platonic tradition, here in particular represented by Plotinus, Augustine and to some extent Avicenna, argues that the intellect possesses essential self-knowledge, while the Aristotelian commentators including Averroes prefer or lean towards a model of accidental self-knowledge. In the first part of the 13th century those two strains converge and a preference, conflict or combination of the two models can often be found in the texts. I argue that some sources, in particular Alexander of Aphrodisias and to some extent Averroes, seem to argue for a self-knowledge that is always concomitant to any act of cognition but may not contain any additional information about the soul or intellect itself. Other sources will argue that the intellect can engage in a specific activity of reflecting on or understanding itself that is not concomitant to any other act but constitutes a separate act that can be realized according to the volition of the intellect. The further we get up through the history the stronger the tendency will be to also include this latter focused act of self-reflection.

Chapter three, which is the first of the two central chapters, focuses on the doctrines of intellectual self-knowledge in commentaries to *De anima* 3.4. This is split into four sections according to the different types of problems engaged by the questions, namely the intelligibility and self-intelligibility of the intellect, the process of self-knowledge through an external species, self-knowledge through the intellect's own species, and how the possible intellect knows the agent intellect. Based on these analyses I identify the most common points of doctrines across these areas. The basic indeterminate condition of the intellect makes direct, or essential, self-knowledge impossible. All commentators agree on this conclusion which goes directly against the doctrines that we often see within an Augustine-inspired tradition. This fundamental difference is also reflected in one of the most common phrasings of questions of self-knowledge, whether the intellect knows itself by its own essence or substance, or by something else. The answer of the commentators is unanimously that it knows itself by being actualized by an external species. But once it is actualized by an external species many will argue that the intellect, in virtue of its immaterial nature, is able to reflect directly on itself and from that get information about itself. Many commentators will highlight the Aristotelian procedure of acquiring substantial knowledge from the observation of the accidents of a substance. By looking to the objects and activities of the intellect it will get knowledge about its own powers, and the knowledge of those will then reveal the nature of the substance that is the subject of such powers. Although I have not seen it addressed explicitly as a doctrinal conflict, one matter of a difference is whether the intellect has any species or form prior to external actualization. One commentator, Anonymus Digby 55, unfolds this view clearly, and from that it easily follows that this partly indeterminate form of the intellect becomes the object of its self-knowledge. But in spite of an already existing species of the intellect, it still requires an external stimulus to engage in this self-knowledge.

When it comes to the knowledge of the agent intellect a significant difference in doctrine has revealed itself. Anonymus Bazán, Siger of Brabant, and Radulphus Brito hold that the human intellect knows of the agent intellect in the same way as it knows of the possible intellect (or the intellect more generally) by observation of its activity and from that arrive at a conclusion of its essence. Siger of Brabant and John of Jandun on the other hand support a monopsychist model of the intellect where both the possible and agent intellect are completely separate from the individual humans and only connected through processing of phantasms

belonging to the individual persons. They further maintain that the agent intellect is eternally engaged in self-reflection, and that this activity is reflected in the possible intellect which therefore is also always engaged in a reflection of the agent intellect. But they deny that this knowledge ever propagates down to the level of individual humans.

The fourth chapter focuses on the science of the soul and self-knowledge. That restriction to self-knowledge is important, as the discussion of the possibility, nature, and procedure of the science of the soul can easily take up the majority of a commentary on book one of *De anima*. So the focus on the connection between self-knowledge and science is necessary to restrict the scope of that chapter and to maintain the focus of the study in general. All question commentaries from the investigated period that I have had access to contain a question on whether there can be a science of the soul, so for the chapter I strive to make a representative selection of relevant texts. But although the chapter contains more texts than the previous on commentaries to book three it spans a smaller range of doctrines and presents a more homogeneous debate, as the focus of the question is much clearer. The main challenge for the commentators is the problem that you cannot see a soul, and in particular the intellect, which makes it difficult to have a science about it. But they present arguments similar to those seen in the discussion of the material of book three, that it is possible to acquire a substantial knowledge of a subject by observation of its accidents. That is also the procedure suggested by Aristotle in the first book and further established in the second book of *De anima*. But they also draw in ideas from the *Analytica posteriora* that to have a science you need a subject with parts or properties that can be ascribed to it according to a given principle. Some will also argue that one of the constitutive elements in a science of the soul is the ability of the intellect to reflect on itself.

I present a few short analyses of the view of the science and show that some commentators, most clearly John of Jandun, argue that it is even possible to have a fully demonstrative science of the soul. But others, such as Simon of Faversham, will reject that the investigation and description of the soul can be described as a science in the proper sense. In another analysis I argue that when we look at the role of intellectual self-knowledge there seems to be a spectrum of opinions about how important it is for the science. A character like Jandun will keep the inclusion of self-knowledge to an absolute minimum, while others will maintain that intellectual self-knowledge or self-reflection is a necessary requirement for the science. It is curious to note that there seems to be a correlation between the degree to which a commentator considers the science of the soul demonstrative and his view on the role of intellectual self-knowledge in the endeavour. Conversely, the commentators who argue against a demonstrative science will also tend to emphasize the importance of intellectual self-knowledge in the description, or *historia*, of the soul.

In the final chapter of the dissertation I dive a bit deeper into two selected subjects of intellectual self-knowledge. Those chapters draw directly on the big repository of information and material mapped in the two central chapters, and function as two examples of some of the interesting studies that this dissertation enables.

First I devote more energy to the many different elements that constitute the complete picture of intellectual self-knowledge in the question commentary of John of Jandun. He devotes no less than three extensive questions solely to the problems of self-knowledge, and at first sight he may seem to present diverging or conflicting doctrines. I argue that first he

presents an extended defence of a concomitant but contentless self-knowledge that is actualized whenever an intellect reflects on a object of knowledge. This necessary self-knowledge is nothing more than a reflection of the fact than once the possible intellect is actualized by the species of an object of knowledge, it becomes itself that thing immaterially, and this actualization constitutes an act of knowing. But because the intellect itself also is that which it knows, it can be considered to know itself in a certain way, but in such a way that it yields absolutely no additional extra knowledge about the intellect. For that to take place, the intellect must reflect on its own activities in a separate act of self-reflection. Like most of the commentators he argues that this is possible, once the intellect is actualize by an external object, and when it then follows the procedure of acquiring substantial knowledge from accidental properties, it is even possible to approach useful and informative knowledge about intellect, although it is not enough to qualify as scientific knowledge. Finally, this type of self-knowledge if fundamentally different from the way the possible intellect knows the agent intellect in the separate intellect. The study helps us understand some parts of his doctrines that may be confusing or seem to be in conflict within the general surveys of the doctrines, but I also want to show how a rich and strong commentary in this period can get far in the domain of self-knowledge.

In the second study I compare the literal commentary by Simon Magister with the questions of the tradition, not least those of Simon of Faversham, who has been suggested as the author of the literal commentary. The study aims to demonstrate that the assumption that literal commentaries do not contain any content of philosophical interest is false. I demonstrate how a majority of the interesting and common points of the question commentaries are to be found in the literal commentary by Simon Magister, and that in most cases the points are more well-developed in both philosophical depth and doctrinal breadth. The preceding chapters also enable me to put the doctrines of intellectual self-knowledge into a broad context and thus to show that the ascription of the text to Faversham is no more than hypothetical. The connections between the two commentators has many uncertainties and very few strong connections. I argue that we merely have two commentators who share the same first name, and that the author of the literal commentary borrowed material across the tradition. Some of those doctrines correspond to those of Faversham, but we cannot from that conclude an identity of the two authors.

The study of intellectual self-knowledge in these commentaries shows how the problems discussed and the solutions offered centre around the workings of the intellect. Commentators focus on the nature of the possible intellect, the relation between that and the agent intellect, and their relation to the individual human. In the case of concomitant self-knowledge we have seen how reflections on the basic mechanics of general cognition can result in a certain variant of self-knowledge where the concept of the self is completely reduced to the identity-relation that follows from the ontology of the intellect. In that act the 'self' in self-knowledge imports absolutely no additional information about the possible 'I' or the subject of the activity. But we have also seen the more common interpretation of self-knowledge as an attentive observation or investigation of the activities and nature of the intellect itself, where the 'self' may actually tell something about the subject of the activities. Such views include some agency in the procedural self-analysis of the intellect and the indications that this whole activity includes a choice, although that is never addressed explicitly. Nonetheless, this has first and foremost

been a study of some particular mechanisms of Aristotelian epistemology and noetics.

I have not found any examples in these texts of reflections of a more expansive concept of self that involves any concept of an acting, thinking, feeling and projecting nexus that views itself as a particular individual with unique traits and properties that persist throughout the whole lifetime of the subject. In other words, we have not seen any indications that intellectual self-knowledge gives the individual knowledge about itself as a *person* in a social, ethical, subjective, and individual sense. Such reflections may exist in the commentary tradition, but they have not been found in expositions of the Aristotelian psychology. A place to look for such reflections would be the commentaries on the *Ethica Nicomachea*, not least the passages involving self-knowledge that have already been laid out in the historical chapter. Those passages move more in the direction of such expansive ideas of the self, but that of course all belongs to an entirely different investigation.

### 6.3 Connecting some dots

The big central chapters have revealed numerous connections within the included material. In the third chapter about commentaries on *De anima* 3.4 some striking connections stood out. Anonymus Bazán and Brito share great proportions of their material and it seems likely that Brito used the commentary of Anonymus Bazán (or another very closely related text) in the development of his own commentary. The big striking group of that part of the dissertation is however constituted by Anonymus Assisi, Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II, Dinsdale, Wyle and Faversham. They share many of the most noticeable doctrines within that chapter, such as the comparison of the human intellect with the other types of intelligences, and the discussion of its location on the big *scala naturae*. They also often compare the possible intellect to prime matter and point out the complete reflexivity of the intellect once actualized by an external species. Some may even draw an explicit connection to this doctrine in *Liber de causis* (a trait Brito shares with this group). Doctrinally Jandun is closest to Brito and Anonymus Bazán, but since he also presents a high degree of originality and a high proportion of all the most common doctrines of the tradition he does not pair directly with any other commentator or group.

Some of these connections are also to be found in the chapter on the science of the soul. Brito and Anonymus Bazán still have much in common, while they also share some connections with Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II and Faversham who also still follow each other relatively closely. But the most notable connection is between Dinsdale and Anonymus Orielensis 33 who present two doctrinally almost identical texts. They differ at the surface level, and a direct comparison will quickly reveal that neither of them seems to be a direct exemplar of the other. But nonetheless they present such striking correspondences that a further study of the relation between the two texts is destined to give an interesting result. A possible hypothesis that I have not been able to pursue fully here is that they represent two different versions of a course on *De anima* given by Dinsdale, but no conclusions have been drawn to that effect here. Some of the other commentators who are not included in the preceding chapter are Anonymus Mertonensis 275, Anonymus Vennebusch, and Anonymus Bernardini. It was already known in the literature before that the three texts are connected, and that is also confirmed here, but this study has also revealed that although Anonymus Mertonensis 275 may be closer in structure to

Anonymus Vennebusch, it shares more doctrinal material with Anonymus Bernardini in their first question.

## 6.4 Next steps

In closing I will suggest some of the possible avenues of future work that seem most obvious to me, both within the analysis of the content and the development of the methodologies employed here. The present dissertation is consciously designed in a way that should facilitate further study within the subject. The two central chapters of doctrinal surveys lay out the atomic doctrines and map them to the commentators in such a way that it should be possible to expand the list. The generalized list of doctrines in the appendix, the in-depth registration of which commentators present which doctrines, and the discussions of which doctrines are more or less common all serve the same purpose, to make it easy to use the present results as a reference work for any future related studies.

We can suggest three axes along which it would be obvious to pursue this subject further: breadth, time, and depth. When it comes to the questions on self-knowledge on book three the material presented here is almost exhaustive with respect to the selected period and the material available to me. But I believe that further studies of the question commentaries that I have not been able to include here is certain to reveal interesting results. My suspicion is that within this period we would see many of the already known doctrines and ideas, but I would also expect a good portion of new doctrines or new combinations of existing ideas to show up. Another possible and easy group of questions to dive into are the questions that occasionally occur that ask how the human intellect or soul is related to the separate intelligences.

As I have shown how the discussion of the science of the soul in questions to the first book are closely related in doctrine and perspective to the discussions of self-knowledge in book three, that is also great area of further exploration. I was forced to present only a subset of the commentaries that I have seen, as every commentary within the period contains some relevant material on this whole subject, so it would be easy to expand the study to all commentaries of the period that discuss the possibility of the science of the soul. It would be interesting to see whether such studies would reveal some breaks or diversions from the tendency we saw here to present a relatively homogeneous group of arguments and doctrines. If that is not enough it is always possible to also expand the range of questions that are included. In particular questions concerning the possibility of acquiring substantial knowledge from accidents would be expected to contain connected material, but also questions on the difficulty and nobility of the science give me an expectation of interesting material.

Looking more into the chronology and subsequent history of these problems proves another obvious axis of work. This study has included a good proportion of texts that have are more fluidly dated, and chronological reflections and studies have therefore played a anecdotal role at best. But the presented result could easily be supplemented by further studies to provide the basis for a more extended chronological narrative. I am however also sure that it would be just as interesting to move further up in time and see what happens in the 14th century. As I mentioned in the introduction there is a bit more literature on that period which indicates that such an expansion will contain many interesting relations and developments. A

quick review of the existing literature and a few commentaries suggest that there will be many continuities between the doctrines registered here and the following tradition, but also some breaks. It would for instance be interesting to look into the tendency that commentators are less inclined to raise the question on the possibility of the science in book one, while questions of self-knowledge in book three are at least as common as in our commentators. But we also see another type of questions discussing the possibility of necessary self-knowledge as part of every act of knowledge (e.g. *utrum omnis cognitio sit cognitio sui*).<sup>1</sup> Graphing the doctrinal development in the subsequent tradition would therefore be highly interesting and certain to yield interesting results.

Finally, further in-depth studies are certain to reveal many new and interesting relations and complications of what I have presented so far. I have found, and the quantitative analyses have also indicated, that the commentary of John of Jandun is particularly interesting in both its breadth and depth. Further studies of his noetics would be certain to reveal interesting new points, as would further investigations of the traditions of commentators inspired by him. The same goes for the literal commentary of Simon Magister, a text that in my view is most deserving of a full edition. An edition of the text would give us access to insights about the genre and teaching methods around the turn of the 13th century, but it would also provide us with a rich source of doctrines and authorities that is likely to represent a big part of the contemporary philosophical tradition. But I am also certain that reading a commentary by a reader as well read as him will reach across the ages and also help us to understand the works of the Philosopher still better. Other virtually unknown commentators that I believe also deserve further studies and full or partial editions are Anonymus Assisi, Anonymus Vaticanus 2170 II, Henric de la Wyle, and the pair of John Dinsdale and Anonymus Oriensis 33. Each in their way these commentators present to us strong readings, clever insights, interesting windows into their tradition, and the occasional stroke of original genius, wit, or genuine humanity that make it a joy to study their these historical works.

The use of graph theory that I have developed and applied in this study is partially experimental, and I see many ways to develop that much further. My hypothesis is that this provides a powerful tool for content registration as well as analysis, and it should be developed further through studies of similar as well as different material. I will just mention two areas where a lot of low-hanging fruit will make it easy to ascertain the utility of the ideas further. The first area of focus would be to enrich and solidify the data model. It should be able to handle a wide range of different texts within the commentary tradition, and testing it on different commentaries from different periods will be certain to reveal weaknesses and areas of improvement. It would be interesting to implement possibilities for including temporal data to analyse developments over time. Another obvious possibility is to ascribe the different doctrines a weight according to the relative importance within the domain. Different types of weights, based on automatic calculations of the graph as well as expert evaluations by the annotator could be tested. The indication of whether a given instance of a doctrine is endorsed by the commentator would also give an extra dimension of nuance for the philosophical analysis. The model could also be developed to accommodate a more fine-grained analysis of the constitutive logical

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<sup>1</sup> Brower-Toland 2017 and Zupko 2007 are two studies on these subjects, both with a certain focus on Buridan.

elements of an argument, either as full propositions composed into premises and conclusions (which is now just merged into a single doctrine node), or with the possibility of even more fine grained analysis into terms, predicators and syncategoremata. Depending on the type of text and scope and purpose of the application of the method such details may be of high significance or seem less relevant.

Once the data model acquires more stability and proves sufficiently robust for broader studies, a user interface needs to be implemented. Currently there is no simple way for a user who is not intimately familiar with the workings of the graph store to annotate any information in the system, and there is also no good way of updating relations or changing the structure between nodes. So it is absolutely necessary for the success of any further work on these ideas that a full user interface for the less technical user gets developed. That in itself would imply many decisions of a theoretical nature, and cannot in my opinion simply be outsourced to technical personnel. For it to succeed such implementations must either be done by a domain expert or in very close collaboration with domain experts. Such interface should also facilitate good methods for presenting and navigating the material in order for users to discover and explore it in ways that are not only preconceived by the original developers. Optimally this could also include at connection to a strong backend of presenting the texts themselves, so that simple navigation between the abstract doctrine analysis and the sources of those doctrines becomes seamless and natural, both during annotation and exploration. I have just given two paragraphs of further possible work on this, but in my view this is a domain pregnant with countless possibilities that are now, through converging developments, becoming ripe for the picking.

In conclusion, I have with this dissertation sought to map out the philosophical arguments and positions in the commentaries on Aristotle's *De anima* between 1250 and 1320 on intellectual self-knowledge. With the presented results it is now not only possible to identify a range of different tendencies within the analysed material, but also to use it as a basis for the comparison in any future studies of related material to see how other texts relate to the tradition mapped here. I have shown which doctrines are most commonly used, which are more unique, and how that relates to each of the included texts. I have identified particular doctrinal clusters within the corpus, clusters that indicate possible connections between the texts that all may be subject to much further study, and I have shown how this can be used to identify texts of particular interest. To facilitate the study I have developed the existing traditional methods of text analysis by viewing the individual texts as networks (or graphs) of connected ideas and arguments, which in turn partake in a much larger network of highly interconnected texts. This has made it possible to analyse and visualize the material in ways that are not commonly used within this field, but which I deem to hold great potential for this as well as related disciplines.



## Abstract

In this dissertation I present qualitative and quantitative analyses of intellectual self-knowledge in the Latin commentaries of Aristotle's *De anima* from 1250 to around 1320. The study contains a historical overview of the preceding doctrines of self-knowledge that are relevant to the selected commentaries, two central chapters where the doctrines of intellectual self-knowledge are analysed, and a final chapter where two studies exemplify what kind of further studies and results the presented analysis can facilitate.

The dissertation shows how central doctrines on intellectual self-knowledge can be identified across two different types of questions, focusing on the possibility and process of self-knowledge, and the considerations on whether and how it is possible to have a science of the soul. It has been shown how all included commentators reject an Augustinian model of essential self-knowledge and support an Aristotelian model where self-knowledge takes place by actualization of the possible intellect in the reception of an intelligible species. It has also been shown how such discussions include considerations such as the place of the human intellect in relation to other types of intellects, how problems of the imperceptibility of the intellect are solved, and what kind of knowledge about the soul intellectual self-knowledge might provide. The two detailed studies in the last chapter highlight a complex case of three different views on self-knowledge in the latest commentator in the corpus, John of Jandun, and presents an argument that literal commentaries need not be neither boring nor superficial in comparison with the contemporary question commentaries through a reading of parts of the commentary by Simon Magister.

The texts of the tradition are connected in an interrelated network, and by modelling elements of that network in the reading of the texts, it is possible to register, represent, and analyse the material in ways that would otherwise be impossible or impracticable. A comparison of texts is realized through a registration of the doctrines of a text, their context, use, and how they are related internally. This has provided a powerful tool for revealing numerous quantitative tendencies, groups, and connections within the material, including clusters of texts and commentators that would be opaque and inaccessible to even the most attentive reader. To reach such results I have developed models for registering and representing the data, and methods for analysing the registrations quantitatively.

The dissertation thus paves the way for further studies by presenting methodological innovations within the traditional discipline of history of philosophy, and by opening up a significant, representative, and mostly unknown part of the Aristotelian commentary tradition of the 13th and early 14th century on the subject of intellectual self-knowledge.



## Dansk resumé

I denne afhandling præsenterer jeg kvalitative og kvantitative analyser af intellektuel selvrefleksion i latinske kommentarer til Aristoteles's *De anima* fra 1250 til omkring 1320. Studiet indeholder et historisk overblik over de forudgående doktriner vedrørende selvrefleksion som er relevante for de udvalgte kommentarer, to centrale kapitler hvor alle doktriner om intellektuel selvrefleksion analyseres, og et afsluttende kapitel hvor to studier eksemplificerer hvilke nærmere undersøgelser der er mulige på baggrund af de præsenterede analyser.

Afhandlingen viser hvordan centrale doktriner vedrørende intellektuel selvrefleksion kan identificeres på tværs af forskellige typer af kvæstioner. Jeg har fokuseret på kvæstioner der behandler hvorvidt og på hvilken måde intellektuel selvrefleksion er mulig og overvejelser over hvorvidt det er muligt at have en videnskab om sjælen. Jeg har vist at alle inkluderede kommentarer afviser en augustinsk forklaring på essentiel selvrefleksion og støtter en aristotelisk forklaring hvor selvrefleksion finder sted gennem aktualiseringen af det potentielle intellekt når det modtager en erkendbar former. Jeg har også vist hvordan deres diskussioner omfatter overvejelser over placeringen af det menneskelige intellekt i forhold til andre typer af intellekter, hvordan det håndteres at intellektet ikke kan sanses, og hvilken slags viden om sjælen intellektuel selvrefleksion kan bidrage med.

De to detaljerede studier i det afsluttende kapitel viser dels et komplekst tilfælde af tre forskellige typer af selvrefleksion hos den seneste kommentator i korpusset, John af Jandun, dels et argument for at såkaldte literal-kommentarer hverken behøver at være kedelige eller overfladiske i sammenligning med samtidige kvæstions-kommentarer gennem en læsning af dele af Simon Magisters kommentar.

De analyserede tekster er forbundet i et tæt sammenknyttet netværk, og ved at modellere dele af dette netværk i analysen af teksterne er det muligt at registrere, repræsentere og analysere materialet på måder der ellers ville have været umulige eller upraktiske. Teksterne sammenlignes på baggrund af registreringen af doktriner og deres kontekst, brug og hvordan de er internt forbundet. Dette har været et stærkt værktøj til at afsløre talrige kvantitative tendencer, grupper og forbindelser i materialet, inklusive klynger af tekster og kommentatorer som ellers ville være uklare eller utilgængelige for selv den mest opmærksomme læser. For at nå disse resultater har jeg udviklet modeller for registreringen og repræsentationen af disse data, og metoder til at analysere registreringerne kvantitativt.

Afhandlingen baner således vejen for yderligere studier i kraft af metodiske nyskabelser indenfor rammerne af traditionel filosofihistorie, og ved at blotlægge en betydelig, repræsentativ og hovedsageligt ukendt del af den aristoteliske kommentartradition i det 13. og tidlige 14. århundrede vedrørende intellektuel selvrefleksion.



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# **Appendices**



# Appendix A

## Inventory of doctrines

This as a registry of all doctrines registered within the texts. The purpose of this inventory is to present the range of general constitutive elements of the arguments of self-knowledge. The doctrines presented in this inventory do not necessarily reflect exactly phrasing or presentation all the commentaries, as the collection of arguments into doctrines contains some degree of abstraction and interpretation. The doctrines recorded here are also not exhaustive of the doctrines found in the questions investigated here. The level of detail, focus of interpretation and mind of the interpreter plays a role in what gets registered. It is therefore to some extent a representation of my selection of themes from the texts rather than a direct representation of their content. The concept of a piece of doctrine is of also course fluid. But it represents what I consider a singular, contained statement about an aspect of the worldview of the commentator, regardless of how many commentators present it.

The list of positive points contains doctrines that are used to establish or constitute an argument that supports the conclusion of a commentator. These are partly found within the determination of a question, but a good portion of them also stem from the discussion of the *rationes principales*. Positive *rationes* (supporting the main conclusion) or doctrines used to refute a negative *ratio* are also included in the positive list. The list of negative points contains the points presented to support the opposite conclusion of that which a commentator reaches. In these lists we see few conflicts of the doctrines within the lists, which is consistent with the observation that commentators generally agree on the most general position. This overview of challenges contains some arguments that are weak, simple to refute, or even invalid, while others may actually present strong objections to our main question, and yet others may look like duplicates of the same point in different phrasings. The details of this are generally addressed within the dissertation. Duplicate doctrines occur between the two lists, as the same doctrine may be used in both a positive and negative context.

When it is appropriate I have tried to present the points in a clear argumentative structure, and in particular the negative points yield very easily to that ambition. But since the lists do not only comprise arguments in a strict sense, but also ideas and points more broadly speaking, it is neither possible nor advantageous to force every doctrinal point into an argumentative structure.

## A.1 Positive points

**P1 Primary and secondary intelligibility** Something that is not intelligible in itself can however be intelligible through its actualization by something else. Generalization of P8.

**P2 Substantial knowledge from accidents** Stronger version of the self-observation thesis. Through a stepwise process the intellect acquires knowledge about its own substance by (a) first observing its own handling of its primary object of knowledge, (b) informing it about the kind of activity it engages in, (c) this reveals which powers the intellect possesses (d) which finally yields insights into the substance that possesses these powers.

**P3 Self-knowledge through external species**

- (a) The possible intellect is completely indeterminate before actualization through an external species.
- (b) The possible intellect must be actualized to be able to engage in self-knowledge.
- (c) ∴ The possible intellect engages in self-knowledge through actualization by an external species.

This is a stronger version of P7. The process of how the self-knowledge comes about naturally has to be expanded by the commentator.

**P4 Possible intellect completely indeterminate before actualization by an external species**

- (a) What is known must be in act.
- (b) The possible intellect is not in act until it knows something else.
- (c) ∴ Therefore the possible intellect cannot be known until it knows something else.

**P5 An immaterial substance is self-reflexive**

- (a) An immaterial substance is self-reflexive.
- (b) The human intellect is an immaterial substance.
- (c) ∴ The human intellect is self-reflexive.

This doctrine may be phrased as a complete return to itself (*reditio completa*) with reference to *Liber de causis*. For the human intellect this often includes restriction on external actualization.

**P6 Science about subject, parts or properties, principles** A science requires (a) a subject, (b) properties that are ascribed to the subject, and (c) the principle according to which the properties are ascribed to it. Positive use: The investigation of the soul fulfills

all these three requirements. The definition of the soul can be used as the principle by which the properties are ascribed to the subject.

Negative use: The soul as form is not a subject, because it is not a hylomorphic compound.

**P7 The intellect is self-intelligible**

- (a) The intellect is potentially any intelligible object.
- (b) When the intellect is actualized by the species of an intelligible object, it can know itself.
- (c)  $\therefore$  The intellect is potentially self-intelligible.

This is a stronger version of P8.

**P8 Intellect intelligible through external species**

- (a) The intellect cannot be known before it is actualized.
- (b) The intellect is actualized by an external species.
- (c)  $\therefore$  The intellect is known through an external species.

This is not always a sufficient condition for intellectual self-knowledge.

**P9 Agent intellect known through its products** The agent intellect is known by observation of its activity and results, namely abstraction of universals.

**P10 Possible intellect similar to prime matter** The possible intellect stands to the intelligible species as prime matter stands to forms. This is based on the idea of the complete potentiality of the intellect before the act of knowing.

**P11 Science through self-reflection** An incorporeal thing can reflect on itself, and by virtue of that we can have a science of the soul. This is a necessary, but not always sufficient, condition for the science.

**P12 Great chain of being and the intellect** In a hierarchy of being the first mover knows itself (and possibly all subordinate beings) essentially. The separate intelligences know only themselves essentially. The human intellect can only know itself through the actualization by an external species.

**P13 The intellect is intelligible**

- (a) Any actualized thing can be an object of knowledge.
- (b) The intellect is actualized by an external species.
- (c)  $\therefore$  The intellect can be an object of knowledge through actualization by an external species.

- P14 Successive self-knowledge** The self-knowledge does not take place at the same time as the knowledge of the primary object of knowledge, but subsequent to it. This doctrine can naturally be combined with the procedure of acquisition of substantial knowledge from accidents (P2)
- P15 Proper and improper science** Knowledge acquired through observation of effects is not a proper science because it does not proceed from explanation of causes, and is therefore not *propter quid* knowledge.
- P16 Form of particular can be studied as a universal** There can be no science about particulars, but a particular can be viewed as an example of a universal and thus serve as the object of scientific investigation.
- P17 The soul is difficult but not impossible to know** The intellect is among the most obscure things in nature, but they can be known too, it is just more difficult.
- P18 Self-knowledge different from the science of the soul** Intellectual self-knowledge does not require the same rigorous investigation as the science of the soul.
- P19 Intellect especially difficult to know** Knowing the intellect is particularly difficult, as it is not intelligible through observation.
- P20 Bodily senses are not reflexive**
- (a) Only immaterial substances are self-reflexive.
  - (b) The bodily senses are not immaterial substances.
  - (c) ∴ The bodily senses are not self-reflexive.
- P21 Three meanings of science** 'Science' can be of something in three different ways. It can be of something (a) as about a subject, (b) as about a conclusion in a demonstration, or (c) as about a property of a subject.
- P22 Identity of knower and known in immaterial substances**
- (a) Complete certainty when the knower and known are identical.
  - (b) In the soul the knower is identical with the known.
  - (c) ∴ There must be a science of the soul.
- P23 The intellect has essential self-knowledge** The intellect has essential self-knowledge and is hence not known through an external species.
- P24 Knowing a blocking activity** The intellect cannot know more than one thing at any time because knowing is a blocking activity. Essential, and thus constant, self-knowledge would therefore result in the impossibility of any other act of knowing.

- P25 No identity of knower and known before actualization of possible intellect** This is an expansion of P31, as it makes it clear that self-knowledge is self-identity.
- P26 Analogy with vision: Only things visible in act can be perceived** Just as only actualized objects of vision are visible, so is only the intellect once actualized.
- P27 Soul has parts and properties in virtue of its embodied activities**
- P28 Perfect mover can move itself** A perfect mover is immaterial.
- P29 Perpetual self-knowledge of agent intellect not available to humans** Although the agent intellect is in a constant state of self-knowledge, and that knowledge may be available also to the possible intellect, this never propagates to the level of human knowledge.
- P30 Self-knowledge by own species, once actualized by external species** Unlike P4 the intellect does have some sort of species before any external stimulus, and that species is abstracted and known during self-knowledge.
- P31 Intelligibility requires actuality** No potential property or substance can be actually intelligible. This finds support in Aristotle *Metaph.* 9.10, 1051b30–32.
- P32 Infinite regress not a problem in the intellect** This solves the potential problem that self-reflection may result in a regress problem.
- P33 The intellect can observe its own activity**
- P34 Knowledge may proceed from temporal to atemporal matters** Knowledge starts from temporal objects but results in atemporal universals.
- P35 Knowing a power does not mean knowing its products** It is not possible to determine the products of a power *a priori*.
- P36 Not all universals are abstracted from sense perception**
- P37 Science about a substance which contains parts and properties** This is closely related to P6
- P38 The soul is not known through phantasms** Only things that have quantity are known through species and phantasms.
- P39 Subsistence is not a requirement as long as it is the subject of properties** P6 might presuppose a subsisting subject, which would exclude the soul as simple, non-hylomorphic form, but a subject with properties is sufficient.
- P40 Possible and agent intellect joined in constant knowledge** The agent intellect is in a constant state of self-knowledge; the possible intellect is permanently bound to the agent intellect; therefore the possible intellect is in a constant state of knowing the agent intellect.

- P41 Only restriction of identity in physical movement** This solves the challenge that the same thing cannot be mover and moved.
- P42 Objects of knowledge need not be temporal, but analysis is** The process of knowing an object may not be confused with the nature of the object. Analysis of atemporal objects can therefore still be temporal.
- P43 Intellect not its own proper object of knowledge**
- (a) The intellect knows its objects of knowledge.
  - (b) The intellect is not its own object of knowledge.
  - (c) ∴ The intellect is not intelligible to itself.
- P44 The stronger principle of attribution** That which is the reason of a property possesses that same property to at least the same degree, and because the soul facilitates science about everything other than itself, a science of it must also be possible.
- P45 No science of the separate soul** As the soul is studied as the actualization of a body, the study of the soul as a separate substance falls outside the purview of this science.
- P46 Essential self-knowledge in the afterlife** Once the intellect is no longer encumbered by the materiality of the body, it may engage in essential self-knowledge.
- P47 Intellect is perceptible after actualization** Once the intellect becomes actualized by a species of a material object it becomes available to sense perception itself.
- P48 Internal experience of own mental faculties** An individual has an internal experience of his own possible intellect and its difference from the agent intellect and the intelligible species.
- P49 Multiple simultaneous objects of knowledge is possible** The intellect can entertain several simultaneous objects of knowledge. This enables a self-knowledge that is temporally simultaneous with knowledge of an external object.
- P50 Science from observations of accidents is also science** This counters the idea that science only proceeds from causes.
- P51 Soul does exist as something outside itself (in certain sense)** Soul is not different from itself, but its being does not depend on its operation.
- P52 Three types of knowledge from one species** From an intelligible species knowledge can be obtained about (a) the primary object of knowledge as a universal, (b) the particular object giving rise to the knowledge, and (c) the intellect realizing the knowing.
- P53 Superiority to sense-perception** As the sense perception has an ability of self-perception, the intellect must have an analogous ability, as it is superior to sense perception and hence more able.

**P54 Concomitant higher-order knowledge** When the intellect knows a primary object of knowledge, it also by necessity knows that act of knowledge. This implies P49 but is not the only possible instance of P49.

**P55 Soul intelligible as object of dubium** When it is possible to wonder about something, intelligibility is implied.

**P56 Material objects can never become intellects**

**P57 Certain science about simple subject** The science about a simple subject must be certain, and as the soul is simple, the science about it must be certain, and (*a fortiori*) it must hence be possible to have a science about it.

**P58 Atemporal soul the actualization of temporal body** The soul itself is atemporal, but it is the actualization and perfection of a temporal body.

**P59 Only material things cannot receive their own species** Because material things are already actualized as their own species.

**P60 Self-knowledge by innate species**

- (a) Some things are known by an innate species
- (b) The intellect is one of the things that are known by an innate species.
- (c) ∴ The intellect knows itself without the need of an external species.

**P61 Science by answering (four) scientific questions** There can be a science about that which answers the four basic analytical questions of a science, namely *si est*, *quid est*, *quia est*, and *propter quid*.

**P62 Diversification only a problem with same mode of being** The identity of categories between object and act only required in same mode of being.

**P63 Soul is simple in essence but has different powers (partes potentiales)** In itself the soul is simple, but it actualizes different powers.

**P64 Act and potency with different respects** In intellectual self-knowledge the act and potency are different in respect.

**P65 The agent intellect is known like any other object**

- The possible intellect is able to know any intelligible object.
- The agent intellect is an intelligible object.
- ∴ The agent intellect can be known by the possible intellect

**P66 Intellect is incorruptible** This is based on the immaterial nature of the intellect, and means that the entire soul is not corruptible.

**P67 Essential self-knowledge results in no self-knowledge** Knowledge requires the subject being stripped of the object of knowledge, but nothing can be stripped of its own species.

**P68 Transference of properties from agent to patient (e.g. light and the visible object)**

- (a) The efficient cause of a property possesses the property itself.
- (b) The agent intellect causes potentially intelligible objects to be actually intelligible.
- (c) ∴ The agent intellect itself is intelligible.

**P69 Soul not available to sense perception**

- (a) Science can only be about that which can be known, and scientific knowledge can only be acquired through sense perception.
- (b) The soul is not available to sense perception.
- (c) ∴ There cannot be a science about the soul.

**P70 Only physical movement requires difference between mover and moved** The body makes identity of mover and moved impossible.

**P71 Vague, incomplete self-knowledge possible** Some knowledge about the intellect or soul is attained, but it does not amount to a full substantial knowledge. It may be qualified as simple, intuitive, and immediate.

**P72 Self-knowledge necessary for a science of the soul** Intellectual self-knowledge is a necessary condition for a universal science about the soul because some parts of the soul can only be known by introspection.

**P73 Soul not intelligible to us**

- (a) The subject of a science must be intelligible.
- (b) A soul is not intelligible.
- (c) ∴ There cannot be a science about the soul.

**P74 The intellect is intelligible like any other thing** The intellect can be known in the same way as any other intelligible thing. This argument implies a reference to *De anima* 3.4, 430a2–3.

**P75 Agent intellect the most venerable object of knowledge** If the possible intellect is disposed towards knowledge about lowly beings such as material objects, it must so certainly also be disposed towards knowledge about the elevated nature of the agent intellect.

**P76 Science requires intelligible essence or definition**

**P77 Intellect not available to sense perception**

- (a) Anything that is intelligible is available to sense perception.
- (b) The intellect is not available to sense perception
- (c) ∴ The intellect cannot be intelligible.

**P78 The intellect can know completely immaterial things** The knowledge is immediate, as there is no requirement of species reception of immaterial objects.

**P79 Four requirements of a science** (a) A science is about a subject as a universal, (b) which, as a universal, is incorruptible, (c) has own parts and properties, (d) and the science constitutes a knowledge that has an intellectual immediacy in the reflection on the subject.

**P80 Science of form and perfection** There can be a science about the form and perfection of a natural thing, which is the case for the soul.

**A.2 Negative arguments****N1 Soul not intelligible to us**

- (a) The subject of a science must be intelligible.
- (b) A soul is not intelligible.
- (c) ∴ There cannot be a science about the soul.

**N2 Soul not available to sense perception**

- (a) Science can only be about that which can be known, and scientific knowledge can only be acquired through sense perception.
- (b) The soul is not available to sense perception.
- (c) ∴ There cannot be a science about the soul.

**N3 Identity of mover and moved impossible**

- (a) The same thing cannot be mover and moved at the same time and in the same respect;
- (b) if the intellect knew itself, it would be mover and moved in the same time and in the same respect;
- (c) ∴ the intellect cannot know itself.

**N4 Intellect not available to sense perception**

- (a) Anything that is intelligible is available to sense perception.

- (b) The intellect is not available to sense perception
- (c) ∴ The intellect cannot be intelligible.

**N5 Identity of knower and known impossible**

- (a) In any knowledge there must be a real difference between the knower and the known.
- (b) In a science of the soul the same thing would be knower and known.
- (c) ∴ There cannot be a science about the soul.

**N6 Knowledge is continuous and temporal, but soul is simple**

- (a) All human knowledge is a continuous and temporal process.
- (b) The soul is neither continuous nor temporal.
- (c) ∴ The soul cannot be intelligible.

**N7 Science about subject, parts or properties, principles** A science requires (a) a subject, (b) properties that are ascribed to the subject, and (c) the principle according to which the properties are ascribed to it. Positive use: The investigation of the soul fulfills all these three requirements. The definition of the soul can be used as the principle by which the properties are ascribed to the subject.

Negative use: The soul as form is not a subject, because it is not a hylomorphic compound.

**N8 Similar to separate intelligences**

- (a) The separate intelligences know themselves by their own substance
- (b) The intellect is similar to the separate intelligences
- (c) ∴ The intellect knows itself by its own substance.

**N9 Things most manifest in nature are opaque, so no science of the soul**

- (a) The things most manifest by nature cannot be known by the intellect.
- (b) The soul is among the things most manifest by nature.
- (c) ∴ The soul cannot be known by the intellect.

**N10 Knowing the act of the intellect risks infinite regress**

- (a) If the intellect knows its own activity, that knowledge constitutes a second order activity.
- (b) If that new activity is intelligible, then the knowledge of that constitutes a third order activity.
- (c) From this an infinite regress arises.

- (d) Infinite regresses are impossible.
- (e) ∴ The intellect cannot know itself by a separate activity.

**N11 Soul is a particular, so there can be no science about it**

- (a) A science must be about universals.
- (b) A soul as the form of a body is a particular.
- (c) ∴ There cannot be a science about the soul.

**N12 Analogy with sense and sensation**

- (a) As the senses stand to sensation, so does the intellect stand to knowing.
- (b) The senses cannot perceive their own sensation
- (c) ∴ The intellect cannot know its own knowledge.

**N13 No abstraction of the intellect**

- (a) Human knowledge is based on phantasms abstracted from sense perception.
- (b) The intellect cannot be abstracted from matter
- (c) ∴ The intellect cannot be know through an abstracted species.

**N14 No science about corruptible things**

- (a) There is no science about corruptible things.
- (b) The soul is corruptible as the form of a corruptible body.
- (c) ∴ There cannot be a science about the soul.

**N15 Nothing can be stripped of itself**

- (a) The intellect ought to be stripped of its object of knowledge before knowing it.
- (b) Nothing can be stripped of itself.
- (c) ∴ There cannot be a science about the soul.

**N16 Intellect not its own proper object of knowledge**

- (a) The intellect knows its objects of knowledge.
- (b) The intellect is not its own object of knowledge.
- (c) ∴ The intellect is not intelligible to itself.

**N17 Self-knowledge by innate species**

- (a) Some things are known by an innate species
- (b) The intellect is one of the things that are known by an innate species.

(c) ∴ The intellect knows itself without the need of an external species.

**N18 All intelligibles become intellects if intellect is intelligible**

- (a) All intelligibles are intelligible by the same form.
- (b) The intellect is intelligible and has reason by one form.
- (c) If N18b then all intelligibles are intelligible by the same form as the intellect.
- (d) If N18c then all intelligibles have reason.
- (e) N18d is false.
- (f) ∴ The intellect cannot be intelligible.

This could be seen as an interpretation of the argument Aristotle presents against the idea that the intellect knows itself by itself in *De anima* 3.4, 429b27–28: “ἢ γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις νοῦς ὑπάρξει, εἰ μὴ κατ’ ἄλλο αὐτὸς νοητός, ἐν δέ τι τὸ νοητὸν εἶδει ...”

**N19 No universal about the soul, as it requires sense perception**

- (a) A science is about a universal.
- (b) Universals are abstracted from sense perception, but the soul is not available to sense perception.
- (c) ∴ There can be no universal (and hence no science) about the soul.

**N20 No simultaneous act and potency**

- (a) The same thing cannot be in act and potency at the same time and in the same respect.
- (b) The object of knowledge is in act with respect to the knowing subject, and the knowing subject is in potentiality with respect to the object of knowledge.
- (c) The intellect cannot know itself.

**N21 The possible intellect is not actualized**

- (a) All that is intelligible is actual.
- (b) The intellect is not actual.
- (c) ∴ The intellect is not intelligible.

**N22 Material intelligibles cannot know themselves**

- (a) The intellect is known in the same way as other objects of knowledge.
- (b) Other objects of knowledge are not self-intelligible.
- (c) ∴ The intellect is not self-intelligible.

**N23 No species proportional to the intellect**

- (a) When something is known through a species, that must be proportional to the thing known.
- (b) Any external species cannot be proportional to the intellect.
- (c) ∴ The intellect cannot be known by an external species.

**N24 No experience of higher-order knowledge**

- (a) We sense our state of sensation, so we should also know our states of knowing.
- (b) We do not experience any higher order knowledge.
- (c) ∴ Higher order knowledge does not take place.

**N25 Essential self-intelligibility by self-identity**

- (a) The intellect is identical with that which it knows when it knows.
- (b) That which is known is intelligible.
- (c) The intellect knows by its own essence.
- (d) ∴ The intellect is intelligible by its own essence.

**N26 Agent intellect has no positive content**

- (a) The power of the agent intellect is abstraction of universals.
- (b) Abstraction of universals cannot be intelligible, because then the agent intellect would know the universals itself.
- (c) ∴ The power of the agent intellect cannot be known.

**N27 Accidents cannot affect their own subject**

- (a) Knowledge takes place by an affection of the intellect.
- (b) Accidents cannot affect the subjects in which they are properties.
- (c) An act of intellection is an accident of the intellect.
- (d) ∴ The act of intellection cannot affect the intellect, and hence it cannot be known by the intellect.

**N28 Nothing can move itself (knowledge is being-moved)**

- (a) What cannot move the intellect cannot be known.
- (b) Nothing can move itself.
- (c) ∴ The possible intellect cannot know the possible intellect.

**N29 Diversification of knowledge according to object**

- (a) The act of knowing is determined by the nature of the object of knowledge (cf. *Averrois Cordubensis Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De anima libros ad III.4* 429b10–14, com. III.9, p. 422.36–50).
- (b) The primary object of knowledge and the act of knowing have two different natures.
- (c) ∴ The intellect cannot know both types of objects.

**N30 No essential self-knowledge, so not self-knowledge by own species**

- (a) In immaterial substances the same thing is knower and known.
- (b) If the intellect knows itself by its own species, it will know itself by itself.
- (c) ∴ The intellect cannot know itself by itself, hence it cannot know itself by its own species.

**N31 Science proceeds from causes, so no science about the soul**

- (a) All science proceeds from causes.
- (b) The soul is not known through its causes.
- (c) ∴ There cannot be a science of the soul.

**N32 Essential self-knowledge by self-presence**

- (a) Knowledge requires presence of the known object to the knowing subject
- (b) The intellect is present to itself by itself.
- (c) ∴ The intellect knows itself by itself.

**N33 Intelligibility requires actuality** No potential property or substance can be actually intelligible. This finds support in Aristotle *Metaph.* 9.10, 1051b30–32.

**N34 Intellectual self-knowledge is impossible**

- (a) If there were a science of the soul the intellect would be able to know itself.
- (b) The intellect cannot know itself.
- (c) ∴ There cannot be a science of the soul.

**N35 Nothing simpler than the intellect, hence no species abstraction**

- (a) A species is simpler than the thing from which it is abstracted.
- (b) The intellect does not have a species that is simpler than itself.
- (c) ∴ The intellect cannot be known by a species.

**N36 No science about the non-existent**

- (a) There cannot be a science about that which does not exist.

- (b) The soul does not exist.
- (c) ∴ There cannot be a science about the soul.

**N37 Knowing agent intellect means knowing all phantasms**

- (a) If the possible intellect could know the agent intellect, this would be through its abstraction of phantasms.
- (b) The agent intellect abstracts all phantasms.
- (c) ∴ The possible intellect cannot contain all phantasms at the same time; hence, the possible intellect cannot know the agent intellect.

**N38 Nothing can receive its own species**

- (a) The possible intellect only has knowledge by reception of the species of the object.
- (b) Nothing can receive itself.
- (c) ∴ The intellect cannot have knowledge of itself.

**N39 Power of the agent intellect not intelligible**

- (a) If the intellect is known, then its power is also known.
- (b) The power of the intellect cannot be known.
- (c) ∴ The intellect cannot be known.

**N40 The intellect has essential self-knowledge** The intellect has essential self-knowledge and is hence not known through an external species.

**N41 Multiple simultaneous objects of knowledge impossible** The intellect cannot be actualized by more than one species at any time.



# Appendix B

## Surveys

### B.1 Sources with questions on the science of the soul

The survey was made on September 8, 2016 and updated on the February 12, 2018.<sup>1</sup> At that point the database contained 79 commentaries on *De anima* that were registered to belong in part of full to the 13th century.

The survey outlines which commentaries contain the question ‘Whether a science of the soul is possible’ or similar variations thereof among the questions pertaining to the beginning of book one.

The main conclusion of the survey is that the question ‘Whether a science of the soul is possible’ or similar variations thereof are very strongly represented in the given section of the question commentaries. 79 commentaries were reviewed, of those 61 were question commentaries, but I did not have access to 24 of those. Of the remaining 37 15 did not contain material on book 1 (being either fragmentary or partial) and did therefore not contain the relevant section of the question. Of the remaining 22 commentaries every one contained such a question. This is a very strong indication that the majority of the remaining question commentaries from the period will also contain such a question.

The following tables document the reviewed commentaries. When the relevant part of a commentary exists in a modern edition, I refer to that. When it only exists in early print editions or manuscripts, I refer to those.

The first table (B.1 on the next page) lists commentaries that have been found to include a relevant question in this survey. The commentaries in table B.2 on page 260 do not contain any question on the science, while the commentaries in table B.3 on page 261, which are not question commentaries, also have not been found to contain an extensive or focused treatment of the possibility of a science of the soul. In these cases it is most likely due to the type or genre of the text. Some of them are *tractatus*, others are different type of literal commentaries that only rarely contains such a treatment.

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<sup>1</sup> Update removed a duplicate entry (of commentary in ÖNB 2319: ff. 83ra–100vb which is a witness to Brito, *Quaestiones in libros De anima*) and the addition of Jandun, *Quaestiones super libros De anima* and Bartholomaeus de Bodekisham, *Quaestiones in tres libros De anima*.

Table B.1: Question commentaries including a question on the science of the soul at the beginning of book one.

Author	Title	Witnesses or edition
Anonymus Orielensis 33	<i>Quaestiones in De anima I–III</i>	Oriel 33: ff. 120r–162v
Anonymus Vennebusch	<i>Quaestiones in tres libros De anima</i>	Anonymus Vennebusch 1963
Anonymus Giele	<i>Quaestiones in Aristotelis libros I et II De anima</i>	Anonymus Giele 1971
Anonymus Leipzig 1150	<i>Quaestiones in De anima I–III</i>	Leipzig UB 1150: 107ra–118vb
Anonymus Vaticani 2170 I	<i>Quaestiones in De anima I–II</i>	Vat. Lat. 2170: ff. 6v–25v
Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II	<i>Quaestiones in De anima I–III</i>	Vat. Lat. 2170: ff. 51r–62v
Anonymus Parisiensis 16609	<i>Quaestiones in De anima</i>	BNF Lat. 16609: ff. 41va–61rb
Anonymus Parisiensis 16618	<i>Quaestiones in De anima I–II</i>	BNF Lat. 16618: ff. 153ra–160vb
Anonymus Orielensis 66	<i>Quaestiones in De anima I–II</i>	Oriel 61: ff. iir–ivv, 116r–119v
Anonymus Monacensis	<i>Quaestiones in De anima I–II</i>	CLM 6971: ff. 158r–195v, CLM 16980: ff. 106r–167r, Bern 507: 1r–86v, Munich UB 2° 567: 122r–192v
Anonymus Mertonensis 275	<i>Quaestiones in De anima I</i>	Merton 275: ff. 88–101 (85–98 old fol.)
Anonymus Mertonensis 276	<i>Quaestiones in De anima I</i>	Merton 276: ff. 13r–16v
Anonymus Chasselensis	<i>Quaestiones in De anima I–III</i>	Kassel 2° Phys. 11: ff. 104–121r
Anonymus Vaticanus Latinus 869	<i>Quaestiones in De anima I–II</i>	Vat. Lat. 869: ff. 51v–101r, Vat. Lat. 3092: 45v–54v
Anonymus Vennebusch Vaticani	<i>Quaestiones in De anima I–II</i>	Vat. Lat. 869: ff. 200r–210v
Anonymus Bernardini	<i>Quaestiones super librum De anima</i>	Anonymus Bernardini 2009
Anonymus Steenberghen	<i>Quaestiones in De anima I–III</i>	Anonymus Steenberghen 1971

Table B.1: (Cont.) Question commentaries including a question on the science of the soul at the beginning of book one.

Author	Title	Witnesses or edition
Anonymus Bazán	<i>Quaestiones super Aristotelis librum De anima</i>	Anonymus Bazán 1971
Bartholomaeus de Bodekisham	<i>Quaestiones in tres libros De anima</i>	Peterhouse 192: ff. 133-49, 153-9, 150-2; Assisi 290: ff. 87r-95r (bk. 2 only)
Henric de la Wyle	<i>Quaestiones in De anima I-III</i>	Magdalen 63: ff. 57r-94v
John Dinsdale	<i>Quaestiones in De anima I-III</i>	Dinsdale n.d.
John of Jandun	<i>Quaestiones super libros De anima</i>	Jandun 1480
Radulphus Brito	<i>Quaestiones in libros De anima</i>	Brito 2012 (bk. 1, part of bk. 2), Brito 1974
Simon Magister	<i>Expositio in De anima</i>	Leipzig UB 1359: ff. 44r-77v
Simon of Faversham	<i>Quaestiones in De anima I-III</i>	Vat. Lat. 10135: ff. 87r-118r, Cambrai 486: f. 2ra, Merton 292: 355r-361v, 364r-370v (old fol.) Kassel 2° Phys. 11: ff. 56r-77r, BNF Lat. 16170: 53r-v, Vat. Lat. 2170: ff. 63r-114r

Table B.2: Question commentaries that do not contain a question on the science of the soul, as the commentary does not cover the passage.

Author	Title	Witnesses or edition
Adam Whitby	<i>Quaestiones in De anima II-III</i>	Kapit Knihovna M.80: 42r-78r
Anonymus Mertonensis 272	<i>Quaestiones in De anima III</i>	Merton 272: 240v-244r, (237va-241rb old fol.)
Anonymus Gonville & Caius 460 I	<i>Quaestiones in De anima II (fragment)</i>	G&C 460/397: ff. 1-12v
Anonymus Digby 55	<i>Quaestiones in De anima III</i>	Digby 55: 82v-84v
Anonymus Knihovna I	<i>Quaestiones in De anima II (fragment)</i>	Kapit Knihovna M.80: 37r-41r
Anonymus Knihovna II	<i>Quaestiones in De anima I (fragment)</i>	Kapit Knihovna M.80: 80vb-89vb
Anonymus Gonville & Caius 460 II	<i>Expositio cum quaestionibus in De anima II (fragment)</i>	G&C 460/397: ff. 23r-32v
Guillelmus de Falgario	<i>Quaestiones in De anima III</i>	Arsenal 457: 97ra-105vb
Siger of Brabant	<i>Quaestiones in tertium de anima</i>	Siger of Brabant 1972b
Walter Burley	<i>Circa tertium De anima</i>	Walter Burley 1997
William of Hennor	<i>Quaestiones in De anima III</i>	G&C 512/543: ff. 127r-134v

Table B.3: Commentaries that do not contain a focused treatment of the possibility of a science of the soul.

Author	Title	Witnesses or edition
Anonymus Viennensis 2373	<i>Expositio in De anima I–III</i>	ÖNB 2373: ff. 22va–25vb
Anonymus Bazán II	<i>Sententia super II et III De anima</i>	Anonymus Bazán II 1998
John Blund	<i>De anima</i>	Blund 1970
Johannes Grimaldi	<i>Lectura super II–III De anima</i>	Jagiellońska 1734: ff. 1r–18r
Anonymus Corporis Christi 243	<i>Conclusions De anima</i>	Corpus Christi 243: ff. 83v–90v
Anonymus Parisiensis 16130	<i>Expositio in De anima III</i>	BNF Lat. 16130: ff. 25r–35v
Albert the Great	<i>De homine</i>	Albert the Great 2008
Petrus Hispanus Portugalensis	<i>Scientia libri de anima</i>	Petrus Hispanus Portugalensis 1961
Adam Buckfield	<i>Sententia super librum De anima</i>	Corpus Christi 111: 252a–294d, Madrid 1067: 73r–76v, Bologna 2344: 24a–53b, Canon. Misc. 322: 1–63v, BNF Lat. 6319: 112r–, Berlin SB 906: 115a–173b, Marciana Lat. VI.1: 130b–161a, Vat. Urb. 206: 259a–299a, Madrid 9726: ff. 82v, Jagiellońska 726: 1r–40v, Merton 272: 1r–22r, Ambros. 2° 318: 174ra– 225a (new foliation, old: 173ra– 223a) <sup>2</sup>
Siger of Brabant	<i>De anima intellectiva</i>	Siger of Brabant 1972a
Thomas Aquinas	<i>Quaestiones disputatae de anima</i>	Aquinas 1996

<sup>2</sup> This probably includes inauthentic witnesses, see discussion in section 2.5.3 on page 49.

Table B.3: (Cont.) Commentaries that do not contain a focused treatment of the possibility of a science of the soul.

Author	Title	Witnesses or edition
William of Hedon	<i>Tractatus de anima</i>	Corpus Christi 107: 1-149r, G&C 342/538: 1-200
Giles of Rome	<i>Expositio in De anima I-III</i>	BSB 2° Inc.c.a 2805: ff. 1-86v, Ambros. 2° 330: 1r-89r
Alexander Bonini de Alexandria	<i>Expositio De anima I-III</i>	Magdalen 80: ff. 68-160* [ff. 1-92v] assisi-326 [ff. 1-125] escorial.III.19 [1-197v] oriel58 [1-99] london-lambeth.100
Anonymus Erfordiensis 303	<i>Conclusions in De anima</i>	Ambros. 2° 303: 196va-204r
Henric of Renham	<i>De anima</i>	Brit. Lib. 12.G.II: ff. 316-355
Anonymus Gauthier 2	<i>Lectura in librum De anima. A quodam discipulo re- portata</i>	Anonymus Gauthier 2 1985

## B.2 Question commentaries possibly of relevance

On the following page I list the question commentaries that I have not been able to inspect, but which I suspect may be interesting. This evaluation is very naive, as it is only based on the information available in catalogues. Unfortunately I have not been aware of these commentaries until too late in the process to incorporate them in the investigation.

The commentaries that are not referred to Mora-Márquez's catalogue are from is Bernardini's list of commentaries in the introduction to her edition of *Quaestiones super librum De anima*.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Bernardini 2009: xix–xxi.

Table B.4: Commentaries that are deemed likely to contain relevant material.

Author	Title	Witnesses or edition
Anonymus ÖNB 5453	<i>Quaestiones circa Aristotelis libros De anima</i>	ÖNB Pal. 5453: 11a–28a
Anonymus Berlin 97	<i>Quaestiones in De anima</i>	Berlin SB 97: 198rb–213rb
Anonymus CLM 18892	<i>Quaestiones in De anima</i>	CLM 18892: 3r–82v
Anonymus Vat. Lat. 2160	<i>Quaestiones et notabilia in Aristotelis De anima</i>	Vat. Lat. 2160: 63–114 <sup>4</sup>
Anonymus Knihovna 1970	<i>Quaestiones in De anima</i>	Prague Nat. Mus. 1970: 198r–247r
Anonymus Todi	<i>Quaestiones in De anima</i>	Todi 23: 124r–162v
Anonymus Knihovna 903	<i>Quaestiones in De anima</i>	Prague Nat. Mus. 903
Anonymus Eichstätt 476	<i>Quaestiones in De anima</i>	Eichstätt 476: 242r–288v
Anonymus CLM 26929	<i>Quaestiones in De anima I–II</i>	CLM 26929: 275ra–298va
Anonymus Jagiellońska 2016	<i>Quaestiones in De anima I–III</i>	Jagiellońska 2016: 2r–81v
Anonymus Munich UB 823	<i>Quaestiones in De anima I–III</i>	Munich UB 823: 5r–87r
Anonymus Melk	<i>Quaestiones in De anima I–III</i>	Melk 801: 353v–442r
Anonymus Marciana	<i>Quaestiones in De anima</i>	Marciana Lat. VI.14: 1r–69r <sup>5</sup>
Anonymus Mainz	<i>Quaestiones in De anima</i>	Mainz SB 616: 212r–265va <sup>6</sup>
Anonymus Darmstadt	<i>Quaestiones in De anima</i>	Darmstadt 15: 140r–205v <sup>7</sup>
Anonymus Torino	<i>Quaestiones in De anima</i>	Turin H.III 30: 1ra–43ra <sup>8</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Mora-Márquez 2014: 249, no. 114.<sup>5</sup> Mora-Márquez 2014: 249, no. 118.<sup>6</sup> Mora-Márquez 2014: 247, no. 87.<sup>7</sup> Mora-Márquez 2014: 246, no. 74.<sup>8</sup> Mora-Márquez 2014: 248, no. 108.

# Appendix C

## Texts

Here follows excerpts from texts that I have included in this study where no critical edition is available. They are to be considered working editions, which means that there may still have some problems and are not all print-ready, but they are good enough to provide a base text to work with. I therefore also do not endeavour to present extended descriptions of the witnesses, discussions of dating and other details that would normally constitute the introduction to a full-fledged edition. In several of the editions many authority references still need to be resolved.

In presenting the drafts below I adhere to the following general principles: I have imposed my own classicising orthography, and my own paragraphing and punctuation. Section headings and structural numbers (e.g. 1.1, 2.1, Ad 3.1 etc.) are meta-text added by me. Normally I expand any scribal abbreviations silently.

### *Sigla*

- ⟨content⟩ The *content* is not part of the transmitted text, but I have supplied it.
- {content} The *content* is preserved in the transmitted text, but in my best judgement it does not belong in the text.
- †content† The *content* is part of the transmitted text, but it results in an incoherent text for which I have found no remedy.
- ⟨\*\*\*⟩ I find that the transmitted text contains a *lacuna* at this place. The text leaves no indication thereof.
- .n. The number *n* indicates the number of units that are not included in the text. When *n* is wrapped in “/” the unit is lines, when it is wrapped in “||” the unit is columns, otherwise it is characters. When followed by “(rep.)” it is due to an illegible reproduction, when followed by “(ed.)” it is an editorial decision, otherwise it is due to an illegible manuscript witness.

### *Abbreviations*

*scr.* Scripsi vel scripsit.

<i>inv.</i>	Invertit.
<i>inv. a.c.</i>	Invertit ante correcturam.
<i>iter.</i>	Iteravit.
<i>om.</i>	Omisit.
<i>del.</i>	Delevit.
<i>add. et del.</i>	Addidit et delevit. Deletion of an a scribal addition made by the same scribe.
<i>del. et scr.</i>	Delevit et scripsit. Deletion of a deletion.
<i>a.c.</i>	Ante correcturam.
<i>corr. ex</i>	Correxit ex.
<i>transp.</i>	Transposuit.
<i>suppl.</i>	Supplevi vel supplevit.
<i>secl.</i>	Seclusi vel seclisit.
<i>coni.</i>	Conieci vel coniecit.
<i>ut vid.</i>	Ut videtur.
<i>sup. lin.</i>	Supra lineam.
<i>in marg.</i>	In margine.

These abbreviations can all be exchanged with appropriate plural versions where more than one witness is referenced.

## C.1 Adam Whitby et al.: *Quaestiones in De anima II–III*

This text is preserved in a single manuscript, Kapit Knihovna M.80: ff. 42–78. Rega Wood has produced an extensive description of the manuscript.<sup>1</sup> She dates the codex to the 1250s, although it is bound in the volume in the 14th century.<sup>2</sup>

The dating of the text to the middle of the 13th century is supported by Lohr.<sup>3</sup> The style and structure of the questions on *De anima* also supports that hypothesis, as it does not look like a text from the last part of the 13th century. Gauthier notes how he in part resembles the masters of the 1250s, and is also aware of the monopsychist problems discussed about that time.<sup>4</sup>

Adam Whitby was probably an English arts master who has been ascribed four works of Aristotelian natural philosophy, *De anima* (books II–III), *De memoria et reminiscencia*, glosses on *De sensu et sensibilibus*, and *Aristotelis meteorologicorum libri quattuor*.<sup>5</sup> Weijers is only certain about the ascription of the glosses on *De sensu et sensibilibus* and parts of the *De anima* questions (as I interpret the note in her catalogue).<sup>6</sup>

Judging from the manuscript it is unlikely that Adam Whitby is the author of all the questions, because only a group of the questions (I count seven along with Rega Wood) are ascribed to him, some to a ‘Magister A’ (which could also be him), and yet others to ‘Magister R’ or are without any ascription.<sup>7</sup> Unfortunately the question treated here, the second on book three on folio 66vb has no ascription, but it follows directly after the first, which has the heading “Quaestio de intellectu possibili utrum sit unus in omnibus hominibus secundum Magistrum Adam” (f. 66ra) in the same hand but different ink. The third question begins “Consequens tertia quaestio de intellectu agente, utrum sit aliquid animae vel non” (f. 67ra) which probably indicates that at least the first three questions belong together. And if that is the case, the author of the second question must also be Adam. Although this is only circumstantial, I will refer here to these parts of the commentary as through Adam Whitby is the author. Taken together we could refer to the authors of the text as ‘Adam Whitby et alii’ as he is really the only one of the multiple authors who has a full name in the ascriptions.

### *Manuscript sigla*

P Prague, Kapit Knihovna, M.80: ff. 42–78.

<sup>1</sup> As far as I know only published in digital form on <http://rrp.stanford.edu/pragM80-xml.html>.

<sup>2</sup> Podlaha 1922: 314 on the 14th century dating of the volume.

<sup>3</sup> Lohr 1967: 324.

<sup>4</sup> What Gauthier refers to as the second Averroism, see Gauthier 1984: 267\*, n1.

<sup>5</sup> Lapidge, Nocentini, and Santi 2000–: I.1, p. 35.

<sup>6</sup> Weijers 1994: 31.

<sup>7</sup> See also Köhler 2008: 45, n. 147.

### III.2 Utrum intellectus noster intelligit <se> per speciem suam

*Quoniam autem aliud est magnitudo et magnitudinis esse. Quaestio est super hoc quod vult Averroes, quod intellectus noster intelligit <se> per speciem suam.* P 66vb

1.1 Contra quod sic: Formae <im> materiales, qua <im> materiales sunt, non indigent intelligi per speciem abstractam ab illis; cum ergo intellectus sit forma immaterialis, non indiget intelligi per aliquam speciem abstractam ab illo, sed seipso potest intelligi.

1.2 Item intellectus, cum sit forma immaterialis, est abstractus ultima abstractione, quare non abstrahetur alia species ab illo per quam intelligitur, quare seipso intelligitur.

1.3 Item si intellectus intelligeret se per speciem suam, cum eodem modo intelligat res materiales, tunc non esset differentia intelligendi inter intelligens et intellectum in separatis a materia et non separatis. Dicit tamen Aristoteles quod differentia est. “In separatis enim a materia,” ut dicit, “est idem intelligens et intellectum”, quare videtur quod intellectus intelligat se seipso et non a sua specie, et hoc concedendum est.

Super hoc, cum dubitatur quomodo hoc esse possit quod idem penitus sit intelligens et intellectum, cum intelligens sit motum et intellectum movens, et movens et motum oporteat differre secundum essentiam, dicendum quod si intellectum esset physice movens, et intelligens physice motum, teneret oppositio; sed non est sic; immo communiter est hoc movens et hoc motum.

1.4 Sed adhuc est quaestio super hoc quod dicit <Philosophus> quod in separatis a materia idem est intelligens et quod intelligitur; tunc enim, cum unus intellectus intelligit †a impossibile†, dicendum quod haec propositio ‘in separatis a materia et cetera’ sic debet intelligi quod in hiis idem est intelligens et intellectum, cum intelligens convertit se super se, nec est hoc universaliter verum.

Sed tunc est quaestio quomodo unus intellectus intelligit alium, utrum per seipsum vel per suam speciem. Si per seipsum, ergo unus intellectus erit essentialiter in alio intelligente ipsum, quod est impossibile. Quod etiam unus non intelligat alium per speciem suam sic videtur: Formae materiales, quia materiales sunt, indigent intelligi per speciem abstractam ab illis; cum ergo ipsi intellectus non sint formae materiales, non indigent intelligi per speciem abstractam ab illis.

1.5 Item intellectus, cum sit forma immaterialis, est abstractus ultima abstractione. Ergo | species non potest abstrahi ab illo per quam intelligatur. P 67ra

1.6 Item quicquid sit de intelligentibus causatis a primo intellectu, qui est causa prima, <a quo> nihil abstrahi potest, nihil enim ipso est simplicius; abstractum autem simplicius est eo a quo abstrahitur; causa ergo prima per speciem abstractam ab illa non intelligitur.

35 Forte dicit quod solus intellectus possibilis intelligit per receptionem specierum, nullus autem intellectus alius, sive causatus sive non, intelligit per receptionem specierum; tunc tantum convertendo se supra se et intelligendo se omnia alia intelligit.

2 Arist., DA III.4 429b10–22 3 Averr. *Comm. DA III com. 8*, p. 420.19–21. 11–12 Arist. DA III.4 430a3–4.

4 non ] ideo P 12 et non separatis *post materia del.* P 17 movens ] motum P 22 intelligens<sup>2</sup> ] intelligunt P 28 intelligi ] *in marg.* P 36 causatus ] causatur P

Sed tunc non erit diversus modus intelligendi in primo et in intellectibus causatis. Primum enim intelligit intelligendo se et intelligendo se intelligit omnia alia; sed dicit quod immo differentia est; primum enim intelligendo se intelligit omnia alia, et hoc ex natura propria; intellectus <autem> causatus intelligendo se intelligit omnia alia non ex sua natura, sed per virtutem aliunde receptam. 5

Sed contra hoc sic: In sola causa prima relucet formae exemplares omnium, quia sola causa prima convertendo se supra se intelligit omnia.

Item omne causatum habet formam completivam qua differt essentialiter ab omni alio, quare in forma istius causati <non> relucet formae omnium, quare nullum causatum convertendo se supra se intelligit omnia. 10

Forte dicit quod intellectus causatus est propinqua imago causae primae, et ideo intellectus causatus intelligendo se ex consequenti intelligit causam primam in qua intellecta omnia intelligit.

Et potest adduci exemplum tale: Fantasma imaginatum et est pictura et est imago, et ideo imaginativa dupliciter potest convertere se super fantasma imaginatum, scilicet vel ut est pictura vel imago, si secundo modo, tunc per ipsam imaginem comprehensam comprehendit rem extra cuius est imago; similiter intellectus causatus est res quaedam in se, et est imago propinqua primae causae. Potest ergo convertere se super se dupliciter, vel ut est res vel ut est imago. Si secundo modo, tunc in se intellecto ex consequenti intelliget causam primam in qua intellecta intelligit omnia. 15 20

Habito quod sic, lux corporalis exterior pura primo recipitur in visu corporali, quare lux spiritalis pura primo recipitur in visu spiritali. Cum ergo causa prima sit spiritalis pura, intellectus vero causatus quidam visus spiritalis, quare causa prima primo suscipitur in intellectu causato, quare intellectus causatus non primo intelligit se et ex consequenti causam primam, sed magis e converso. 25

Item, lux corporalis pura existens essentialiter in visu corporali non videtur a visu corporali per imaginem suam, sed per essentiam suam, quare lux pura spiritalis existens essentialiter in visu spiritali non videbitur a visu spiritali per imaginem suam, sed per essentiam suam. Cum ergo causa prima sit lux spiritalis pura existens essentialiter in intellectu causato, qui est sicut visus spiritalis, non videbitur ab intellectu causato per imaginem suam, sed per essentiam suam. 30

Ad hoc dicendum quod intellectus causatus separatus primo intelligit causam primam et intelligendo ipsam intelligit omnia in formis exemplaribus omnium quae sunt in ipsa. Et iste est modus unus intelligendi quem habet huiusmodi intellectus quo cognoscit causata omnia in sua causa, huiusmodi etiam intellectus habet species omnium aliorum causatorum sibi cognatas et concreatas, sicut intellectus possibilis habet huiusmodi acquisitas, et intellectus causatus separatus per species sibi connatas intelligit omnia causata in se ipsis sicut intellectus possibilis per species rerum acquisitas intelligit res in seipsis. 35

14 Arist. *Mem.* 2 450b20–22.

8 omni ] omnium P 21 habito ] hoc P 27 imaginem ] imaginationem a.c. P

## C.2 Adam Buckfield: *Sententia super librum De anima*

This text is dated to between 1238 and 1249, and may possibly be from before 1245. On the dating and details of whether there is one or more redactions, see section 2.5.3 on page 49, which influences the decision here to present the two texts that are considered to be by Buckfield and Ps.-Adam Buckfield respectively as two different texts.

According to Lohr there are three redactions in the following manuscripts.

Redaction 1    Corpus Christi 111: 252a–294d, Madrid 1067: 73r–76v, Bologna 1180: 24a–53b, Canon. Misc. 322: 1–63v, BNF Lat. 6319: 112r–114r.

Redaction 2    Ambros. 2° 318: 174ra–225a (new foliation, old: 173ra–223a), Merton 272: 1r–22r, Jagiellońska 726: 1r–40v, Madrid 9726: 82v, Vat. Urb. 206: 259a–299a, Marciana Lat. VI.1: 130b–161a.

Redaction 3    Berlin SB 906: 115a–173b

Gauthier thinks there is only one redaction with two so-called redactions that have been mistakenly attributed to Adam but are actually not by him. One of those is the last part of the Merton 272 witness (15v–22r), the other is the full commentary in Berlin SB 906: 115a–173b.<sup>8</sup> That analysis is reflected in the presentation of the manuscripts by Weijers and Wood.<sup>9</sup>

I follow the analysis of Gauthier here and give a transcription of a selection of the witnesses. The base text that I have used is in Ambros. 2° 318: 216v–217v. In some places one or more of the manuscripts BNF Lat. 6319: 130v, Canon. Misc. 322: 53ra, Vat. Urb. 206: 292v, and Bologna 2344: 48v–49r have been included to help solve textual uncertainties. Bologna 2344: 24r–53v has been transcribed and published online as part of the Richard Rufus Project.<sup>10</sup>

### *Manuscript sigla*

- E    Erfurt, Universitätsbibliothek, CA 2° 318: 174ra–225ra.
- B    Bologna, Biblioteca universitaria, 2344: 24r–53v.
- V    Vatican, Vatican Library, Urbinus Latinus 206: 259a–299a.
- O    Oxford, Bodleian Library, Canon. Misc. 322: 1–63v.
- P    Paris, Bibliothèque National de France, Latin 6319: 112r–134r.

<sup>8</sup> Gauthier 1984: 247\*.

<sup>9</sup> Weijers 1994: 25, Wood 2018: 59.

<sup>10</sup> Buckfield 2017.

## Liber tertius, lectio secunda

E 216va Consequenter, ibi, *Cum autem*, declarat quomodo intellectus possibilis egreditur de potentia accidentali ad actum, intendens <quod> cum iam est intelligens in potentia accidentali sive secundum habitum, tunc dicitur sciens et intelligens actu, quod quidem contingit cum se ipso potest ingredi in actum nisi prohibeatur. Verumtamen non simpliciter dicitur ad huc intellectus secundum actum, sed est quodammodo in potentia, sicut fuit dum fuit in potentia essentiali, scilicet sicut fuit ante addiscere aut ante inventionem, licet non eodem modo ut in potentia. Adhuc autem cum hoc secundo modo est in potentia, potens est ut intelligit seipsum. Quo tamen modo intelligit seipsum patebit inferius. Sic igitur cum est in potentia accidentali est omnino impassibilis in egrediendo in actum. 5 10

||2|| (ed.)

E 217ra | *Dubitabit autem*. Procedit dubitando ubi sic procedit: Primo movet quasdam dubitationes secundo ut ibi *aut pati* eas solvit. Movet autem duas dubitationes circa substantiam intellectus possibilis. Prima est an intellectus sit substantia simplex et omnino impassibilis, ut praeostensum est, non habens communicationem cum alia forma materiali, quod etiam concessit Anaxagoras, potest aliquis dubitare, cum ita sic quomodo intelliget et hoc, si intelligere sit aliquando pati. Quae enim agunt et patiuntur ad invicem videntur habere aliquod commune; cum igitur intellectus nullam habeat communicationem formis materialibus, ut dictum est, et intelligere sit pati a formis intelligibilibus, ut videtur intellectus, nullam formam materialem intelliget. 15

Consequenter cum dicit *amplius autem* movet secundam dubitationem, et est si intellectus autem intelligit se ut praedictum est, tunc est dubium utrum intellectus seipso intelligit a se aut per speciem suam, sicut aliae res intelligibiles intelliguntur per species suas in ipso modo, scilicet si ipse intelligitur tunc sicut hoc intellectum est, scilicet intelligens. Arguitur ut videtur omnia alia intellecta erint intelligentia, cum omne intelligibile sive intellectum videatur | esse unum specie, id est uno et eodem modo intelligibile. Si autem secundo modo, scilicet intellectus intelligatur per suam speciem, sicut alia intelligibilia, tunc habebit intellectus formam aliquam sibi admixtam per quam intelligetur sicut et alia intelliguntur per suas formas, et si hoc, tunc sicut alia intelligibilia, cum intelliguntur non intelligunt, similiter nec intellectus cum intelligatur non intelliget, aut si intellectus cum intelligitur intelligat et alia similiter cum intelliguntur intelligunt. 20 25

E 217rb Consequenter cum dicit *aut pati* solvit istas quaestiones. Et primam, intendens quod etsi intellectus dicitur pati ab intelligibili, erit hoc consequenter sumendo pati, quoniam dicitur passio in formis naturalibus; intellectus enim solum patitur in recipiendo et sine omni transmutatione et corruptione; forma autem materialis in patiando transmutatur et corrumpitur. Unde comparat intellectum, cum est in potentia ad susceptionem intelligibilium nullum habens actu, tabulae nudae quae potens est recipere omnes figuras. Sicut enim tabula nuda non patitur, ita autem transmutatur cum recipit picturas creatas in ipsa, sed magis perficitur per ipsas. Similiter intellectus non patitur a formis intelligibilibus, sed magis per ipsas perficitur et sic patet quod solvitur illa dubitatio per distinctionem aequivocationis. Verbi huius, scilicet 30 35

Consequenter cum dicit *aut pati* solvit istas quaestiones. Et primam, intendens quod etsi intellectus dicitur pati ab intelligibili, erit hoc consequenter sumendo pati, quoniam dicitur passio in formis naturalibus; intellectus enim solum patitur in recipiendo et sine omni transmutatione et corruptione; forma autem materialis in patiando transmutatur et corrumpitur. Unde comparat intellectum, cum est in potentia ad susceptionem intelligibilium nullum habens actu, tabulae nudae quae potens est recipere omnes figuras. Sicut enim tabula nuda non patitur, ita autem transmutatur cum recipit picturas creatas in ipsa, sed magis perficitur per ipsas. Similiter intellectus non patitur a formis intelligibilibus, sed magis per ipsas perficitur et sic patet quod solvitur illa dubitatio per distinctionem aequivocationis. Verbi huius, scilicet 30 35

2 Arist. DA III.4, 429b5. 11 Arist. DA III.4, 429b22. 12 Arist. DA III.4, 429b29. 19 Arist. DA III.4, 429b26. 30 Arist. DA III.4, 429b29.

7 inventionem ] adventionem a.c. E 17 intell post intellectus del. E 25 sicut ] fuit E

‘pati’, ubi enim dicitur aliquid proprie pati, ibi oportet esse commune agenti et patienti, sicut est in actione et passione naturali, communiter autem dicendo ‘pati’ ut si dicitur intellectus pati ab intelligentia nequaquam.

Consequenter cum dicit *et ipse autem* solvit secundam dubitationem. Et habet illa pars duas, in prima determinat quae pars illius dubitationis est eligenda, secundo ut ibi *non oportet autem*, quia videbatur sequi ex illa parte dubitationis quam eligit inconveniens docet ipse vitare. Igitur in parte prima, quod prima pars dubitationis eligenda est, intendens quod intellectus seipso seipso est intelligibilis sicut nullo mediante comprehensa ab intellectu seipsa intelligitur et non per suam speciem, aliter enim esset processus in infinitum. Et quod intellectus hoc modo seipso intelligitur et non per speciem suam probat cum dicit *in hiis quidem* per hoc quod in formis penitus immaterialibus idem est intellectus et quod intelligitur, idem etiam est speculans et speculatum; in formis autem materialibus non sic est, sed intellectus <est> aliud ab eo quod intelligitur, et etiam speculans ab eo quod speculatur; cum igitur intellectus | sit forma immaterialis, ut praeostensum est, intellectus seipso est intelligens, et non per speciem intellectus seipso et non per aliam sui speciem.

E 2017va

Commentator tamen non hoc modo solvit hanc quaestionem, sed manifeste videtur consentire in secundam partem quaestionis. Sed quod debeat solvi ut dictum est, per nostram translationem manifestum est, et etiam per intellectum Aristotelis in fine huius capituli.

Consequenter cum dicit *non autem semper* docet vitare inconveniens quod videtur sequi ex illa parte dubitationis quam eligit intendens quod causa propter quam alia intelligibilia, cum intelliguntur ab intellectu non intelligunt, licet intellectus cum intelligitur intelligat, est quia unumquodque intelligibile aliud ab intellectu sive a substantiis separatis, quia est forma materialis, non est intelligibile in actu, neque intellectus in actu, sed solum in potentia. Propter hoc huiusmodi intelligibilia, licet intelligantur non intelligunt; illud enim quod est in potentia sive virtus intellectus oportet quod sit sine materia cuiusmodi est intellectus, et tali virtuti inest actu intelligere; cum igitur intellectus, qui huiusmodi est, intelligitur intelligit, licet alia intelligibilia cum intelligantur non intelligant.

4 Arist. DA III.4, 430a2. 5 Arist. DA III.4, 430a5. 10 Arist. DA III.4, 430a3. 19 Arist. DA III.4, 430a5.

17 sed quod ] si E; sed quod sic B 17 ut ] sicut B 17 patet post est B 17 nostram ] E V P; aliam B; illam C 18 manifestum ] verum B C 23 non ] sup. lin. E

### C.3 Ps.-Adam of Buckfield: Expositio in De anima I–III

This commentary, which is preserved as an integrated part of Buckfield's commentary, has been identified as a different text by Gauthier (rather than merely a different redaction). Weijers and Wood have followed his analysis, and so do I in the historical chapter.<sup>11</sup>

The text has only been identified in 15v–22r, but I believe to have found another witness to the text in Ambros. 4° 293: 86r–100v. If that is true, this will provide us with a witness to the full text of the commentary, unlike the Merton witness, which only contains a fragment on books two and three. I have not yet had the opportunity to study the hypothesis further, nor to fully collate the Erfurt witness with the presented transcription of the Merton text, so the hypothesis still needs to be confirmed.

The text is closely related to that of Buckfield and certainly more or less contemporary with that commentary, which puts it around 1250.

*Manuscript sigla*

M Oxford, Merton College Library, 272: 15v–22r.

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<sup>11</sup> Weijers 1994: 25, Wood 2018: 59, cf. the section on the Buckfields on page 49.

## Liber tertius, lectio secunda

*Cum autem unaquaque.* Ostenso qualiter intellectus possibilis se habet in egrediendo de potentia essentiali ad actum. Hic oportet qualiter se habet cum intelligit in potentia accidentali in egrediendo ad actum, et intendit quod est immaterialis et impassibilis sicut prius dictum. Ergo  
 5 quod, cum intellectus sciat res in habitu, et hoc est cum est in potentia accidentali, tunc dicitur sciens secundum actum primum; et quod sit sciens in habitu accidit cum possit per se operari et considerare cum vult, verumtamen non est intellectus; tunc simpliciter in actu sed est quodammodo in potentia, scilicet accidentali, sed non est sic in potentia sicut fuit in potentia ante inventionem et doctrinam; et etiam cum hoc secundo modo sit in potentia, scilicet accidentali,  
 10 potens intelligere seipsum.

||2|| (ed.)

| *Dubitabit aliquis.* Hic movet duas dubitationes circa praedeterminata et eos dissolvit. Et  
 primo movet eas, et est prima: Cum intellectus sit substantia simplex et omnino impassibilis non habens communicationem cum aliquam forma materiali, ut praedictum est, sicut etiam dixit Anaxagoras, quomodo tunc intelliget formas materiales, et hoc si intelligere sit quoddam  
 15 pati. Quae enim agunt et patiuntur adinvicem videntur habere aliquod commune; et intellectus, cum forma in materia non communicat quare non patietur ab ea, nec eam intelliget.

Secunda dubitatio ibi *amplius autem*, et est si intellectus sit intelligibilis a seipso sicut dictum est, aut ergo est intelligibilis per seipsum aut per formam sive speciem existentem in eo. Si primo modo, tunc eadem ratione omnia alia intellecta erunt intelligentia vel possunt intelligere;  
 20 illud consequens sit quod tunc eadem ratione alia intelligibilia intelliguntur per seipsa et non per species suas; omnia enim intelligibilia videntur esse unum specie, et hoc est eodem modo intelligibilia. Si autem intellectus intelligatur secundo modo, scilicet per speciem existentem in ipso, tunc habebit intellectus formam aliquam sibi mixtam sive speciem per quam intelligitur sicut alia intelligibilia intelliguntur per suas species, et ita sicut alia, cum intelliguntur, non  
 25 intelligunt, similiter intellectus cum intelligitur non intelliget.

Et cum dicit *aut pati* solvit eas, et primo primam dubitationem dicens quod communiter dicitur pati quando dicitur quod intellectus patitur ab intelligibili, et communius quoniam sit pati naturale, quod est inter formas naturales contrarias; passio enim hoc secundo modo est cum transmutatione et corruptione aliqua, et sic mediante aliquo quod est commune agenti et  
 30 patienti. Incontinuata enim ut album et dulce non agunt nec patiuntur adinvicem. Passio vero primo modo est sola receptio, quae est sine transmutatione et corruptione, nec oportet quod fiat per aliquod commune. Unde sicut dictum est, intellectus solum est in potentia receptiva respectu intelligibilium, et naturalis ipsorum habet actu antequam intelligat actu, et sicut dictum, oportet sic esse in intellectu in receptione intelligibilium sicut est in tabula nuda in receptione  
 35 picturae, ita scilicet quod intellectus non transmutatur nec patitur substantialiter in receptione intelligibilium, sed magis perficitur per ipsa et solum est in potentia receptiva ad ipsa, sicut tabula nuda recipit picturas et non transmutatur proprie sed quodammodo perficitur per eas.

2 Arist. *DA* III.4, 429b5. 11 Arist. *DA* III.4, 429b22. 17 Arist. *DA* III.4, 429b26. 26 Arist. *DA* III.4, 429b29.

24 intelligibilia *post* alia *del.* M 26 eas ] et M 32 ad ipsa *post* receptiva *del.* M

*Et ipse autem intellectus.* Hic solvit secundam dubitationem, et primo docet quae pars dubitationis est eligenda dicens secundum quasdam quod ipse intellectus seipso est intelligibilis, sicut species immediatae comprehensae ab intellectu seipsis intelliguntur et non per suas species, quia si per species intelligerentur esset processus in infinitum. Et quod intellectus sic seipso intelligatur et non per suam speciem probat ibi *in hiis quidem* per hoc quod in formis immaterialibus penitus idem est intellectus et quod intelligitur; idem etiam est speculatio vel operatio speculativa et speculans; cum igitur intellectus sit forma immaterialis ut praedictum, tunc idem erit intelligens et intellectum, et ita seipsa intelligatur. 5

Iste modus legendi satis videtur consonus nostrae translationi et etiam veritati Commentatoris, et quidam famosi manifeste consentiunt in partem aliam, scilicet quod intelligit se per speciem. Ambe tamen expositiones possunt habere veritatem et simul stare hoc modo: Intellectus possibilis intelligit se per seipsum, hoc est non per speciem sui ipsius, proprie autem sit abstracta a seipso. Item intelligit se non per se tantum, sed per speciem receptam in ipso. Unde cum intellexerit aliquid aliud a se per speciem abstractam ab illo alio, tunc per illam speciem, cum actu habuerit illam praesens se, intelligit seipsum. Sunt ergo aliae res intellectae per species existentes in ipsis in potentia abstractas ab ipsis et stans in actu per intellectum agentem et receptas in intellectu possibili. Intellectus vero possibilis per istam speciem actu in eo convertendo se supra se seipsum intelligit et fortuite haec species non est causa intelligere, sed occasio necessaria. 10 15

*Non autem semper.* Hic docet vitare inconueniens quod videtur sequi ex illa parte dubitationis cui consentit dicens quod causa propter quam alia intelligibilia, cum intelligantur, non intelligant, licet intellectus cum intelligatur intelligat †est quia unde† quod est intelligibile aliud ab intellectu, et a substantiis separatis est forma quoddammodo materialis, et ideo non est intelligibile in actu, secundum quod in huiusmodi materia est, nec etiam intellectis est in actu, et ideo licet intelligatur non tamen intelligit. Oportet enim ratio sive virtus intelligens sit sine materia ad minus materiali, cuius est intellectus, et tali virtuti inest actu intelligere, et propter hoc solus intellectus cum intelligatur intelligit. 20 25

1 Arist. *DA* III.4, 430a2. 5 Arist. *DA* III.4, 430a3. 20 Arist. *DA* III.4, 430a5.

18 fortuite ] for<sup>te</sup> *ut vid.* M

### C.4 Anonymus Assisi: *Quaestiones in De anima III*

The text exists in a single manuscript, Assisi 290, from the 14th century, probably English. This text is the last in the manuscript, and most if not all of the preceding three texts are by Bartholomaeus of Bodekisham (*Quaestiones super primum Physicorum*, *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum* (dubious according to Lohr), and *Quaestiones in tres libros De anima* bk. 2 only).<sup>12</sup> It is likely to be roughly contemporary with the commentaries of Bartholomaeus of Bodekisham. This would place the text in the last quarter of the 13th century, which also aligns well with the structure and content of the question included here.

#### *Manuscript sigla*

A Assisi, Biblioteca Convento di San Francesco, ms. 290: 95r–107v.

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<sup>12</sup> Cenci 1981: II.447, cf. Lohr 1974: 124–5.

### III.15: Utrum intellectus secundum se sit intelligibilis tamquam proprium obiectum

A 104vb Quaeritur nunc utrum intellectus secundum se sit intelligibilis tamquam proprium obiectum sui ipsius.

1.1 Et videtur quod sic, nam per Philosophum in littera “unumquodque est intelligibile in quantum a materia separabile”; sed intellectus est omnino separabilis a materia secundum essentiam, quia est substantia simpliciter immaterialis; ergo erit per se intelligibilis. Per consequens potest intelligi a seipso tamquam obiectum. 5

1.2 Praeterea, per Commentatorem in isto tertio: “ex intellectu et intellecto fit verius unum quam ex materia et forma”, et Philosophus similiter: “intellectus in actu et intellectum in actu sunt unum secundum actum.” Ex hoc arguo: intellectus est illud idem quod intelligitur; quod intelligitur est intelligibile; ergo intellectus est intelligibilis. 10

1.3 Praeterea per Philosophum in quinto “duplex est actio, una quae manet in agente, alia quae transit in rem extrinsecam”; unde dicit quod intelligere est actio manens in agente, sed in tali actione oportet id quod agitur esse unitum cum agente, illud ergo quod intelligitur oportet esse unitum ipsi intellectui; si enim esset separatum ab intellectu, iam eius actio transiret in aliud, quod negat Philosophus; cum igitur intellectus sit maxime sibi un<it>us, et eius intelligere recipitur in ipso maxime, ergo erit quod intelligitur et per consequens intelligibile. 15

1.4 Praeterea intelligentia separata intelligit suam essentiam; ergo intellectus noster. Consequentia apparet quia intellectus noster est in eodem genere cum intelligentiis. 20

2 Ad oppositum.

2.1 Intellectus est in potentia; ergo est in potentia intelligibilis. Consequentia apparet quia sicut aliquid est sic intelligitur.

2.2 Praeterea, si intellectus esset per se intelligibilis, cum una sit ratio omnium intelligibilium, sequeretur quod alia intelligibilia intelligerent sicut intellectus.

3.1 Ad quaestionem dicendum quod intellectus noster, in quantum est forma et perfectio corporis, non est intelligibilis nisi in potentia solum. Et ratio huius est per Philosophum in isto tertio: “intellectus noster est in potentia receptiva omnium formarum intelligibilium.” Unde dicit Commentator quod “est in potentia ad formas intelligibiles ut materia prima ad formas individuales”, nunc autem unumquodque est intelligibile secundum quod est actu, ut dicit Philosophus nono *Metaphysicae*; intellectus ergo non erit intelligibilis cum sit ens in sola potentia respectu cuiuscumque intelligibilis; unde, sicut materia prima ex hoc quod est in potentia receptiva omnium formarum de se nullam habet, sed formam recipit ab extra, sic intellectus quia est in potentia receptiva omnium intelligibilium nullum sibi determinat, nec etiam recipit 25

4–5 Arist. *DA* III.4 429b21–22 (?). Cf. *DA* III.4 429b4–5 et III.8.431b28–29. 8–9 Aver. *Comm. DA* com. III.5 ad III.4 429a21–24, p. 404.501–512 (ed. Crawford). 9–10 Arist. *DA* III.4 430a2–3. 12–13 Locus non inventus, sed num ad Arist. *Metaph.* IX.8 1050a30–b2 aspicit? 26–27 Arist. *DA* III.4 429a14–15 28–29 Aver. *Com. in DA* com. III.5 ad III.4 429a21–24, p. 387–88.27–32 (ed. Crawford). 29–30 Arist. *Metaph.*, IX.10 1051b30–32. Cf. Arist. *Metaph.*, IX.9 1051a29–31 et *Auct. Arist.* (ed. Hamesse), 6.234.

6 et post intelligibilis del. A 7 obiectum ] obiecto A 10 illud ] id A 15 si ] sed a.c. A 28 ut ] vel A

aliquid intelligibilium nisi cum movetur ab extra; est igitur intellectus in quantum est forma corporis humani intelligibilis solum in potentia.

Ista autem potentia reducitur ad actum, nam sicut dicit Philosophus superius in littera “intellectus intelligit seipsum aliquando”, nam in hoc differt a sensu, nam sensus non sentit seipsum. Similiter dicit auctor *De causis* “omnis substantia sciens vel intelligens intelligit seipsam”, sed statim post dicit “ergo redit supra seipsum reditione completa”. Oportet tunc ponere quod intellectus quamvis sit in potentia intelligibilis, aliquando seipsum intelligit actu, et propter hoc dicit Commentator “intellectus intelligit se sicut et alia” et similiter Philosophus.

3.2 Sed per quem modum ista potentia reducitur ad actum, ut intellectus actu intelligatur a seipso, dubium est. Et propter hoc intelligendum quod intellectus intelligens proprium obiectum intelligit se intelligere, et ita redit ab obiecto supra actum suum. Cognoscit enim quod talis est suus actus intelligendi. Actus autem procedit a virtute et substantia, et ideo ultimo redit supra suam substantiam, et sic eam cognoscit. Unde illa eadem species quae est principium intelligendi obiectum extra est etiam principium intelligendi substantiam intellectus, et etiam singulare materiale aliter tamen et aliter.

3.3 Propter hoc intelligendum est quod per eandem speciem acquiritur triplex cognitio in nobis, scilicet obiecti et singularis materialis et ipsius intellectus. Istud apparet sic: nam intellectus agens illuminans | phantasma abstrahit speciem, quae quidem species actuat vel informat intellectum possibilem, et tunc actu intelligit rem cuius est illa species; quia specie existente in intellectu possibili, cum ista species sit assimilatio rei statim per hanc speciem fit res intelligibilis actu, unde impossibile est speciem actu informare intellectum, nisi statim res simul intelligatur per eam; et propter hoc dicit Philosophus quod intellectus in actu et intellectum in actu sunt unum secundum actum, et ita species est principium immediatum cognoscendi obiectum. Sed si fiat reditio ab obiecto ad speciem, et a specie ad phantasma, et iterum ad singulare sensibile, a quo primo exivit illa species, per hunc modum intelligitur singulare sensibile, ut prius dictum est. Si autem ab obiecto usque ad actum intelligendi fiat reditio, sicut intellectus intelligit seipsum sit cognitio, hoc modo vel illo semper una species est principium cognoscendi. Prius tamen et immediate est principium cognoscendi obiectum, per posterius et mediate est principium cognoscendi alia. Unde dicendum est quod intellectus non est intelligibilis in actu nisi per hoc quod informatur prius aliqua specie rei extra, sicut nec materia prima aliquem actum habet nisi a forma quam recipit per transmutationem agentis. Et ista vera sunt de intellectu coniuncto, utrum tamen intellectus separatus a corpore intelligat se isto modo alia ratio est, nec pertinet ad naturale considerare.

*Ad 1.1* Ad primum argumentum. Cum dicitur “unumquodque est intelligibile et cetera”, dicendum est quod unumquodque ens actu est intelligibile in quantum seipsum separatur a materia; sed iam dictum est quod intellectus est in potentia intelligibilis; ideo non concludit.

*Ad 1.2* Ad secundum. Cum dicitur “ex intellectu et intellecto et cetera”, dicendum est quod ex intellectu et intellecto fit verius unum quam ex materia et forma. Hoc dicit Commen-

3–4 Arist. *DA* III.4 429b5–9 (?) 5–6 *Liber de causis*, XV.124. 8 *Aver. Com. in DA* com. III.15 ad III.4 430a2–5, p. 434.6–17 (ed. Crawford). 8 Arist. *DA* III.4.430a2–3. 22–23 Arist. *DA* III.4 430a2–3.

21 si post simul del. A 28 s post cognoscendi del. A 31 quam ] quae a.c. A

A 105ra

tator, quia ex hiis fit simplicius unum quam ex materia et forma. Non autem intelligit quod intellectus secundum suam naturam sit res intellecta ita quod de ratione sui possit intelligi, nec etiam (cum dicit Philosophus quod intellectus et intellectum sunt unum) non intelligit quod intellectus de ratione sui et per se sit illud quod est intellectum, quia ut praedictum est non est intelligibile, nisi per hoc quod recipit speciem ab extra, sed pro tanto dicit hoc quia unus est actus numero intelligibilis in actu et intelligentis in actu, quia impossibile quod intelligibile sit in actu nisi simul sit intelligens in actu, et ita unico actu actuatur et intelligibile et intelligens. Et propter hoc dicit quod sunt unum et actum, et cum dicitur ulterius “intellectus est id quod intelligitur”, verum est, sed non de se; immo multo posterius intelligitur quam ipsum obiectum, ut visum est.

*Ad 1.3* Ad tertium. Cum dicitur “duplex est operatio”, dicendum quod intellectus est maxime sibi ipsi un(it)us et etiam praesens; sed ex hoc non sequitur quod seipsum intelligit per se, quia nihil intelligit nisi per receptionem ab extra; unde quantum ad cognitionem dicitur de eo quod est velut tabula nuda, unde est in potentia ad intelligere seipsum sicut et alia, vel magis.

*Ad 1.4* Ad quartum. Cum dicitur “intelligentia intelligit et cetera,” concedatur, et tunc dicendum quod non est simile de intellectu nostro, quia natura intelligentiae separatae est ens completum, et respectu esse et respectu operationis, et ideo de se habet quod possit intelligere unumquodque intelligibile, sed sic non est de intellectu nostro, nam intellectus unitus corpori intelligit secundum suum modum essendi in corpore, et ideo intelligit mediante virtute sensitiva a qua haurit species intelligibiles, et propter hoc est solum in potentia respectu intelligibilis.

1 Aver. *Comm. in DA com.* III.5 ad III.4 429a21–24, p. 404.501–512 (ed. Crawford) (?) 3 Arist. *DA* III.4 430a2–3. 8–9 Locus non inventus, sed confer Philoponus *Com. in DA*, ad III.4 429b9, p. 21.11–18.

16 est<sup>1</sup> ] *ut vid.* A 19 corpore ] corpori *corr. ex corpore* A

### C.5 Anonymus Digby 55: *Quaestiones in De anima III*

This short text stretches over three folios in the only witness of the text, Digby 55: 114r–117r. It is an English manuscript from the last half of the 13th century.<sup>13</sup> According to Thomson the text extends over the folios 114r–125v, but as it is a section of heterogeneous questions on different subjects (as he also notes), I have chosen to let the commentary conclude on folio 117r, although it does not look like a complete text. The codex is a collection of different texts from the arts faculty, including quite a bit of Aristotelian commentaries. On folios 72r–82v it contains an anonymous *expositio* on *De anima* (not included in this study).

*Manuscript sigla*

D Oxford, Bodleian Library, Digby 55: 114r–117.

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<sup>13</sup> Thomson 2011: 125.

### III.12: Utrum intellectus possit intelligere se

D 115vb Quaeritur utrum intellectus possit intelligere se.

1 Et quod non.

1.1 Probatio: Impossibile enim est idem esse movens et motum et cetera.

2.1 Ad oppositum est Aristoteles, qui dicit quod “intellectus intelligit seipsum”, et postea 5  
dicit quod “intellectus est intelligentia”.

3.1 Arguitur quod cum intellectus possibilis est aliquo modo in actu, potest seipsum  
intelligere. Intellectus autem possibilis numquam intelligit se antequam sit in actu, sed non est  
in actu quando est sicut tabula nuda, et ideo tunc non potest intelligere se. Sed est in actu cum  
repperit aliquam formam in actu intellectam, idem enim est actus intelligentis et intellecti, et 10  
tunc potest se ipsum intelligere. Unde sic seipsum intelligens acquisitione alicuius intellecti, et  
sic intellectus intelligit se per posterius, quia intelligit se per rem intellectam.

*Ad 1.1* Ad obiectionem dicitur quod intelligere est actio simplicissima, sed moveri non  
est actio simplex, sed procedit ab uno ad aliud; non sic est de actione quae est intelligere; unde  
non est simile de movente et moto et de intelligente et intellecto. 15

Contra: Intellectus possibilis nihil intelligit nisi per receptionem, iste enim modus intel-  
ligendi solum debetur intellectui possibili; sed impossibile est intellectum possibilem intelli-  
gere se per receptionem, cum nihil possit seipsum recipere, quia omne quod recipit aliud caret  
eodem; igitur intellectus possibilis per nullam actionem quantumcumque simplicem seipsum  
potest intelligere, cum omne suum intelligere sit per receptionem. 20

Solutio per se et primo.

5 Arist. *DA* III.4 429b9 6 Arist. *DA* III.4 430a1–4

10 aliquam ] aliquam a.c. D 10 intellectam ] intellectiva D 19 quantumcumque ] quamcumque  
D

### III.13: Utrum intellectus intelligat se per speciem

Quaeritur utrum intellectus intelligat se per speciem.

D 115vb

1 Et quod non.

1.1 Probatio: Nam in non habentibus materiam idem est intelligens et intellectum; ergo  
5 si intellectus intelligat seipsum per speciem, intelliget seipsum per se, quod falsum est.

1.2 Item non habet aliquam speciem simpliciolem se per quam possit intelligi.

2.1 Ad oppositum est Commentator qui dicit quod intellectus possibilis intelligitur per speciem sicut alia intellecta.

3.1 Dicitur quod intellectus intelligit se per speciem vel intentionem sicut omnia alia  
10 intellecta, sicut dicit Commentator, melius quam per seipsum.

*Ad 1.1, 1.2* Ad obiectionem dicitur quod haec propositio “in ⟨non⟩ habentibus materiam et cetera” intelligenda est in hiis quae nec habent materiam nec conditionem materiae, et quia intellectus possibilis habet conditionem materiae, ideo de ipso non habet intelligi ista propositio. Immo bene potest se intelligere per speciem quae est alia ab ipso intellectu.

15 Contra: Si intellectus possibilis intelligeret se mediante specie, quae esset alia a se, tunc ipsa species aut esset abstracta a se aut ab alio. Non a se, quia tunc ista species semper esset praesens intellectui, et sic posset intellectus possibilis seipsum intelligere semper; nec ab alio constat quia non a phantasmate; | ergo nullo modo potest per huiusmodi speciem seipsum  
116ra intelligere.

20 Dicitur ad hoc quod species qua intellectus possibilis intelligit se, licet sit ei semper praesens sicut aliae species intelligibiles, tamen haec species non est principium intelligendi nisi reducat in actum; sed quam cito haec species reducat in actum, tunc seipsum intelligit intellectus per speciem.

25 Contra: Quocumque modo haec species abstrahatur vel ad actum reducat, hoc est necessarium quod species mediante qua res intelligitur sit simplicior ipsa re intellecta; sed species propter quam intellectus intelligit se non est simplicior ipso intellectu, quia intellectus est materiae penitus impermixtus; ergo et cetera.

30 Ad hoc dicitur quod quanto aliquid est magis in actu, tanto est simplicius eo quod est in potentia; unde intellectus in actu simplicior est seipso existente in potentia; unde possibile est isto modo abstrahere speciem simpliciolem. Et si arguatur non est permixtus corpori, dicitur quod non est permixtus corpori sicut sensus et aliae virtutes materiales et ita debet intelligi cum dicitur quod est impermixtus corpori. Et si ulterius arguatur quod haec species numquam fuit abstracta a phantasmate, dicendum quod bene verum est, nam iste modus est per quem intelligit alia a se.

35 Secundum tamen quod intelligit seipsum sciendum est quod intellectus agens abstrahit speciem ab intellectu possibili existentem in seipso in potentia; unde intellectus intelligit seipsum per speciem abstractam a seipso. Haec tamen abstractio, licet non sit a phantasmate, non ta-

7–8 Averroes *Comm. DA III*, c. 15, p. 434 10 Averroes *Comm. DA III*, c. 15, p. 434

4 subiectum *post est del.* D 8 intellecta ] intelligentia D 10 intellecta ] intelligentia D

men est sine phantasmate penitus, quia non possit intelligere nisi receperit speciem vel formam aliunde, ut a phantasmate.

## C.6 Anonymus Merton 275: *Quaestiones in De anima* *I*

This commentary is preserved in a single manuscript, Merton 275: 88r–101r (new foliation) from the 13th or 14th century of Parisian origin according to Thomson.<sup>14</sup> It is a manuscript dedicated almost exclusively to Aristotelian material and contains no less than five commentaries on *De anima*-manuscript. Three of them are those by Thomas Aquinas, Anonymus Steenberghen, and Anonymus Giele, while the latter two are yet unpublished and anonymous.

This is a commentary on book one.<sup>15</sup> The text is closely connected with Anonymus Vennebusch. In passages of the first question the text is virtually identical, but this text is more expansive in passages (q. 1a differs most from Anonymus Vennebusch). De Raedemaeker and Gauthier consider it a witness to the text of Anonymus Vennebusch, and this very well may be true.<sup>16</sup> But in the first question there are considerable differences in phrasing, and the Merton text contains more material. So at least for that part of the text it may be profitable to analyse them in tandem but with an eye for the differences. Gauthier has also pointed out substantial connections in the preface and first question (where the Merton text in particular differs from Anonymus Vennebusch) with the text of Anonymus Bernardini.<sup>17</sup>

### *Manuscript sigla*

M Oxford, Merton College Library, 275: 88r–101r.

<sup>14</sup> Thomson and Luscombe 2011: 326.

<sup>15</sup> Not the whole text as indicated by Mora-Márquez (2014: 248).

<sup>16</sup> De Raedemaeker 1968–1970: 194–5, Gauthier 1984: 261\*.

<sup>17</sup> Gauthier 1984: 261\*–263\*, cf. Bernardini 2009: xv–xvii.

## Quaestiones in primum De anima

### ⟨Tres quaestiones circa scientiam de anima⟩

#### ⟨1. Utrum nos habeamus cognitionem de anima⟩

M 87ra Circa ingressionem huius scientiae: De motivis tria quaeruntur externis: Primum est utrum nos habeamus cognitionem de anima, secundum utrum sit nobis innata, tertium utrum per substantiam animae aut per speciem. 5

1 Circa primum arguitur sic:

1.1 Nihil cadit in intellectu nisi quod prius fuit in sensu. Cum ergo anima intellectiva non cadit sub sensu eo quod immaterialis est, manifestum est quod non cadet in intellectu; sed de illo quod non cadit in intellectu non est scientia; ergo de anima non poterit esse scientia. 10

1.2 Item arguitur. In libro *De memoria et reminiscentia* dicit quod omne nostrum intelligere est cum continuo et tempore; sed anima non est quid continuum vel temporale sive subiectum tempori; ergo anima non poterit intelligi, et sic adhuc de anima non poterit esse scientia.

1.3 Item arguitur in tertio huius nostrum intelligere vel est fantasma vel non est sine fantasmate; sed anima nec est {est} fantasma, nec cum fantasmate, quoniam est substantia simplex cui nihil admixtum est de fantasmate; quare adhuc de anima non poterit esse scientia. 15

M 87rb 1.4 Item omnis scientia est per causam; sed scientia de | anima non est per causam; igitur vera scientia non est de anima. Probatio minoris est quod operationes, ut signat Aristoteles, cognoscuntur per obiecta, ex operationibus vero cognoscuntur potentiae, ex potentiis ipsa anima, et sic adhuc non prodit per causam, quare adhuc scientia vera non est de aliqua. 20

1.5 Item si scientia esset de anima, hoc non esset nisi quia seipsam cognosceret; sed ipsa seipsam cognoscere non potest, quoniam sicut se habet virtus sensitiva non scit se reflectere supra se ut visus supra videre; quare et cetera.

1.6 Item sic⟨ut⟩ se habet oculus noctuae ad lucem solis, sic intellectus noster ad manifestissima naturae; sed oculus noctuae nullo modo potest recipere lumen solis; ergo nec intellectus manifestissima naturae, sed talium est anima, ergo et cetera. 25

2.1 Oppositum arguitur sic: Propter quod unumquodque tale et illud magis; si ergo per animam et propter animam scimus unumquodque, igitur de anima erit scientia.

2.2 Praeterea cuius sunt causae, ⟨de eo potest esse scientia⟩; sed anima est huiusmodi, ut patet in hoc libro; ergo et cetera. 30

2.3 Item omnis substantia simplex nata est existere per se ⟨et⟩ nata est cognoscere per se; sed anima est huiusmodi; ergo et cetera.

11 Arist. *Mem.* 2, 450a7–9. 15–16 Arist. *DA* III.8, 432a7–14. Cf. Arist. *DA* I.1, 403a8–10. 19 Arist. *DA* I.1, 402b9–22. Cf. Arist. *DA* II.4, 415a14–22.

9 sub ] *sup. lin.* M 10 est ] *corr. ex M* 12 vel ] et vel M 15 arguitur ] dicitur Gauthier 19 signat ] dicit *a.c.* M 23 quoniam probatio s *post* potest *del.* M 25 solis ] *sup. lin.* M 32 et ] *suppl.* Gauthier; *om.* M

2.4 Item nulla propositio est verior illa in qua idem de se dicitur; ergo similiter nulla scientia est verior illa in qua idem est sciens et scitum; sed scientia de anima est huiusmodi, ergo et cetera.

## ⟨2. Utrum eius cognitio sit nobis innata⟩

5 Iuxta hoc quaeritur de secundo utrum eius cognitio sit nobis innata, et arguitur quod sic.

3.1 Omnis cognitio ⟨in qua⟩ cognitum naturaliter est coniunctum cognoscenti est innata; in cognitione animae cognitum est nobis naturaliter coniunctum; ergo et cetera. Major patet de se. Minor declaratur quoniam in cognitione animae a nobis idem est cognoscens et cognitum; anima enim est illud quo scimus ⟨et⟩ intelligimus, ut habetur tertio huius.

10 3.2 Praeterea, quanto virtus cognoscitiva est simplicior et subtilior causato, tanto facilius potest in suam propriam operationem ⟨procedere⟩; virtus intellectiva est simplicior quam sensitiva; ergo et cetera. Sed virtus sensitiva potente praesente sensibili naturaliter procedit ad suam propriam operationem; potente enim sensibili nullo impediendo oculus naturaliter videt illud; ergo virtus intellectiva potest intelligere ipso *intelligibili* [?] potente. Hoc autem non es-  
15 set, nisi cognosceret ⟨*naturaliter* [?]. Cum ergo, si ipsi sit praesens seipsam cognosceret, in hoc autem consistit complectio, quoniam ipsa seipsam cognoscit; ergo cognitio animae est nobis innata.

4.1 Oppositum arguitur: Omnis cognitio quae est in nobis per adiutorium sensus est acquisita, non innata, quoniam sit per abstractionem intellectus a fantasmate; sed cognitio in  
20 nobis sit per adiutorium sensus (tertio huius), quoniam sit procedendo ab obiectis ad opera, ab operationibus ad virtutes, a virtutibus ad substantiam; ergo est acquisita et non innata.

## ⟨3. Utrum cognitio ipsius fiat immediate per suam substantiam vel per aliud medium⟩

Iuxta hoc quaeritur utrum cognitio ipsius fiat immediate per suam substantiam vel per aliud medium.

25 5 Arguitur quod immediate.

5.1 In separatis a materia unumquodque id quod est statim est intelligibile et intellectum (tertio huius); anima aliquid separatum est | a materia sicut ibidem dicit; {aut} ergo ipsa est  
M 87va intelligibile et intellectum simul; et si sic, scientia de anima quam ipsa habet de se est immediate, et non per aliud medium.

30 5.2 Praeterea quanto intelligibile magis approximatur intellecti, tanto magis ab ipso haec intelligit, quoniam intellectus perficitur ex unitate intelligibilis cum intelligibilia; sed anima

20 Arist. *DA* III.7, 430a14–17. 27 Arist. *DA* III.4, 430a2–5. 27 Arist. *III.4* 429a22–b5.

7 coniunctum ] cognitum M 9 huius ] huiusmodi M 11 virtus *post* quam *del.* M 12 potente ] *in marg.* M 14 illud ] illum M 14 intelligibili ] intellectuali M 15 naturaliter ] *om.* M 18 est in ] inest *a.c.* M 27 aliquid ] quid M 28 intelligibile ] intellectus M 28 intellectum ] intellectus M 30 praeterea ] prima M

in cognitione sui de se magis sibi approximatur quam aliquid aliud; ergo in cognitione sui cognoscit immediate, non per medium.

6.1 Oppositum patet per hoc quod dicit Aristoteles inferius de cognitione animae de qua determinatur hic, quod obiecta prima sunt operationibus, et opera potentiis secundum cognitionem, et quod potentiae procedunt substantiam; sed obiecta, operationes et potentiae non sunt idem quod substantia animae; ergo anima in cognitione sui quam habet de se cognoscat per huiusmodi media. 5

### 〈Ad primam quaestionem〉

Ad primam quaestionem dicendum quod de anima potest esse scientia, quoniam cum sit quod simplex per suam potentiam, nata est cognoscere se; unde in separatis a materia statim est idem cognoscens et cognitum, et intelligens et intellectum, sciens et scitum. 10

Et sciendum quod aliquid cognoscitur dupliciter, vel per privationem vel per positionem. Per privationem dupliciter, vel per privationem cuius nihil est, ut prima causa in creaturis; vel cuius aliquid est ut punctus in linea. Per positionem tripliciter, vel per effectus sicut per creaturas devenimus in cognitionem creatoris, et hoc modo procedit scientia de anima; secundo modo per species, et hoc dupliciter quia aut per speciem propriam ut aliquis per idolum sui quod est in anima, vel per speciem alienam, ut Herculem per imaginem; tertio modo per praesentiam ut intelligentia alterius {potens} cognoscit alterum. Anima ergo cognoscit se per effectus suos et per sui praesentiam, et hoc modo habet esse scientia de anima. 15

*Ad 1* Ad rationes. 20

*Ad 1.1* In oppositum dicendum ad primam quod licet anima per se non cadat in sensu, cadit tamen per accidens, ut per suos effectus.

*Ad 1.2* Ad secundum dicendum quod anima secundum suam essentiam non sit res continua et temporalis, tamquam ad suos operationes est continua et temporalis.

*Ad 1.3* Per hoc patet ad tertium. 25

*Ad 1.5* Ad quintum dicendum quod non valet prior quia *sensitiva* [?] <est> virtus materialis et ligata organo, et ideo non potest se convertere supra se; sed anima intellectiva non est sic ligata.

*Ad 1.4* Ad aliud quod arguitur quod ‘omnis scientia est per causam’ et cetera, dicendum quod duplex est scientia: ‘quia’ et ‘propter quid’; auctor autem tenet de scientia ‘propter quid’; scientia autem posita est scientia ‘quia’, et propter hoc non valet ratio. 30

*Ad 1.6* Ad ultimam rationem dicendum quod illa ratio nihil aliud potest includere nisi quia sicut est impossibile oculum noctuae videre lumine solis, sic difficile nos cognoscere manifestissima naturae mediante intellectu.

3 Arist. *DA* II.4, 415a18–21.

5 obiecta ] obiectum M 6 idem ] id M 9 quaestionem ] quaestione M 15 secundo ] alio Gauthier  
17 ut herculem ] et Hercules O 17 praesentiam ] *coni.* Gauthier; potentiam O 18 potens ]  
19 praesentiam ] *coni.* Gauthier; potentiam O 24 tamquam ] tamen quam M 26 quintum ] quartum  
O

### 〈Ad secundam quaestionem〉

Per hoc patet solutio ad secundam quaestionem dicendo quod cognitio animae de qua est hic sermo, non est innata nobis, 〈sed〉 mediante sensu et mediante abstractione facta a fantasmatibus sensualibus, et hoc loquendo de cognitione animae de qua est hic sermo in hac scientia, quamquam habet de se, immo verius totum coniunctum in quantum est actus et perfectio totius corporis; loquendo enim de eius cognitione a se ipsa in statu suae separationis naturaliter se ipsam cognoscit per sui praesentiam.

*Ad 3.1* Ad illud quod arguitur primo in oppositum, ‘omnis argumentatio in qua cognoscens naturaliter est coniunctum cognito est innata’, dicendum quod verum est. Cum autem assumitur quod sic est in cognitione de anima, dicendum quod falsum est, nisi considerando ipsam secundum statum suae separationis quem habet ipsa de se sit intelligibile, quia cum | intelligere non convenit ei secundum quod est coniuncta nisi per adminiculum sensus abstrahendo species sensibiles a fantasmatis, cum sit sicut tabula nuda in qua nihil et cetera, huiusmodi sic est cognoscens seipsam 〈ut〉 non est cognitum coniunctum cognoscenti immediate eo quod non cognoscit se per se, sed per obiecta suarum operationum.

M 87vb

*Ad 3.2* Ad illud quod arguitur secundo, ‘sensus naturaliter potest in propriam operationem potentia sensibilis, ergo et intellectus’, potest dici quod verum est. Cum autem assumitur quod intellectus semper est sibi praesens, dicendum quod falsum est in quantum est coniunctus, quoniam nihil est cognoscibile ab intellectu coniuncto, ut per abstractionem iam dictam. Aliter potest dici quod sensus non potest naturaliter super suam operationem presente sensibili, quo ad hoc quod sua cognitio non fiat acquisita. Immo praesente sensibili nullo impediendo posito potest supra suam operationem in apprehendendo sensibile, et hoc non nisi per speciem quam acquirit a sensu ex eius potentia; sed dicitur naturaliter quo ad hoc posse suam operationem potente sensibili, quia de se habet potentiam naturalem, ut per speciem quam acquirit per sensibile potest speciem apprehendere; et similiter est dicendum de intellectu respectu intelligibilis ita quod per speciem quam acquirit sibi ab intellectu convertendo se supra speciem habet naturalem potentiam ipsum intelligendi, sed hoc non ponit scientiam naturaliter innata, quoniam scientia naturaliter innata ponit speciem innatam, quando fit cognitio per speciem.

### 〈Ad tertiam quaestionem〉

Per hoc etiam de tertia quaestione patet dicendo quod cognitio de anima de qua hic agitur non est per eius substantiam immediate acceptam sed mediantibus obiectis operationibus et potentiis, ut procedit ultima obiectio, licet cognitio in statu suae separationis sit per suam substantiam immediate, ut patet similiter ex dictis.

*Ad 5.1* Ad primum cum dicitur ‘in separatis a materia idem est intelligibile et intellectum’, verum est sub ratione qua separatum a materia, et sic concedendum esset quod cognitio animae de se esset per immediationem, sed quoniam intellectus non intelligit sub ratione qua separatus 〈non contingit〉; sed quia non intendimus hic de ipsa anima nisi prout est coniuncta cum

7 praesentiam ] potentiam M 12 adminiculum ] adni<sup>m</sup> per adminiculum M 21 sensibili ] sensibiler M 26 convertendo ] convertende O 32 separationis ] operationis M 37 nec *post* anima *del.* M

intelligere, quod proprie debetur coniuncto, illud non oportet; et de tali cognitione cognoscet anima, sed verius ipsum cognitum, ut determinatur in hac scientia.

*Ad 5.2* Similiter patet ad secundum quod illud verum est considerando intelligibile sub ratione qua intelligibile, nunc autem, licet anima per suam scientiam intelligibile sit, quid sit a se ipsa <intellectum>, et magis approximatum sibi ipsi illud quod est quantum est de cognitione eius, ut est coniuncta sui, verius est de cognitione coniuncti ipsa sub ratione qua intelligibile non se habet immediatius ad intelligens. Immo obiecta operationis magis haberent rationem intelligibilis eo quod in tali cognitione nihil fit intelligibile nisi per sensum cuius sunt obiecta et opera, et non eius obiecta, ut visum est. 5

## C.7 Anonymus Oriensis 33: *Quaestiones in De anima I–III*

This text precedes the commentary of Dinsdale in the Oriel manuscript (ff. 120r–162v), which is the only text in the codex that has an attribution (although it also contains his questions on *Ethica Nicomachea* without any ascription). Ebbesen presents the possibility that this anonymous commentator might also be the author of the questions on *De memoria et reminiscencia* that he has edited.<sup>18</sup>

This text is very close to that of Dinsdale, which has been dated to between 1274 and 1289. It is not possible to clarify the exact relation between the two texts, so the best we can do is to assume that the two texts are roughly contemporary.

### *Manuscript sigla*

O Oxford, Oriel College Library, 33: 120–162v.

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<sup>18</sup> Ebbesen 2016: 130.

## I.1: An cognitio de anima sit nobis possibilis

O 120rb,

O 120va

Iuxta cuius introitum primo quaeratur an cognitio de anima | sit nobis possibilis.

1.1 Videtur quod non, nam cum scientia sit habitus intellectualis, omne scibile oportet esse intelligibile; anima autem non est aliquid intelligibile; ergo nec scibile. Minor probatur ex hoc quod anima sub sensu non cadit, quare nec sub apprehensione intellectus. Praeterea anima non facit fantasma, fantasia enim est motus factus secundum actum. 5

1.2 Praeterea omne intelligere nostrum est cum continuo et tempore, ut dicitur in *De memoria et reminiscentia*; anima autem continua non est nec temporalis; non ergo erit intelligibilis, et per consequens nec scibilis.

1.3 Praeterea Philosophus secundo *Metaphysicae* dicit: “sicut oculus ad lucem diei se habet, sic intellectus noster ad ea quae sunt manifestissima in rerum natura”, de quorum numero est anima saltem humana, ergo ipsa non magis apprehendetur ab intellectu nostro quam lux diei ab oculo nycticoracis; sed apprehensio lucis diei ab oculo noctuae est impossibilis, ergo sic erit ex parte ista. 10

1.4 Praeterea impossibile est idem esse movens et motum, nam sic idem esset in actu et in potentia respectu eiusdem. Quod autem cognoscitur ab aliquo movens est respectu cognoscentis. Igitur impossibile est idem simul esse cognitum et cognoscens. Hoc tamen contingeret si anima de seipsa scientiam haberet. 15

2.1 Ad oppositum est determinatio Philosophi.

3 Dicendum quod <cognitio> de anima possibilis est nobis; et proprie dicta et extensive. 20

3.1 Primum apparet sic: Scientia propriissime dicta est habitus quidem intellectus per demonstrationem acquisitus. De quocumque igitur contingit habere demonstrationem de eodem erit scientia. Ad demonstrationem vero tria sufficiunt: subiectum, passio, et principium per quod ostendatur passio de subiecto. Quod quidem principium ab Aristotele dicitur propositio immediata a privatione medii inter extrema cui notius attribuatur predicatum vel notius subiecto attribuatur. Haec tria contingit reperire circa animam. Est enim anima quoddam subiectum scibile cuius sunt multae proprietates et passionem, ut intelligere, speculari et cetera. Est etiam animae alia certa definitio per quam, ut per medium, heae proprietates de anima possunt concludi. Tunc arguo: Cuicumque possibilis est cognitio principii, eidem possibilis est etiam cognitio conclusionis. Sed intellectui nostro possibilis est cognitio huius principii sive propositionis immediatae qua proprietas animae attribuitur eius definitioni, illius etiam qua definitio animae de ipsa anima praedicatur; ergo possibilis erit haec conclusio qua passio animae de anima concluditur, et haec est habere certam cognitionem de anima, et sic patet primum. 25

3.2 Secundum patet sic: Accidentia, eo quod non sunt entia nisi in alio, ipsa praecognita manuducunt in cognitionem eius cuius sunt. Sed multae sunt operationes artificiales nobis manifestae quae non possunt procedere nisi a potentia intellectiva. Haec enim immediate fluit a substantia animae, propter quod huiusmodi operationes nobis manifestae statim ducent in 35

6 Cf. Arist. *DA* III.3 429a1–2; *Auct. Arist.* 6.111. 7 Arist. *Mem.* 1 450a7–8 10–11 Arist. *Metaph.* II.1, 993b9–11. 19 Arist. *DA* I.1 402a1–22. 24–26 Locus non inventus.

13 noctuae ] noctutae B 26 attribuatur ] atebuatur a.c. B 32 praedicatur ] ut vid. O

cognitionem animae. Sed scientia de anima sic acquisita per effectus non est proprie scientia, quia ex causa haec procedit.

*Ad 1.1* Ad primum argumentum dicendum quod minor est falsa, et ad eius probationem dicendum quod aliquid sub sensu cadere est dupliciter: Aut per privationem sicut negationes  
 5 et privationes, ut tenebrae, aut per positionem, sicut illa quae sentiuntur per speciem; et hoc dupliciter, quaedam enim per speciem propriam sentiuntur, quaedam autem per speciem aliorum (per propriam sicut color per propriam speciem sentiuntur, per alterius sicut Diari filius); anima igitur sentitur per positionem, sed non per sui ipsius speciem, sed alterius, et sic etiam facit fantasiam. Per hoc enim quod operationes animae nobis manifestae sensum immutant,  
 10 anima quae est immediate principium huius immutationis quodammodo sentitur, et sic facit fantasma per aliud, et hoc sufficit ad hoc quod intelligatur.

*Ad 1.2* Ad aliud dicendum quod intelligere nostrum incipit a continuis et temporalibus, | sed ex eis procedit ad separata, et sic cognitio nostra de anima a quibusdam temporalibus  
 15 procedit in quibus non sistit, sed ulterius transit ad substantiam animae quae est supra omne tempus. Vel potest dici quod non ideo dicitur intelligere nostrum cum continuo et tempore, quia omne quod intellegimus sit continuum et temporale, sicut ratio deducit. Sed quia nihil intellegimus nisi prius existens in virtute fantastica, fantasma autem non est sine continuo, quia non sine organo. Iterum intelligere nostrum est discursivum, et ita cum tempore, propter quod sine hiis non intelligimus.

O 120vb

*Ad 1.3* Ad aliud dicendum secundum Commentatorem quod illud exemplum non adducitur propter impossibilitatem, sed propter difficultatem, ita ut sicut difficile est tali oculo inspicere lumen solis, ita difficile est intellectum nostrum inspicere et cognoscere separata. Manifestum est enim quod licet oculus noctuae non possit directe in apprehensionem solis, poterit tamen in apprehensionem alicuius effectus luminis solis. Volat enim in vespertis. Quod  
 25 si oculus eius esset ab effectu ad causam lumen solis, posset apprehendere. Nunc autem intellectus noster apprehendens quosdam effectus substantiarum separatarum est, propter quod eis cognitio surgit in cognitionem substantiarum separatarum ad discursum quoddam, sed quia effectus animae humanae sunt nobis manifestiores quam alicuius alterius substantiae separatae, ideo operationes animae sunt magis adaequate substantiae animae. Ideo magis cognoscimus de  
 30 anima humana quam de aliqua alia anima.

*Ad 1.4* Ad aliud dicendum quod est motus duplex. Quidam qui est actus entis imperfecti, et proprie dictus est actus perfecti sicut intelligere et speculari. Motu primo impossibile est idem simul movere et moveri, nisi valde per accidens, ut homo movens navem etiam movetur motu eodem per accidens. Sed motu secundo possibile est hoc, immo necessarium, et {hoc}  
 35 ideo quod movetur isto motu, ut quod intelligit aut speculari, necessario est substantia immaterialis, et ita aliquid indivisibile. Sed indivisibile potest reflecti supra seipsum totaliter, quod tamen impossibile est de habente partem extra partem, propter quod omnis substantia intelligens potest seipsam intelligere. Sed hoc est differenter. Est enim aliqua substantia semper actu intelligens, sicut prima causa et intelligentiae, et talis per se et primo seipsam potest intelligere  
 40 sine adiutorio alterius. Est autem aliqua substantia intelligens nunc in potentia nunc in actu, et quia omne tale reducitur de potentia in actum per quid aliud a se, ideo ut se intelligat quid

24 tamen *post* apprehensionem *del.* B

aliud exigit. Huiusmodi autem est intellectus noster, qui existens in potentia ad actum intelligendi non reducitur nisi per speciem alterius. Cum autem aliud intelligit per speciem seipsam percipit intelligere et sic reflectitur supra suam propriam operationem et per consequens supra suam substantiam apprehendens se esse substantiam intellectivam, et sic anima intelligit se.

## C.8 Anonymus Vaticanus 2170 I: *Quaestiones in De anima I-II*

This text is preserved in Vat. Lat. 2170: 6v–25v (14th century), which, as the name implies, also contains the commentary of Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II, but also a witness to the questions of Faversham.

Based on the doctrinal analyses I estimate that the text belongs to the later quarter of the 13th or early 14th century. Doctrinally this commentary is closest to that of Anonymus Giele, but also with some connections to Jandun, Brito, and Faversham, which are all from 13.4 or 14.1. That the text also occurs in the same manuscript as a witness to the commentary of Faversham also puts it in historical proximity to that text.

*Manuscript sigla*

V Vatican, Vatican Library, Vaticanus Latinus 2170: 6v–25v

## I.2: Utrum de anima possit esse scientia

V 6vb Consequenter quaeritur utrum de anima possit esse scientia.

1 Et videtur quod non. Et hoc praecipue de intellectiva.

1.1 De illo quod nullo modo est sensibile non potest haberi scientia, quia per Philosophum tertio huius intellectus intelligit per fantasmata; fantasmata autem fiunt per sensum; anima intellectiva nullo modo est sensibilis, quia nec per se, quia non est quid corporeum, nec per suas operationes, quia nullus sensus percipit intelligere quod est operatio intellectus; ergo et cetera. 5

1.2 Item arguitur hoc sophisticè: corruptibilium non est scientia quia scientia est habitus intransmutabilis et ideo non potest esse corruptibilium; anima autem est transmutabilis quia corrumpitur ad corruptionem corporis, scilicet vegetativa et sensitiva; ergo et cetera. 10

1.3 Item inter sciens et scitum oportet esse aliquam diversitatem, cuius probatio est quia sunt relativa, idem autem non refertur ad se ipsum; sed si de anima esset scientia, tunc non esset diversitas inter sciens et scitum, immo idem esset sciens et scitum, quia anima sciret se ipsam; ergo de anima non posset esse aliqua scientia. 15

2.1 Oppositum patet per Philosophum. Patet per Philosophum qui nobis tradit scientiam de anima.

3.1 Ad hoc dicendum est quod diversimode contingit habere scientiam de aliquo, large accipiendo scientiam pro cognitione qua aliquid certe cognoscitur, scilicet per definitionem, per divisionem, per demonstrationem. 20

3.1.1 Modo dicendum est quod esse illud quod habet quod quid est sive essentiam quam intellectus potest apprehendere potest cognosci, quia definitio ad hoc ordinatur quod indicet quod quid est rei; sed anima habet quod quid est sive essentiam, quia non est quid privatorium neque figmentorium, quare de anima potest esse scientia per definitionem.

3.1.2 Item ad hoc quod fiat divisio sive scientia per divisionem de aliquo exigitur quod habeat partes sub se contentas in quibus salvetur, quia divisim salvatur in dividendis, et non exigitur nisi quod habeat partes, quia divisio est in partes; sed anima habet partes, scilicet subiectivas et etiam potentiales, quare de anima est scientia per divisionem. 25

3.1.3 Iterum ad habendum scientiam de aliquo per demonstrationem exigitur quod habeat passiones quae de ipso habeant probari per definitionem illius cuius sunt, quia quod est principium subiecti est causa accidentium eius, et intelligendum est hoc de accidentibus propriis; sed anima habet passiones quae de ipsa possunt probari per eius definitionem; quare de ipsa potest esse scientia per demonstrationem. 30

3.1.4 Et sic de anima potest haberi scientia istis tribus modis sciendi, qui traduntur in logica, et illo modo tradit Philosophus scientiam de anima quia dedit definitionem animae et divisit eam in partes integrales et subiectivas et potentiales, et probavit de ipsa passiones. 35

3.2 Considerandum tamen est quod difficultas est in isto et in aliis qualiter intellectus consurgit in cognitione quod quid est, et videtur esse altera istarum duarum viarum ad hoc.

4-5 Arist. DA III.8, 432a7-9.

5 intellectus ] *in marg.* V 5 autem ] *sup. lin.* V 7 percipit ] *participit a.c.* V 10 esse ] *sup. lin.* V 13 d *post sed del.* V 13 oportet esse s *post scientia del.* V 27 nisi ] *in marg.* V

Intellectus enim percipit quod ex aliqua re procedunt operationes, tunc facit quandam coniec-  
turationem, et videt in quo habet esse et in quo non, et resolvit illa accidentia in illa ex quibus  
possunt procedere, scilicet in illa principia ex quibus habet causari, et ideo, quia coniecturat  
in quo habent <esse> huiusmodi accidentia et in quibus non, et sic devenit in cognitionem ip-  
sius quod quid, ita quod ex virtute illius rei †alias† innotescit genus, et ex diversitate accipitur  
5 differentia.

Est tamen intelligendum quod intellectus habet aliquem intellectum essentialem qui non  
est intellectus | accidentis, †et hoc est quod intellectus entis, quia sicut dicit Avicenna “intel-  
lectus entis entis in est dubius ”†, et ideo, quia habet intellectum essentialem ex accidentibus,  
10 potest devenire in cognitionem quod quid est ubi et illud oportet, id est quod habeat aliquem  
intellectum essentialem, quia aliter esset abire in infinitum; sed quia habet intellectum essen-  
tialem ex accidentibus in virtute ipsius quod quid est nec est mirum, quia in naturalibus ita  
est quod accidens in virtute substantiae generat substantiam, sicut calidum quod agit in vir-  
tute ignis, non solum generat calidum sed etiam ignem, et ideo simili modo ex cogitatione  
15 accipiendo per coniecurationem intellectus consurgit ad cognoscendum quod quid est.

3.3 Alia via est quia virtutes inter se habent connectionem ita quod virtus inferior quo  
adiuvat superiorem et ei subministrat suum cognoscibile ita quod superior incipit ubi inferior  
dimittit, sicut sensato lupi et reservato simulacro in fantasia {est} imaginativa, ex hoc elicit  
aliquid insensatum, scilicet inimicitiam; similiter per connexionem ex accidentibus deveniatur  
20 ad cognoscendum quod quid est, ita quod ex accidentibus per hoc quod se faciunt in sensu  
intellectus accipiat aliquid quod non est accidentale, scilicet ipsum quod quid est, et differunt  
istae viae quia una habet intellectum essentialem, alia autem non.

3.4 Tertio est intelligendum quod potentia aliqua per se non vadit ad actum, sed oportet  
quod reducatur per aliquid existens in actu; unde actus similiter praecedit, unde illud quod  
25 reducit potentiam ad actum oportet quod sit actu tale quale illud fuit in potentia. Anima autem  
est in potentia ad omnia intelligibilia, et ideo non potest produci ad intelligendum per se ipsam,  
sed per aliquid quod sit in actu, et cum ita est educta, est ad actum. Amplius non est virtus  
passiva sive in potentia, sed magis in actu, et ideo potest sibi aliquid facere quod prius non  
posset. Unde cum anima ita est in actu quod est virtus reflexiva, potest converti et iterare super  
30 se ipsam, et ita potest intelligere seipsum, non primo actu intelligendi, sed actu secundario sive  
reflexo.

*Ad 1* Per haec aequaliter apparet solutio ad argumenta.

*Ad 1.1* Primo cum dicitur “De eo quod non est sensibile” et cetera, verum est <de> primo  
actu intelligendi, quia sicut arguitur: intellectus accipit ex fantasmatis, tamen quia est virtus  
35 reflexiva, per reflexionem potest haberi de alio.

Vel etiam in aliquibus sine reductione sicut per accidens intelligit subiectum, et cum sub-  
stantia non cadit in sensu, quia sola accidentia sunt sensibilia, et ulterius anima intellectiva non

8–9 Locus non inventus.

1 enim ] *sup. lin.* V 2 in<sup>3</sup> illa<sup>2</sup> ] *in marg.* V 4 habent ] libet O 5 alias ] fortasse corruptum,  
num ‘eius’ scribendum sit? 7 intellectum ] intelligentium *ut vid.* V 9 in ] *post ‘in’ fenestra* 5 *litt.*  
*praebuit* V 13 ita *post* est *del.* V 13 in<sup>1</sup> ] fortasse expunctum 18 sensato ] sensata V 20 se ] si  
O 27 ad ] a *a.c.* V 30 actu<sup>2</sup> ] quoniam V

est sensibilis, nec per se, nec <per> suas operationes, verum est, et ideo cum concludit quod de ipsa non habetur scientia primo, per intellectum, et hoc est concessum.

*Ad 1.2* Ad aliud cum dicitur ‘corruptibilium’ et cetera, dicendum quod rerum non est scientia sub illa ratione sub qua sunt corruptibiles sive singular(i)a, modo singularium non est scientia, quia illis abeu(n)tibus ab oculis amplius non haberet in certitudine <utrum sint an non>, sicut dicitur septimo *Metaphysicae*, et sic non est scientia, quia scientia est habitus intransmutabilis; modo si Socrates recedit ab oculo et habeatur de ipso alia opinio quam habeatur dum erat praesens, non est scientia quia habitus transmutatur; si eadem <de> Socrate, hoc est falsum, quia iam mutatus est; scientia autem est habitus verus, sed ab istis singularibus corruptibilibus abstrahitur universale, et istud est incorruptibile, quia illud est incorruptibile, ut dicitur primo posteriorum; et sub ratione universalis est scientia de rebus propter quod cum dicitur ‘corruptibilium’ et cetera, | verum est sub illa ratione sub qua sunt corruptibilia, sed <non> sub illa ratione sub qua sunt incorruptibilia, et ulterius: anima est corruptibilis verum est in singulari, et hoc modo non est scientia de illa, sed <non> in universali sub illa ratione sub qua est intelligibilis.

V 7rb

*Ad 1.3* Ad aliud est intelligendum quod aliquid esse scitum hoc est dupliciter, aut primo actu intelligendi sive primo intellectu, aut secundario et reflexo sive redivivo; si sic primo intellectu, hoc modo inter sciens et scitum oportet esse diversitatem realem, per hoc quod unum dicitur respective ad alterum; si reflexivo intellectu non oportet, quia reflexio est alicuius supra ipsum vel supra suum actum. Et ideo cum dicitur “inter sciens et scitum oportet esse diversitatem”, verum est si sit scitum primo intellectu. Est ulterius si de anima esset scientia, non esset aliqua diversitas; immo idem esset sciens et scitum, verum est, quia anima non habet scientiam de se ipsa primo intellectu sive primo actu intelligendi; sed per reflexionem et redivivionem quandam.

6 *Auct. Arist.* 1.182. Cf. *Arist. Metaph.* VII.15, 1040a2–4.

1 cum ] fortasse ‘bene’ scribendum sit 4 sive ] sui V 5 certitudine ] certitudo V 6 sicu *post* quia *del.* V 8 socrate ] forte V 13 incorruptibilia ] corruptibilia *a.c.* V

## C.9 Anonymus Vaticanus 2170 II: *Quaestiones in De anima I–III*

This is the same manuscript as the preceding text. I also date this similarly broadly to the late 13th or early 14th century. This text shares the greatest doctrinal similarity with the texts of Dinsdale, Faversham, and Wyle. In the catalogue entry on this manuscript Maier notes that this text may share material or doctrines with Faversham's *Quaestiones in De anima I–III* which follow immediately after this text in the codex, and in the parts analysed here that hypothesis has been confirmed.<sup>19</sup>

### *Manuscript sigla*

V Vatican, Vatican Library, Vaticanus Latinus 2170: 51r-62v

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<sup>19</sup> Maier 1961: 142–53, cf. Vennebusch 1965: 28–9.

## I.1: Utrum de anima sit scientia

V 51rb Sed circa dicta quaeritur utrum de anima sit scientia.

1 Arguitur quo non.

1.1 De illo non potest esse scientia cui non contingit ratio subiecti; anima est huiusmodi; ergo et cetera. Minor patet quia de ratione subiecti est quod habeat partes et passiones quibus subsistet, quas anima non habet cum sit forma simplex et posset esse per se subsistens; igitur et cetera. 5

1.2 Item scientia habet causatum extra sensu de illo, ergo quod nec per se nec per accidens potest cadere sub sensu non est scientia; anima saltem intellectiva est huiusmodi, quod non per se patet quod non per accidens, quia hoc esset per operationem aliam, sed eius operatio est separata sicut eius substantia, quia non transit extra; ergo et cetera. 10

2.1 Oppositum patet per Philosophum.

3.1 Dicendum quod de anima potest esse scientia, sed tota difficultas est de anima intellectiva. Constat enim quod operationes sensitivae sunt eius et experimur, ideo in cognitionem eius possumus devenire, sed intellectus non quomodo cadere sub sensu, nec per se nec per accidens. 15

Sed *probo* [?] quod de intellectu possit esse scientia, quia de omni eo quod est natum intelligi potest esse scientia, quia tale habet partes et passiones; anima quaecumque est huiusmodi quia substantia quaedam est ut est actus; ideo potest intelligi, quia est ens perfectum cum sit actus.

Item est ens tale quod de se est non individuatum, sed est *regularibus communicatum* [?], tale autem habet partes subiectivas quae ad subiectum scientiae requiruntur. 20

Item anima habet principium per se.

Item in ea est principium materiale et formale per quae multarum operationum causa reditur, scilicet intellectus agens et possibilis; ergo et cetera.

3.2 Sed est difficultas, cum intellectus non cadat sub sensu, quomodo de eo est scientia, et per huius tertio huiusmodi solvit quia dicit “intellegit se ut alia”, iuxta quod est intelligendum quod intellectus de se est ut tabula nuda in qua nihil depingitur, et nihil est actu intelligibile ante intelligere. 25

Non {non} intelligit Philosophus quod intelligit se ut alia abstrahendo a sensibus, quia tunc esset alius intellectus qui ipsum intelligeret et illum alius et sic non similiter, quod est impossibile, sed sic intelligit: per speciem alienam reducitur ad actum et tunc se intelligit per propriam speciem. Et tu dices “quomodo se per propriam?” Dicendum quod species aliena | ducit de potentia ad actum quae facit unum cum eo, non facit forma cum eo {non} sicut forma materiae nec ut accidens cum subiecto, sed sic<ut> lumen cum perspicuo. Ideo fit unum ex specie, et ipse ideo dicitur per propriam speciem intelligere, et quia intelligere <\*\*\*>; nisi iudicare se intelligere, et per hunc actum necessaria se intelligit per speciem suam quae cum ducit in actum <\*\*\*>. 30 35

*Ad 1* Ad rationes.

26 Arist. DA III.4, 430a2–3. 27–28 Arist. DA III.4, 429b29–30a2.

17 *probo* ] *ut vid.* V 19 *potest* ] *per* V 19 *intelligi* ] *ut vid.* V 20 *item* ] *ut vid.* V 32 *per* ] *sup. lin.* V 33 *cons post forma del.* V

*Ad 1.1* Ad maiorem primae conceditur. Ad minorem dicendum quod simplicitas animae, cum non sit, non repugnat ei ratio subiecti, quia tali non potest inesse passio ut primo; et tu dicis “non est per se subsistens, ideo non habet passiones”, non valet quia haec non oportet ad hoc quod {quod} aliquid sit subiectum, sed sit subiectum respectu passionum; sed intellectus  
5 est aliquo modo hoc aliquid ut patebit, ideo non valet.

*Ad 1.2* Ad aliam concedo maiorem, et cum dicitur “illud quod non cadit sub sensu” et cetera, non oportet, sed sufficit quod movetur ab illo vel sicut illud quod cadit sub sensu, et sic est in proposito ut ostensum est.

### III.11: Utrum intelligat se per suam substantiam

V 61ra Consequenter quaeritur utrum intelligat se per suam substantiam.

1.1 Arguitur quod sic, quia in separatis a materia idem est intellectus et intellectum, ut dicit Philosophus; sed intellectus est separatus a materia, igitur idem est intellectus et intellectum; sed intellectus <est> sua substantia, ergo intelligit se per suam substantiam. 5

1.2 Item, quae sunt eiusdem generis habent eundem modum cognitionis; sed intellectus est eiusdem generis cum intelligentiis quae intelligunt se per suas substantias; igitur et cetera.

1.3 Item, quia si non non esset nisi quia intelligit se per operationem, scilicet reflectendo se super causam; hoc non stat, quia tunc non est obiectum eius, quod non est verum quia procedit operatio in obiecto; igitur et cetera. 10

1.4 Item, <si> intelligeret reflectendo se super suum actum et per hoc se intelligeret et suam substantiam; tunc se reflecteret iterum super secundum actum, et sic secundus actus esset obiectum eius, et tunc eadem ratione se reflecteret super tertium actum, et sic in infinitum, quod est impossibile.

2.1 Oppositum: Intellectus intelligit se sicut alia, ut dicit Philosophus; sed alia non intelligit per substantias suas; igitur et cetera. 15

3.1 Dicendum quod intelligit se non per suam substantiam, quia quod est in potentia intelligibile non cognoscitur actu et per se, sicut visibile in potentia non videtur per se, et similiter materia prima. Modo quidam sunt qui sunt puri actus, ut primum ipsum, et tale oportet necessario quod intelligat per suam substantiam. Alia autem separata, scilicet intelligentiae, intelligunt se per suas substantias vel per influentiam a primo, intellectu quia sunt actus et actus in eis. Sed intellectus noster est in pura potentia in genere intellectualis naturae, et ideo non potest intelligi; sed oportet quod per alia intelligibilia fiat actu per intelligibile propter suam operationem. 20

Sed quomodo per suum actum intelligat se est difficile intelligere, sed quaedam sunt quorum intelligere est sua substantia, ut primum ipsum, quia in eo nullum est accidens, et intelligentiae quia recedunt a simplicitate primi, intelligere earum non est | sua substantia, sed est prima perfectio sui obiecti primi, scilicet suae substantiae, quia sunt actus. Dico autem quod hoc est intelligere intelligentiarum realiter est substantia earum, tamen differunt secundum modum essendi, sicut ens et esse ita quod intelligere similatur ipsi esse et substantia intelligentiae enti, sed in primo modo differunt, et intelligere et sua substantia. Sed intellectus noster, cum sit in potentia, intelligere non est perfectio eius obiecti primi, quia eius obiectum primum est aliud ab eo. Sed cum factus est in actu per obiectum aliud, inflectitur se super suum actum iterum et intelligit se, non alia, quia non intelligit se per suam substantiam, et quia per speciem aliquo modo propriam, quia species ipsius quod quid est, quod cum obiectum fecit eum in actu, et sic est unum cum ipso in actu, et ideo est ei propria aliquo modo ei per illam se intelligit, ideo per speciem propriam se intelligit. 25  
V 61rb  
30  
35

3–4 Arist. DA III.4 430a2–3. 15 Arist. DA III.4 430a2–3.

2 se per ] *inv.* V 4 et ] *sup. lin.* V 11 intelligeret<sup>1</sup> ] intelligere *sed 'e' ultima in ras.* V 19 qui sunt ] *in marg.* V 21 intellectu ] non curo *ut vid.* V 27 quia ] quae V 30 ens ] *in marg.* V

3.2 Sed dicas si intellectus se reflectendo cognoscat, tunc quilibet intellectus se reflectet suum actum et intelliget substantiam sui intellectus intelligens, et sic non tot errarent circa intellectum. Et dicendum quod actum intellectus reflecti et ipsum intelligere est duplex, uno modo confuse et quantum ad hoc quod intelligit et cognoscit se intelligere et habere intellectum aliquo modo et esse intellectum; Alio modo quod cognoscat qualitatem actus intellectus intellectus perfecte et distincte et substantiam intellectus, et hoc non est facile, sed multum difficile, quia per multa⟨s⟩ inquisitiones fit, et sic Philosophus procedit in determinando de intellectu – primo assimilando eum sensui, deinde investigando propriam eius naturam et distinguendo eum a sensu.

10 *Ad 1* Ad rationes.

*Ad 1.1* Ad maiorem primae: Verum est si sit actu; tamen non est in actu de se, quia si sic, bene concluderet.

*Ad 1.2* Ad secundam conceditur maior. Et ad minorem: falsum est, quia intelligentiae sunt totaliter separatae a corpore; intellectus autem non.

15 *Ad 1.3* Ad tertiam: Ad maiorem conceditur. Ad minorem: falsum est, quia licet operatio in prima operatione sit ab obiecto, tamen in secundo actu fit †alterum† scilicet in reflectione.

*Ad 1.4* Ad quartam: De infinito concedo, quia infinitum se convertere potest super suam operationem, et hoc non est inconveniens cum sit immaterialis sed necessarium.

1 reflectendo ] reflectendi V 14 sunt ] sint V 16 tamen ] tunc V 16 alterum ] num 'a termino' scribendum?

## C.10 Henric de la Wyle: *Quaestiones in De anima I–III*

This text is preserved in Magdalen 63: 57r-94v. The manuscript is English and from the first quarter of the 15th century.<sup>20</sup> Henric de la Wyle is a fellow at Merton College from 1284 and registered as arts master in 1285, and by 1308 he has become *doctor theologiae*. So this text is most like from between 1285 and 1308.<sup>21</sup> Most likely the end of the 13th century, if we also take into account some time to become a theological doctor.<sup>22</sup>

### *Manuscript sigla*

M Oxford, Magdalen College Library, 63: 57r-94v

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<sup>20</sup> Thomson 2011: 289–91.

<sup>21</sup> Lohr 1968: 233, Emden 1957: I.565, Little and Pelster 1934: 286.

<sup>22</sup> Lohr 1968: 233, cf. Mora-Márquez 2014: 214.

## I.1: An de anima possit esse scientia

*Bonorum honorabilium notitiam opinantes. Quaeritur an de anima possit esse scientia.*

M 57ra

1.1 Videtur primo quod non, quia illud de quo est scientia per se oportet esse aliquod universale; anima non est huiusmodi; ergo et cetera. Maior ostenditur primo *Posteriorum*. Minor probatur sic: Universale sit per abstractionem a multis singularibus sensibus; sed anima non est singularare et sensibilis.

1.2 Item illud de quo est scientia oportet esse intelligibile; sed anima non est intelligibile; ergo et cetera. Minor patet ex tribus.

1.2.1 Quod intelligit in quantum intelligit est patiens et motum; quod intelligitur in quantum tale est agens et movens; sed nihil idem est agens et patiens, movens et motum, quia tunc idem eodem respectu esset in potentia et in actu; sed si anima esset intelligibilis, idem esset quod intelligit et quod intelligitur, et per consequens idem esset et eodem respectu agens et patiens, movens et motum.

1.2.2 Idem secundo ostenditur sic: Nostrum intelligere vel est fantasma vel non est sine fantasmate; quod ergo non facit fantasma non est intelligibile; anima est huiusmodi; ergo et cetera. Minor huius ostenditur quia per Aristoteles secundo huius “fantasma est motus factus a sensu”, quare manifestum est quod anima non cadit sub sensu; ergo fantasma facere non potest, et per consequens non est intelligibilis.

1.2.3 Illud idem ostenditur tertio sic: Per Aristoteles tertio huius nostrum intelligere est cum continuo et tempore; sed anima nec est continua nec temporalis; ergo et cetera. Quod non sit continua manifestum est quia non est divisibilis; quod non sit temporalis patet per Aristoteles secundo huius ubi vult quod anima separatur a corpore tamquam perpetuum a corruptibili, sed nihil in quantum perpetuum est temporale.

1.3 Item illud de quo est scientia necesse est habere aliquam proprietatem per se quae possit ostendi de eo; sed anima non est talis proprietas; ergo et cetera. Minor ostenditur si eius esset aliquam proprietas per se, haec maxime esset intelligere et sentire, sed per Aristoteles istae proprietates non sunt per se ipsius animae, sed coniuncti; unde habetur quod nihil aliud est dicere animam gaudere vel tritari quam texere vel aedificare et cetera.

2.1 Oppositum ostenditur sic: de forma et perfectione rei naturalis potest esse aliquam scientia, sed anima est perfectio rei naturalis et forma, quia corporis animati <perfectio est> de ipsa, ergo potest esse scientia. Maior ostenditur sic per Aristoteles primo *Physicorum*: “materia est solum scibilis secundum analogiam.” Quod ergo materia sit scibilis, hoc est per respectum ad formam; forma ergo est magis per se scibilis.

3.1 Ad illud dicendum est quod differenter dicitur de aliquo esse scientia, quia alium dicitur esse scientia de aliquo sicut de subiecto; alium dicitur esse scientia de aliquo sicut de conclusione in demonstratione; alium dicitur esse scientia de aliquo sicut de passione quae scitur de subiecto. Inter istos modos maxime proprie est scientia quando | de alio scitur sicut

M 57rb

2 Arist. *DA* I.1, 402a1–2. 4 *APo* I.4, 73b25–27. 16–17 Aristoteles *DA* III.4, 429a1–2. 19 Aristoteles *DA* III.6, 430b16–20. 22–23 Aristoteles *DA* II.2, 413b26–27. 27–28 Aristoteles *DA* I.4, 408b11–13. 31–32 Arist. *Phys.* I.7, 191a7–12.

17 quare ] quia M

de subiecto, quia proprie est illud quod scitur. Passio est illud quod solum de alio scitur, et obiectum appropriato est illud de quo scitur aliud. Quaerere igitur utrum de anima possit esse scientia est quaerere an ipsa possit esse subiectum scientiae, non ita quod sit illud in quo est scientia sicut in obiecto, quia tunc omnis scientia esset de anima, quia omnis scientia est in anima tamquam in obiecto.

3.2 Est tunc intelligendum scientiam esse de anima ita ipsa possit esse obiectum de quo probatur alia passio per medium, quod est causa vel effectus. Dicitur ergo potest quod anima potest esse subiectum illud de quo probari potest alia proprietas per se per medium quod est causa vel effectus, quia licet forma constituat unum secundum essentiam cum ipsa materia, adhuc essentia formae, in quantum cognoscitur ut simplex, alia est ab essentia formae in quantum compositum, et per consequens alia definitio formae in quantum simplex et {compositum} *in quantum* [?] compositum. Sed ubi alia est essentia et alia definitio, alia potest esse definitio per se; alia ergo potest esse scientia de anima et alia de corpore animato, quia illa tria videntur sufficere, scilicet subiectum scibile, et proprietas per se, et definitio. Dicitur potest igitur quod de anima potest esse scientia tamquam de subiecto.

*Ad 1.1* Ad primum argumentum dicendum quod sicut in composito est assignare universale et particulare, sic quoddammodo in formis in composito ex hoc habemus universale quod illud quod est compositum consideramus praeter significationem, quia intelligere illud quod est Socrates non ut Socrates est est intelligere universale. Consimiliter est in formis, intelligendo formam non ut haec forma est intelligere modo universali, et ideo modo de anima tamquam de subiecto universali potest esse scientia. Unde ad rationem dicendum est quod anima, licet non sit singulare et sensibile, ipsa tamen considerari potest modo universali; unde non oportet deinde considerationem universalis esse per abstractionem a singulari sensibili et composito, quia universale respectu huius quod est sensus vel species habet modum universalis et abstracta, et tum manifestum est quod nec genus nec species est particulare vel sensibile.

*Ad 1.2* Ad aliud dicendum est quod minor est falsa, quia anima est intelligibilis prout sufficit ad dubium cognoscibile, unde difficultas in intelligendo immateriales formas non est ex parte intelligibilis, quia ipsa sunt maxime intelligibilia, sed ipsa est ex parte intelligentis. Unde in aliquibus cognoscibilibus difficultas est ex parte cognoscibilis, et propter hoc quoddam cognoscitur per privationem, sicut punctus est illud cuius pars non est. Similiter in eo quod est ens in potentia, ibi est difficultas ex parte cognoscibilis, sed formae immateriales sunt difficiles ad cognoscendum, et illa difficultas est ex debilitate intellectus nostri.

M 57va

*Ad 1.2.1* Ad primum dicendum est quod loquendo de motu qui est actus entis imperfecti non est possibile idem eodem respectu esse movens et motum, agens et patiens. Sed nunc est ita quod intelligere aliquo modo debeat dici motus, et erit motus entis perfecti et propter hoc aequivoce erit motus ab eo quem definit Aristoteles, et propter hoc in tali non est inconueniens idem respectu sui esset movens et motum. Propter aliud quod tangitur dicendum quod etsi intellectus in intelligendo dicatur pati, hoc est aequivoce, unde Aristoteles vult quod suum recipere magis est salus quam passio.

Ista ratio videtur adhuc esse dubia quia quocumque modo sumatur motus, non videtur unde esse intelligibile quod idem posset esse movens et motum respectu sui ipsius. Ista dubi-

1 quod<sup>2</sup> ] *sup. lin.* M 5 in ] *de a.c.* M 12 in quantum ] *ut vid.* M 35 et<sup>1</sup> ] *sup. lin.* M

tatio non habet locum si intelligamus quod Socrates habeat mentem de intellectu Platonis, sed illa dubitatio habet locum de eodem intelligente respectu sui intellectus, an Socrates posset intelligere suum intellectum, propter quam dicitur ulterius quod cum intellectus intelligit suum intellectum, hoc non est per se et primo, immo est per quemdam discursum quia in hoc quod  
 5 intelligit rem aliam percipit actum suum et in hoc quod percipit actum quodammodo percipit substantiam cuius est iste actus, et ideo ex consequenti intelligit suum intellectum; unde quod id sit sic movens et motum ita quod non primo non est inconveniens.

*Ad 1.2.2* Ad aliam probationem dicendum est secundum nunc dicta quod intellectus sive anima non est illud quod primo <intelligitur>, nec est {per} tamquam per se obiectum intellectus  
 10 nostri, et propter hoc non oportet quod primo faciat fantasma a sensu. Unde de eis quae primo et per se intelliguntur intellectu nostro verum est quod oportet intelligibile primo immitare virtutem sensitivam a qua possit causari fantasma.

*Ad 1.2.3* Ad aliud argumentum dicendum est quod illud quod per se et primo intelliguntur intellectu nostro oportet esse cum continuo et tempore, sed secundum nunc dicta anima non  
 15 est primum intelligibile nisi per discursum.

Aliter dicitur ad illud idem quod licet anima intellectiva non sit continua quantum est de se nec etiam per accidens nec etiam sit temporalis, est tamen perfectio alicuius continuus et alicuius temporalis propter quod intelligi potest sicut aliae formae materiales. Ista dubitationes de intelligibili non faciunt vere difficultatem de anima, immo solum de anima intellectiva.

*Ad 1.3* Ad ultimum argumentum dicendum est quod quamvis huiusmodi proprietates –  
 20 gaudere et cetera – non fiunt per se et primo ipsius animae potentiae, tamen est aliquam esse proprietatem per se et non primo.

**III.10: Utrum intellectus possibilis intelligat se per essentiam.**

M 86vb Quaeritur utrum intellectus possibilis intelligat se per essentiam.

1.1 Et videtur quod sic quia per Aristoteles in littera “in separatis a materia idem est quod intelligit et quod intelligitur”; sed intellectus possibilis separatus a materia quia non determinat sibi organum; in eo igitur idem est intelligens et quod intelligitur, sed per essentiam est intelligens, ergo per essentiam suam intelligitur. 5

1.2 Item, si intelligeret se per aliud aut igitur per speciem eius aut alterius; non per speciem eius, quia facit tunc speciem in virtute fantastica, nec per speciem alterius, ut videtur, quia cum species sit illud quo res cognoscitur, oportet eam esse proportionale cogniti, sed rei alterius species non est proportionalis intellectui; intellectus ergo possibilis non intelligit se per speciem, intelligit igitur se per essentiam. 10

1.3 Item in substantiis separatis ita est quod substantia est intelligens et est intelligibilis, sic scientia est ex parte intellectus possibilis, sed in substantiis separatis ita est quod ipsa intellectu se per essentiam suam <intelligit>; ergo similiter dicit de intellectu possibili.

2.1 Oppositum videtur Aristoteles determinare in littera. 15

3.1 Dicendum est secundum quod innuit Aristoteles in littera quod “intellectus noster intelligit se sicut alia;” sed alia intelligit per speciem; se igitur intelligit per speciem aliquam. Ex hoc dicendum est quod intellectus noster possibilis coniunctus se non intelligit per essentiam. Illud ostenditur sic inter substantias intelligentes: intellectus noster est sicut materia prima quia tenet infimum gradum, quia prima causa quae est substantia intelligens est actus purus. Intelligentia {et} quae est substantia intellectus est actus, sed non purus, quia in omnibus secundum *Boethium* [?] citra primum differt quid est et quo est, quia in omnibus huiusmodi est aliqua compositio potentiae et actus. Intellectus noster respectu praedictarum substantiarum intelligentium est sicut potentia prima, sed omnino sicut res se habent ad actum sic ad intellectum, quia quicquid intelligitur intelligitur ut actu prima, igitur causa quae solum est actus se intelligit per essentiam et solum se, quia ut vult in duodecimo: alia intelligit intelligendo se. Intelligentia, quia distat ab actu puro, se intelligit et etiam alia, sed illa alia quae intelligit non intelligit per speciem, quia huiusmodi substantia est separata a materia secundum essentiam. Propter hoc de illis dici potest quod quae intelligunt intelligunt per essentiam propriam. Intellectus noster, cum sit sicut potentia pura et in hoc multum distat ab actu, se non intelligit per essentiam, quia potentia per se non vadit ad actum, sed intellectus noster inter substantias intelligentes et intelligentes est sicut potentia. 20 25 30

3.2 Istud oportet ex alio: Potentiae distinguuntur per actus et cognoscuntur, intellectus igitur possibilis, ut nominat potentiam, cognoscitur per actum suum secundum quem intelligit alia. Unde intelligendo illum actum per speciem rei extra se ipsum cognoscit et intelligit. Unde non videtur intelligere nisi per reflexionem, quia species intelligibilis extra primo ducit in cognitionem intelligibilis extra, et ex consequenti in cognitionem actus intelligendi, et deinde in cognitionem sui. 35

3–4 Arist. *DA* III.4 430a3–4. 16–17 Arist. *DA* III.4, 430a2–3. 26 Arist. *Metaph* XII.9 1074b21–36 (?)

22 et ] a M 27 intelligentia ] intellectiva M

3.3 Ad illud ostenditur: assumit Aristoteles in littera quod in separatis a materia idem est quod intelligit et quod intelligitur secundum essentiam; in proposito vocat Aristoteles 'speciem' qua intellectus fit actu intelligens; unde quia illa species est eadem cum intellectu nostro possibili quoddammodo separato, ideo intellectus noster se intelligit per illam speciem.

5 3.4 Ulterius videndum est quod contingit intellectum habere cognitionem sui | secundum M 87ra  
essentiam, quia supponitur quod de anima potest esse scientia; sed scientia de aliquo est secundum cognitionem quantum ad essentiam; sed istam cognitionem habet de se ipso per multas reflexiones. Iste modus cognoscendi sive intelligendi non est ad propositum.

10 *Ad 1.1* Ad primum argumentum dicitur secundum iam dicta quod si recte accipitur intellectus litterae, sic magis ad oppositum quam ad propositum, quia sicut in scientiis speculativis idem est scientia et scitum, consideratur de intellectu nostro: quoddammodo separato dicendum est quod est idem cum specie rei intelligibilis extra, et quia sibi est idem, ideo per ipsam se intelligit.

15 *Ad 1.2* Ad aliud argumentum dicendum est quod intellectus noster potest se intelligere per speciem cuiuscumque intelligibilis extra, quia sicut materia fit actu existens sub quacumque forma substantiali, consimiliter intellectus noster possibilis potest fieri actu per quamcumque speciem rei intelligibilis extra, et propter hoc quacumque specie informatur per illa potest se intelligere. Unde dicendum est quod se intelligit per speciem alterius. Et ulterius ad argumentum dicendum est quod oportet speciem esse proportionalem illi in cuius cognitionem primo  
20 ducit, sed secundum iam dicta illud species rei intelligibilis extra non ducunt in cognitionem intellectus noster nisi ex consequenti et per reflexionem, et propter hoc non oportet quod sit proportionalis sibi.

25 *Ad 1.3* Ad ultimum argumentum dicendum est quod aliter est intellectus noster intelligens et intelligibilis quam substantia separata, quia sicut est dictum, cum intellectus noster est coniunctus est sicut potentia pura inter substantias intelligentes, et propter hoc per se non intelligit sicut substantia separata secundum esse. Supposito tamen quod possit separari secundum esse et manere separatus, tunc forte se intelligeret sicut substantia separata vel intelligibilia.

30 *Ad 1.4* Contra praedicta aliquis diceret quod intellectus noster potest habere aliquam speciem sibi innatam quae solum ducit in cognitionem eius, et quod propter hoc intelligit se per speciem, sed non per speciem alterius sed ex illo. Videtur sequi inconsideratio, scilicet quod intellectus noster semper se intelliget, quia semper ipso manente manet species sibi innata, et ex hoc ulterius sequitur quod alia non intelligit quia intellectus noster ad quod se convertit totaliter se convertit.

1-2 Arist. DA III.4, 430a3-5.

2 secundum essentiam ] *in marg.* M 12 specie ] speciei *a.c.* M 27 separatus ] separatim M

## C.11 John Dinsdale: *Quaestiones in De anima I-III*

This text is preserved in two manuscripts, Balliol 311: 148r–181v (late 13th century) and Oriel 33: 164r–182v (early 14th century), both English. The Oriel witness is deemed to present the strongest text and is preferred when possible (it only covers book one and part of book two). The commentary is probably from the 1280's, possibly slightly earlier. The text reproduced here is identical to the edition that I have already published.<sup>23</sup>

John Dinsdale became a fellow at Merton College in 1284–85 and was appointed subwarden in 1286. He died around 1289. Aside from the questions on *De anima*, he also wrote questions on *Nicomachean Ethics I–IV* and *Metaphysics I–XII*.

### *Manuscript sigla*

- O Oxford, Oriel College Library, 33: 164r–182v.
- B Oxford, Balliol College Library, 311: 148r–181v.

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<sup>23</sup> For information about Dinsdale, the witnesses, and the text, see Christensen 2017.

## I.1: Utrum de anima possit nobis acquiri scientia

B 148va,  
O 164rb

Item quaeratur primo utrum de anima possit nobis acquiri scientia.

1.1 Videtur quod non.

1.2 Illud de quo est scientia est intelligibile, quia cum scientia sit habitus intellectus, de  
5 quo est scientia oportet esse intelligibile; sed anima non est intelligibile, quia omnis nostra  
cognitio ortum habet a sensu, unde ipsum intelligere non est sine phantasmate, sed anima sub  
sensu non cadit, nec phantasma facit; ergo et cetera.

1.3 Praeterea, unum et idem non potest esse simul movens et motum, quia sic idem  
10 esset actu et potentia respectu eiusdem; sed cognitum est movens respectu cognocentis; ergo  
unum et idem non potest esse cognoscens et cognitum, hoc tamen contingeret si de anima esset  
scientia.

1.4 Praeterea, sicut oculus nycticoracis <se habet> ad lumen solis, sic intellectus noster  
ad ea quae sunt manifestissima in natura, de quorum numero est anima, saltem humana; sed  
oculus nycticoracis non potest apprehendere lumen solis; ergo et cetera.

1.5 Praeterea, nostrum intelligere est cum continuo et tempore; sed anima, cum sit indi-  
15 visibilis et perpetua, nec est continua nec temporalis; ergo et cetera.

2.1 Oppositum patet per determinationem Philosophi.

3.1 Dicendum quod cum scientia sit habitus acquisitus per demonstrationem, et ad de-  
monstrationem tria requirantur (scilicet subiectum, passio, et principium per quod ostenditur  
20 passio de subiecto), ubi est invenire ista tria, ibi contingit ponere scientiam. Nunc autem anima  
quoddam subiectum est cuius sunt multae proprietates et passiones, ut patebit inferius. Sunt  
etiam principia per quae istae passiones probari possunt de anima. Si enim accipiatur quod  
quid est animae pro medio, per ipsum concludi potest propria passio eius de anima, et ita de  
anima potest aliquid sciri sive esse aliqualis scientia.

3.2 Praeterea, accidentia non sunt per se entia, sed in alio. Qui ergo cognoscit accidentia,  
25 manuduci potest in cognitionem eius cuius sunt. Nunc autem multa accidentia ipsius animae  
nobis sunt manifesta: Operationes enim artificiales nobis notae sunt, quae tamen non fiunt  
absque intelligere, et intelligere procedit ab aliqua potentia, et potentia fluit ab essentia; et  
sic est de aliis operationibus quae procedunt ab irascibili. Unde per multa quae nobis nota sunt  
30 devenire possumus in cognitionem animae. Quia tamen scire est causam rei cognoscere, et talis

12–13 Cf. Arist. *Metaph.* II.1 993b9–11 (νυκτερίς).

2 item ] *om.* B 2 nunc *post* quaeratur B 6 unde ... est ] quia nihil intelligimus B 8 si *post* quia  
B 8–9 idem esset ] *inv.* B 10 cognoscens ] movens B 10 cognitum ] motum sed B 10 sed  
*post* cognitum B 10–11 esset scientia ] cognitionem haberemus B 12 nycticoracis ] vespertilionis  
O 12 se habet ] *spat. vac. 8 litt.* B; *om.* O 13 saltem ] *om.* B 17 determinationem philosophi ]  
Philosophum B 19 scilicet ] *om.* B 20 invenire ista tria ] ista tria invenire B 20 contingit ponere  
scientiam ] est scientiam ponere B 21 quoddam subiectum est ] est quoddam ens B 21 multae ]  
*om.* B 22 istae passiones probari possunt ] ostendi possunt istae passiones B 23 per ipsum ] *om.* B  
24 aliquid sciri sive ] *om.* B 25 per se entia ] entia per se B 27 enim ] *om.* B 27 tamen ] *om.* B  
28 fluit ] *om.* B 28–29 et<sup>3</sup> ... aliis ] eodem modo est de B 29 quae nobis nota sunt ] nobis B 30  
possumus ] possunt B 30 causam rei ] per causam O

cognitio de anima procedit per effectus et non per causam, ideo Philosophus talem cognitionem tradens de anima istam cognitionem nominat “historiam”. Extensive tamen dici potest scientia.

B 148vb *Ad 1.1* Ad primum argumentum dicendum quod minor est falsa. Et ad probationem dicendum quod aliquid cadit | in sensu dupliciter: aut per positionem aut per privationem. Per privationem sicut tenebra et indivisibilia, ut punctum et unitas. Per positionem contingit dupliciter, aut per speciem sui, aut per speciem alterius; per speciem sui sicut color videtur, per speciem alterius sicut videtur Diari filius. Unde, licet anima non cadat sub sensu per se, cadit tamen sub sensu per alterum, ut per sui effectus, et eodem modo, licet per se phantasma non faciat, aliud tamen phantasma facit, quod in eius cognitionem ducere potest.

*Ad 1.2* Ad aliud dicendum quod dupliciter dicitur motus: uno modo est actus imperfecti, et sic definitur a Philosopho in tertio *Physicorum*; alio modo est actus perfecti; sic intelligere et cognoscere dicuntur motus: Primo modo non potest idem esse movens et motum per se, per accidens tamen nihil prohibet, sicut nauta movet navem per se, qua mota movet seipsum. Secundo modo nihil prohibet idem movere se ipsum. Sed tamen differentia est: aliqua enim est substantia semper actu intelligens, et talis substantia potest intelligere se per se, sicut est de prima causa et intelligentiis; sed aliqua est non semper actu intelligens, sicut est anima humana, et talis substantia non intelligit se per se, quia nihil intelligitur nisi secundum quod actu est, et talis substantia, cum sit in potentia intelligens non est in actu nisi per alterum, ut per speciem intelligibilem, ideo per alterum potest se intelligere. Per hoc enim quod anima intelligit obiectum per speciem potest intelligere suum actum, et per actum potest reflectere se supra suam essentiam; unde anima nostra quodammodo intelligit se sicut nauta movet navem.

*Ad 1.3* Ad aliud dicendum quod licet oculus nycticoracis non possit apprehendere directe lumen solis, potest tamen indirecte aliquam claritatem apprehendere, et si visus eius esset discursivus, posset cognoscere lumen solis. Nunc autem, etsi intellectus noster non potest in cognitionem perfectam substantiarum separatarum, tamen aliqui effectus earum apparent nobis, per quos manuducimur in earum notitiam, et quia intellectus noster est discursivus, ideo

2 Arist. *DA* I.1 402a4. 6–7 Arist. *DA* II.6 418a20–22. 11 Arist. *Phys.* III.2 201b31–33.

1 cognitio de anima ] *om.* B 1 et ] *om.* B 2 istam cognitionem nominat ] ipsam vocat B 3 quod minor est falsa ] per interemptionem minoris B 3 et ] *om.* B 4 aliquid ] aliquod B 4 per<sup>2</sup> ] *om.* O 6 sicut ] ut B 7 sicut ] ut B 7 videtur ] *om.* B 7 se ] rei B 7 cadit ] cadat B O 8 et ] *om.* B 9 aliud ] aliquid O B 10 aliud ] secundum B 10 dupliciter dicitur motus ] motus dicitur dupliciter B 11 et sic ] sicut B 11 a philosopho in ] *om.* B 11 sic<sup>2</sup> ] sicut B 12 cognoscere ] sentire O 13 movet navem per se ] per se *ante* movet navem *scr.* B 13 qua mota movet seipsum ] et motu navi movetur per accidens B 14 movere se ipsum ] esse movens et motum respectu sui ipsius B 14 enim ] *om.* B 15 substantia<sup>2</sup> ] *om.* O 15–16 sicut ... intelligentiis ] sed est de prima causa et intelligentiis O; *om.* B 16 substantia *post* est B 16–17 sicut est anima humana ] *om.* B 17 substantia ] *om.* O 17 non intelligit ] non potest intelligere B 18–19 non ... ideo ] per speciem alterius B 19 se ] seipsum B 20 se ] *om.* B 21 unde ... navem ] *om.* B 22 aliud ] tertium B 23 potest ... apprehendere ] aliquem tamen effectum eius potest apprehendere B 23 eius ] *om.* B 24 posset ] possit B 24 cognoscere ] intelligere B 24 autem, etsi ] *om.* B 24 etsi *post* noster *del.* O 24 potest ] posset O; possit B 24 directe *post* potest B 25 perfectam ] *om.* B 25–26 aliqui ... notitiam ] aliqui effectus earum apparent nobis, per quos manuducimur in earum notitiam O; potest in effectus earum B 26 per ... notitiam ] *in marg.* O

potest in aliqualem cognitionem earum ut per effectus. Magis | tamen cognoscimus de anima O 164va  
 quam de substantiis separatis, quia effectus ipsius animae nobis apparentes magis adaequant  
 virtutem eius quam effectus substantiarum separatarum nobis apparentes adaequant virtutem  
 earum.

- 5 *Ad 1.4* Ad aliud dicendum quod intelligere nostrum non est sine continuo et tempore,  
 quia non est sine phantasmate. Non tamen oportet omne intelligere esse continuum et tempo-  
 rale.

1 potest ] per effectus possumus B 1 aliqualem ] aliqualiter O 1 earum ut per effectus ] sub-  
 stantiarum separatarum B 2 substantiis ] aliis O 2 ipsius ] *om.* B 2 nobis apparentes ] *om.* B  
 3 quae *post* effectus O 3 nobis apparentes ] *om.* B 3–4 adaequant virtutem earum ] *om.* O 5  
 intelligere nostrum ] *inv.* B 5 phantasmate *post* sine B 6 quod *post* oportet B 6 intelligere esse ]  
 quod a nobis est quocumque modo intelligibile sit B 6–7 temporale ] temporalis B

### III.15: Utrum intellectus intelligat se per suam essentiam an per aliud sicut intelligit alia

B 174va Supposito nunc quod intelligat se per suam essentiam. Quaeritur utrum intellectus intelligat se per suam essentiam an per aliud sicut intelligit alia.

1.1 Quod per suam essentiam videtur.

1.2 Quia quae intelliguntur ab intellectu intelliguntur per aliud quam per suam essentiam, ut per speciem; sed intelligibile, in quantum intelligibile, est unum specie; si ergo intellectus esset intelligibilis per aliud sicut et alia, cum intellectus, praeter hoc quod est intelligibilis, intelligit, et omnia alia, praeter hoc quod sunt intelligibilia, intellige(re)nt. 5

1.3 Praeterea, in separatis a materia idem est intelligens et quod intelligitur; sed intellectus separatus est a materia; ergo idem est in ipso intelligens et intellectum, ergo per suam essentiam intelligit seipsum. 10

1.4 Praeterea, intelligentia et intellectus humanus conveniunt in genere intelligibilium; sed intelligentia intelligit se per suam essentiam; ergo intellectus humanus.

1.5 Praeterea, actio intelligendi provenit ex unione intelligibilis cum intellectu; sed nihil magis unitur intellectui quam ipse sibi; ergo non potest intelligere per aliud quam per se. 15

B 174vb 1.6 Praeterea, intellectus intelligit se: aut ergo per suam essentiam aut per speciem aut per suum actum; sed nec per speciem | nec per suum actum; ergo per suam essentiam. Probatio assumpti: Nec per speciem, quia intelligibilis abstracta est a phantasmatis, et intellectus phantasma non facit; nec per actum, quia si actum suum intelligeret, aliquo actu ipsum intelligeret. Illum ergo actum aut intelliget aut non. Si non, eadem ratione nec primum, si sic, ergo alio actu, et ita erit procedere in infinitum. Praeterea sensus particularis non sentit suum actum, ergo nec intellectus intelligit suum actum. 20

2.1 Oppositum dicit Philosophus in tertio *De anima*. Dicit enim quod “intellectus intelligit seipsum sicut et alia”; sed alia non intelligit per suas essentias, sed per suas species; ergo eodem modo intelligit se. 25

31.1 Dicendum est quod intellectus non intelligit se per suam essentiam, et huius ratio est: Nihil intelligitur nisi secundum quod actu est, unde nihil est verum quod sub cognitione intellectus cadit, nisi secundum quod est actu, per Philosophum in nono *Metaphysicae*. Immo,

23–24 Arist. *DA*, III.4 430a2 28–2 Arist. *Metaph.*, IX.9 1051a29–31, cf. *Auct. Arist.* (ed. Hamesse), 6.234.

2 nunc ] *om.* Aguin. 2 substantiae separatae *suppl.* Aguin. 2 intelligat<sup>1</sup> ] intelligant Aguin. 6 numquam *suppl.* Aguin. 7 intelligibilis<sup>1</sup> ] intelligibile Aguin. 7 praeter ] propter Aguin. 8 praeter ] propter Aguin. 8 intelligibilia ] intelligentia Aguin. 8 intelligerent ] intelligent B; intelligens Aguin. 15 intellectui ] intel *cum ras.* 3 *litt.* B; *om.* Aguin. 16 aut<sup>1</sup> ] aliter Aguin. 16 aut<sup>2</sup> ] aliter Aguin. 16 aut<sup>3</sup> ] aliter Aguin. 17 nec<sup>1</sup> ] non Aguin. 17–18 probatio assumpti ] Probo ad formam argumenti Aguin. 18 speciem ] species Aguin. 19 aliquo ] altero Aguin. 20 illum ] alium Aguin. 20 aut<sup>1</sup> ] aliter Aguin. 20 aut<sup>2</sup> ] aliter Aguin. 20 nec ] non Aguin. 21 ita erit ] cetera Aguin. 21 particularis ] particulares Aguin. 21 sentit ] sentiunt Aguin. 23 speciem *post* intelligit *del.* B; Aguinagalde writes “Dicit enim... intelligit speciem *add. sed exp.*”. He must be misreading his notes, for only ‘speciem’ is expunctuated. 24 suas essentias ] suam essentiam Aguin. 28 nono ] noveno Aguin.

sicut visus non videt vel non cognoscit coloratum in potentia, sed coloratum in actu, sic nec intellectus intelligit, et ideo, quia materia est ens in potentia, materiam non cognoscit nisi per formam per quam est in actu. Sed intellectus humanus secundum se non est in actu. Ad cuius evidentiam considerandum est quod aliquis est intellectus qui est actus purus et perfectus, ut  
 5 intellectus Dei, et ipse cognoscit se vel intelligit per suam essentiam et omnia alia per se; alius est intellectus qui est in actu sed non est actus perfectus, ut intellectus intelligentiae, quia ipse intelligit se per suam essentiam, alia tamen non intelligit per se, sed per eorum similitudines. Sed intellectus humanus non est in actu secundum se, et propter hoc vocatur possibilis, quia secundum se in potentia est, et ideo ex se non habet quod intelligatur. Ex se tamen ha-  
 10 bet quod intelligat; immo, sicut Plato posuit intelligibilia entia separata et intellectum nostrum intelligibilem secundum quod participat ipsa intelligibilia, sic, cum Philosophus ponit species abstractas a phantasmatis intelligibiles, habet ponere intellectum nostrum intelligibilem secundum quod istas species participat, et hoc sic: Secundum quod intellectus noster intelligit obiectum per speciem potest redire super suum actum, et ab actu potest procedere ad suam  
 15 potentiam, et a potentia ad essentiam, et ita per hoc quod actu est per speciem alterius potest suum actum intelligere et per actum seipsum. Unde illud quod primo intelligitur ex parte intellectus est eius actus, qui est ultima eius perfectio. Quia intelligere non est operatio transiens in extrinsecum sicut calefacere vel aedificare, sed manens in operante, ideo intelligere non est perfectio alicuius extrinseci sicut aedificare, sed est perfectio ipsius intellectus.

20 32.2 Sed istum actum potest intelligere dupliciter. Uno modo in particulari, ut cum actu percipit se intelligere, et alio modo in generali, ut cum per obiectum investigat propriam eius operationem. Et eodem modo per actum potest intelligere suam essentiam dupliciter: Uno modo in particulari, ut cum intelligit quod habet, ut cum Socrates percipit se habere intellectum per hoc quod actu intelligit, et alio modo in generali, ut cum inquitur naturam intellectus per suam  
 25 operationem. Et isti modi differunt, quia ad primam cognitionem sufficit praesentia intellectus actu operantis, sed ad secundam cognitionem requiritur subtilis et diligens inquisitio, et ideo multi naturam intellectus ignoraverunt et multi circa ipsam erraverunt.

Ad primum argumentum dicendum est quod intellectus et intellectum in actu sunt idem, et non intellectus et intellectum in potentia. Modo species intelligibilis est immediatum prin-  
 30 cipium intelligendi. Unde in quocumque est species actu intelligibilis, illud potest intelligere, sed quaecumque species est in lapide vel in re materiali extra intellectum, solum est intelligibilis in potentia, et ideo nullum intelligibile extra intellectum nostrum habet in se immediatum principium intelligendi, et propter hoc non potest intelligere. Sed species quae est in intellectu, intelligibilis actu est, | et ideo, cum intellectus noster habeat in se immediatum principium  
 35 intelligendi, potest intelligere praeter hoc quod intelligibilis est, et ita non est in aliis.

B 175ra

38–39 Cf. Aquinas, *ST* I q. 87, a. 1, resp. p. 429a. 39–40 *De anima* III.7 431b2–3, cf. Aquinas, *Sent. de anima* lib. 3, cap. 7, p. 236, ll. 72–89; lib. 3, cap. 4, p. 218, ll. 8–23 and p. 220, ll. 101–121; id. *ST* q. 84, a. 7, resp., p. 414b.

29 sed coloratum in actu ] *om.* Aguin. 30 materiam ] in materia B; tunc materiam Aguin. 33 dei ] divinus Aguin. 41 sic ] ergo Aguin. 42 redire super suum actum ] super suum actum redire Aguin. 44 illud ] id Aguin. 51 ut<sup>2</sup> ] vel B Aguin. 55 circa ] essentiam Aguin. 60 nostrum ] minime Aguin. 62 noster habeat ] apprehendat Aguin. 63 praeter ] per Aguin. 63 in ] de Aguin.

Ad secundum argumentum dicendum est quod ista dicuntur separata a materia quae sunt actu intellecta, unde Philosophus dicit in tertio *De anima* quod omnino sicut res sunt separabiles a materia sic sunt circa intellectum. Sed intellectum in actu et intellectus sunt idem, sicut sensibile in actu et sensus; sensibile vero in actu et sensus non sunt idem nisi quia eadem est forma utriusque, quia species quae causata est a sensibili <ut> ab agente est in sensu ut in subiecto, et eodem modo in proposito: Intellectum in actu et intellectus dicuntur idem, quia species intellecti in actu est forma perficiens et informans intellectum, et per istam formam intelligit intellectus se discurrendo et non per suam essentiam. 5

Ad tertium argumentum dicendum est quod intellectus intelligentiae est actus perfectus, quia semper actu est. Habet enim in se species innatas. Sed intellectus noster secundum se est in potentia ut possibilis, et ipse intellectus agens, etsi sit actus, est actus intelligibilium, et non intellectus, antequam intelligat. 10

Ad quartum dicendum est quod actio intelligendi causatur ex unione obiecti cum intellectu, sed licet nihil magis uniatur intellectui quam ipse sibi, non tamen unietur sibi ut obiectum, quia obiectum intellectus nostri est natura rei quae est extra animam, et ipsa non unitur intellectui nisi per speciem. 15

Ad ultimum argumentum dicendum est quod intelligit se et per speciem et per actum, sed non per speciem propriam, ut ratio probat, sed per speciem quae alterius est. Similiter per actum suum intelligit se, et illum actum adhuc intelligit alio actu. Propter quod intelligendum est quod aliquis est intellectus qui est suum intelligere, et ideo unico actu intelligit suam essentiam et suum intelligere, quia idem sunt, ut intellectus Dei. Et alius est intellectus qui non est suum intelligere, sua tamen essentia est obiectum sui intelligere, ut intellectus intelligentiae, et licet suum intelligere et sua essentia differant, tamen unico actu intelligit suam essentiam et suum intelligere, quia intelligere est perfectio suae essentiae, et unico actu intelligitur res et sua perfectio. Sed intellectus humanus nec est suum intelligere, nec sua essentia est obiectum sui intelligere, sed obiectum eius est res extra intellectum, et ideo unico actu non potest intelligere obiectum et suum intelligere, quia suum intelligere non est perfectio obiecti. Intelligere enim lapidem non est perfectio lapidis, sed est perfectio intellectus, et ideo unico actu non contingit intelligere lapidem et ipsum intelligere. Unde per hoc dicendum est ad argumentum quod alio actu intelligit suum actum et suum obiectum, et actu intelligit illum actum, et sic in infinitum, nec est inconveniens procedere in infinitum in actibus intellectus et rationis. 20 25 30

Ad aliam probationem dicendum est quod sensus sentit per immutationem organi corporalis, et nihil corporale mutat seipsum, et ideo sensus non immutatur nisi ab extrinseco. Sed intellectus non immutatur per immutationem organi corporalis, sed spiritualiter, et spirituale bene potest reflectere se supra se, et ideo posuit Plato primum movens movere seipsum quia primum movens posuit esse animam et operationes eius, sicut amare et gaudere et huiusmodi, posuit esse motum eius. 35

2–3 Arist. *De anima* III.4 429b21–2.

2 omnino ] omnia Aguin. 4 vero ] veri Aguin. 5 quae ] q *cum ras. 2 litt.* B; ut Aguin. 6 in<sup>1</sup> ... idem ] *om.* Aguin. 8 se ] sed *a.c.* B 11 ut ] vel Aguin. 13 argumentum *suppl.* Aguin. 14 quam ] quod B Aguin. 18 similiter ] Simul Aguin. 19 illum ] ullum Aguin. 21 dei ] divinus Aguin. 22 est ] *om.* Aguin. 28 contingit ] convenit Aguin.

## C.12 John of Jandun: *Quaestiones in De anima*

The texts of Jandun are preserved in numerous manuscripts and *incunabula* spread across two redactions.<sup>24</sup> The editions presented here are based on one of the early *incunabula* from 1480, printed in Venice. In some problematic passages the manuscript Vat. Lat. 2156 has been consulted for further assistance. For that reason the apparatus to these editions are positive, meaning that all consulted readings are reported.

### *Manuscript sigla*

- V1 Venice 1480 *incunabulum*. Exemplar preserved in the Bibliothèque nationale de France, Italian books before 1601; no. 48.3.  
Available online at <https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k58493v>
- V2 Venice 1483 *incunabulum*. Published by F. de Hailbrun and N. de Franckfordia socii. Exemplar preserved in the Bibliothèque national de France, département réserve des livres rares, D-1841.  
Available online at <https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k5403731v>
- A Vatican, Vatican Library, Vaticanus Latinus 2156: 1r–115r.

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<sup>24</sup> For the full list of manuscripts, see Lohr 1970: 212–3.

V1 4b, V2 2ra, A 2rb **I.1: Utrum de anima possit esse scientia**

Omissis autem omnibus partibus philosophiae, solum de naturali est praesens intentio et non de quocumque, sed de illa quae scientia de anima nominatur. Et primo circa ipsam quaeritur utrum de anima possit esse scientia.

1 Et arguitur quod non. 5

1.1 Primo quia de singularibus non est scientia; sed anima est huiusmodi; quare et cetera. Maior patet primo *Posteriorum* et septimo *Metaphysicae*. Minor patet quia anima est forma corporis animati, quod est singulare, talis autem forma est singularis, ut dicit Philosophus septimo *Metaphysicae* in illo capitulo: “Eorum autem quae fiunt omnis vero talis species et in his carnibus et ossibus Callias et Socrates et diversa propter materiam” quare et cetera. 10

1.2 Item de corruptibilibus non est scientia; sed anima est huiusmodi; ergo et cetera. Maior patet primo *Posteriorum* et per Boethium in primo suae *Aritmethicae*. Minor patet quia corpus animatum cuius forma est anima est corruptibile, ut patet secundo huius cum | sit compositum ex materia et forma; compositum autem sic corrumpitur, quia corruptio tangit essentiam formae, licet non materiae, ut satis patet primo *Physicorum* et septimo *Metaphysicae*; quare et cetera. 15

1.3 Item de non intelligibili non est scientia; sed anima est huiusmodi; quare et cetera. Maior patet quia scientia est habitus intellectus, ut dicit Philosophus sexto *Ethicorum*, et ideo scibile debet esse intelligibile per locum a coniugatis. Minor patet tripliciter. Primo quia non est sensibilis, cum anima sit substantia, et sensus non se profundat usque ad substantiam rei, ut dicit Commentator secundo huius, modo intellectus nihil intelligit eorum quae sunt extra suum sensum, ut dicit Philosophus in *De sensu et sensato* et etiam tertio huius; quare et cetera. Secundo quia intellectus debet esse denudatus ab eo quod intelligit, ut dicunt Philosophus et Commentator tertio huius; modo anima non potest denudari a seipsa; quare et cetera. Tertio si sic sequeretur quod idem esset movens et motum; consequens est falsum; ergo et antecedens. Falsitas consequentis patet quia implicat contradictionem, ut ostendit Commentator nono *Metaphysicae*. Consequentia est manifesta quia anima movetur ab eo quod intelligit, ut dicit Commentator tertio huius, et ideo si anima intelligit seipsam movebit seipsam; quare et cetera. 20 25

1.4 Item de non ente non est scientia; sed anima est huiusmodi; ergo et cetera. Maior patet primo *Posteriorum*. Minor probatur quia omne ens vel est in anima vel extra animam, ut patet sexto *Metaphysicae*; sed anima non est ens in anima, quia nihil est in seipso, ut patet per Philosophum quarto *Physicorum* neque est ens extra animam, quia nihil est ens extra seipsum; quare et cetera. 30

1.5 Item si de anima esset scientia sequeretur quod eius scientia esset eadem cum eius substantia; consequens est falsum; ergo et antecedens. Falsitas consequentis patet quia anima est de genere substantiae et scientia de genere qualitatis, et ista sunt impermixta, ut patet primo 35

7 Arist. *APo* I.31, 87b33–37. 7 Arist. *Metaph.* VII.15, 1039b27–40a7. 8–10 Arist. *Metaph.* VII.8, 1034a5–8. “Omnis vero iam talis species in hiis carnibus et ossibus, Callias et Socrates; et diversa quidem propter materiam (diversa namque), idem vero specie (nam individua species).”

9 in illo ] A; et decimo V1 V2 9 vero talis ] vero materialis A; autem materialis V1 V2 10 et<sup>3</sup> ] A; om. V1 V2 15 ut ] et V1 V2 33 ens<sup>1</sup> ] V2 A; eius V1

*Posteriorum*; consequentia declaratur quia in separatis a materia eadem sunt scientia et scibile, ut dicunt Philosophus et Commentator tertio huius et duodecimo *Metaphysicae*; sed anima adminus intellectiva est separata a materia, ut probant Philosophus et Commentator tertio huius; quare et cetera.

- 5        2.1 In oppositum est Philosophus et Commentator et Themistius et Avicenna et omnes qui nobis tradunt scientiam de anima; quare et cetera.

3.1 Ad istam quaestionem, omissis opinionibus Heracliti et Platonis, dicendum quod de anima potest esse scientia, quia de eo potest esse scientia quod est ens intelligibile universale et habet partes et passiones et principia per quae passiones de ipso e suis partibus possunt probari; 10 sed anima est huiusmodi; quare et cetera. Maior patet quia istae sunt proprietates eius de quo potest esse scientia, ut patet per Philosophum primo *Posteriorum*; sed ex omnibus proprietatibus rei colligitur descriptio rei, ut dicit Commentator quarto *Physicorum*, et cui competit descriptio et descriptum, ut dicit Boethius secundo *Topicorum*. Minor patet, est enim ens anima quia anima est actus et forma, ut patet secundo huius; modo cum ens et | unum multipliciter dicatur, 15 quod vere est actus, ut dicit Philosophus ibidem; quare et cetera. Est etiam intelligibilis quia intellectus possibilis est omnia fieri, ut patet tertio huius; sed anima est de numero omnium ut probatum est paulo prius; quare et cetera. Habet etiam partes quia anima est quid universale ad vegetativam, sensitivam et intellectivam, ut patet secundo huius; sed universale continet multa ut partes, sicut dicit Philosophus primo *Physicorum*; quare et cetera. Habet etiam passiones secundum suas operationes, scilicet vegetare, sentire et intelligere. Habet etiam principia per 20 quae istae passiones possunt de ipsa et suis partibus demonstrari, quia principium demonstrationis accidentium est quod quid est sive definitio, ut patet in prooemio huius, et anima habet definitionem non solum communem sed specialem secundum unamquamque partem suam, ut patet secundo huius; quare et cetera.

25        3.2 Item de illo potest esse scientia de quo potest haberi certificatio quaestionis scientificae; sed anima est huiusmodi; quare et cetera. Maior patet quia quaestiones sunt aequales numero his quaecumque vere scimus, ut dicit Philosophus secundo *Posteriorum*. Minor patet quia quaestiones scientificae sunt quatuor, ut dicit Philosophus ibidem, scilicet ‘si est’, ‘quid est’, ‘quia est’, ‘propter quid’, et rationes istae de anima possunt certificari. Certificatur enim 30 ‘si est’ per hoc quod est principium vivendi, ut patet ex secundo huius, cum vivere viventibus est esse, ut etiam patet ibidem; quare et cetera. Certificatur etiam ‘quid est’ quia ‘quid est’ scitur per definitionem, cum definitio sit sermo certificativus quidditatis et essentiae, ut dicit Commentator septimo *Metaphysicae*; sed definitio habetur de anima non solum in communi sed etiam in speciali, ut patet ex secundo huius. Certificatur etiam ‘quia est’ quia ‘quia est’ certificatur per hoc quod scitur inhaerentia passionis; multae autem sunt passiones quae sciuntur in esse animae, ut esse principium vivendi, sentiendi et huiusmodi, cum per haec differt animatum ab inanimato, ut patet in erroribus huiusmodi. Scitur insuper ‘propter quid’ quia ‘propter quid’ scitur cum scitur causa inhaerentiae passionis ad subiectum; talis autem causa scitur per definitionem, ut patet secundo *Posteriorum* et in prooemio huius et quarto *Physicorum* per 40 Philosophum et Commentatorem; quare et cetera.

11 Arist. *APo* I.28, 87a38–87b4. 27 Arist. *APo* II.1, 89b23–24. 28 Arist. *APo* II.1, 89b24–25.

3.3 Sed est intelligendum propter solutiones quarundam rationum quod aliquid est sensibile dupliciter, uno modo per se, alio per accidens. Per se sunt sensibilia propria et communia, et isto modo anima non est sensibilis, cum sit substantia. Alio modo aliquid est sensibile per accidens sicut quando est subiectum alicuius accidentis sensibilis vel causa alicuius operationis sensibilis, et isto modo anima vegetativa est sensibilis et etiam sensitiva, quia eius operationes sunt sensibiles, scilicet nutrire, augmentare, sentire. Anima autem intellectiva nec per se nec per accidens videtur sensibilis esse, cum nec secundum se nec secundum operationes suas apprehendatur a sensu nisi forte | vellemus vocare sensibile per accidens quod habet habitudinem ad aliquod per se sensibile, sicut octavum caelum dicimus locari per accidens quia habet habitudinem ad centrum quod per se locatur, ut patet quarto *Physicorum*, et isto modo anima intellectiva posset dici sensibilis cum habeat habitudinem ad fantasmata, ut patet tertio huius; quare et cetera.

Sed dubitaret aliquis circa dicta quod sicut aliquod esset sensibile ita esset intelligibile; sed anima est sensibilis per accidens; ergo intelligibilis per accidens, quod est falsum, quia si solum esset intelligibilis per accidens, tunc de ipsa solum esset scientia per accidens, quod est manifeste falsum. Maior patet per Commentatorem secundo huius capitolo de odore.

Ad hoc dico quod de anima est scientia, et cum dicitur est intelligibilis per accidens, dico quod aliquid intelligi per accidens potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo quia intelligatur in alio, sicut partes in toto vel oppositum in opposito vel simile in simile, et non in propria specie, et de tali intelligibili non est scientia per se, sed per accidens. Aliud est intelligibile per accidens, quod non intelligitur per propriam speciem, sed intelligitur ex intellectione alterius quod intelligitur in propria forma, et de tali est bene scientia per se. Modo dico quod anima non est intelligibilis per accidens primo modo, sed secundo modo. Et tunc ad probationem quae vadit directe contra verba Commentatoris, “sicut aliquid est sensibile et cetera.” Dico quod haec propositio Commentatoris solum veritatem habet quantum ad bonitatem vel malitiam, ut sit sensus quod illud quod est bene vel male sensibile sit bene vel male intelligibile, sed non habet veritatem quantum ad per se et per accidens; quare et cetera.

*Ad 1* Per hoc ad rationes in oppositum.

*Ad 1.1* Ad primam cum dicitur ‘de singularibus’ et cetera, verum est ut singularia sunt et singulariter concepta. De singularibus vero universaliter conceptis bene potest esse definitio, cum de talibus possit esse definitio ut dicit Commentator in prooemio huius dicens quod “definitiones sunt rerum particularium extra materiam existentium.” Sed intellectus est qui agit universalitatem in eis, et cum dicitur anima est huiusmodi, verum est haec vel illa, tamen anima universaliter accepta non; quare et cetera.

*Ad 1.2* Ad aliam de corruptibilibus et cetera, verum est de corruptibilis per se, de corruptibilibus autem per accidens potest esse scientia. Et cum dicitur anima est huiusmodi, dico quod verum est sed valde per accidens, quia anima in universali non corrumpitur nisi ad corruptionem suorum suppositorum qui quidem corrumpuntur per accidens, cum generatio et corruptio sint solius compositi per se, ut dicit Philosophus octo *Metaphysicae*; quare et cetera.

*Ad 1.3* Ad aliam de non intelligibili et cetera, dico quod verum est et cum dicitur anima

24 commentatoris ] Commentatorem V1 30–31 esse definitio ] A; om. V1 V2 31 cum ... definitio ] V1 V2; om. A 36 esse scientia ] A; om. V1 V2

est huiusmodi, falsum est. Et cum probatur tripliciter, dico praeintelligendo quod aliquid intelligitur dupliciter, uno modo aliquid intelligitur primo sicut | quid habet proprium fantasma mediante quo potest fantasiari, et de tali procedunt omnes tres probationes. Alio modo aliquid intelligitur non primo sed ex intellectione alterius, quod primo intelligitur, et de tali non procedunt probationes. Modo anima non est intelligibilis primo modo adminus intellectiva, sed solum secundo modo, ut patet tertio huius quare et cetera.

V1 6b

*Ad 1.4* Ad aliam de non ente et cetera verum est, et cum dicitur anima est huiusmodi, dico quod falsum est; et cum probatur quod vel esset ens in anima vel extra animam, dico quod est extra; et cum dicitur vel est extra et cetera, dico quod aliquid esse extra animam potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo dicitur esse extra animam omne illud quod est diversum ab anima, et isto modo anima non est extra seipsam. Alio modo dicitur aliquid esse extra animam quod in suo esse ab operatione non dependet, et isto modo animam esse extra seipsam non est inconueniens; quare et cetera.

*Ad 1.5* Ad aliam ‘non de anima’ et cetera, dico quod falsum est, et cum probatur ‘quia in separatis’ et cetera, aliqui dicunt quod verum est in separatis quae primo cognoscunt se, et alia ex consequenti sicut in Deo et intelligentiis, sed in aliis non; modo anima non est huiusmodi; quare et cetera. Sed istud non valet. Primo quia sequeretur quod scientia duodecimi *Metaphysicae*, quae est de Deo et intelligentiis, esset eadem cum ipso, quod est falsum. Secundo, quia secundum istam solutionem sequeretur quod adminus scientia quae est de anima intellectiva agente esset eadem cum ipsa, quod est falsum, et probatur consequentia quia intellectus agens est substantia separata in actu, quae semper intelligit se et primo, sicut aliae intelligentiae, ut dicit Commentator tertio huius; quare et cetera. Et ideo alii dicunt quod in separatis et cetera, quod verum est in separatis quae sunt in actu, sed non in illis quae sint in potentiae; cuiusmodi est intellectus, ut patet tertio huius. Sed istud non valet propter intellectum agentem, qui est substantia actu ens, ut dicit Philosophus tertio huius. Et ideo aliter dico exponendo illam auctoritatem sic: ‘in separatis a materia et cetera’ verum est de scientia quam habet de seipsis, et hoc solum in illis quae prius cognoscunt se quam alia, sed de scientia quam nos habemus de ipsis non est verum; modo anima est huiusmodi; quare et cetera.

Alio modo potest dici quod verum est in separatis totaliter, scilicet quantum ad substantiam et operationem eius primam, sed in separatis solum quoad substantiam et non operationem dico quod non oportet: modo intellectus non est separatus totaliter quia sua prima operatio, quae est intelligere, non est sine corpore, ut patet primo et secundo huius. Et si dicatur quod intellectus agens separatus est totaliter, et quantum ad substantiam et quantum ad eius primam operationem, quae est intelligere, cum nihil intelligat eorum quae sunt hic, ut dicit Commentator tertio huius, dico quod intellectus agens non | est totaliter separatus quantum ad istam operationem, quia licet non coniungatur corpori quantum ad istam operationem in primo acquisitionis scientiarum, tamen nobis coniungitur in postremo post acquisitionem intellectuum speculationem, ut dicit Commentator tertio huius; quare et cetera.

V1 6a

### III.13: Utrum intellectus possibilis possit intelligere suam intellectionem existentem in eo

V1 217a,  
V2 62ra,  
A 76vb

⟨C⟩um autem sic singula fiant et cetera. Quaeritur hic utrum intellectus possibilis possit intelligere suam intellectionem existentem in eo.

1.1 Arguitur primo quod non, quia sicut se habet sensus ad sensationem sic intellectus ad intellectionem per convenientem similitudinem; sed sensus non potest sentire suam sensationem, ut plane dicit Aristoteles in *De somno et vigilia* et Commentator in *De substantia orbis*, non enim visu videt aliquis quem videt; similiter autem et in aliis, quare et cetera. 5

V1 217b

1.2 Item, illud quod non est sensibile non est intelligibile, cum anima nihil intelligat sine phantasmate, ut dicit Aristoteles in isto tertio; phantasma autem non est nisi rei sensibilis ut patet ex secundo hoc et tertio; sed ipsa intellectio non est sensibilis, ut manifestum est, quare et cetera. 10

1.3 Item, omne quod intelligitur agit in intellectum, cum intelligere sit quoddam pati ab intelligibili aut aliquod huiusmodi alterum, scilicet consequens passionem; sed intellectio non agit aliquod in intellectum, quia accidens non agit in suum subiectum, et universaliter forma non agit in suam materiam in qua existit; quare et cetera. 15

1.4 Item, si intellectus intelligeret intellectionem existentem in eo, verbi gratia intellectionem lapidis, sequeretur quod simul intelligeret diversa intelligibilia, quod reputatur impossibile secundum Aristotelem quarto *Metaphysicae* ubi dicit quod quis unum non intelligit nihil intelligit. Et probatur consequentia quia cum intellectio lapidis sit in intellectu, oportet quod intellectus intelligat lapidem sicut cum visio coloris est in visu, necesse est tunc quod visus videat colorem, si igitur intellectus intelligeret intellectionem lapidis existentem in ipso, dum est in ipso cum ipsa intellectio lapidis sit aliud lapide, sequeretur inconueniens praedictum; quare et cetera. 20

2.1 Oppositum arguitur auctoritate Aristotelis in isto capitulo ubi dicit quod intellectus intelligit se per suum actum, quod non contingeret nisi posset intelligere suum actum, ut manifestum est. 25

3.1 Ad quaestionem dico breviter quod intellectus bene potest intelligere suam intellectionem et universaliter suum actum quicumque sit, sive primus sive secundus. Et probatur quia intellectus potest intelligere omne ens; sed actus ipsius intellectus est aliquod ens; igitur et cetera. Maior est manifesta ex isto tertio cum intellectus sit in potentia omnia fieri et Commentator dicit in suo libro *De generatione* quod nullum ens est ignotum naturaliter; et minor similiter apparet de se; quare et cetera. 30

3.2 Sed de modo secundum quem intellectus intelligit intellectionem existentem in ipso est magna difficultas. Si enim intellectus cognoscit intellectionem lapidis existentem in ipso, quaero utrum intellectio illa quae intelligit intellectionem lapidis sit per se eadem cum ipsa intellectione lapidis aut diversa. Si dicatur quod sit eadem, hoc videtur esse falsum, quia intelligere diversificatur secundum naturam rei intellectae, ut dicit plane Commentator in isto 35

2 Arist. *DA* III.4 429b5. 8–9 Arist. *DA* III.7, 432a7–14. 18–19 Arist. *Metaph* IV.4 1006b10. 24–25 Arist. *DA* III.4 429b5–9. 30 Arist. *DA* III.4 429a21–23. 37–1 Averr. *Comm. in DA* ad III.4 429b10–14, comm. III.9, p. 422.36–50 (ed. Crawford).

tertio commento nono; cum igitur lapis sit alia natura a sua intellectione et econverso, quomodo potest esse unum et idem intelligere quo intelligit utrumque? Si autem illa intellectio sit alia ab intellectione lapidis, sequitur unum inconueniens manifestum, scilicet quod intellectus simul potest intelligere infinita sub rationibus suis propriis, | quia qua ratione intellectus  
 5 intelligit intellectionem lapidis existentem in eo intellectione alia ab ipsa eadem ratione intelligere poterit intellectionem illius intellectionis per aliam intellectionem, et illam per aliam, et sic in infinitum, et unamquamque istarum intellectionum simul intelligeret intellectus secundum rationem suam propriam, sicut simul ponitur intelligere lapidem et intellectionem lapidis existentem in eo secundum rationem suam propriam. Hoc autem videtur omnino absurdum,  
 10 scilicet quod intellectus intelligat infinita acta, quia infinitum est ignotum secundum Aristotelem primo *Physicorum* et secundo *Metaphysicae*, quare inconueniens videtur quod intellectus intelligat intellectionem existentem in eo intellectione diversa ab illa.

V1 218a

3.3 Qualiter ergo intelliget eam? Et ad istam difficultatem solvendam inuenio paucos laborasse manifeste. Unde ad praesens sufficit mihi probabiliter transire, salva mihi libertate  
 15 aliter dicendi alias, si mihi melius apparebit. Possem itaque dicere quod intellectus intelligit intellectionem lapidis existentem actu in eo, sed non alia intellectione simpliciter sed eadem, ita quod intellectio lapidis existens in intellectu est intellectio lapidis et intellectio sui ipsius, et intellectus ista intellectione denominatur intelligens lapidem et ipsammet intellectionem. Et quodammodo simile sicut albedo non dicitur alba per aliam albedinem superadditam sibi, sed  
 20 dicitur alba eo modo quo potest dici alba per seipsam, quia ipsa est illud quo formaliter aliquid est album; sic intellectio lapidis dicitur intellecta non quidem per aliam intellectionem sed per seipsam in quantum est id quo aliquid dicitur intellectum et intelligens.

3.4 Et si quis quaeret quare intellectio lapidis est aliud a lapide, et intellectio intellectionis lapidis non est aliud ab ipsa, forte causa huius est quia lapis est res materialis et non abstracta,  
 25 et talia non sunt de se actu intellecta nec intellectiones, ut dicit Aristoteles in isto tertio. In habentibus autem materiam potentia est unumquodque intelligibile, sed ipsa intellectio est res abstracta a materia, scilicet actus universalis; omnis autem talis actus est de se intellectus, et habens huiusmodi actum in se est actu intelligens; quare et cetera.

3.5 Et ad auctoritatem Commentatoris, cum dicitur “intelligere diversificatur secundum  
 30 diversitatem naturae intellectae”, possum dicere quod verum est si illae res sint eiusdem ordinis, verbi gratia intellectiones duarum formarum materialium sunt diversae, et similiter intellectiones duorum diuersorum actuum immaterialium sunt diversae; sed si intelligibilia sunt diuersorum ordinum, scilicet quod unum illorum sit materiale et aliud abstractum ab illo materiali, sic non oportet quod eorum sint diversae intellectiones, et sic est in proposito, nam  
 35 intellectio lapidis est in alio ordine entium a lapide et e contrario; lapis enim est res materialis, et eius intellectio est quid immateriale et abstractum et causatum ab ipso lapide et quoquo modo, scilicet median|te suo phantasmate, una cum intellectu agente, quare non valet.

V1 218b

*Ad 1.1* Ad primam rationem dico quod est simile de sensu et intellectu quoad hoc, quia sicut sensus est subiectum sensationis sic intellectus intellectionis; sed est difficile in hoc,  
 40 quia sensus est virtus organica et corporea, et ideo non est nata cognoscere suum actum, sed intellectus est virtus abstracta et incorporea, et ideo potest cognoscere suum actum.

*Ad 1.2* Ad aliam cum dicitur “quod non est sensibile et cetera” potest dici quod verum est

quod nec est sensibile nec habet habitudinem ad aliquod sensibile, licet si habet habitudinem per se ad aliquod sensibile sic potest intelligi, modo licet intellectio non sit sensibilis per se, tamen habet habitudinem ad sensibile per se, scilicet ad illud a quo causatur in intellectu quoquo modo, sicut causatum habet habitudinem ad suam causam, et hoc dicitur sufficere. Quomodo enim aliter possemus intelligere substantias separatas, nisi quia habent habitudinem ad aliquae sensibilia, scilicet ad motus caelestes? 5

*Ad 1.3* Ad aliam potest concedi rationabiliter quod intellectus bene potest simul intelligere diversa saltem una intellectione, et sic erit in proposito. Intelligens enim intelligit lapidem et intellectionem lapidis unica intellectione, et cum dicit Aristoteles quod “unum non intelligit et cetera”, potest dici sicut communiter exponitur quod quis unum non intelligit secundum unam intellectionem nihil intelligit. Utrum autem possint intelligi plura diversis intellectionibus simul ab eodem individuo bona difficultas est, sed magis habet locum alibi, scilicet in quarto *Metaphysicae* et sic de isto. 10

### III.27: Utrum intellectus possibilis possit intelligere seipsum

V1 262b,  
V2 78va,  
A 97vb

⟨N⟩unc tempus est quaerendi utrum intellectus possibilis possit intelligere seipsum.

1.1 Et arguitur primo quod non, quia sicut se habet sensus ad sentire sic intellectus ad intelligere per convenientem similitudinem; sed sensus non sentit seipsum immo neque suam  
5 cognoscit sensationem, ut vult Aristoteles in de somno et vigilia, non enim visus sentit seipsum quando videt.

1.2 Item, quod non est sensibile non est intelligibile, cum intelligere vel sit phantasia vel non est sine phantasia, et intelligentem quemcumque necesse est phantasma aliquod speculari; sed intellectus possibilis non est sensibilis, ut patet ex isto tertio; quare et cetera.

10 1.3 Item, si sic tunc idem esset in actu et in potentia respectu eiusdem, quod est impossibile quia ista sunt valde opposita, ut patet nono *Metaphysicae* et habetur a Commentator in primo huius; et patet consequentia quia intelligere est actus respectu intellectus agentis, et intellectus est in potentia respectu intellectionis, ut patet ex isto tertio; quare et cetera

1.4 Item, si sic aut intelligeret seipsum | per suam essentiam seu substantiam aut per  
15 aliquid aliud per sufficientem divisionem; non per seipsum, quia intelligibilia et intellectus possibilis sunt eiusdem rationis, quia aliter intellectus possibilis non esset potentia una; si ergo intellectus possibilis est intellectus a seipso per seipsum sequitur quod etiam alia intelligibilia | essent intelligibilia per seipsa, et tunc sicut intellectus possibilis intelligit se sic et alia  
20 intelligerent, quod est absurdum – lapis enim et lignum non intelligunt; si autem ipse intellectus possibilis est intelligibilis per intentionem aliam sive per | aliquid aliud, tunc cum alia  
intelligibilia, scilicet entia materialia, sint intelligibilia per aliquid aliud et ipsa non intelligunt, sequitur quod intellectus possibilis etiam non intelligeret, quod est absurdum, et haec est ratio Aristotelis in littera.

A 98a

V1 263a

V2 78vb

1.5 Item, quod non potest movere intellectum non potest intelligi, intelligibile enim movet intellectum sicut sensibile sensum, et propter hoc intelligere est sicut sentire secundum Aristotelem hoc; sed intellectus possibilis non potest movere intellectum possibilem, cum nihil moveat seipsum, et amplius semper aestimabitur species aliqua movens tertio *Physicorum*, ipse autem intellectus possibilis non est species aliqua, immo est ens pure potentiale secundum se.

30 2.1 Oppositum vult Aristoteles in littera ibi “et ipse autem seipsum potest intelligere.”

3 Ad quaestionem primo dico breviter quod intellectus possibilis potest seipsum intelligere, secundo ostendetur quod non intelligit seipsum per seipsum, scilicet per suam propriam substantiam, tertio videbitur modus per quem contingit ei seipsum intelligere.

3.1 Primum breviter probari potest quia intellectus possibilis potest intelligere omne illud quod continetur sub eius obiecto primo, sicut visus potest videre omne illud quod continetur sub suo obiecto primo; modo intellectus possibilis continetur sub ente quod est primum obiectum intellectus, quare et cetera

25–26 Arist. *DA* III.4, 429a13–18 30 Arist. *DA* III.4, 429b9.

12 agentis ] A; intelligentis V1 V2 12 et<sup>2</sup> ] ; iter. V1 V2

Item, intellectus possibilis enuntiat aliquae de seipso secundum affirmationem et negationem, ut quod ipse sit substantia incorporea et est in potentia ad intelligibilia et huiusmodi multa, sicut patet ex prius dictis.

3.2 Secundum ostenditur quia si intellectus possibilis esset intellectus per seipsum sine quacumque intellectione sibi superaddita, sequeretur quod in ipso sua intellectio esset idem cum sua substantia, quod videtur impossibile. 5

Istam rationem tangit Commentator in commento quinto ubi dicit “et si iste intellectus esset intellectus per se, contingeret in scientia speculativa quod scientia et scitum essent idem, quod est impossibile.” Consequentia non est omnino manifesta nec etiam impossibilitas consequentis, et ideo considerandum est in istis. 10

Medium est propinquius extremis quam extrema inter se – hoc bene manifestum est; cum ergo intellectus et intelligibile se habeant sicut extrema, et intellectio sit sicut medium inter ea, sequitur quod si intellectus et intelligibile sint omnino unum et idem, sequitur quod intelligere fit idem cum eis, et sic si intellectus possibilis secundum seipsum est intelligens et quod intelligitur, necesse est quod intellectio sua sit substantia sua, et sic patet consequentia. Sed falsitas huius consequentis potest sic probari: nam si intellectus possibilis esset sua intellectio essentialiter, numquam reciperet de novo intellectionem suae propriae substantiae, nihil enim est per se receptivum alicuius quod est eiusdem speciei cum eo; omnis autem intellectio propria secundum quam intelligitur substantia propria intellectus possibilis est eadem secundum speciem per se, loquendo sicut “et ipse est unus secundum speciem”; si ergo intellectus possibilis esset sua intellectio, numquam reciperet suam intellectionem eo quod recipiens debet esse denudatum essentialiter a tota specie ipsius recepti, sicut pulchre docet Commentator in isto tertio commento quinto et septimo. Ridiculum enim esset dicere quod aliquid eiusdem speciei cum aliquo esset per se receptivum illius, ut quod una albedo esset per se receptiva alterius albedinis. Inconveniens autem videtur omnino quod intellectus possibilis numquam recipiat de novo intellectionem propriam suae propriae substantiae, quia quilibet intelligens experitur in seipso se intelligere propriam substantiam intellectus possibilis et eius differentiam a sua potentia quoquo modo, et ab intellectu agente et a specie intelligibili recepta in intellectu; ergo sequitur quod intellectus possibilis non est intellectus a seipso per seipsum. 15 20 25

Et ex hoc sequitur unum correlarium quod etiam prius positum est, scilicet quod intellectus possibilis non est substantia aliquae intellectualis actu de se formaliter, quia omnis talis substantia est de se intelligens et intellecta intellectione quae est sua substantia secundum doctrinam Aristotelis et Commentatoris in isto tertio. Sed diceret aliquis contra istud correlarium quod non sequitur, et cum dicitur “omnis substantia intellectualis actu existens de se intelligit seipsa et cetera”, verum est si sit talis substantia actu quae non sit dependens in operatione sua ab aliquo existente in materia, scilicet a phantasmate. Hoc non proficit quia secundum istam positionem ipse intellectus possibilis erit substantia actu naturaliter priusquam moveatur ab aliquo phantasmate humano, et sic naturaliter prius habebit aliquam operationem, quod non esset nisi prius naturaliter intelligeret suam propriam substantiam. Et confirmatur: omne quod de se formaliter est ens actu antequam moveatur et informetur ab aliquo de se est intelligibile 30 35 40

7–9 Averroes, *Comm. Magn. in DA*, ad 430a2–5, comm. III.15, p. 434.20–22 (ed. Crawford).

4 esset ] V2; esse V1 11 medium ] Consequentia V1 V2 13–14 sequitur<sup>2</sup> ... idem ] A; *om.* V1 V2

ab ipso intellectu possibili priusquam ab aliquo moveatur, si ergo intellectus possibilis est substantia actu de se formaliter antequam immutetur ab aliquo | existente in materia, necessario prius est intelligibilis sive intellectus a seipso, quare ergo prius naturaliter intelliget seipsum quam moveatur a phantasmate, cum ibi est prius intellectus et intelligibile secundum seipsum. V2 79ra

5 Sed ad hoc respondetur hic quod intellectus possibilis bene est actu de se intellectus naturaliter antequam moveatur a phantasmate, sed non est intellectus secundum seipsum, nec potest intelligere seipsum potentia propinqua nisi cum receperit speciem a phantasmate qua quidem specie disponitur ad recipiendum cognitionem suiipsius. Sed illud non est rationabile omnino, quia postquam intellectus possibilis esset substantia ens actu de se formaliter antequam moveatur ab aliquo alio, ipse debeat aliter et magis esse dispositus ad recipiendum cognitionem suiipsius quam ad recipiendum cognitiones aliorum entium; unde cum ad recipiendum cognitiones entium naturalium disponatur per species eorum, non esset rationabile quod eisdem speciebus proficeatur ad cognitionem suiipsius, quod ergo intellectus possibilis indigeat ad cognitionem suiipsius disponi per species aliorum. Hoc non est nisi quia ipse secundum se est ens pure in potentia receptiva et non actu de se formaliter. V1 263a

3.3 Nunc videndum est modus per quem intellectus possibilis perveniat ad intelligere seipsum, et breviter credo quod modus est quod prius intelligat aliquod intelligibile per eius speciem receptam quodcumque sit illud, deinde considerat istam speciem in se receptam de novo, et postmodum considerat potentiam receptivam illius speciei, et tandem considerat substantiam subiectam illi potentiae et illi speciei receptae; nec oportet dicere quod simul intelligat omnia illa, sed cognitio rei cuius species informat intellectum continuabitur per aliquod tempus, et in fine illius temporis incipiet considerare speciem illam receptam, et illa consideratio erit per aliquod tempus, deinde in fine illius temporis incipiet intelligere potentiam susceptivam illius speciei, et postea continget ut intelligat substantiam subiectam illi potentiae et speciei et sic intelliget seipsum. 20 25

Et si quis quaerat quid sit principium effectivum illius intellectionis qua intellectus | possibilis seipsum intelligit, credo sine dubio quod illud sit intellectus agens, et credo quod illa eadem species quae prius disponit intellectum ad intelligere quiditatem eius cuius est species etiam disponit ipsam ad suscipiendum intellectionem suiipsius, sed diversimode; nam illa species est conformis quiditati quam repraesentat et eius effectus quoquo modo; et secundum hoc 30 disponit et perficit intellectum possibilem ad intelligere quiditatem illam, et illa species est in intellectu sicut forma ei inhaerens et ipsum perficiens; et est effectus ipsius intellectus possibilis tamquam subiecti et materiae in qua, ut prius apparuit, et secundum istam conditionem ipsa perficit intellectum ad intelligendum seipsum, et ipsa etiam est quodam ens in se, et sic 35 perficit intellectum ad cognitionem suiipsius, scilicet speciei intelligibilis.

Et credo quod hoc voluit dicere Commentator in isto tertio commento octavo ubi dicit quod “cum intellectus fuerit in hac dispositione,” scilicet ubi erit actuatus specie intelligibili quiditatis alicuius, “tunc intelligit seipsum per quod ipse non est aliud nisi formae rerum in quantum abstrahit eas a materiis” id est secundum quod ipse est dispositus et perfectus speciebus intelligibilibus abstractis a materia, “cum ergo intelligit seipsum modo accidentali, ut dicit Alexander, id 40 est secundum quod accidit intellectis rerum quae fuerunt ipsae, id est essentia eius.” Haec sunt V1 263b

40–41 Averroes, *Comm. Magn. in DA*, ad 429b5–10, comm. III.8, p. 420.19–24 (ed. Crawford).

1 si ] sic V1 V2

verba Commentatoris quae sic intelligo quod intellectus intelligit seipsum modo accidentali, id est disponitur ad intelligendum seipsum per aliquod accidens, scilicet per speciem intelligibilem receptam in eo, et hoc est quod subdit ‘secundum quod accidit’, id est contingit intellectus rerum, id est speciebus intelligibilibus ‘rerum quae fuerint ipsae’, id est essentia eius, id est quae fuerunt receptae in essentia eius. Non ergo est intelligendum quod ipse intelligit seipsum per species rerum pro tanto quia illae species sint idem essentialiter cum substantia ipsius intellectus (hoc absit), sed quia huiusmodi species accidunt ei et recipiuntur in eius essentia. Bene tamen verum est quod huiusmodi species sunt essentia intellectus possibilis secundum quod ipse non est dispositus et praeparatus ad intelligere sine illis, sed tunc illae species non sunt idem essentialiter cum substantia intellectus possibilis absolute, et haec expositio hoc est consideranda. 5 10

Considerandum etiam quod quamvis intellectus possibilis secundum communem doctrinam non intelligat seipsum in eodem instanti in quo intelligit rem cuius species est apud eum, sed in alio instanti, et in tempore medio continuatur intellectio illius rei, cum contingit quod illud tempus est multum breve et parvum et propter eius parvitatem putatur nullum esse, et ideo in eodem instanti creditur utraque intellectio contingere; immo audivi aliquis dicere | se expiri in seipsis quod ipsi intelligerent simul rem et ipsum suum intellectum; hoc autem est bene difficile et forte inquiretur a modo in consequentibus an intellectus possit simul intelligere plura intelligibilia diversis intellectionibus. 15

V2 79rb

3.4 Notandum etiam quod intellectus possibilis non solum potest intelligere seipsum modo praedicto intellectione simplici et intuitiva quae est de primis eius operationibus quoquo modo, sed etiam ipse potest se intelligere enuntiando aliqua de seipso secundum affirmationem et negationem, ut quod ipse sit substantia <im>materialis et incorporea et receptiva specierum et alia huiusmodi quae etiam de ipso demonstrative cognoscit, sicut patet ex ista scientia de anima, et in hac scientia est delectatio mirabilis et sincera quam non percipiunt nisi pauci. 20 25

*Ad 1* Ad rationes in oppositum.

A 98vb

*Ad 1.1* Ad primam dicendum quod simile | est in hoc quod sicut sentire est actus ipsius sensus ita intelligere intellectus et in aliis multis; sed difficile est in hoc quia sensus est virtus corporea et ideo non potest reflectere se supra seipsum secundum communem modum loquendi, quare non cognoscit se; intellectus autem est incorporeus, ideo potest redire supra seipsum se cognoscendo postquam cognoverit alia. Si autem aliquis sibi quaereret demonstrari istam conclusionem, scilicet quod virtus corporalis non potest recipere cognitionem suiipsius, hoc esset difficile, sed dimitto propter brevitatem, et in liber de causis debet esse speculatio de hoc. 30

V1 264a

*Ad 1.2* Ad aliud cum dicitur | “quod non est sensibile non est intelligibile et cetera”, dico quod verum est quod illud quod non est sensibile non est intelligibile primo, id est non praecedente cognitione alicuius alterius; sed quod non est sensibile potest esse intelligibile secundo, scilicet praecedente cognitione alterius, et sic est in proposito, ut patet ex modo dicto, quia autem dicit Aristoteles quod “intelligentem quemcumque necesse est et cetera” non sic est intelligendum quod illud phantasma universaliter sit species individualis repraesentans rem quae intelligitur, sed sufficit quod sit phantasma alicuius alterius ad quod illud quod intelligitur ha- 35 40

beat habitudinem per se. Sic autem est in proposito, nam intellectus possibilis, dum seipsum intelligit, potest uti phantasmate alicuius rei sive quiditatis ad quam se habet sicut mobile ad motum ita quod quiditas phantasiata movet intellectum ad suam speciem per quam seipsum intelligit modo praedicto.

5 *Ad 1.3* Ad aliud potest dici quod bene concludit intellectum non intelligere se per seipsum omnino sed per speciem alterius entis. Considerandum tamen est quod idem esse in actu et in potentia respectu eiusdem et secundum idem sui non est possibile, sed secundum aliud et aliud bene est possibile, ut patet in animali movente seipsum; dicam ergo quod anima intellectiva intelligens seipsam est in actu et in potentia simul respectu sui intelligere, sed hoc est ratione  
10 diversorum quae sunt in ea. Est enim in potentia receptiva ratione suae naturae possibilis, et est in potentia activa respectu intellectu agentis ut prius dictum fuit.

*Ad 1.4* Ad aliud dico breviter quod intellectus intelligit seipsum per aliquid aliud, scilicet per speciem alicuius alterius modo prius dicto, non autem per suam substantiam proprie. Et cum dicitur “ergo entia quae sunt intelligibilia per suam speciem erunt intelligibilia sicut  
15 intellectus”, dico quod non est simile quia species rerum materialium quibus intelliguntur non sunt in eis in actu subiective et inhaerenter, sed in potentia activa pro quanto movent intellectum ad suas species, et ideo non intelligunt secundum eas; sed huius species sunt in intellectu secundum actum, id est inhaerentes ei formaliter, et sic perficiunt eum ad intelligere. Et haec est intentio Aristotelis et Commentatoris in littera, dicit enim Aristoteles quod in habentibus  
20 materiam unumquodque intelligibilem est in potentia, scilicet ad species intelligibile modo praedicto, et ideo illis, scilicet rebus materialibus, non inhaereat intellectus in intelligere, et subdit sine materia, enim est intellectus talium, id est intelligere talium est in potentia immateriali, scilicet in intellectu, illud autem, scilicet ens materiale, cuius species est in intellectu, est intelligibile et non intelligens, et hoc etiam voluit dicere Commentator ibidem ubi sic loquitur.

25 Dissolutio ergo quaestionis est quod intentio per quam intellectus materialis sit intellectus actu est quantum est intellectu actu, id est species intelligibilis per quam intellectus materialis fit actu intellectus, est in ipso intellectu actu, scilicet sicut forma ei inhaerens. Intentio vero  
per quam res quae sunt extra animam sunt entia est quia sunt intellectae in potentia, id est species intelligibilis per quam res extra animam est intelligibilis est in ipsa in potentia modo  
30 praedicto. Vel sic intentio, id est forma per quam res extra animam est intellecta in potentia, id est in potentia ad speciem intelligibilem modo praedicto, et non habens eam in se formaliter, et si haberet eam in actu, tunc esset intelligens ut ipse subiungit ibidem.

*Ad 1.5* Ad aliam rationem patet ex dictis quia | intellectus non movet seipsum ad intel-  
lectum per speciem sui sed alterius.

V1 264b

V2 79va

### III.30: Utrum intellectus possibilis semper intelligat intellectum agentem eadem intellectione numero

V1 273a,  
V2 81rb,  
A 101vb

Consequenter potest quaeri utrum intellectus possibilis semper intelligat intellectum agentem eadem intellectione numero.

V2 81va

1.1 Et arguitur primo quod non, quia si ita esset, tunc anima humana haberet | operationem omnino sibi propriam quae non dependeret a corpore nec tamquam a subiecto nec tamquam ab obiecto, quod videtur impossibile secundum Aristotelem in prooemio huius, et in isto tertio. Dicit enim in prooemio huius: “Si autem est hoc, scilicet intelligere, phantasia quidem aut non sine phantasia non contingit, itaque neque hoc sine corpore esse”. Et in isto tertio dicit quod intelligentem quemcumque necesse est phantasma aliquod speculari. Consequentia patet quia nihil quod est aeternum et unum numero dependet ab aliquo corpore tamquam ab agente, nec aliquo existente in corpore, et constat etiam quod illud intelligere quo intellectus possibilis intelligeret agentem non esset in corpore ut subiecto, sicut videtur; nullum enim intelligere est in corpore, ut patet hoc; igitur et cetera. 5 10

2.1 Oppositum dicit Commentator super istam particulam “Sed non aliquando quidem intelligit aliquando vero non intelligit”. Ibi enim dicit Commentator quod “cum intellectus fuerit acceptus simpliciter et secundum quod intelligit formas abstractas et liberatas a materia, tunc non invenitur quandoque intelligens quandoque non, sed invenitur in eadem forma; verbi gratia, in modo per quem intelligit intellectum agentem cuius proportio est ad ipsum, ut diximus sicut lucis ad diaphanum.” 15 20

3 Ad quaestionem dico breviter primo quod intellectus possibilis natus est intelligere intellectum agentem, secundo quod intelligit ipsum semper eadem intellectione in numero.

A 101vb

3.1 Primum probo ratione Commentatoris quam tangit hoc: Nam minus videtur quod intellectus possibilis sit natus | intelligere formas materiales quam intellectum agentem, quia formae materiales non sunt de se intellectae actu, sed potentiae sunt intellectae; fiunt autem intellectae per intellectum agentem. Intellectus autem agens, cum sit substantia immaterialis, actu ens est de se intellectus, et ideo rationabile est, cum ipse intellectus possibilis sit natus perfici per formas materiales et intelligere eas, ut sit natus perfici per intellectum agentem et intelligere ipsum. Et haec ratio similiter concludat quod ipse natus est intelligere alias formas abstractas, et ratio huius potest esse quia illud quod habet naturale desiderium ad inferiorem et minus nobilem perfectionem alicuius generis multo magis debet habere naturale desiderium ad perfectionem altiore, quia natura non consistit in imperfectio. Constat autem quod perfectio per formas immateriales longe nobilior est quam perfectio per formas materiales. 25 30

3.2 Secundum ostenditur sic: Illud cui semper est coniuncta vel unita intellectio alicuius intelligibilis eadem numero semper intelligit illud intelligibile intellectione eadem numero – haec est omnino manifesta; sed ipsi intellectui possibili semper est unita intellectio intellectus agentis, quia ipse intellectus agens est suamet intellectio sui ipsius secundum Aristotelem et 35

8–9 Arist. *DA* I.1 403a8–10. 9–10 Arist. *DA* III.8 432a7–8. 15–16 Arist. *DA* III.5 430a22. 16–20 Averr. *Comm. magnum in DA* com. 19 in III.5 430a17–20, p. 450.193–198 (ed. Crawford). 23 Cf. Averr. *Comm. magnum in DA* com. 19 in III.5 430a17–20, p. 450.198–205 (ed. Crawford).

9 in isto ] V2; isto | in V1 (273b)

Commentatorem hoc: In ipso enim scientia est eadem rei scitae. Cum igitur intellectus agens sit semper unius intellectui possibili, sicut perfectio naturalis suo perfectibili, ut patet ex praestens, sequitur quod semper est unita intellectio intellectus agentis, et per consequens semper ipsum intelligit.

5 Ex hoc autem videtur correlarie posse concludi quod ipse intellectus possibilis per seipsum et per suam propriam substantiam non intelligit intellectum agentem intellectione eadem numero alia ab illa qua intellectus agens intelligit seipsum. Nam si sic, sequeretur quod unum et idem haberet diversas intellectiones unius intelligibilis simul, quod non videtur possibile, praecipue quia | cum intellectus possibilis sit substantia pure in potentia, non est bene rationabile  
10 quod ex sui propria natura habeat aliquem actum sine aliquo alio actu. Unde cum intelligere intellectum agentem sit quidam actus et operatio, non bene viderem qualiter intellectus possibilis per seipsum sine alio actu informante intelligeret intellectum agentem.

V1 273va

3.3 Propter quod videtur mihi ad praesens esse tenendum quod intellectus possibilis semper intelligit intellectum agentem modo praedicto, scilicet quia semper est ei unita intellectio  
15 intellectus agentis qua seipsum intelligit. Illa tamen intellectio non est substantia nec essentia intellectus possibilis nec e contrario.

3.4 Si quis autem diceret quod non solum intellectus possibilis intelligit intellectum agentem intellectione qua ipse intellectus agens intelligit seipsum, et quae est substantia intellectus agentis perficiens intellectum possibilem, sed etiam quadam alia intellectione quae sequitur  
20 immediate unionem intellectus agentis ad possibilem, quae quidem intellectio non est ipsa substantia intellectus agentis, sed consequens unionem intellectus agentis cum possibili, tunc inquaerendum est quae esset necessitas essendi huius intellectionem, cum intellectus possibilis sufficienter intelligat intellectum agentem per eius substantiam. Hoc autem tibi perficiendum reliquo.

3.5 Sed considerandum est quod quamvis intellectus possibilis semper intelligat intellectum agentem per eius substantiam modo praedicto, modo ista intellectio non denominat  
25 | aliquid individuum hominis, ut puto, quia non dependet a phantasmate alicuius hominis, nec omnium. Immo etiam intellectio similis huic intellectioni, scilicet qua intelligit intellectus agens, non contingit nobis perfecte in principio generationis philosophiae nec in medio,  
30 sed forte in complemento, et de hoc debet | inquaeri in consequentibus.

V2 81vb

A 102ra

*Ad 1.1* Ad rationem dico quod anima nostra nullam habet operationem propriam novam et differentem a tota sua substantia sine corpore obiecto, et sic intelligit Aristoteles. Unde intelligentem quemcumque, supple de novo, necesse est phantasma et cetera. Sed non negavit Aristoteles animam intellectivam humanam habere operationem aeternam non per corpore  
35 et operationem quae non est aliud realiter a sua substantia, et huiusmodi est intelligere praedictum. Non enim est realiter diversum a tota substantia animae intellectivae, cum sit ipsa substantia intellectus agentis. Immo huius intelligere non est operatio propria nisi secundum modum intelligendi et significandi, quare et cetera.

1 Arist. *DA* III.430a19–20. Cf. Arist. *DA* III.430a2–3.

### C.13 Simon of Faversham: *Quaestiones in De anima I–III*

Faversham's questions to book three are published by Sharp.<sup>25</sup> The present working edition only seeks to make a readable version of the first question available and is therefore only based on one manuscript, Vat. Lat. 2170: 63r–114r. Reading the manuscript provides quite some problems (not least due to the reproduction that I have used), but I have not been able to compare it with the other witnesses. It should also be noted that for some parts of the commentary the Vatican manuscript may not be the best witness, as it differs from the other manuscripts.<sup>26</sup> The known witnesses are Vat. Lat. 2170: 63r–114r, Vat. Lat. 10135: 87r–118r, Merton 292: 355r–361v (364r–370v in old fol.) Kassel 2° Phys. 11: 56r–77r, Cambrai 486: 2ra, BNF Lat. 16170: 53r–53v.

#### *Manuscript sigla*

V Vatican, Vatican Library, Vaticanus Latinus 2170: 63r–114r.

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<sup>25</sup> Sharp 1934.

<sup>26</sup> See Vennebusch 1965: 28–31.

## I.1: Utrum de anima possit esse scientia

Quaeritur utrum de anima possit esse scientia.

V 63rb

1 Et arguitur quod non.

1.1 De eo quod non habet speciem vel formam intelligibilem non potest esse scientia; sed  
5 anima non habet speciem vel formam intelligibilem; et cetera. Maior patet quia scientia | non  
est nisi de intelligibili. Minor patet: Philosophus enim dicit tertio huius quod intellectus noster  
nihil est actu eorum quae sunt, ergo nullam speciem intelligibilem habet, et cetera. Item, si quis  
temptet considerare materiam et substantiam animae, statim apperebit ei quod non potest eam  
intelligere nisi per opera sua {hoc non est nisi per opera sua}. Hoc non est nisi quia ipsa anima  
10 nullam formam intelligibilem habet in actu. De anima ergo non potest esse scientia.

V 63va

1.2 Item, de singularibus non est scientia; sed animae humanae sunt singulares et nume-  
ratae numeratione corporum; et cetera.

1.3 Item, de eo non potest esse scientia cui non competit ratio subiecti; sed animae non  
competit ratio subiecti, et non est per se subsistens; et cetera. Maior patet de se. Minor probatur  
15 quia de ratione subiecti {quia de ratione subiecti} est quod habeat partes et passiones quibus  
subsistet; anima autem non est huiusmodi, cum sit forma simplex.

1.4 Item Avicenna: scientia nostra habet ortum a sensu. De illo ergo quod nec per se nec  
per accidens cadere potest sub sensu, non est scientia; anima solum intellectiva est huiusmodi;  
et cetera. Quod non per se patet, sed quod non per accidens probatio quia hoc esset per actum  
20 suum; sed eius operatio est separata, sicut et substantia, quia non transit in materiam extra; et  
cetera.

1.5 Item, omnis scientia est de bono. Anima non est quid bonum, quare et cetera. Maior  
patet quia omnis scientia est de bono et difficili. Minor patet quia illud quod est bonum movet  
appetitum, anima non movet appetitum nec aliud obiectum appetitus, quare et cetera.

2.1 Oppositum patet per Philosophum et arguitur: De eo quod habet diffinitionem, pro-  
prietates et passiones, quae possunt probari de ipso, potest esse scientia. Nunc autem anima  
habet diffinitionem, ut patet ex secundo huius. Habet etiam proprietates et passiones quae pos-  
sunt probari de ipsa; anima enim est motrix corporis, et per animam sentimus et intelligimus,  
et haec possunt praedicari de anima et cetera. Et hoc etiam patet inducendo in singulis partibus  
30 animae, in vegetativa, sensitiva et intellectiva. Vegetativa enim partes habet, scilicet potentiam,  
generativam, augmentativam et nutritivam. Habet etiam passiones quae sunt augere, nutrire et  
generare. Similiter anima sensitiva habet partes sicut potentiam visivam, auditivam et cetera.  
Habet etiam passiones quae sunt audire, videre et cetera. Similiter anima intellectiva, de qua  
maior est difficultas, habet partes, scilicet intellectum agentem et possibilem. Habet etiam pro-  
35 prietates, scilicet intelligere, quae convenit intellectui possibili, et abstrahere, quae inest agenti  
et cetera.

3 Intelligendum est quod de anima potest esse scientia.

6–7 Arist. *DA* III.4, 429a22–24, cf. 429b30–31.

8 ei ] sibi V 14 subiecti, ... subsistens ] *in marg.* V 22–24 item, ... cetera. ] *in marg.* V 28  
animam ] anima V 28 sentimus ] sensimus V 29 haec ] haec hoc *ut vid.* V 29 possunt ] post  
*ut vid.* V

3.1 Sicut enim probat Proclus: “omne incorporeum est conversivum sui ipsius ad se ipsum.” Hoc est quia non habet distantias partium, corporeum autem non, et hoc est quia habet distantias partium, incorporeum autem cum sit indivisibile est conversivum, et cetera. Anima autem est incorporeum aliquid, quia non est magnitudo nec magnitudinem habens. Si enim nos poneremus quod anima esset magnitudo, tunc sicut nos videmus quod mobile pertransit unam partem magnitudinis et postea aliam, et sic pertransit totam magnitudinem in tempore et successive, sic, si intellectus esset magnitudo, tunc intelligibile tangens intellectum, sive per speciem sive per aliquid aliud, prius pertransiret unam partem intellectus quam aliam, et ita actus completus intelligendi non fieret in nobis, nisi in generatione magni temporis, et ex hoc sequeretur quod intellectus esset sciens et ignorans, quia secundum unam partem cognosceret aliquid et secundum aliam illud idem ignoraret. Sic etiam sequeretur quod intellectus posset simul multa et contraria intelligere quod est inconveniens. Non enim est possibile quod intellectus noster simul intelligat plura et contraria. Intellectus igitur noster est incorporeus, et per consequens est conversivus sui ipsius ad se ipsum. | Ipsa autem anima non est conversiva sui ipsius ad se ipsam nisi intelligendo suam substantiam et proprietates sibi inhaerentes, et ideo anima nostra se et alias res intelligere potest. Sic autem intelligendo cognitionem habet de anima. Et ideo per animam nostram possumus habere cognitionem de anima.

V 63vb

3.2 Sed advertendum quod licet anima nostra possit habere cognitionem de se ipsa, prius tamen oportet quod habeat cognitionem de aliis quam de se ipsa, et ratio huius est quia anima nostra nullam cognitionem habet sibi innatam. Sed omnis cognitio quae est in anima est sibi acquisita et istam cognitionem quam habet immediate, acquirit ex sensibilibus et singularibus, quia quicquid intellectus intelligit in fantasmatis sensibilibus intelligit. Est enim intellectus in prima sui creatione sicut tabula rasa in qua nihil est scriptum, nata autem sunt omnia de pingi. Omnis enim cognitio in anima est acquisita et istam acquirit ex fantasmatis. Intellectus igitur in actu praesupponit fantasiam in actu, fantasia autem in actu praesupponit sensum in actu. Fantasia enim est modus factus a sensibilibus secundum actum, ut dicitur secundo huius. Sensus autem in actu praesupponit ea quorum est sensus in actu. Verum est ergo quod quamcumque cognitionem habet intellectus noster, illius scibilis primo erit sensus in actu. Si ergo anima non cadat sub sensu, manifestum est quod anima non potest habere primo cognitionem de se ipsam, sed oportet quod prius habeat cognitionem ipsorum quae cadunt sub sensu. Sed ulterius, quando anima sic acquisivit cognitionem de aliis sensibilibus, postea scit se habere cognitionem de illis, cognoscit operationem sibi propriam, et quia operatio ducit in cognitionem substantiae, ideo ex hoc quod anima cognoscit operationem sibi propriam cognoscit suam substantiam. Sic igitur anima ex cognitione aliorum entium devenit in cognitionem sui ipsius, et hoc est quod dicit Albertus in libro suo de anima. Dicit enim quod licet omnis cognitio nostra incipiat a sensibilibus, non tamen semper stat et terminatur ad sensibilia, sed anima ulterius extollitur ad cognoscendum se ipsam, et hoc in quantum se cognoscit negotiari circa quidditates sensibilibus intelligendo et cognoscendo quidditates eorum, et quia anima cognoscit se sic

1–2 Proclus *Elementatio theologica* §15. 35–2 Albertus Magnus, *De anima*, Lib. 1, tract. 1, cap. 1, pp. 2–3, ll. 52–5

8 pertransiret ] pertransit a.c. V 9 generatione ] ut vid. L 25 fantasiam ... praesupponit<sup>2</sup> ] in marg. V 26 secundum actum ] in marg. V 26 factum post actum del. V 30 habeat ] habet a.c. V 33 hoc ] huiusmodi V

negotiarum circa quidditates sensibilium, percipit suam operationem et deinde veram habet sui ipsius cognitionem. Isto ergo modo devenit anima in cognitionem sui ipsius, et hoc necessarium fuit ponere, quia secundum Themistium anima de se incerta de aliis conn<sup>o</sup> verificabitur quasi dicens quod nullo modo. Unde cognitio eorum dependet ex cognitione ipsius animae, propter  
5 quod etiam Philosophus concludit quod utilis est haec scientia ad omnium veritatem et cetera.

3.3 Ulterius intelligendum quod Philosophus tertio huius dicit quod intellectus intelligit se ut alia, et hoc non est intelligendum quod intellectus intelligat se ut alia abstrahendo a sensibilibus, quia tunc esset alius intellectus, qui ipsum intelligeret et illum alius, et sic in infinitum quod est impossibile, sed sic intelligit quod per speciem alienam ducitur in actum, et tunc se  
10 intelligit per speciem propriam.

Et tu dices “quomodo intelliget se per speciem propriam”, dicendum quod, ut visum est, species aliqua ducit ipsum ad actum de potentia quae species facit unum cum ipso, non sicut forma cum materia, nec ut accidens cum subiecto, sed sicut lumen cum perspicuo, ut infra dicit Commentator, quia igitur fit unum ex specie intelligibili et ipso intelligibili. Ideo dicitur  
15 se intelligere per propriam speciem et cetera.

*Ad 1 Ad rationes.*

*Ad 1.1* Ad primam cum arguitur ‘de eo quod non haberi formam’ et cetera, dico quod de illo quod | de se non habet formam intelligibilem in actu, non potest esse scientia. Et quando dicitur quod ‘intellectus non habet formam intelligibilem’ et Themistius similiter illud verbi  
20 Philosophi: “Intellectus nihil est actu eorum que sunt ante addiscere vel invenire” dicit ridiculum erit intelligere quia anima nihil sit in actu eorum que sunt, ac si intellectus non sit illud quod ipsum erit, planum est enim quod intellectus est illud quod est, quia est natura aliqua, et substantia non ergo dicitur sic non esse {in} in actu, quia non sit aliqua substantia, et natura est enim substantia in actu, sed intellectus noster se habet ad formas intelligibiles sicut materia se habet ad formas sensibiles. Materia autem secundum se et secundum suam naturam  
25 considerata non est aliquod sensibilium in actu nihilominus materia, ut consideratur in actu, et sub forma est aliquid sensibilium. Similiter est de intellectu, quod intellectus noster non est aliquid intelligibile in actu, sed hoc solum quod potest recipere omnes formas intelligibiles, hoc enim solum habet quod sit possibilis vocatus, ut dicit Philosophus tertio huius, sed statim cum  
30 acquisiverit formam intelligibilem propter speciem quam habet penes se, tunc etiam quod per eandem speciem ipsa anima fit anima intelligibilis et ideo non est intellectum nisi per speciem aliorum sensibilium, et hoc est quod dicit Philosophus tertio huius. Anima ergo, quantum est de se, non est aliquod intelligibile in actu. autem est aliquod intelligibile in actu per ipsam speciem, ipsa fit in actu intelligibilis, et cum de eo quod est in actu intelligibile sit scientia, ideo  
35 de ipsa est scientia propter quod bene dictum est a principio quod ipsa anima numquam est intelligibilis primo, sed postquam apprehendit alias res apprehendit se ipsam.

*Ad 1.2* Ad aliam, cum dicitur ‘de singularibus non est scientia’, verum est ut sic, et tu dices ‘animae humanae’ et cetera, verum est. Et ideo de eis ut sic non est scientia, tamen de

6–7 Arist. *DA* III.4 430a2–3 20 Arist. *DA* III.4, 429a22–24, cf. 429b30–31.

3 conno ] *in marg. ut vid.* V 3–4 quasi dicens ] q-d V 4 cognitio ] *in marg.* V 5 d *post ad del.* V 8 intelligeret ] intelligit V 13 est *post* lumen *del.* V 23 aliqua *post in del.* V 23 sit ] sunt *a.c.* V 23 *in post* substantia *del.* V 33 aliquod<sup>1</sup> ]

V 64ra

singularibus animabus ut conveniunt in natura communi animae, est scientia, et sic patet ad illud.

*Ad 1.3* Ad aliam dicendum concedendo maiorem. Ad minorem dicendum quod simplicitas animae, cum sit *visum* [?] simplicia, non repugnat ratio subiecti, ut patiat, neque etiam oportet ad hoc quod aliquid sit subiectum quod sit per se subsistens, sed sufficit quod sit subiectum respectu passionum. 5

*Ad 1.4* Ad maiorem ultimae dicendum quod verum est primo, et cum dicitur ‘illud ergo quod non cadit sub sensu’ et cetera non oportet, sed sufficit quod moveatur ab illo vel specie illius, quod cadit sub sensu, et sic est proposito ut ostensum est prius et cetera.

*Ad 1.5* Ad aliud ‘omnis scientia est de bono’ et cetera, verum est ad minorem. Dico quod duplex bonum <sup>!2!</sup> (rep.) apparentia <sup>!4!</sup> (rep.) .<sup>2.</sup> (rep.) bonum <sup>!1!</sup> (rep.) 10

5 Et notandum quod secundum Averroem in prooemio isto Philosophus intendit nos invitare ad amorem scientiae huius libri, ut ei studium impendamus, et hoc philosophus facere nititur per quatuor quae hic inducit. Ostendit enim primo dignitatem et mirabilitatem et honorabilitatem huius scientiae. Secundo ostendit eius utilitatem ibi “videtur autem” et in hiis duobus ipse reddit auditores benevolos. Tertio ostendit modum procedendi circa huius libri scientiam, et in hoc ipse reddit auditores dociles ibi “inquirimus autem”. Quarto autem inducit nos ad amorem huius scientiae per huius scientiae difficultatem, et in hoc ipse reddit auditores attentos ibi “omnino autem”. 15

Et intelligendum quod prius ad praesens duobus modis dicitur uno modo ordine dignitatis, et sic scientia libri de anima in primis debet poni, secundum quod dicit Philosophus super excepta metaphysica quia, ut dicit Averroes, illa ordine dignitatis | prima est. Alio modo dicitur V 64rb aliquid prius ordine doctrine, et sic liber de anima primus non est, immo sextus. 20

Primus enim inter libros naturales est liber *Physicorum*, qui dictus est liber de mobili secundum quod mobile absolute, et de omnibus hiis quae attribuuntur motui secundum quod motus. Secundus autem liber est liber *De caelo* qui sit, ut dictus, de mobili in communitate accepto, sed de mobili contracto ad ubi sive ad motum localem, qui prior est inter omnes motus alios secundum quod apparet in praedictis, multa enim moventur hoc motu quae non moventur aliquo alio motu, sicut patet in motu celi, sed hoc non est econverso. Tertius liber est *De generatione* qui dictus de ente mobili ad formam elementi secundum quod elementum est. Quartus autem est *Meteorum*, qui dictus de ente mobili ad formam elementi sub ratione qua tale et speciale elementum, ut aqua vel ignis et cetera. Quintus est liber *De mineralibus*, quem non habemus a Philosopho sed ab altero, in quo determinatur de ente mobili ad formam mixti secundum quod mixtum est, ut de natura et generatione lapidum et metallorum et cetera. Sextus autem est liber *De anima* qui dictus de ente mobili ad formam mixti non absolute sed mixti animati, ut apparet. Propter quod etiam in hoc libro Philosophus supponit aliqua a libro *Physicorum*, *De generationes* et aliis, licet raro et cetera. 25 30 35

Et quod ille sit debitus ordo patet quia secundum Philosophus secundo *Physicorum* innate in nobis ut a communioribus ad magis specialia procedamus. Modo motus ad formam mixti animati praesupponit motum mixti absolute, et hoc presupponit motum elementi talis, et hoc 40

10–11 ad ... bonum<sup>2</sup> ] *in marg.* V 12 Averroi *post* secundum *del.* V 24 *physicorum post* liber *del.* V 26 sit ] *ut vid.* M 27 contracto ] *ut vid.* M 35 generati *post* mixti *del.* V 39 ut ] *sup. lin.* V 39 o *post* ad *del.* V

ulterius motus ad formam elementi unde elementum est, et ultimus motus ad formam elementi praesupponit motum localem, et motus localis motus simpliciter et cetera. Et propter hoc liber *De anima* Avicennae, cum sextus sit in ordine, vocatur communiter *Sextus naturalium* et cetera.

5       Ulterius notandum quod de passionibus propriis et communibus tripliciter exponitur. Uno modo ita quod per passiones proprias intelligere possumus illas quae insunt animae principaliter, ut speculatio et intelligentia. Secundum Themistium communes autem quae principaliter attribuntur corpori sicut delectatio tristitia et cetera, et hoc modo videtur exponere Themistius. Aliis modis exponit Averroes, ita quod passiones proprias possumus intelligere quae non sunt permixtae organo corporeo, ut intelligere, speculari. Per communes autem illas quae fiunt  
10 et exercentur organo corporali, ut sensus, fantasia. Tertio modo per passiones communes intelligimus illas quae incipiunt a corpore et terminantur ad animam, ut sompnus et vigilia. In dormiente enim primo ligatur cor, quod est principium vitae, et ex consequenti omnes sensus exteriores cordi deservientes et cetera. Passiones autem proprie dicuntur quae insipiunt ab anima et terminantur ad corpus, ut intelligere, speculari et cetera.

15       Et nota quod dicit Philosophus “notitiam” et non scientiam, quia scientia proprie habet esse per causam, ut patet primo *Posteriorum*, et quia anima solum cognoscitur per effectus et cetera. Iterum, propter eandem causam dixit “historia animalium” et propter hoc etiam quod ante tempus suum historiatae fuit scripta et cetera.

## C.14 Simon Magister: *Expositio in De anima*

This text is witnessed in Leipzig UB 1359: 44r–77v. As per the comparative analysis of the text in section 5.2 on page 175 this is here not ascribed to Simon of Faversham. The text is from the end of the 13th or beginning of the 14th century. See the relevant section for more information about this text and manuscript.

### *Manuscript sigla*

L Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek, Ms 1359: 44r–77v.

L<sup>h2</sup> Secondary hand in L, black ink.

L<sup>h3</sup> Tertiary hand in L, light brown ink.

## Prooemium

Philosophus scribit in primo *De partibus animalium* quod plus delectamur et diligimus scire de rebus incorruptibilibus et aeternis, quamvis solum probabiliter et topice sciamus quam scire omnia reliqua quae apud nos sunt necessarie et demonstrative. Et ratio huius propositionis est quia secundum Philosophum tertio *Topicorum* et secundum Alanum in libro suo *De planctu naturae* illa quae cum maiore difficultate et labore acquiruntur cum maiori delectatione et dilectione possidentur, eo quod delectatio nihil aliud est quam quies iure amata. Unde et Alanus in praedicto libro dicit “praemia quidem laboribus comparata ceteris muneribus dulcius elucescunt, munera enim empta laboribus, iucundius omnibus clarescunt gratuitis, labor enim antecedens quamdam consequenti praemio infundens dulcedinem, maiori favore praemiatur laborantem.” Sed nunc ita quod aeternorum et incorruptibilium cognitio etiam probatur cum labore et difficultate acquirimus, quia secundum Philosophum secundo *Metaphysicorum*: “Ad talia se habet noster intellectus sicut oculus noctuae ad lumen solis.” Eo sequitur quod plus diligimus et delectamur modicum scire de rebus aeternis et incorruptibilibus, etsi probabiliter et topice sciamus, quam alia apud nos necessarie et demonstrative, quod erat propositio primo proposita. Cum igitur anima intellectiva sit incorruptibilis et aeterna secundum Philosophum in tertio *De anima* et ab eodem in secundo expressius, ubi dicit quod intellectus est quodam alterum genus animae, separatur enim ab aliis sicut perpetuum a corruptibili, et hoc idem vult Augustinus duodecimo capitulo libri sui *De anima et spiritu*, ubi dicit quod immortalis est anima ne a creatoris sui similitudine discrepare videatur. Non posset enim et imago et similitudo Dei esse, si mortis timor clauderetur. Sequitur autem quod plus delectamur et diligimus aliquid scire de anima intellectiva etiam probabiliter quam omnia alia hoc inferius apud nos existentia, cuiusmodi sunt plantae, elementa et cetera, si necesse sciantur.

Advidendum est autem quod licet omnia aeterna et incorruptibilia habeant huiusmodi praestantiam seu praeeminentiam, in hoc oportet quod plus delectamur et diligimus ipsa scire aliis, ut dictum est, tamen inter aeterna et incorruptibilia naturaliter plus diligimus cognitionem animae nostrae quam alicuius alterius. Cuius ratio est quia illud plus delectamur et diligimus scire et cognoscere quod a nobis plus est dilatum, quia secundum Philosophum ibidem, scilicet in primo *De partibus animalium*, magis diligimus et delectamur videre modicam partem alicuius dilati a nobis ut manum aut faciem quam totam partem alterius non sic dilati, et hoc docet experientia; sed nunc est ita quod anima intellectiva a nobis est maxime diligenda ut probabo, quare sequitur quod maxime delectemur ipsam scire et cognoscere.

Propositio assumpta declaratur per Philosophum in nono *Ethicorum*. Ibi vult quod unusquisque maxime se ipsum diligit, praecipue quod est honorabilissimum et praecipuum in ipso, nam ut ibidem vult, amicitia et delectatio debet esse ordinata, et quod omne delectabile seu amicale, quod est ad alterum, causatur ex animacibili ad se ipsum, propter quod et Seneca: “Si prudens es incipiat a te consideratio tua, ut aliquos non promoveas re neglecto.” Unde et pro-

2–4 Arist. *PA* I.5, 644b31–35 7–11 Alanus *De planctu naturae*, p. 443D–44A. 12–13 Arist. *Metaph.* II.1, 993b9–11. 16–17 Arist. *DA* III.5, 430a22–23. 17–18 Arist. *DA* II.2, 413b24–27.

5 alinum ] alarium *a.c.* L 10 praemio ] primo *a.c.* L 21 esse ] *sup. lin.* L<sup>h2</sup> 24 huiusmodi ] huius L 26 incorruptibilia ] incorruptibilia *corr. ex* corruptibilia L<sup>h3</sup> 26 cognitionem ] cognoscere *a.c.* L<sup>h3</sup> 36 ex eo *post* causatur *del. ut vid.* L 37–1 proverbium ] potentia L

verbum: “Qui sibi non parcit mihi quomodo parcit?” quod dicit nullo modo. Unusquisque ergo maxime se ipsum diligit et praecipue honorabilissimum et optimum in ipso, sed anima intellectiva est huiusmodi, ut declarabo, quare unusquisque eam maxime diligit et per consequens maxime delectabitur aliquid scire de ipsa, quod ostendere intendebamus.

Quod autem anima intellectiva sit honorabilissima in homine declaratur primo per Themistium *su*<sup>u</sup> [?] in capitulo *de anima* ubi dicit quod natura usque ad intellectum progressa cessavit tamquam nihil habens honorabilius cui utique faceret ipsum subiectum. 5

Item, secundo hoc declaro per Philosophum primo *De anima* capitulo de erroribus conspectu Empedoclis ubi dicit anima quidem aliquid esse antiquis et melius, impossibile est ad hoc autem impossibilius intellectu rationale enim est hunc esse scilicet intellectum nobilissimum et divinissimum secundum naturam. 10

Tertio hoc idem declaro per ibn-David Israelitam, id est iudaeus qui fuit translator libri *De anima* Avicennae de arabico in latino. Dicit enim “omni paene creatura homo corpore est inferior, sola vero anima aliis antecellit simulacrum sui creatoris quam expressius ante cetera gerit.” Hoc etiam vult Boethius secundo *De consolatione philosophiae*, ubi dicit quod homines mente Deo sunt consimiles: “Quid vero, si ad corpus spectes (id est videas), homine imbecillius (id est debilius) reperire queas, quod saepe homines muscularum morsus vel in secreta quoque reptantium (id est introitione unci) necat introitus?”. *quo nihil* [?] unde Ovidius “mors sola fatetur quantula fiut hominum corpuscula” quam est caduca. 15

Quarto hoc declaro per Senecam qui dicit: “Non deformitate corporis foedatur animus, sed pulchritudine animae corpus ornatur.” Nihil enim aliud est animus quam pars quaedam divini spiritus in corpus immersa. Unde etiam Expositor sententia quintum *Ethicorum* dicit quod licet intellectus careat magnitudine molis, excedit tamen omnia alia quae sunt in homine quantitate virtutis. 20

L 44rb /30/(ed.) | /32/(ed.) 25

Ex hiis quae dicta sunt possumus accipere quid sit subiectum libri de anima quem habemus prae manibus, et quae causa efficiens et sic de aliis, scilicet causis. Notandum tamen quod anima de qua determinatur in praesenti libro tripliciter considerari potest. Uno modo ut habet rationem entis et substantiae, et sic de ea considerat metaphysicus. Secundo modo potest considerari in quantum est actus et perfectio naturalis corporis et quantum ad partes et operationes naturales quas exercet in corpore physico, et sic de ea considerat naturalis philosophus in praesenti libro. Tertio potest considerari in quantum per diversas eius potentias est subiectum virtutum moralium et intellectualium et quantum ad eius operationes morales et voluntarias quas exercet in corpore, et sic de ea considerat moralis philosophus. Et sic est visum quomodo anima sit de consideratione philosophi naturalis. 30 35

Secundo vero intelligendum quomodo ipsa anima sit cognoscibilis et est notandum quod aliquid est cognoscibile dupliciter. Uno modo per privationem, alio modo per positionem.

53–55 Boethius *Cons. phil.* II, pros. 6.5. Cf. *ibid.* II, pros. 5.26. 55–56 Juvenal *Sat.* 10.171–172. 57–58 Seneca, *Ep.* 66.4.

38 tibi *post* mihi *del.* L 38 vel tibi *post* mihi *del.* L<sup>h2</sup> 38 ergo ] igitur *a.c.* L<sup>h2</sup> 39 diligit ] intelligit *a.c.* L<sup>h2</sup> 40 huiusmodi ] huius L 46 anima *post* quidem *del.* L 51 aliis ] alios *corr. ex* aliis L<sup>h2</sup> 51 ante ] *sup. lin.* L<sup>h2</sup> 54–55 quoque reptantium ] *in fenestra* L<sup>h2</sup> 56 est ] et *corr. ex* est L<sup>h2</sup> 56 caduca ] caducia *a.c.* L<sup>h2</sup> 65 determinatur ] terminatur *a.c.* L 74 *p post* uno *del.* L

Si per privationem, hoc est dupliciter, vel quia est pars vel aliquid illius per cuius privationem cognoscitur, et hoc modo punctus cognoscitur per privationem continui, cuius tamen continui, ut lineae, ipse punctus est aliquid; unde dicit Philosophus tertio huius “punctum et omne indivisibile monstratur divisione continui”. Ultimo, cognoscibile per privationem non est  
 5 aliquid illius per cuius privationem ipsum cognoscitur, sed penitus diversum ab illis vel ab illo, et sic Deus sive causa prima intelligitur. Dicimus enim quod Deus sit impassibilis, immortalis, immaterialis, intransmutabilis, nullam habens magnitudinem quantitativam, et dicimus Eum esse simplicitatem privatione compositionis.

Secundo autem modo aliquid est cognoscibile positione, quod est multis modis. Primo modo  
 10 contingit hoc per essentiam, et hoc est dupliciter; vel enim aliquid positione cognoscitur per essentiam suam a se ipso vel ab alio. A se ipso autem ut solus Deus cognoscit se ipsum per essentiam, et per illam cognoscit omnia alia quasi relucentia in sua(m) essentiam. Si autem aliquis cognoscitur per suam essentiam ab alio, hoc est dupliciter; vel enim apprehenditur sensu per essentiam suam, et sic a visu lux apprehenditur, vel cognoscitur ab intellectu, et sic dolor,  
 15 gaudium, spes, et huiusmodi quae non solum per species suas cognoscuntur, immo per essentiam. Secundo vero aliquid positione cognoscitur per speciem, et hoc est dupliciter; vel enim per species concreatas, et sic substantiae separatae cognoscunt et intelligunt<sup>27</sup> (unde in *Libro de causis* dicitur “omnis intelligentia plena est formis”), vel illud contingit per species acquisitas, et sic nos homines aliqua cognoscimus, et utrumque illorum modorum potest distingui, quia  
 20 aliqua sunt cognoscibilia in propria species, ut lapis, vel in specie aliqua, sicut pater cognoscitur specie filii, si ei filius similis sit, et Hercules cognoscitur per statuum Herculis. Tertio modo cognoscitur aliquid positione, scilicet per causam propriam et immediatam, et sic cognoscuntur conclusiones demonstrationum, et talis cognitio ‘propter quid’ dicitur scientia secundum Philosophum primo *Posteriorum*. Quarto modo aliquid cognoscitur per effectus et per operationes  
 25 et hoc cognitio dicitur a Philosopho primo *Posteriorum* ‘cognitio quia’, et hoc modo cognoscimus substantias separatas et animam. Unde ille erit modus Philosophi, quis prius cognosceret operationes et potentias et per consequens animam.

Ita ex superius positus palam est animae cognitionem et scientiam esse appetendam a nobis, tum propter ipsius saltem humanae animae incorruptibilitatem et perpetuitatem sive propter  
 30 eius diligibilitatem, tum propter eius mirabilitatem, tum propter eius proficuitatem et utilitatem, et sub illis dictis omnibus suppositum est animam esse scibilem sive intelligibilem.

### ⟨Dubitatio: Utrum anima intellectiva sit scibilis et intelligibilis⟩

<sup>27</sup> Above ‘cognoscunt’ and ‘intelligunt’ something is written that is difficult to decipher. The readings of the two words as active is also dubious. They may actually read ‘cognoscun/cognoscuntur’ and ‘intelliguntur’, and maybe the notes correct that. The correct reading must be active.

3–4 Arist. *DA* III.6, 430b20–21. Punctum autem et omne diuisio et sic indiuisibile monstratur sicut priuatio. 17–18 *Liber de causis* IX.92. 23–24 Arist. *APo* I.13, 78a22–23. 25 Arist. *APo* I.13, 78a22–39.

4 ultimo ] *ut vid.* L 9 modo<sup>1</sup> ] *sup. lin.* L 15 huiusmodi ] huius L 15 non ] *sup. lin.* L 19 aliqua ] aliqua L 28 ex ] *sup. lin.* L

Dubitaret aliquis forte praecipue de anima intellectiva, de qua minus videtur, utrum sit scibilis et intelligibilis.

1.1 Et videretur alicui quod non hac ratione, et suppono quod omnis nostra cognitio sumat exordium a sensu, quia dicit Philosophus *Primo posteriorum* “omnis doctrina et omnis disciplina et cetera”. Videtur et idem per dictum Philosophus in tertio huius ubi dicit quod “intelligentem quemque necesse est fantasmata speculari”, ad quod idem Philosophus loquens in prohemio huius quod intellectus, scilicet illa virtus qua scimus et intelligimus et cognoscimus, vel est fantasia vel non est sine fantasia. Et secundum Philosophum secundo huius “fantasia est motus factus post sensum”, propter quod bene supponere possumus intelligere nostrum sumere exordium a sensu.

Ex illo arguitur sic: Illud non est intelligibile nec scibile per consequens quod non est sensibile, nec per se nec adminus per accidens; sed anima intellectiva non est sensibilis, nec per se nec per accidens, ut declarabo; quare et cetera. Maior patet ex suppositione. Minor declaratur in utroque membro. Planum autem est quod anima intellectiva per se non est sensibilis eo quod est incorporea, sed secundum Philosophum in libro *De sensu et sensato* “solum corporeum et sensibile erit”, ergo anima intellectiva non est per se sensibilis, nec est etiam per accidens sensibilis, scilicet ut per effectus eius qui sunt operationes eius. Sicut enim secundum Philosophum in tertio huius essentia {huius} animae est immaterialis et sempiterna et abstracta, sic et eius operatio, eo quod illa non transit in materiam exteriorem sed manet intus secundum Philosophum secundo | *Metaphysice*. Manifestum enim est ex istis quod intelligere et speculari et alia huiusmodi opera animae intellectivae non sunt sensibilia, quare nullo modo scibilis et intelligibilis erit anima intellectiva.

L 44va

1.2 Secundo idem ostenditur sic, et praesuppono quod inter sciens et scitum et intelligens et intellectum debet esse realis diversitas quia secundum Philosophum quinto *Metaphysice* sciens et scitum ad se invicem referuntur, sed nihil idem ad seipsum refertur, cum relatio non ponat unum extremum sed duo, quare suppositio haec est vera. Et ex hac arguitur sic: Si ipsa anima intellectiva sive intellectus esset intelligibilis sive scibilis, iam sequeretur quod inter intelligens et intellectum non sit realis diversitas, sed consequens est falsum per suppositionem, ergo et antecedens. Probatio consequentiae: quia non est dubium <quin> anima intellectiva sit sciens et intelligens, sic igitur, cum hoc etiam esset intelligibilis et scibilis, iam sequeretur quod idem esset ibi sciens et scitum, ad quod deducere intendebamus, quare cum illud falsum sit, oppositum erit verum, scilicet quod intellectiva anima non sit scibilis.

2.1 Oppositum autem huius declaratum fuit heri, et patet ex auctoritate Philosophi qui potissime et principaliter tradidit hanc scientiam et cognitionem de anima intellectiva.

3 Ad cuius evidentiam duo sunt praeintelligenda. Primo quod ipsa est scibilis et intelligibilis, secundo intelligendum est per quem modum ipsa sit scibilis et intelligibilis.

4–5 Arist. *APo* I.1 71a1–2 5–6 Arist. *DA* III.8 432a7–8. 6–8 Arist. *DA* I.1, 403a8–10. 8–9 Arist. *DA* III.3 429a1–2. 15–16 Arist. ?? 17–18 Arist. *DA* III.5, 430a18–19 19–20 *Metaph*?? 24–25 Arist. *Metaph*. V.15, 1021a14–19.

11 consequens ] antecedens *corr. ex* consequens L; We have consequens with a written over the ‘con’ abbreviation. 17 qui ] que L 21 huiusmodi ] huius L 21 modo ] est L 29 quia ] quando *a.c. probabiliter* L 30 sic ] si L 33 auctoritate ] virtute L

3.1 Ad evidentiam autem primi est notandum quod ipsa est scibilis triplici modo sciendi tradito in logica, scilicet definitione, divisione, demonstratione.

3.1.1 Ratio autem primi est ista, scilicet quod sit scibilis definitione. Illud enim per definitionem est scibile quod habet quiditatem ab intellectu apprehensibilem, quia secundum Philosophum quinto *Metaphysice* definitio est sermo quiditatis et essentiae, et in sexto *Topicis* [?] definitio est significans quid est esse rei. Sed <anima> intellectiva habet essentiam ab intellectu apprehensibilem ut heri declarabatur in tertio notabili; quare anima intellectiva erit definitione scibilis.

3.1.2 Secunda ratio est. Illud enim est scibile divisione quod habet partes potentiales et subiectivas in quas est divisibile; sed anima intellectiva habet huiusmodi partes. <Pro> partibus enim potentialibus habet intellectum agentem et possibilem; <pro> partibus vero subiectivis intellectum Sortis, Platonis et aliorum, quare et cetera.

3.1.3 Tertii ratio est: illud est scibile demonstratione quod habet proprietates et partiones de ipsa per definitionem mediam demonstrabiles; quia secundum Philosophum secundo *Posteriorum* definitio est medium in demonstrando propriam passionem de suo proprio subiecto; sed anima intellectiva habet huiusmodi proprietates, scilicet quod sit motrix corporis humani, et quod ea vivimus et intelligimus quantum ad intellectum possibilem et abstrahimus quoad intellectum agentem; quare et cetera.

3.1.4 Et si anima intellectiva istis tribus modis sciendi est scibilis, multo fortius et anima vegetativa et sensitiva. Habent enim etiam huiusmodi partes potentiales. Et partes vegetativae sunt nutritivum et generativum, augmentativum, sensitivae vero auditiva, olfactiva et huiusmodi. Animae proprietates autem vegetativae sunt nutrire, augere, generare, sensitivae vero audire, videre et huiusmodi. Est igitur omnis anima scibilis, illo triplici modo tradito in logica quod declarare et ostendere intendebamus. Et si modus Philosophi procedendi intuetur ratione, ipse istis modis tradet scientiam de anima, scilicet definitione, divisione et demonstratione. Definit igitur animam in secundo huius et dividit eam per potentias suas et demonstrat eam sic: illo nos vivimus vel sentimus et intelligimus quod est primus actus corporis organici physici et cetera; sed anima est huiusmodi; ergo et cetera. Ecce qualiter de anima demonstrantur huiusmodi proprietates.

3.2 Secundo notandum circa modum ipsam intelligendi, ad quod intelligendum secundum Proclum qui probat quod omne incorporeum cognoscitum est reflexivum sui ipsius super seipsum, quod declarat ex hoc: Virtus enim incorporealis et indivisibilis non habens distantiam partium. Similiter illud patet per oppositum: In virtutibus cognoscitivis corporeis, sicut in oculo: Oculus enim seipsum non videt, cuius non est alia causa nisi quia solum est virtus

5–6 Arist. *APo* II.3, 90b3–4. “Diffinitio enim indicat essentiam rei.” Locus non inventus in *Topica*. 31–32 Proclus *Elementatio theologica* §15.

4 ab *post* intellectu *del.* L 7 heri ] *in marg.* L 7 declarabatur *post* heri *del.* L; The scribe corrects ‘declaratur’ to ‘declarabatur’ by adding ‘ba’ above the line. He then realizes that this is unclear and deletes the whole word and then writes it out fully, so the chunk reads “[declara\ba/tur *del.* ms] declarabatur”. 10 huiusmodi ] huius L 13 partiones ] Num partes scribendum sit? 14 demonstrabiles ] demonstrabilem L 16 huiusmodi ] huius L 17 vivimus ] vivamus L 19 sciendi *post* est *del.* L 20 huiusmodi ] huius L 21–22 huiusmodi ] huius L 23 sū *post* omnis *del. ut vid.* L 23 sū *post* anima *del. ut vid.* L 24 procedendi ] consequenter L 28 huiusmodi<sup>1</sup> ] huius L 28 huiusmodi<sup>2</sup> ] huius L

corporea non reflexiva sui ipsius super se ipsam. Sed anima intellectiva est virtus incorporea cognoscitiva, quia nec est magnitudo nec habens magnitudinem ut declaratur, ergo et cetera. Maior patet per Proclum. Minor declaratur quia si ipsa esset magnitudo aliqua vel habens magnitudinem, tunc sicut mobile quod movetur supra magnitudinem vel supra spatium aliquid, primo movetur supra unam partem spatii illius, et deinde supra aliam, ita quod ille motus fiat in tempore et successive. Modo si ita esset de intellectu, ipsum intelligibile intelligendum successive et in tempore attingeret ipsam animam sive intellectum primo secundum unam partem magnitudinis animae, deinde secundum aliam, et sic actus intelligendi non esset simpliciter in instanti, quod vere probat Philosophus in tertio huius; sequeretur etiam quod ipsa anima esset sciens et ignorans, quia si ipsa haberet magnitudinem secundum illam partem, esset sciens secundum quam intelligibile attingeret ipsam, et secundum aliam ignorans secundum quam non attingeret. Sequeretur etiam quod simul et semel contraria intelligeret, quia secundum aliam partem magnitudinis posset intelligere unum contrariorum, secundum aliam autem non, quod falsum est secundum Philosophum in tertio *Topicorum*, qui dicit quod contingit unum solum intelligere <vel> scire vero plura vel multa; patet igitur quod ipsa non sic habens magnitudinem aliquam omnino sed sit virtus cognoscitiva incorporea. Omnis autem talis est reflexiva sui ipsius super se ipsam, quare anima intellectiva se ipsam reflexive poterit intelligere et scire.

Secundo ad idem est notandum dictum Philosophi in tertio huius, scilicet quod intellectus intelligit se sicut alia, quod non est ita intellectum quod intellectus sit intelligibilis hoc modo ut ipse a semet abstrahat unam speciem sui sicut oportet alia intelligi. Hoc enim modo in intellectibus abstrahentibus esset processus in infinitum quod declaro sic: Ponas enim unum intellectum intelligibilem modo dicto Philosophi sic intellecto sicut iam recitavimus oportet ponere alium intellectum abstrahentem †sumi habet† quo abstrahit ab illo intellectu intelligibili unam speciem. Si modo talem intellectum negaveris, iam habeo propositum quod intellectus non est intelligibilis, ut ab ipso species abstrahitur. Si autem aliquam virtutem haec agentem posueris, ego quaero utrum ille intellectus, quem tu ponis, sit intelligibilis vel non. Non autem poteris dicere quod non sit intelligibilis, quia omnis intellectus intelligibilis est secundum Philosophum in tertio huius. Si autem dicis quod sit intelligibilis, aut habet ipsum esse per speciem ab illo vel non, ergo eadem ratione qua ille intellectus non est per speciem propriam intelligibilis, nec primus. Si autem dicis quod sic, quaeram iterum et eodem modo de illo intellectu abstrahente procedendo in infinitum, quod quidem procedere sic omnes artifices abhorrent.

Intelligit igitur Philosophus quod intellectus intelligit se per species aliorum. Est enim intellectus, secundum Philosophum tertio *De anima*, in pura potentia ad omnia intelligibilia, et dicit ibidem quod hoc habet intellectus de sua natura quod est potentialis vocatus. Ad actum autem intelligendi de potentia intelligendi reducitur per species intelligibiles quas in se gerit postquam intellexit; est igitur in actum reductus. Tunc quando est informatus speciebus, et cum ita sit in actu existens, scilicet intelligendo res et habendo rerum species, tunc revertendo se ad se percipit et intelligit se intelligere.

18–19 Arist. *DA* III.4, 430a2–3.

1 corporea ] incorporea a.c. L<sup>h2</sup> 1 non ] est a.c. L<sup>h2</sup> 8 secundum ] habet a.c. *probabiliter* L<sup>h2</sup> 9 vere ] cum a.c. *ut vid.* L<sup>h2</sup> 9 quod<sup>2</sup> ] *sup. lin.* L<sup>h2</sup> 11 animam sive intellectum primo secundum unam partem magnitudinis animae *post ipsam del.* L 13 non ] *sup. lin.* L<sup>h2</sup> 13 ad *post* non *del.* L<sup>h1, h2</sup> 16 sed ] si a.c. L<sup>h2</sup> 19 alia ] anima a.c. L 20 hoc ] haec a.c. L<sup>h2</sup> 20 in ] *sup. lin.* L 28 esse ] erit L

Sed intelligere est propria operatio ipsius intellectus, sed non ita quod nobis congruit talis modus intelligendi secundum quem quidem possumus, secundum Philosophum in prooemio *De anima*, ex propria alicuius operatione devenire in cognitionem substantiae ipsius et quod quid est, quare ipse intelligit ita ipsas res aspiciens et operationem suam. Secundum intentionem Procli speciebus rerum in actu factus manuducitur et vadit in cognitionem ipsius, sed per quem modum ex accidentium cognitione deveniamus in cognitionem substantiae? Postmodum dicemus super litteram loco suo.

3.3 Patet igitur quod anima intellectiva habet essentiam ad intelligendum apprehensibilem cognoscibilem et quomodo sit scibilis et intelligibilis, quod ostendere intendebamus, ad quam intentionem Commentator duodecimo *Metaphysicae* loquitur quod intellectus noster est aliorum per se, sui ipsius autem per accidens et accessorie, et ex | hoc idem sumit differentiam inter intellectum divinum et nostrum qui sunt oppositorum modorum intelligendi se et alia, et patent isti modi ex iam dictis. Intellectus enim divinus intelligit se primo modo et alia ex consequenti, ut relucent in se ipso tamquam in speculo et exemplari. Patet etiam ex dictis quod dupliciter est aliquid scibile, vel actu intelligendi primario et directe, vel actu intelligendi sive sciendi secundo et per quandam reflexionem et conversionem.

L 44vb

*Ad 1.1* Ad rationem primam dicendum quod verum est de actu intelligendi primario, quoniam tamen secundo non oportet. Ad minorem dicendum verum est, et ideo optime concludis quod intellectus nullo modo scibilis est actu sciendi sive intelligendi – primario.

20 *Ad 1.2* Similiter ad secundam est dicendum quod verum est de actu sciendi primario inter sciens et scitum, tunc debet esse realis diversitas. Si autem convenit intelligere per reflexionem, non oportet illa esse diversa, ut patet per definitionem reflexionis. Est enim reflexio nihil aliud nisi conversio alicuius supra se ipsum, et ita converse intelligendo aliquid non oportet ipsum intelligens et intellectum esse diversa realiter.

2–4 Arist. *DA* I.1, 402a10–25.

2 secundum<sup>1</sup> ] *sup. lin.* L<sup>h2</sup> 3 substantiam ipsius *post in del.* L<sup>h1, h2</sup> 4 intell *post res del.* L<sup>h1, h2</sup> 4 et ] *sup. lin.* L<sup>h2</sup> 8 ad intelligendum ] 13 *post post intelligit del.* L<sup>h1, h2</sup> 17–18 quoniam ] quin *ut vid.* L

## Liber tertius, lectio prima

### *De parte autem animae.*

L 70va Secundum Iohannem Grammaticum et secundum communiter loquentes, hoc incipit tertius liber de anima. Continuat ipsum ad libros praecedentes sic: Supra determinat Philosophus de parte animae irrationali, sicut de vegetativo et sensitivo, hoc intendit determinare de parte 5  
rationali, sicut de intellectu, et dividitur in duas. Primo enim de intellectu praemittit suam intentionem, secundo intentum suum exsequitur ibi *si igitur intelligere*.

Primo igitur intendit de parte animae rationali, sicut de intellectivo, ad cuius evidentiam est notandum quod ‘intellectus’ multis modis dicitur secundum Alfarabium in libello suo *De intellectu et intelligibili*. 10

Primo potest accipi pro quamcumque rei apprehensione secundum quod dicimus aliquem boni intellectus, id est bonae comprehensionis. Alio modo ‘intellectus’ sumitur pro ‘sententia’, ut hic dicam tibi intellectum Aristotelis, id est sententiam. Tertio modo accipitur pro ‘homine’ sive est idem quod ‘homo’, et sic dicit Philosophus quarto *Ethicorum* quod totus homo dicitur intellectus, et dicit illi Eustathius: “totus Aristoteles intellectus dicitur.” Quarto ‘intellectus’ 15  
idem est quod ‘habitus principiorum’ et eorum quae per se nota sunt, et sic Philosophus innuit ‘intellectum’ primo *Posteriorum*, et hoc modo dicitur quod intellectus semper est verorum, sive sint agibilia sive spectabilia. Quinto modo dicitur ‘intellectus’ pro ‘fantasia’, quae dicitur intellectus materialis et passivus, et de tali intellectu dicitur posterius, quod intellectus materialis et passivus est corruptibilis et sine hoc nihil intelligit anima. Sexto ‘intellectus’ idem est quod 20  
res intellecta secundum quod intellecta est, et sic sumitur in libro *Peri hermeneias* ubi dicitur “est autem quod aliquid aliquotiens quidem intellectus sine vero et sine falso, aliquotiens alterum inesse, sic est et in voce.” Septimo modo accipitur pro ‘conceptu’ et hoc modo dicimus logice quod genus et species sunt intellectus, id est sunt secundum rerum conceptus, et secundum hoc etiam Porphyrius dicit quod species est composita ex genere et differentia, id est 25  
ex conceptu et intellectu utriusque. Octavo modo intellectus sumitur pro ipsa substantia sive essentia animae intellectivae, et hoc modo dicimus quod anima intellectiva est forma corporis humani. Nono ‘intellectus’ acciditur pro specie intelligibili quae est recipiendo intellectu possibili, et est idem quod ratio intelligendi, et secundum Albertum talis intellectus dicitur ratio formalis, et est ille quo intelligimus. Et de hoc intelligitur propositio Commentatoris, quod ex 30  
specie intelligibili et intellectu magis fit unum quam ex materia et forma, quam etiam ex subiecto et accidente, et hoc modo Philosophus saepe ‘intellectum’ sumit pro ‘specie intelligibili’. Decimo ‘intellectus’ sumitur pro ‘actu et operatione intellectiva’, sicut etiam sensus quandoque acciditur pro operatione sensitiva. Ultimo modo ‘intellectus’ accipitur pro quacumque virtute et potentia animae intellectivae, et de hoc Philosophus specialiter intendit determinare in hoc 35  
capitulo, et de hoc praemittit dicens quod “considerandum de parte potentiali animae qua ipsa, scilicet anima, cognoscit et sapit”, et talis virtus sive potentia animae intellectivae subdividitur,

2 Arist. *DA* III.4, 429a10. 7 Arist. *DA* III.4, 429a13. 21–23 Arist. *Int.* 1, 16a9–11. 29 Albertus Magnus *De intellectu et intelligibili* Lib. I, tr. 3, cap. 5, p. 510b (ed. Borgnet). 36–37 Arist. *DA* III.4, 429a10–11.

quia quaedam potentia intellectiva est practica, et quaedam speculativa, sicut etiam inferius distinguetur intellectus in practicam et speculativam.

<sup>150</sup>/(ed.) | <sup>13</sup>/(ed.)

L 70vb

Deinde cum dicit *si igitur intelligere*, exsequitur de suo intento, et dividitur in duas secundum quod duo consideranda et determinanda. Praemissit primo determinare primum, scilicet quam differentiam intellectus habet ad sensum et fantasiam. Secundo autem determinat quomodo fiat intelligere, et quale quidem sit illud ibi *indivisibilem quidem intellectu*. Prima in quatuor secundum quod de quadruplici intellectu declarat, ad cuius evidentiam est sciendum quod quidam intellectus est vocatus possibilis qui recipit omnes species intelligibiles. Alius autem dicitur intellectus agens per cuius virtutem intellectus possibilis talis species recipit. Tertius est quidem intellectus in actu vocatus. Quarto est intellectus materialis et passivus, et secundum hoc dividitur pars in quatuor determinat enim primo de intellectu primo, secundo de secundo ibi *quoniam sicut in omni natura*, tertio de tertio ibi *idem autem secundum actum*, quarto de quarto ibi *passivus vero intellectus*. Prima in tres. Primo enim determinat de intellectu possibili per compositionem ad sensum, secundo determinat de intellectu<s> possibilis obiecto ibi *quoniam autem aliud est magnitudo*, tertio movet quasdam dubitationes circa ipsum ibi *Dubitabit autem aliquis*. Prima in duas. Primo enim determinat de intellectu per compositionem ad sensum secundum convenientiam, secundo determinat de intellectu possibili secundum compositionem ad sensum secundum differentiam ibi *unde et misceri*. Prima in duas, secundum quod duo sunt praesens, quae sensus et intellectus possibilis conveniunt, secundum ibi *necesse itaque*.<sup>135</sup>/(ed.)

### ⟨Dubitatio: quomodo intellectus possibilis possit intelligere se secundum ipsius substantiam ex quo receptum oportet esse nudatum a natura recepti.⟩

Et est advertendum quod Iohannes Grammaticus movet hoc dubium, quomodo intellectus possibilis possit intelligere se secundum ipsius substantiam ex quo receptivum oportet esse nudatum a natura recepti. Ipse respondet et dicit quod si ita esset quod intellectus esset in potentia ad rerum substantias quas deberet intelligere ita quod rerum intelligibilium substantias reciperet, tunc illa dubitatio locum haberet. Sed modo non est ita. Sed pro tanto intellectus dicitur recipere res quia recipit species rerum noscibiliter. Et ex hoc trahitur distinctio quod intellectum recipere intelligibilia dupliciter intelligitur. Uno modo quod sit in potentia receptiva, ad intelligibilia, id est ad substantias intelligibilium, et talis intellectus est falsus; alio autem modo intellectus potest intelligi in potentia ad intelligibilia, id est ad species et rationes rerum intelligibilium quas noscibiliter recipit et sic bene habet veritatem. Unde Philosophus huic concordat postea dicens “lapis non est in anima, sed species eius,” et hoc modo est intelligendum quod

4 Arist. *DA* III.4, 429a13. 7 Arist. *DA* III.6, 430a26. 13 Arist. *DA* III.5, 430a10. 13 Arist. *DA* III.5, 430a19. 14 Arist. *DA* III.6, 430a24. 16 Arist. *DA* III.4, 429b10. 16–17 Arist. *DA* III.6, 429b10. 19 Arist. *DA* III.4, 429a24. 20–21 Arist. *DA* III.4, 429a18. 24 Philoponus *In De anima* III.4, ad 429a15–16. p. 9.1–10.21. 34 Arist. *DA* III.8, 431b29–32a1.

6 intellectus habet ] *inv. a.c.* L 25 se ] *sup. lin.* L

intellectus possibilis est in potentia receptiva sui ipsius, scilicet specie et ratione, eo modo quo patebit.

L 71rb ¶¶(ed.) |

### ***Quoniam autem sic singula***

Determinata triplici differentia inter sensum et intellectum, consequenter intendit ponere quartam, quae sumitur ex comparatione sensus et intellectus ad species sensibiles et intelligibiles, et est talis: Quia ex speciebus intelligibilibus agregatur in nobis habitus eo quod in nobis firmatur sicut aliquis dicitur prudens vel sciens, sed ex speciebus sensibilibus alicui sensui non aggeneratur sive acquiritur habitus ita quod dicatur sciens. Littera ita posita est differentia triplex inter sensum et intellectum. Sed cum intellectus actu fiat *singula*, id est cum species singulorum actu receperit, tunc intellectus sic, scilicet receptus speciebus et habitis, dicitur *sciens*, id est habens scientiam secundum quod sic est inhabituatus vel informatus, supple singulorum entium speciebus.

Et est advertendum secundum Expositorem quod sicut pupilla est quodammodo omnis color eo quod est receptiva omnium colorum, sic dicit Philosophus quod anima est quodammodo omnia eo quod per intellectum est nata recipere quodammodo omnia intelligibilia. Dicit Philosophus quod sicut manus est organum organorum eo quod deservit singulis organis, sic intellectus dicitur esse species specierum intelligibilium, et sensus dicitur quodammodo omnis species specierum sensibilibus eo quod aptus est recipere omnes species. Sed anima per intellectum aut per receptionem specierum dicitur in potentia omnia intelligibilia; sed postquam ipsa receperit dicitur quodammodo omnia intelligibilia, quia non oportet quod si habuerit habitum intelligibilium, quod secundum actum conservaverit.

Ad cuius evidentiam est notandum secundo quod secundum Iohannem Grammaticum et secundum Philosophum supra, intellectus dicitur dupliciter. Quidam primus sicut scientia vel habitus alius, secundus sicut considerare. Modo dicit Philosophus quod cum intellectus acquirat species intelligibilium, est in actu, id est in actu primo, nihilominus est in potentia ad actum secundum, et subdit intellectus sic habet secundum suum habitum, et accipit ipsum posse per se ipsum operari <et> intelligere. Unde dicit Commentator: “Habitus est illud quod quis habens facile operari potuit quando voluit.” Intellectus igitur habituatus et informatus intelligibilibus potest se ipsum considerare et intelligere quando velit, et in littera supra Philosophus posuit sensum differe ab ipso, et dicit ‘per se ipsum’, quia operari potest absque omni doctore extrinseco. Et hoc est quod dicit Philosophus, quod, supple intellectus, dicitur secundum actum.

4 Arist. *DA* III.4, 429b5. 14–15 Aquinas *Quaest. disp. de anima* art. 2, resp. Aquinas writes: “Hunc igitur intellectum possibilem necesse est esse in potentia ad omnia quae sunt intelligibilia per hominem, et receptivum eorum, et per consequens denudatum ab his: quia omne quod est receptivum aliquorum, et in potentia ad ea, quantum de se est, est denudatum ab eis; sicut pupilla, quae est receptiva omnium colorum, caret omni colore.” 15–16 Arist. *DA* III.7, 431b20–21. 17–19 Arist. *DA* III.7, 432a1–3. 23 Philoponus *In De anima* III.4, ad 429b8–9. p. 19.59–62. 24 Arist. *DA* III.4, 429b5–9. 28–29 Averroes *In DA* III.18, in 430a14–17, p. 438.25–29 (ed. Crawford).

8 non post sensibilibus del. L 8–9 aggeneratur ] aggeneretur L 10 id est ] 19 sensibilibus ] intelligibilium L 24 a post vel del. L

Hoc accidit statim cum possit per se ipsum considerare, et ex isto manifeste reprehenditur error Avicennae qui voluit quod species intelligibiles non sunt in intellectu nisi quando intellectus actu intelligat. Immo Philosophus hoc praesupponit considerari actualiter ipsum habitum unde et quo consideretur.

5 Deinde cum dicit *Et quidem igitur*, dicit quomodo intellectus secundum habitum sit in potentia et in actu, et cum hoc ponens quandam differentiam inter intellectum et sensum, et dicit <quod> quando intellectus est informatus speciebus, tunc est in potentia, sed non est eodem modo, sicut erat intelligere sive hoc fiat per inventionem sive per doctrinam. Et subdit quod  
10 quando intellectus sit sub habitu specierum, tunc se ipsum potest intelligere. Advertendum est quod omnis scientia acquisita, sive omne quod quis novit, vel habetur per doctrinam vel per inventionem secundum Philosophum secundo *Elenchorum*. Et pro tanto dicit Philosophus “non sicut ante {non} addiscere”, designans acquisitionem scientiae per doctrinam, “aut invenire”, designans scientiam per inventionem.

Advertendum est ulterius secundum Philosophum supra: dupliciter aliquid est in potentia ad actum, scilicet in propinquo et remoto. Modo ante addiscere et ante invenire aliquid est  
15 in potentia remota ad considerare, sive quando habet habitum ante addiscere et invenire, et quando habuerit habitum, <est in potentia propinqua>. Et subdit quod intellectus existens secundum habitum potest se ipsum intelligere, et hoc patebit per Philosophum inferius, cum dicit quod intellectus intelligit seipsum <sicut> alia, id est per species aliorum, postquam est informatus et actu existens intelligibili. Et per hoc intellectus differt a sensu, quia sensus non sentit nisi mediante organo, et quia inter sensum modo et suum actum nullum est organum medium,  
20 sicut inter obiectum <et sensum> [?]; ideo bene potest sentire suum proprium obiectum, nullo autem modo suum actum, nec per consequens se ipsum, et hoc etiam vult Proclus, dicens omnis virtus corporea non potest esse reflexiva sui ipsius super se ipsum propter transmutationem partium in organo. Intellectus autem, propter causam oppositam, bene potest intelligere suum  
25 actum et per consequens se ipsum.

Littera: Ita dictum fuit quod quando intellectus recipit species singulas, tunc dicitur habitatus et secundum actum, ergo, supple tantum talem actum intellectus habuerit, tunc est in potentia ad actum secundum, et non primum, et propter hoc dixit quodammodo eo quod non  
30 in potentia simpliciter, nec in actu simpliciter, et est quod subdit dicens: *Non tamen similiter* in potentia sicut *ante addiscere*, id est ante acquisitionem habitus per doctrinam, *aut ante invenire, et ipse*, supple intellectus postquam est ita habitatus, *potest se ipsum intelligere* quod, supple, sensus nullo modo facere potest.

2–3 Avicenna *DA* V.6, p. 147.16–148.39 5 Arist. *DA* III.4, 429b7. 10–11 Arist. *SE*??? 11–12 Arist. *DA* III.4, 429b8–9. 12 Arist. *DA* III.4, 429b9. 19 Arist. *DA* III.4, 430a2.

2 nisi ] non L 3 considerari actualiter ] *inv. a.c. probabiliter* L (Each of the two words is followed by an inversion meta-mark. It is unclear how this is best interpreted.) 12 ante ] autem L 14 ulterius secundum philosophum ] ulterius *ante* secundum Philosophum *transp.* L 15 ante<sup>1</sup> ] autem L 15 et<sup>2</sup> ] est L 16 et<sup>1</sup> ] est L 20 intelligibili ] intelligibilia *a.c.* L 21 actum ] actuum *a.c.* L

## Liber tertius, lectio tertia

### *Dubitabit autem aliquis*

L 72ra Superius Philosophus determinavit de obiecto intellectus possibilis. Hic circa dicta movet dubitationes, et dividitur in duas. Primo enim ipsas movet, secundo dissolvit ibi *aut pati*.

Prima adhuc in duas secundum quod duae sunt dubitationes quas movet, secunda ibi *Amplius si intelligibilis*, ex quo Philosophus ostendit quomodo intellectus fertur in cognitionem quod quid est, <\*\*\*> et hoc recta linea, et ideo illud est obiectum eius directe, ex quo autem fertur in singulare indirecte et per accidens, ideo tale est obiectum ipsius per accidens. Hic subiungit duas dubitationes quarum prima est utrum possibile sit intellectum intelligere, et supponatur quod intelligere sit quodam pati. Ex hoc sic activa et passiva communicant in materia, et sunt unum in genere naturali. Sed nunc ita est quod intellectus, cum sit immixtus et immaterialis, ad hoc quod omnia cognoscat immaterialiter, nulli quicquam habet commune, quare non potest pati, et si non potest pati, {quare} necque intelligere.

Littera: Ita determinatum est de obiecto intellectus. Sed utique aliquis dubitabit si intellectus videtur esse simplex et impassibilis, et nihil enim nullam habet materiam communem ulli, sicut dixit Anaxagoras interrogative quomodo tunc intelligeret intellectus. Sed si, supple intelligere, est pati, quia in quantum utique, id est agenti et patienti, est aliqua materia communis, tunc hoc quidem, id est agens videtur agere, et patiens videtur pati.

Deinde cum dicit *Amplius autem* movet secundam dubitationem, quaesito quomodo sit possibile quod intellectus intelligat, consequenter quaeritur quomodo intellectus sit intelligibilis. Et probatur primo quod non, quia si esset intelligibilis, aut per se et per suam essentiam est intelligibilis, aut per aliud aliquid essentiae additum. Modo quodcumque illorum dederis, sequetur impossibile ut declaro, quare non est intelligibilis intellectus, et fundatur haec ratio super illam maximam Philosophi *Primo posteriorum*: “Illud est impossibile quod consequitur impossibile.” Probatio minoris: Quoad utrumque eius membrum sic: Unumquodque est intelligibile eiusdem speciei cum alio intelligibili, omnia enim intelligibilia in eo quod sunt intelligibilia sunt eiusdem speciei et in omni materia; si igitur intellectus sit intelligibilis, erit eiusdem speciei cum aliis intelligibilibus. Si sic, sequetur quod alia intelligibilia intelligant sicut intellectus, supple, isto supposito quod intelligibilia sint eiusdem speciei; vel sequetur quod intellectus non intelligat sicut alia intelligibilia non intelligunt, et stat ista virtus illationis in hoc quod omnia intelligibilia in eo quod sunt habent eundem modum, quod Philosophus supponit. Ita patet quod intellectus saltem de se non est intelligibilis, et patebit ulterius.

Littera: Ita aliquis dubitabit quomodo intellectus, cum sit immaterialis, possit intelligere, sed amplius, supple dubitabit aliquis, si (pro ‘utrum’) et ipse intellectus noster est intelligibilis.

2 Arist. *DA* III.4, 429b22. 4 Arist. *DA* III.4, 429b29. 5–6 Arist. *DA* III.4, 429b26. 19 Arist. *DA* III.4, 429b26.

6 quomodo ] *sup. lin.* L 18 quidem ] quod<sup>1</sup> *ut vid.* L 20 quaeritur ] quaero quaerit L 20 intellectus<sup>2</sup> ] intelligit intellectus L 21 et ] aut *a.c.* L 22 aliquid ] 27 igitur ] *sup. lin.* L 27 erit *post* sit *add. et del.* L 28 supple ] *sp a.c.* L<sup>h3</sup> (Later hand adds the second ‘p’ in the abbreviation ‘spp’) 31 ] intellectus intelligibilia L<sup>h3</sup> 31 eundem ] eundem L; corrected by erasure of one or two letters. In the margin it also says “habent eundem modum” in later hand. 33 intellectus ] *post ‘intellectus’ rasura* 10 litterarum L

Hoc enim non videtur possibile. Autem (pro 'quia') intelligibile est unius speciei, vel uniforme vel secundum unum modum, quia inquam hoc ita etenim (pro 'tunc') *universali* [?] (pro 'ergo') aut aliis, supple inerit intellectus et intelligunt, quod est impossibile, et hoc potissime contingit si intellectus <non> sit intelligibilis per aliud sibi additum, sed per se.

5 Et est advertendum quod esse illud quod per se intellectum est, abstractum est a materia, sed in abstractis a materia est idem intelligens et intellectum, quare cum intellectus sit eiusdem speciei cum aliis intelligibilibus, et cum ipse sit quid abstractum a materia, sicut ipse cum intelligat, intelligitur; sic et alia intelligunt cum intelliguntur, ex quo autem illud sequitur <quod> suppositum est; et tunc deducit ad membrum minoris essentiae rationis duas. Sed si intellectus  
10 immixtum addi<tur>, id est aliquod habet annexum et additum suae essentiae per quod intelligatur, tunc habebit quod facit ipsum intelligibile sicut alia materialia {non intelligunt}; sed, supple alia materialia, non intelligunt; sic intellectus noster non intelliget ex quo ita est quod intellectus, cum sit intelligibilis, sit eiusdem speciei cum aliis intelligibilibus.

Advertendum quod substantiae separatae, cum sint entia immaterialia et purae formae, alio  
15 modo sunt intelligibiles quam materialia. Materialia enim non sunt intelligibilia nisi per speciem abstractam ab ipsis virtute intellectus agentis abstrahentis. <\*\*\*> intellectum possibilem repositam lapidis essentia species novi imprimitur speculo; sed species eius modi, si speculum esset cognoscitiva per talem speciem, utique intelligeret tamquam per similitudinem, sed nunc ita est quod materialia non sunt in intellectu essentiis, simul enim per intentiones quibus in-  
20 tellectui sunt proportionalia <\*\*\*>. Substantiae autem separatae quae sunt purae formae, cum sint actu abstractae a conditionibus materialibus non oportet quod aliud intelligendum eas fiat abstractio, sed intelligantur per seipsas. Patet igitur quod ipsae essentialiter sunt intellectae, et cum hoc intelligentes; sed ipsa materialia se habent ex opposito modo. Talia quidem sunt intel-  
25 ligibilia seu intellecta, non tamen intelligunt, sed ipse intellectus inter huiusmodi entia, scilicet substantias separatas, et materialia, tenens medium gradum, propter quod in libro *De causis* dicitur quod "anima est in horizonte aeternitatis et temporis", ita quod teneat infimum gradum intelligentiarum aeternarum et supremum gradum inter materialia. Rationabiliter igitur dubi-  
30 tatur quomodo anima intellectiva sit intelligibilis vel intelligit; sicut substantiae separatae quae intellectae intelligunt, vel sicut entia materialia quae intellecta non intelligunt. Quodcumque il-  
lorum detur, habetur impossibile: Si autem primo modo dicatur cum intelligibilia sunt eiusdem speciei, alia materialia intelligerent; si secundo modo cum intelligibilia sint eiusdem speciei, sequitur sicut materialia non intelligunt quod intellectus non intelligat.

Deinde cum dicit *Aut pati quidem quid*, ad dubitationes motas solvit, et primo ad primam, secundo ad secundam ibi *et ipse autem*. Prima dubitatio fuit ista: Quomodo sit possibile quod  
35 intellectus intelligat cum tamen sit impassibilis et intellectus fiat cum passione. Philosophus re-

25–26 *Liber de causis* II.22 33 Arist. *DA* III.4, 429b29. 34 Arist. *DA* III.4, 430a2.

1 videtur ] *post* 'videtur' *rasura* 2 *litterarum* L 5 est<sup>3</sup> ] *sup. lin.* L 8 9 suppositum ] *sumptum* L  
16 The manuscript contains a meta-mark signaling an insertion of some material, but there is nothing  
in the margins to insert. 19 in intellectu ] *intellectum* L 21 conditionibus ] *ad()tionibus a.c.* L 24  
intelligunt ] *intelligent* L 24 inter ] *nititur* L 24 huiusmodi ] *huius* L 24 scilicet ] *secundum*  
*ut vid.* L 25 non *post* substantias *del. ut vid.* L 25 tenens ] *tenent corr. ex tenens* L 25 modum *post*  
medium *del.* L 29 intellectae ] *intelligentiae intellectae* L<sup>h3</sup> 35 impassibilis ] *impossibilis* L

spondet et dicit quod duplex est passio, uno modo secundum opposita et contraria, et talis est propria passio, alia est sicut salus et perfectio, et illa est in propositione dicta. Modo dicendum quod sufficit quod intellectus existens impassibilis ipse intelligit passione{m} improprie. Ad formam argumenti dicendum concedatur suppositio. Ad maiorem dicendum quod non oportet in activis et passivis mathematicis. Ad minorem quod verum est, et ideo concludit quod intellectus non patitur propria passione, non autem concludit quod non patiatur improprie, et hoc sufficit ad intelligere littera 'aut nota solutionis est pati proprie' dictum secundum communem materiam est prius scilicet in libro *De generatione* distinctum contra pati improprie acceptum; sed, supple intelligere, non est pati, quod declarat, dimitatur 'quoniam', intellectus est quodammodo in potentia intelligibilium, sed nihil est ante intelligibilia, antequam ipse intelligat, quoniam ita est *autem* (pro ergo) illud quod accidit in intellectu debet se similiter habere sicut in, supple tabula, rasa vel nuda in qua nihil, supple est scriptum, sed quando in illa aliquid scribitur, ab ipsa nihil abiicitur, sed magis perficitur. Ergo simili modo quando species intelligibiles depinguntur in intellectu, nihil ab intellectu tunc abiicitur, sed ipse magis perficitur, ideo patitur non proprie.

Expositor autem primam litteram sic aliter legit aut dicit ipse. *Pati*, supple dictum et acceptum, *secundum commune aliquid* id est communiter, *est divisum prius*, scilicet in se, huiusmodi in pati proprie dictum vel in pati improprie dictum, et, supple intellectus, non patitur proprie, et cetera. Ex littera huius partis deprehenditur Plato qui voluit <quod> ante coniunctionem intellectus cum corpore creatus sub duabus stellis comparibus sibi <\*\*\*> concreatae species omnium intelligibilium, sed ex imperio sui creatoris iungitur mole corporis quo obumbratur a sui ipsius conscientia proprii, quod dicit animam intelligere in corpore quasi reminisci. Sed Philosophus dicit quod ipse intellectus quasi <est tabula> rasa; ex hoc enim deprehenditur error dicentium animam esse compositam ab omnibus ut omnia cognosceret.

Deinde cum dicit *et ipse autem intelligibilis*, solvit secundam dubitationem quae duas tenuit difficultates. Una fuit ad quam deduxit, scilicet si intellectus est intelligibilis cum intelligibilia unius speciei sint, sicut intellectus intelligibilis intelligit sic alia quaecumque intelligibilia intelligunt. Alia difficultas est eodem modo, cum intelligibilia sint eiusdem speciei sicut alia intelligibilia non intelligunt, sic neque intellectus. Ideo circa illud dua facit. Primo ostendit quod intellectus sit quodammodo intelligibile quod tamen intelligat, secundo ostendit quomodo alia sunt intelligibilia quod tamen non intelligant ibi *non autem semper*.

Advertendum quod triplex est intellectus: divinus, humanus, medio modo se habens sicut intellectus intelligentiarum. Humanus quidem intellectus omnino contrario modo se habet ad intellectum divinum, et e converso intelligentiarum vero intellectus medio modo se habet. Divinus namque intellectus est purus actus nihil habens de potentialitate admixtum secundum Philosophum duodecimo *Metaphysice*, simili modo huiusmodi intellectus versatur circa universale totius entis, sicut causa omnium quae sunt in universo et inde. Primo et principaliter intelligit sui ipsius essentiam et per illam in qua re lucent omnia tamquam in speculo aeternitatis intelligit omnia alia, verbi gratia. Si enim esset aliquod speculum in quo omnes species apparent

16 Aquinas *Sent. DA III.3*, ad 429b29, p. 215–16 (ed. Gauthier). 25 Arist. *DA III.4*, 430a2. 31 Arist. *DA III.4*, 430a5. 35–36 Arist. *Metaph. XII.7* and *XII.9*.

2 propositione ] proportione L 10 intelligibilia ] intelligibilium L 12 in, supple ] *corr. ex L* 12 est *post nihil del.* L 12 quando ] quoniam L 17 huiusmodi ] huius L 38 qua ] quam L

et illud, cum esset hoc causa omnium, per se ipsum intelligeret omnia. Unde intellectus divinus, quia et substantia est necessaria unica pura et simplex et aeterna, ideo aeterna cognoscit aeternae materialia immaterialiter multa una et contingentia necessario totum simpliciter.

Contrarium autem est de intellectu nostro humano, qui non habet aliam naturam nisi quia  
 5 est possibilis vocatus, et in hoc iam opponitur intellectu divino qui est purus actus. Similiter  
 cum ipse intellectus humanus sit creatus et causatus, non versatur circa universale totius entis,  
 simili modo etiam ipse primo et per se intelligit aliorum species quibus in actu ductus potens est  
 per huiusmodi species se ipsum intelligere, sic enim quod intellectus noster est potentia pura  
 in genere intelligibilium, sed talis non vadit ad actum, nisi ab aliquo actuetur; modo ad actum  
 10 reducitur per species aliorum, quasi per species aliorum vadit ad actum se ipsum intelligendi.  
 Et hoc etiam vult Commentator duodecimo *Metaphysice*, dicens “intellectus est aliorum per se,  
 sui autem ipsius per accidens.” Unde tali modo est imaginandum quod virtus intellectiva, post-  
 quam recipit species obiectorum, est in actu, est amplius non in potentia passiva, sed activa, et  
 quia virtus est incorporea ideo potest reflectere super suum actum, et ita potest se intelligere,  
 15 quoniam intelligit. Sed intelligere sive quod intellectus intelligat est propria operatio intellec-  
 tus. Propria autem operatio manuducit in cognitionem essentialem, ideo ex speciebus aliorum  
 a primo ad ultimum potest intelligere se ipsum, et hoc est quod Philosophus dicit, *et ipse est* |  
*{est} intelligibilis sicut intelligibilia*, id est per species aliorum intelligibilium, et ita declaratum  
 est de intellectu humano, et ex incidenti de intellectu divino.

72va

Restat determinare de intellectu medio modo se habente sicut est intellectus intelligen-  
 20 tiarum. Intelligentia quidem omnis intelligit se ipsam per essentiam suam, ut dicit Albertus  
*Libro de causis*. Dicit enim quod “intelligentiae redeunt super se ipsas reditione completa”,  
 sed intelligentia intelligit alia a se per species concreatas sibi. Dicit enim auctor *De causis* quod  
 “intelligentia est plena formis”, id est speciebus concreatis. *Κα* Philosophus dicit in littera  
 25 quod in *κ* materialibus idem sit intellectus et quod intelligitur.

Advertendum quod illa species quam virtus intellectiva intelligit est una, {duo} et duo sunt  
 quae intelligunt<ur per> unum intelligibile; illorum est materiale obiectum quod intelligit<ur>,  
 ut parum prius dictum est, <et intellectus> qui speciebus aliorum intelligitur a se ipso. Modo hoc  
 tamen est aliter et aliter: Materiale enim obiectum intelligitur modo abstractionis, sed intellec-  
 30 tus se intelligit per istam speciem materialis obiecti modo informationis, et ita illa una species

11–12 Averr. *Comm. magn. in Metaph* XII, cap. 4, com. 51, p. 336B–C (ed. Junct.). Averroes writes:  
 “Deinde dicens *sed semper videmus quod alterius est scientia et sensus* et cetera, id est sed videmus co-  
 gnoscere et sentire et existimare et intelligere esse aliud ab eo cuius sunt, id est ab intellectu, cognito,  
 et sensato, et existimato in nobis. Hae enim actiones ex istis virtutibus sunt aliorum, non sui ipsorum,  
 nisi per accidens, scilicet quia sensus et existimatio et intellectus sunt intellecti et sensati et existimati  
 non per se, sed per accidens, id est quod intellectus in nobis non intelligit se nisi per accidens, scilicet  
 quia accidit intellecto quod fit forma intellectus, et similiter accidit existimato quod fit existimatio, et  
 sensato similiter quod fuit sensus sentire, et hoc fuit quando intellectus non est in nobis intellectum  
 omnibus modis, et magis remotum hoc est quod sensus fit sensatum.” 17–18 Arist. *DA* III.4, 430a2.  
 22 Albertus Magnus *De causis* Lib. II, tr. 2, cap. 43, p. 542b (ed. Borgnet). 23–24 *Liber de causis* IX.92.  
 24–25 Arist. *DA* III.4, 430a2–3.

2 simplex ] simpliciter L 4 aliam ] aliquam L 6 intellectus ] intelligit L 6 creatus ] craeatus  
 a.c. L 8 huiusmodi ] huius L 9 vadit ] itur L 21 ut ] et L 29 aliter<sup>2</sup> ] arguitur L

qua intellectus intelligitur et qua materiale obiectum intelligitur est quid abstractum ab obiecto materiali. Sed illa species eadem materiali immo in tantum quod secundum Commentatorem, “ex ipso magis fit unum quam ex subiecto et accidente, et materia et forma,” immo ex hiis, scilicet specie intelligibili et intellectu, sicut ex lumine et peruio, luce et perspicuo. Unde dicit Commentator quod in corporalibus nihil similis invenire possumus intelligibili quam lumen 5 multiplicans se in medio peruio.

Et nota quod hic Expositor variat suam sententiam aequivocando, intellectum etenim, sicut lumen est actus et perfectio diaphani, sic species intelligibilis est perfectio intellectus. Modo ad propositum, supposito quod intellectus aliquando sumatur pro specie intelligibili (sive pro intellectu formali secundum Albert<sup>um</sup>), unde secundum hoc dicit quod in seperatis a materia 10 est idem intellectus et intelligibile. Ista littera non est retorquenda ad intelligentias, quia de illis non loquitur Philosophus in proposito, sed sumamus quod intellectus, qui a nobis intelligitur, est separatus a materia. Materia in talibus separatis idem est intellectus, id est species intelligibilis, est, inquam, ille idem cum eo quod intellectus in separatis a materia, id est in nostro intellectu qui est materialis, sed in coniunctis materiae sicut est obiectum materiale ab hoc 15 species separata non est idem tali obiecto.

Advertendum est modo propter solutionem primae distinctionis quomodo dictum Philosophi applicetur ad propositum. Sicut enim nulli competit actus calefaciendi nisi habeat formaliter calorem in actu, et in istis inferioribus sic etiam nihil intelligitur nisi habeat intellectum in actu; sed nunc intellectus possibilis habens species intelligibiles habet intellectum in actu, quare ille, 20 cum intelligitur, intelligit quare si sic est quod talis intellectus in actu est abstractus a talibus materialibus, ideo materialia intellectu carentia sic sunt intelligibilia ita quod non intelligant. Et ponatur exemplum ut si aliquid infrigidetur infrigiditate quae non est in seipso sed in alio,

7 Aquinas *Sententia in De anima* III.3, ad 430a2, p. 216, ll. 75–86 (ed. Gauthier). 10 Albertus Magnus *De intellectu et intelligibili* Lib. I, tr. 3, cap. 5, p. 510b (ed. Borgnet). He writes: “⟨Intellectus formalis⟩ est forma omnis intellectus secundum esse quod habet intelligibile. Hic autem formalis intellectus, non est ille quem quidam formam rei intellectivam arbitrantur: quia, sicut jam ostensum est, ille non est formalis ad intellectum possibilem: eo quod species est possibilis intellectus talium specierum et locus, et omne formale esse potius accipit id quod intelligitur ab intellectu in quo est, quam quod det sibi esse formale, sicut species et locus formalia sunt ad ea ad quae comparantur [etc.]” First introduced in the context of the intellect in Lib. I, tr. 3, cap. 3, p. 501a: “Est autem intellectus diversitas quam multi Philosophorum posuerunt quantum ad ipsas partes animae, quod est intellectus possibilis et intellectus agens, de quibus in libro de Anima dictum est. Tertius autem est, qui est formalis intellectus, quando scilicet forma sciti vel operandi per lucem intellectus est apud animam.” Cf. also idem *Summa theologiae* Pars II, tr. 15, q. 93, m. 2, p. 201b (ed. Borgnet): “Est etiam in anima intellectus formalis sive speculativus, qui est adeptio specierum intelligibilium.” It does not occur as a term in *De homine* or *De anima*, but it may be connected with ‘intellectus speculativus’, cf. *Summa theologiae* Pars II, tr. 4, q. 14, m. 3, p. 169b (ed. Borgnet): “Cum multae sunt differentiae intellectus, scilicet agens, possibilis, speculativus sive formalis, speculativus practicus, adeptus sive possessus, et non adeptus . . . (ed.)”

1 intellectus ] intelligit L 2 e post quod del. L 5 quam ] quod L 5 lumen ] unum L 7 aequivocando ] aequivoco L 9 supposito ] suppositam L 15 hoc ] hic a.c. L (in scribendo) 19 sed post inferioribus del. ut vid. L 20 intelligibilis post inferioribus del. L 21 intelligit ] ‘intelligit’ is followed by two meta-marks that might indicate the insertion of some material, but the margins are empty. 22 intellectu ] intellectum L 22 non ] sup. lin. L

planum est quod aliud non in frigidat, sed oportet quod frigus formaliter habeat; sed nunc ita est quod obiecta materialia intelliguntur per id quod est in alio, et non in ipsis formaliter, quare ipsa, cum intelligantur, non intelligunt et sic patet secunda difficultas determinata.

Littera: Ita fuit secunda dubitatio quomodo intellectus esset intelligibilis vel sicut substantiae separatae, id est per sui ipsius substantiam, vel sicut materialia, id est per speciem. Philosophus respondet et, supple intellectus, intelligibilis non per se et secundum suam essentiam, sed est intelligibilis sicut intelligibilia, id est per species intelligibilium, et cum intellectus intelligit, licet, supple alia, non intelligant, et bene est hoc quia intellectus, id est species intelligibilis, et quia intelligitur, supple per talem speciem, in hiis quae sunt sine materia, cuiusmodi est noster intellectus, est idem. *In coniunctis autem* et cetera, et subdit quia ita est quod intellectus et quod intelligitur sunt idem, ipse subdit quod scientia speculativa et suum scibile, id est speculativum, idem, *sed* [?] grammatica est scientia et est aliud quod scitur, et naturalis scientia est scientia et est aliud quod scitur; et sicut semper scibile est suae scientiae, vel idem vel aliter est, scientia est unio specierum scibilium in anima, quia secundum Commentatorem duodecimo *Metaphysice* nostra scientia causata est a rebus eo quod nihil intelligitur nisi per abstractionem specierum a rebus, ergo idem iudicium est de speciebus intelligibilibus et est etiam de scientia. Sed auditum est quod sunt species in intellectu, ergo etiam est scientia.

Littera: scientia speculativa et scibile, id est speculativum, sicut et noster intellectus, sunt idem, sed ista causa est consideranda cum non semper intelligit, id est quare obiecta materialia, cum sint intelligibilia, non etiam intelligunt. Autem, pro 'quia', in habentibus materiam, id est in obiectis materialibus, unumquodque est de numero intelligibilium in potentia eo quod secundum se non sunt abstracta a materia. Ideo subdit *quare quidem illis*, id est obiectis materialibus, non erit potentia intellectiva nec species intelligibilis quae vero intelligit in actu, quia intellectus potentia de numero, supple talium quae sunt sine materia, et ideo intellectus erit in actu quid immateriale, et quia obiecta materialia non sunt separata a materia quare, supple et ex hoc licet non intelligat ipsum, materiale autem, pro 'tamen', ipsum est intelligibile.

14–16 Non inventus, sed cf. *Comm. in Metaph* XII, com. 39, p. 322E–F and com. 50, p. 336B–C (ed. Juncta).

7 est<sup>1</sup> ] et L 9 cuiusmodi ] cuius materia L 11 et *post* speculativum *del.* L 17 est<sup>2</sup> ] etiam L 26 licet ] *sup. lin.* L

# Appendix D

## Question lists

### D.1 Anonymus Digby 55: *Quaestiones in De anima III*

No.	Title	Witnesses
<b>Liber III</b>		
1.1	Utrum intellectus possibilis possit esse differentia ipsius intellectus	D 114ra–b
1.2	Utrum possibile sit differentia essentialis ipsius intellectus.	D 114rb
1.3	Utrum intellectus dicatur possibilis ratione sui totius	D 114rb–114va
1.4	Utrum intellectus dicatur possibilis in comparatione ad intellectum agentem et non in comparatione ad formas quas recipit.	D 114va
1.5	Utrum intellectus possibilis ante addiscere sit in potentia essentiali.	D 114va–b
1.6	Utrum illae potentiae sint una potentia vel diversa.	D 114vb
1.7	Utrum intellectus recipiat omnes species vel formas una potentia.	D 114vb–115ra
1.8	Utrum intellectus sit unus et idem numero in omnibus.	D 115ra
1.9	Utrum intellectus possit uniri cum corpore.	D 115ra–115va
1.10	Utrum intellectus possibilis sit eadem virtus cum imaginativa.	D 115va
1.11	Utrum idem sit modus intelligendi organica et natrualia.	D 115va–b

Table D.1: List of questions in Anonymus Digby 55, *Quaestiones in De anima III*.

Table D.1 – continued

No.	Title	Witnesses
1.12	Utrum intellectus possit intelligere se.	D 115vb
1.13	Utrum intellectus intelligat se per speciem.	D 115vb–116ra
1.14	Utrum intellectus prout est unitus possit cognoscere substantias separatas.	D 116ra
1.15	Utrum intellectus in aliquo statu possit cognoscere causam primam.	D 116ra–b
1.16	Utrum intellectus possibilis recipiat omnes sensus ab imaginatione ita quod non habeat sensus concreatas.	D 116rb–116va
1.17	Utrum species recepta in intellectu sit eadem cum ipso intellectu.	D 116va
1.18	De origine animae rationalis humanae, utrum a primo oriatur immediate an mediante aliqua intelligentia.	D 116vab–117rab

Table D.1: List of questions in Anonymus Digby 55, *Quaestiones in De anima III*.

## D.2 Anonymus Oriel 33: *Quaestiones in De anima I-III*

No.	Title	Witnesses
1	Prooemium	O 120ra
<b>Liber primus</b>		
1.1	Utrum cognitio de anima sit nobis possibilis.	O 120rb–120vb
1.2	Utrum ista scientia sit de anima ut de subiecto vel de corpore animato.	O 120vb–121rb
1.3	Utrum omnis scientia sit bona.	O 121rb
1.4	Utrum scientia de anima excedat alias nobilitate subiecti.	O 121vb–122rb
1.5	Utrum universale sit nihil aut per posterius.	O 122rb–122vb
1.6	Utrum accidens sit principium cognoscendi substantiam.	O 122vb–123rb
1.7	Utrum intelligere sit propria operatio animae.	O 123rb–124ra
<b>Liber secundus</b>		
2.1	Utrum anima sit actus simplex aut sit quid compositum.	O 124ra–124v
2.2	An sit actus, supposito quod forma.	O 125ra
2.3	Utrum sit actus primus alicuius corporis.	O 125r–132ra
2.4	Utrum in animatis sit ponere plures formas.	O 132r–134va
2.5	Utrum principium intellectivum convenienter uniatur corpori organico ut actus eius.	O 134v–135r
2.6	Utrum anima intellectiva uniatur corpori humano ut forma substantialis eius.	O 135rb–137va
2.7	Utrum vegetativa, sensitiva et intellectiva sint tres animae in homine substantialiter distinctae vel tres potentiae eiusdem animae.	O 137r–137va
2.8	Utrum virtus quae est in semine hominis possit producere intellectivam.	O 137v–138ra
2.9	Utrum intellectiva secundum se totam sit in qualibet parte corporis.	O 138r–138va
2.10	Utrum intellectiva quae est forma substantialis hominis uniatur corpori humano mediantibus dispositionibus accidentalibus.	O 138v–139ra

Table D.2: List of questions in Anonymus Oriensis 33, *Quaestiones in De anima I–III*.

Table D.2 – continued

No.	Title	Witnesses
2.11	Utrum in homine sit aliqua alia forma substantialis ab intellectiva.	O 139r–140r
2.12	Utrum anima sit sua potentia.	O 140rb–140v
2.13	Utrum potentiae animae sint in anima ut in subiecto.	O 140vb
2.14	Utrum potentiae animae fluant ab eius essentia.	O 140vb–141ra
2.15	Utrum inter potentias animae sit ordo.	O 141ra–b
2.16	Utrum potentiae distinguantur per actus et obiecta.	O 141rb–141v
2.17	Utrum sint tantum quinque genera potentiarum animae.	O 141vb–142va
2.18	Utrum vegetativae sunt tantum tres potentiae, scilicet nutritiva, augmentativa et generativa.	O 142va–b
2.19	Utrum alimentum sit obiectum cuiuslibet partis vegetativae.	O 142vb–143r
2.20	Utrum inanimata possit augeri et nutriri.	O 143rb–143v
2.21	Utrum sensitiva potentia sit virtus passiva aut activa.	O 143vb–144ra
2.22	Utrum sensus possit decipi circa proprium sensibile.	O 143vb–144ra
2.23	Utrum sensibilia communia sint per se sensibilia.	144r–144va
2.24	Utrum Diarii filius et talia sint sensibilia per accidens.	O 144v–145ra
2.25	Utrum sensus sit per se singularis.	O 145r–145va
2.26	Utrum color per se sit visibilis, et hoc est quaerere an lumen requiratur propter necessitatem medii.	O 145v–146r
2.27	Utrum lux sit de essentia coloris.	O 146rb–147ra
2.28	Utrum lumen multiplicet se in medio subito vel successive	O 147r–147v
2.29	An corpus luminosum posset se multiplicare per totum medium, posito ipso medio infinito	O 148ra–b
2.30	Utrum ipsum lumen sit corpus.	O 148rb–149ra
2.31	Utrum coloratum sicut lucentium lux de die videri possit et color de nocte, et quod lux eorum videatur de die.	O 149r–149va
2.32	Utrum visus sit per se cognitivus visibilis et non visibilis.	O 149va–b
2.33	Utrum visibile positum supra visum immediate videatur.	O 149vb–150r
2.34	Utrum sonus soneretur ex percussione corporum adinvicem.	O 150rb–150v
2.35	Utrum sonus habeat esse in percutiente.	O 150vb–151r

Table D.2: List of questions in Anonymus Oriensis 33, *Quaestiones in De anima I–III*.

Table D.2 – continued

No.	Title	Witnesses
2.36	An sonus multiplicetur usque ad auditum cum motu aeris.	O 151rb–151va
2.37	Utrum sonus habeat esse reale in medio.	O 151vb–152ra
2.38	An sonus primo et proprio causatus sit unus numero.	O 152ra–b
2.39	An odor in medio existat realiter vel intentionaliter.	O 152rb–153ra
2.40	Utrum distantia rei visibilis impendiat visionem.	O 153ra–b
2.41	An visus sit cognoscibilis visibilis et non visibilis.	O 153rb
2.42	Utrum solius hominis sit odorare cum respiratione aeris.	O 153rb–153va
2.43	Utrum gustus sit quidam tactus.	O 153va–b
2.44	Utrum gustus prius sentiatur sapor quam humidum.	O 153vb–154ra
2.45	Utrum sensus tactus sit unus.	O 154r–154v
2.46	Utrum omnia tangibilia sufficienter reducantur ad has duas contrarietates, calidi et frigidi, humidi et sicci.	O 154vb–155ra
2.47	Utrum caro sit medium in tangendo.	O 155r–155v
2.48	Utrum ad tactum necessario requiratur medium extraneum.	O 155va–b
2.49	<Utrum aqua possit frigoriferi.>	O 156ra
2.50	Utrum omne recipiens speciem sive materiam sit cognoscens.	O 156ra–b
2.51	An possibile sit plures esse sensus quam quinque.	O 156vb–157va
2.52	Utrum perceptio operationis sensitivae pertineat ad eundem sensum vel ad alium, et hoc est an visus videat se videre.	O 157v–158ra
2.53	Utrum necessarie sit ponere sensum communem	O 158ra
2.54	Utrum sensus communis sit unus virtus formaliter.	O 158ra–b
2.55	Utrum necessarie sit ponere sensum agentem.	O 159vb–160r
<b>Liber tertius</b>		
3.1	Utrum intellectus possibilis sit essentia intellectivae animae an potentia.	O 160rb
3.2	Utrum intellectus possibilis sit potentia passiva.	O 160rb–160v
3.3	Utrum ad cognitionem habendam de omnibus naturalibus oporteat intellectum secundum se privari omni re corporea.	O 160vb–161r
3.4	Utrum oporteat intellectum privari organo corporeo ad hic quod omnia cognoscit.	O 161rb–161va

Table D.2: List of questions in Anonymus Oriensis 33, *Quaestiones in De anima I-III*.

Table D.2 – continued

No.	Title	Witnesses
3.5	Utrum intellectus noster sit incorporalis.	O 161v–162ra
3.6	Utrum intellectus habens penes se speciem intelligibilem possit intelligere absque conversione eius ad fantasma.	O 162ra
3.7	An clausis omnibus sensibus exterioribus ut in dormientibus possit intellectus in suam operationem <venire>, et hoc est an intellectus dormientis possit actu intelligere.	O 162ra–b

Table D.2: List of questions in Anonymus Oriensis 33, *Quaestiones in De anima I–III*.

### D.3 Anonymus Vaticanus 2170 I: *Quaestiones in De anima I-II*

No.	Title	Witnesses
<b>Liber primus</b>		
1.1	Utrum anima principaliter per hoc quod habeat scientiam de seipsa possit habere scientiam et cognitionem de aliis rebus.	V 5va–b
1.2	Utrum de anima possit esse scientia.	V 6vb–7r
1.3	Utrum de anima sit scientia una vel plures.	V 7rb–7va
1.4	Utrum scientia de anima sit scientia naturalis.	V 7va–b
1.5	Utrum ista scientia de anima sit difficillima.	V 7vb–8ra
1.6	Utrum scientia de anima sit certior allis naturalibus.	V 8r–8va
1.7	Utrum accidens ducat in cognitionem substantiae.	V 8v–9r
1.8	Utrum sit aliqua operatio animae quae sibi sit propria.	V 9rb–10ra
1.9	Si contingat aliquas passiones esse circa materiam scilicet quod non sunt naturales passiones materiae sed ei contingit, ideo quaeritur utrum hoc sit verum.	V 10r–10va
<b>Liber secundus</b>		
2.1	Cum autem Philosophus inquirat quod quid est eadem animae dicit quod est substantia. Ideo quaeritur utrum hoc sit verum.	V 10v–11r
2.2	Utrum materia includatur in natura animae.	V 11rb–12ra
2.3	Utrum anima sit corpus.	V 12r–12va
2.4	Utrum ex materia et forma fiat unum essentialiter.	V 12v–13r
2.5	Utrum ex materia et forma fiat unum in essentia per aliquod medium.	V 13rb–14ra
2.6	Utrum in partibus animalium <i>analosorum</i> [?] de similis sit anima.	V 14r–14v
2.7	Utrum anima sit tota in toto corpore.	V 14vb–15va
2.8	Utrum potentia animae sit aliud ab ipsa anima.	V 15v–16ra
2.9	In quo sit potentia animae sicut in subiecto.	V 16r–16va
2.10	Utrum potentiae animae fluant ab anima.	V 16v–17ra
2.11	Utrum potentiae definiantur per actus et actus per obiecta.	V 17ra–b

Table D.3: List of questions in Anonymus Vaticani 2170 I, *Quaestiones in De anima I-II*.

Table D.3 – continued

No.	Title	Witnesses
2.12	Utrum vegetativa, nutritiva et generativa sint una potentia vel plures.	V 17v–18ra
2.13	Utrum nutritio, generatio et augmentatio sint opera animae.	V 18r–18va
2.14	Utrum augmentum sit in infinitum.	V 18va–b
2.15	Utrum nutritio sit possibilis.	V 18vb–19ra
2.16	Utrum augmentatio sit possibilis.	V 19r–20ra
2.17	Utrum generet ex aliquo sui.	V 20r–20v
2.18	Utrum corpus vivens per alimentum possit se continere ut est in <i>numero</i> [?] per totum aeternum.	V 20vb–21ra
2.19	Utrum alimentum moveatur naturaliter cum movetur ad contraria loca.	V 21rb–21va
2.20	Utrum virtus passiva sit passiva vel activa.	V 21v–22va
2.21	Utrum sensitiva virtus reducatur ad actum a sensibili exteriori.	V 22v–23ra
2.22	Utrum in educatione sensus de potentia ad actum sit alteratio et similiter a parte intellectus.	V 23r–23va
2.23	Utrum universale habet esse in re vel in anima.	V 23v–24v
2.24	Utrum hoc sit verum quod sensus non decipitur circa proprium sensibile.	V 24vb–25r
2.25	Utrum sensibile commune sit sensibile per accidens vel per se.	V 25rb–25va
2.26	Utrum sit sensibile per accidens.	V 25va–b

Table D.3: List of questions in Anonymus Vaticani 2170 I, *Quaestiones in De anima I–II*.

## D.4 Anonymus Vaticanus 2170 II: *Quaestiones in De anima I–III*

No.	Title	Witnesses
<b>Liber primus de anima</b>		
1.1	Prooemium	V 51ra–b
1.2	Utrum de anim sit scientia.	V 51rb–51va
1.3	Utrum ista scientia sit vera.	V 51va–b
1.4	Utrum in ista scientia <i>videtur</i> [?] anima vel corpus animatum.	V 51va–b
1.5	Utrum ista scientia sit utilis.	V 51vb–52ra
1.6	Utrum ista scientia sit difficillima.	V 52ra
1.7	Utrum ex accidentibus possimus cognoscere quod quid est et substantiam rei.	V 52ra–b
1.8	Utrum sit aliqua propria operatio animae.	V 52rb–52va
<b>Liber 2</b>		
2.1	Utrum anima sit materia.	V 55vb
2.2	Utrum anima sit forma substantialis corporis.	V 55vb–56ra
2.3	Utrum definitio data de anima, scilicet quod est actus corporis et cetera, sit sufficiens.	V 56ra–b
2.4	Utrum anima immediate corpori uniatur.	V 56rb
2.5	Utrum anima sit una et eadem existens in omnibus corporis partibus.	V 56rb–56va
2.6	Circum illud capitulum potentiarum autem animae et primo utrum potentiae animae aliquid addant super essentiam animae.	V 56va–b
2.7	Utrum potentiae animae fluant ab essentiam animae.	V 56vb–57ra
2.8	Utrum quinque sint potentiae animae, scilicet vegetativum, sensitivum, intellectivum, motivum secundum locum et appetitivum.	V 57ra–b
2.9	Utrum generativum et nutritivum et augmentativum sint potentiae vegetativae	V 57rb–57va
2.10	Utrum sensus sit virtus passiva.	V 57va–b
2.11	Utrum res sensibilis extra existens possit per se deducere sensum de potentiae ad actum.	V 57vb–58ra

Table D.4: List of questions in Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II, *Quaestiones in De anima I–III*.

Table D.4 – continued

No.	Title	Witnesses
2.12	Utrum universalia sint solum in anima.	V 58r–58va
2.13	Utrum sensibile commune sit sensibile per se.	V 58va–b
2.14	Utrum sit aliquid sensibile per accidens.	V 58vb–59ra
2.15	Utrum sint plures sensus particulares quam quinque.	V 52va–b
2.16	Utrum sensus particularis directe suam sensationem percipit.	V 52vb–53ra
2.17	Utrum sensus indirecte possit percipere suam sensationem.	V 53ra–b
2.18	Utrum excellentiae sensibilibus corrumpant sensum.	V 53va–b
2.19	Utrum sensus communis sit una et idem qui iudicat differentiam diversorum sensibilibus, scilicet et album et dulcis.	V 53vb–54va
2.20	Utrum caelum possit imprimare in intellectum et voluntatem.	V 54ra–b
2.21	Utrum phantasia sit virtus differans a sensu communi.	V 54rb–54va
2.22	Utrum phantasia sit motus factus ab actu sensus.	V 54va–b
2.23	Utrum secundum phantasiam contingit agere et pati.	V 54vb
<b>Liber 3</b>		
3.1	Utrum intellectus sit passiva virtus.	V 54vb–55ra
3.2	Utrum ad hoc quod intellectus omnia intelligat oportet esse eum ab omni natura denudatum et format materialiter.	V 55ra–b
3.3	Utrum intellectus a materia differat prima.	V 55rb
3.4	Utrum intellectus possibilis antequam intelligat sit aliquid eorum quae sunt actu	V 55rb–55v
3.5	Utrum intellectus speculativus sit aeternus.	V 59ra
3.6	Utrum intellectus sit unus numero in omnibus hominibus.	V 59r–59v
3.7	Utrum species intelligibiles influantur in intellectum nostrum a substantiis separatis ut voluit Avicenna et Plato.	V 60ra–b
3.8	Utrum intellectus per species in habitu existens ad ipsum <i>possunt</i> [?] intelligere in convertendo ad phantasmata.	V 60rb–60va
3.9	Utrum intellectus possit intelligere per quod quid abstrahendo ipsum a phantasmatis.	V 60va–b
3.10	Utrum idem intellectus possit intelligere singulare ut universale est.	V 60vb–61ra

Table D.4: List of questions in Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II, *Quaestiones in De anima I–III*.

Table D.4 – continued

No.	Title	Witnesses
3.11	Utrum intelligat se per suam substantiam.	V 61ra–b
3.12	Circa capitulum de intellectu agente, et primo utrum sit necessarium ipsum ponere.	V 61rb–61va
3.13	Utrum intellectus sit substantia separata vel potentia aliqua animae nostrae.	V 61v–62ra
3.14	Utrum intellectus agens sit substantia intellectus.	V 62ra–b
3.15	Utrum intellectus agens sit unus.	V 62va–b
3.16	Utrum post mortem et meminiscemur.	V 62vb
3.17	Utrum intellectus intelligat componendo et dividendo.	V 62vb

Table D.4: List of questions in Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II, *Quaestiones in De anima I–III*.

## D.5 Henric de la Wyle: *Quaestiones in De anima I-III*

No.	Title	Witnesses
<b>Liber primus</b>		
1.1	An de anima possit esse scientia	M 57r–57va
1.2	Utrum de anima possit esse scientia naturalis.	M 57v–58ra
1.3	Utrum scientia sit bonorum.	M 58ra–b
1.4	Utrum in omnibus substantiis et quod quid est sit unus modus cognoscendi.	M 58rb–58v
1.5	Utrum universale sit posterius particulari.	M 58vb–59va
1.6	Utrum intelligere sit proprio operatio animae et per se.	M 59vb–60va
<b>Liber secundus</b>		
2.1	Utrum anima sit actus corporis physici.	M 60v–61ra
2.2	Utrum anima sit actus corporis organici.	M 61r–61va
2.3	Utrum ex corpore et anima fit vere unum.	M 61v–62r
2.4	Utrum in eadem re possibile sit esse duas formas substantiales.	M 62rb–64ra
2.5	Utrum vegetativam, sensitivam et intellectivam sint diversae secundum formam.	M 64r–65ra
2.6	Utrum pars animalis decisi sit actu animata.	M 65ra–b
2.7	Utrum potentia anima sit de essentia animae.	M 65rb–66ra
2.8	Utrum potentiae distinguuntur per obiecta.	M 66r–67v
2.9	Utrum unum sit obiectum omnium potentiarum animae.	M 67vb–68va
2.10	Utrum potentia sensitiva sit potentia activa.	M 68v–69ra
2.11	Utrum sensus decipiatur circa proprium sensibile et per se.	M 69ra–b
2.12	Utrum sensibile commune sit sensibile.	M 69rb–70r
2.13	Utrum aliqua substantia sit sensibilis per se.	M 70rb–70va
2.14	Utrum color sit per se visibilis.	M 70v–71r
2.15	Utrum lux sit de essentia coloris.	M 71rb–71v
2.16	Utrum multiplicatio lucis sit in instanti	M 71vb–72r
2.17	Utrum lux sit in medio secundum esse realis vel secundum esse intentionalis.	M 72rb–72va

Table D.5: List of questions in Wyle, *Quaestiones in De anima I–III*.

Table D.5 – continued

No.	Title	Witnesses
2.18	An visibilia de nocte videantur mediante colore.	M 72vb–73r
2.19	Utrum sonus causetur ex percussione corporum adinvicem.	M 73rb–73va
2.20	Utrum sonus sit in corpore percusso sicut in subiecto.	M 73v–74ra
2.21	Utrum sonus sit in medio realiter.	M 74r–74va
2.22	Utrum omnis vox sit sonus significativus.	M 74ca–b
2.23	Utrum olfactus in hominibus sit peior quam aliis animalibus.	M 74vb–75r
2.24	Utrum ex bono tactu habeat hoc dici boni intellectus.	M 75rb–75va
2.25	Utrum odor sit in medio realiter.	M 75v–76ra
2.26	Utrum gustus sit quid tactus.	M 76r–76va
2.27	Utrum sensus tactus sit sensus unus.	M 76v–77ra
2.28	Utrum caro sit organum tactus.	M 77r–77va
2.29	An imitatio tactus fiat per medium extrinsice	M 77v–78r
2.30	Utrum sensus sit susceptio speciei sine materia.	M 78rb–78v
2.31	Utrum excellens sensibile corrumpat sensum.	M 78vb–79r
2.32	Utrum sensus particularis directe cognoscat actionem suam.	M 79rb–79v
2.33	Utrum necesse sit ponere aliquem sensum communem.	M 79vb–80va
2.34	Utrum sensus communis simul apprehendat diversa sensibilia.	M 80v–81ra
<b>Liber tertius</b>		
3.1	An intellectus sit de novo aut sit ab aeterno.	M 81r–81va
3.2	Utrum intellectus humanus ab agente particulari fiat.	M 81v–82r
3.3	Utrum intellectus sit forma substantialis materiae.	M 82rb–82v
3.4	Utrum intellectus sit forma materialis.	M 82vb–83r
3.5	An intellectus sit unus numero in omnibus.	M 83rb–84ra
3.6	Utrum intellectiva secundum se <i>essentiam</i> [?] sit in qualibet parte materiae quam perficit.	M 84r–85r
3.7	An intellectus sit aliqua potentia passiva.	M 85rb–85va
3.8	Utrum intellectus possibilis habeat aliquod intelligibile sibi innatum ante actu intelligere.	M 85v–86r
3.9	Utrum species rei intelligibilis maneat in intellectu cum actu non intelligat.	M 86rb–86v

Table D.5: List of questions in Wyle, *Quaestiones in De anima I–III*.

Table D.5 – continued

No.	Title	Witnesses
3.10	Utrum intellectus possibilis intelligat se per essentiam.	M 86vb–87ra
3.11	Utrum necesse sit esse aliquem intellectum agentem.	M 87r–88r
3.12	Utrum omnia intelligibilia actu fiant intellecta per intellectum agentem.	M 88r–88va
3.13	Utrum intellectus agens intelligat.	M 88v–89ra
3.14	Utrum intellectus agens faciat universale.	M 89r–91ra
3.15	An intellectiva hominis differat specie ab intelligentia.	M 91ra–b
3.16	Utrum intellectiva hominis separata secundum esse possit intelligere.	M 91rb–91va
3.17	Utrum in intellectiva hominis separata maneat potentiae sensitivae.	M 91v–92ra
3.18	Utrum intellectus noster prius intelligat indivisibile quam divisibile.	M 92r–93ra
3.19	Utrum intellectus noster unitus corpori possit intelligere substantias separatas.	M 93r–94v

Table D.5: List of questions in Wyle, *Quaestiones in De anima I–III*.

## D.6 John Dinsdale: *Quaestiones in De anima I-III*

No.	Title	Witnesses
1	Prooemium	B 148rb–148va, O 164ra–b
<b>Liber primus</b>		
1.1	Utrum de anima possit nobis acquiri scientia.	B 148va, O 164rb–164va
1.2	Utrum aliqua scientia sit de anima vel de corpore animato ut de subiecto.	B 148vb–149ra, O 164va–b
1.3	Utrum scientia sit quid bonum et honorabile.	B 149ra–b, O 164vb–165ra
1.4	Utrum scientia de anima sit dignior aliis secundum certitudinem et subiecti dignitatem.	B 149rb–149va, O 165ra–b
1.5	Utrum universale nihil sit aut per posterius.	B 149va–150ra, O 165rb–165va
1.6	Utrum accidentia magnam partem conferant ad cognoscendum quod quid est.	B 150ra–b, O 165va–b
1.7	Utrum aliqua sit propria operatio animae in qua non communicet cum corpore.	B 150rb–150vb, O 165vb–166rb
1.8	Utrum naturalis differat ab aliis artificibus in definiendo.	B 150vb–151ra, O 166rb–166vb
<b>Liber secundus</b>		
2.1	Utrum anima sit forma simplex vel compositum.	B 151ra–151va, O 166vb–167ra
2.2	Utrum omni animae conveniat esse actum corporis.	B 151va–152ra, O 167ra–167vb
2.3	Utrum corpus cuius actus est anima sit in actu per aliam formam quam per animam.	B 152ra–154r, O 167vb–170r
2.4	Utrum anima debeat uniri corpori organico.	B 154rb–154v, O 170rb–170va
2.5	Utrum ex anima et corpore fiat unum.	B 154vb–155ra, O 170va–b
2.6	Utrum in homine sensitivum, vegetativum et intellectivum sint tres animae aut tres potentiae animae.	B 155ra–155vb, O 170vb–171v

Table D.6: List of questions in Dinsdale, *Quaestiones in De anima I-III*.

Table D.6 – continued

No.	Title	Witnesses
2.7	Utrum in parte animalis vel plantae decisae sit anima.	B 155vb, O 171vb–172ra
2.8	Utrum anima sit sua potentia.	B 155vb–156rb, O 172ra–b
2.9	Utrum potentiae distinguantur per actus et obiecta.	B 156rb, O 172rb–172va
2.10	Utrum in potentiis animae sit ordo secundum prius et posterius.	B 156rb–156va, O 172va–b
2.11	Utrum potentiae distinguuntur per actus et obiecta.	B 156va–b, O 172vb
2.12	Utrum potentiae animae sint quinque.	B 156vb–157rb, O 172vb–173r
2.13	Utrum tres sint potentiae vegetativae, scilicet nutritiva, generativa et augmentativa.	B 157ra–b, O 173va–b
2.14	Utrum alimentum sit obiectum vegetativae in qualibet operatione.	B 157rb–157va, O 173vb
2.15	Utrum alimentum convertatur in veram naturam rei.	B 157va–b, O 173vb–174rb
2.16	Utrum semen sit de substantia generantis vel de superfluentia.	B 157vb–158ra, O 174rb–174va
2.17	Utrum virtus in semine sit productiva sensitivae.	B 158ra–b, O 174va–b
2.18	Utrum virtus in semine sit productiva intellectivae.	B 158rb–158va, O 174vb–175ra
2.19	Utrum sensus sit virtus passiva.	B 158va–b, O 175ra–175va
2.20	Utrum sit ponere sensum agentem.	B 158vb–159rb, O 175va–176ra
2.21	Utrum sensus decipiatur circa proprium sensibile.	B 159rb–159va, O 176ra–b
2.22	Utrum sensibilia communia sint sensibilia per se.	B 159va–b, O 176rb–176va
2.23	Utrum Diarii filius et huiusmodi sint sensibilia per accidens.	B 159vb, O 176va–b

Table D.6: List of questions in Dinsdale, *Quaestiones in De anima I–III*.

Table D.6 – continued

No.	Title	Witnesses
2.24	Utrum color sit visibile per se sive secundum se. Utrum color sit visibile secundum se et hoc est quaerere utrum lumen requiratur propter neccesitatem coloris vel medii.	B 159vb–160rb, O 176vb–177va
2.25	Utrum lux sit de essentia coloris.	B 160rb–160va, O 177va–b
2.26	Utrum multiplicatio lucis in medio sit successiva vel in instanti.	B 160va–161rb, O 177vb–178rb
2.27	Posito quod medium sit infinitum, utrum corpus luminosum possit totum medium illuminare.	B 161ra–b, O 178rb–178va
2.28	Utrum lux sit substantia vel accidens.	B 161rb, O 178va–b
2.29	Utrum aliqua de nocte visa habeant videri tantum de nocte, ut lucerna, et de die, ut colorata.	B 161rb–161va, O 178vb–179ra
2.30	Utrum visibile supra organum positum videatur.	B 161va–b, O 179rb–179va
2.31	Utrum sonus causetur ex percussione corporum ad invicem.	B 161vb–162ra, O 179va–b
2.32	Utrum sonus sit in aere vel in percutiente aut percusso.	B 162ra–b, O 179vb
2.33	Utrum sonus multiplicetur ad auditum cum motu aeris.	B 162rb–162va
2.34	Utrum sonus sit in medio secundum esse intentionale vel rationale.	B 162va–b
2.35	Utrum sonus directus et refluxus ut ecco sit unus.	B 162vb–163ra
2.36	Utrum vox generetur a virtute imaginativa.	B 163ra–b
2.37	Utrum homo habeat peiorem olfactum aliis.	B 163rb–163va
2.38	Utrum odor multiplicetur in medio tantum intentionaliter vel cum fumili evaporatione.	B 163va–b
2.39	Utrum gustus sit quidam tactus.	B 163vb–164ra
2.40	Utrum sapor multiplicet se per se.	B 164ra
2.41	Utrum sapor multiplicet se intentionaliter vel materialiter.	B 164ra–b
2.42	Utrum tactus sit unus sensus.	B 164rb–164va
2.43	Utrum caro sit organum an aliud.	B 164va–b
2.44	Utrum in tactu requiritur medium extrinsecum.	B 164vb–165ra

Table D.6: List of questions in Dinsdale, *Quaestiones in De anima I–III*.

Table D.6 – continued

No.	Title	Witnesses
2.45	Utrum sensus sit susceptivus specierum sensibilium sine materia.	B 165ra–b
2.46	Utrum excellens sensibile corrumpat sensum.	B 165rb
2.47	Utrum sint tantum quinque sensus.	B 165va–b
2.48	Utrum sensu particulariter percipimus nos sentire ut visu videre aut sensu aliquo aut sensu communi.	B 165vb–166rb
2.49	Utrum oporteat ponere sensum communem propter distinctionem vel participationem inter sensibilia diversa animae.	B 166rb–166va
2.50	Utrum sensus communis sit unicus an plures.	B 166va–167ra
2.51	Utrum organum sensus communis sit internis iuxta cor vel non.	B 167rb
2.52	Utrum sensus communis simul apprehendat sensibilia diversi generis.	B 167ra–167va
2.53	Utrum phantasia differat a sensu.	B 167va–b
2.54	Utrum phantasia sit motus factus a sensu secundum actum.	B 167vb–168ra
2.55	Utrum fantasia insit omni animali.	B 168ra–b
2.56	Utrum opinio pertineat ad sensum vel ad intellectum.	B 168rb
2.57	Utrum convenienter distinguantur istae quatuor, scilicet sensus communis, imaginativa, aestimativa et memorativa.	B 168rb–168vb
<b>Liber tertius</b>		
3.1	Utrum intellectus sit essentia animae vel potentia.	B 168vb–169ra
3.2	Utrum intellectus sit potentia passiva.	B 169ra–b
3.3	Utrum oporteat intellectu esse immixtum ita quod nullam naturam corpoream habeat ad hoc ut omnia cognoscit.	B 169rb–169va
3.4	Utrum oporteat intellectum privari organo ut omnia cognoscit.	B 169va–b
3.5	Utrum intellectus humanus sit unus numero in omnibus hominibus.	B 169vb–170va
3.6	Utrum intellectus sit incorruptibilis.	B 170va–171ra
3.7	Utrum anima intellectiva in qualibet parte corporis sit tota.	B 171ra–171va
3.8	Utrum intellectus intelligat rem corpoream et sensibilem.	B 171va–b

Table D.6: List of questions in Dinsdale, *Quaestiones in De anima I–III*.

Table D.6 – continued

No.	Title	Witnesses
3.9	Utrum intellectus intelligat per species a sensibilibus acceptas an per species innatas aliunde adquisitas vel per essentiam vel qualitercumque.	B 171vb–172r
3.10	Utrum species possint manere in intellectu cum actu non intelligit.	B 172v–173ra
3.11	Utrum intellectus per species quas praesens se habet, possit intelligere absque hoc quod convertat se ad phantasmata.	B 173ra–b
3.12	Utrum intellectus intelligat res corporales et materiales abstrahendo a phantasmatibus.	B 173rb–173v
3.13	Utrum species abstracta sit illud quod intelligitur primo et per se aut res cuius est species.	B 173vb–174r
3.14	Utrum intellectus intelligat singulare per se.	B 174rb–174va
3.15	Utrum intellectus intelligat se per suam essentiam an per aliud sicut intelligit alia.	B 174v–175ra
3.16	Utrum intellectus possibilis sit actu aliquid eorum quae sunt antequam intelligat.	B 175ra–b
3.17	Utrum necesse sit ponere intellectum agentem.	B 175rb–175v
3.18	Utrum intellectus agens sit pars animae nostrae.	B 175vb–176ra
3.19	Utrum intellectus agens abstrahendo intelligat.	B 176ra–b
3.20	Utrum omnia a nobis intellecta fiant intellecta per intellectum agentem.	B 176rb–176va
3.21	Utrum substantia quae est huius intellectus obiectum faciat ex re speciem per quam cognoscat sicut et a materia.	B 176va–177ra
3.22	Utrum intellectus noster intelligat componendo et dividendo.	B 177ra–b
3.23	Utrum intellectus per prius intelligat divisibile quam indivisibile.	B 177rb–177va
3.24	Utrum intellectus possit esse falsus.	B 177va–b
3.25	Utrum verum et falsum primo et principaliter sit in intellectu componente et dividente.	B 177vb–178ra
3.26	Utrum intellectus practicus et speculativus sint diversae potentiae.	B 178ra–b

Table D.6: List of questions in Dinsdale, *Quaestiones in De anima I–III*.

Table D.6 – continued

No.	Title	Witnesses
3.27	Utrum sit ponere plures potentias in parte intellectiva quam possibilem et agentem.	B 178rb–178va
3.28	Utrum intellectus noster magnitudine coniunctus possit cognoscere vel intelligere.	B 178va–179ra
3.29	Utrum appetivum sit distinctum ab aliis potentiis animae.	B 179rb–179va
3.30	Utrum appetitus dividatur in rationalem et sensitivum.	B 179va
3.31	Utrum appetitus sensitivus dividatur in irascibilem et concupibilem.	B 179va–b
3.32	Utrum appetitus rationalis dividitur in irascibilem et concupibilem.	B 179vb–180ra
3.33	Utrum voluntas quae est appetitus rationalis sit nobilior potentia quam intellectus.	B 180ra–b
3.34	Utrum appetitus rationalis quae est voluntas moveat intellectum.	B 180rb–180va
3.35	Utrum appetitus sensitivus oboediat intellectui et rationi.	B 180vb–181ra
3.36	Utrum intellectus et appetitus et appetibile moveant.	B 181ra–b
3.37	Utrum potentia motiva ab aliis sit distincta.	B 181rb–181va
3.38	Utrum animalis moti ex se necesse est a materia partem quiescere et immobilem esse.	B 181va–b

Table D.6: List of questions in Dinsdale, *Quaestiones in De anima I–III*.

## D.7 John of Jandun: *Quaestiones in De anima Aristotelis, redactio secunda*

No.	Title	Witnesses
1	Prooemium	V1 2r-3v
<b>Liber I</b>		
1.1	Utrum de anima potest esse scientia	V1 3vb-5ra
1.2	Utrum scientia de anima sit naturalis	V1 5r-5v
1.3	Utrum anima sit subiectum in hac scientia vel corpus animatum	V1 5vb-6v
1.4	Utrum scientiae speculativae sint de numero bonorum honorabilium	V1 6vb-8r
1.5	Utrum ista scientia sit utilis ad alias scientias	V1 8rb-9r
1.6	An ista scientia sit difficillima	V1 9rb-10va
1.7	Utrum sit una communis methodus investigandi quod quid est omnium quorum est quod quid est investigandum	V1 10v-11va
1.8	Utrum universalis sint priora singularibus aut posteriora	V1 11v-17v
1.9	Utrum universalis sint priora singularibus vel posteriora	V1 17vb-18r
1.10	Utrum accidens conferat ad cognoscendum substantiam	V1 18rb-21ra
1.11	Utrum anima habeat aliquam operationem sibi propriam	V1 21r-22ra
1.12	Utrum logicus definiat per formam	V1 22r-23va
1.13	Utrum naturalis definiat per materiam sensibilem	V1 23v-24v
<b>Liber 2</b>		
2.1	Utrum anima sit substantia	V1 25r-25v
2.2	Utrum anima sit substantia quae est forma sive forma substantialis	V1 25vb-28v
2.3	Utrum definitio animae sit bene assignata	V1 28vb-30v
2.4	Utrum ex anima et corpore fiat unum per se	V1 30vb-32ra
2.5	Utrum omnis anima sit actus primus corporis	V1 32r-34r
2.6	Utrum in partibus animalis annulosi decisi remaneat anima	V1 34r-35ra
2.7	Utrum tota anima sit in qualibet parte corpori animati	V1 35r-36v
2.8	Utrum potentiae animae distinguantur per actus suos	V1 36vb-37v

Table D.7: List of questions in Jandun, *Quaestiones super libros De anima*.

Table D.7 – continued

No.	Title	Witnesses
2.9	Utrum potentiae animae sint idem essentialiter cum ipsa anima	V1 37vb–39ra
2.10	Utrum potentiae fluant ab essentia animae	V1 39r–40r
2.11	Utrum generare sibi simile sit opus naturalissimum viventibus	V1 40rb–41v
2.12	Utrum generare sibi simile et nutriri et augeri sint ab anima	V1 41vb–43ra
2.13	Utrum potentia generativa et augmentative sint diversae potentiae animae	V1 43r–44va
2.14	Utrum sensus sit virtus passiva	V1 44v–46ra
2.15	Utrum sensibile reducat sensum de potentia ad actum	V1 46r–47r
2.16	Utrum praeter speciem rei sensibilis in sensu receptam et praeter sensum qui est subiectum sensationis sit aliqua alia virtus activa sensationis naturalis existens in anima sensitiva, et hoc querere utrum in anima sensitiva sit aliquis sensus agens	V1 47rb–56ra
2.17	Utrum sensus particularis possit decipi circa suum proprium sensibile	V1 56r–57v
2.18	Utrum sensibilia communia sint sensibilia per se	V1 57vb–61ra
2.19	Utrum lux conferat colori formam vel habitum per quam vel per quem moveat medium et visum	V1 61r–62ra
2.20	Utrum lumen sit corpus	V1 62r–63ra
2.21	Utrum color sit primum obiectum visus	V1 63r–64r
2.22	Utrum sonus sit realiter in aere ut in subiecto	V1 64rb–65r
2.23	Utrum echo sit idem sonus cum primo sono	V1 65rb–65v
2.24	Utrum odor sit in medio realiter	V1 65vb–67va
2.25	Utrum homo habeat peiorum odoratum ceteris animalibus	V1 67v–68v
2.26	Utrum animalia respirantia et non respirantia habeant eundem odoratum	V1 68vb–69ra
2.27	Utrum tactus sit unus sensus	V1 69r–70ra
2.28	Utrum tactus indigeat medio extrinseco	V1 70r–72ra
2.29	Utrum sensibile positum supra sensum facit sensationem	V1 72ra–b

Table D.7: List of questions in Jandun, *Quaestiones super libros De anima*.

Table D.7 – continued

No.	Title	Witnesses
2.30	Utrum ista propositio sit vera, omnis sensus est receptivus specierum sine materia	V1 72v–73r
2.31	Utrum species non sensibilis recepta in sensu sit idem essentialiter cum ipso sentire	V1 73rb–74ra
2.32	Utrum sensus sint quinque et non plures neque pauciores	V1 74r–75va
2.33	Utrum sensus particularis cognoscat suam propriam operationem ut visus visionem et sic de ceteri	V1 75v–76va
2.34	Utrum sensibile agat in sensum	V1 76v–77ra
2.35	Utrum excellens sensibile corrumpat sensum	V1 77r–77va
2.36	Utrum sensus communis sit unus sensus	V1 77v–78va
2.37	Utrum phantasia sit idem cum sensu	V1 78v–81ra
<b>Liber 3</b>		
3.1	Utrum naturalis philosophus debeat considerare de intellectu	V1 81r–81v
3.2	Utrum intellectus sit virtus passiva ab intelligibili	V1 82r–82v
3.3	Utrum potentia animae intellectivae ad speciem intelligibilem vel ad intelligere sit idem essentialiter cum substantia animae	V1 82vb–83v
3.4	Utrum ad hoc quod intellectus intelligat aliquod intelligibile oporteat ipsum esse denudatum ab illo intelligibile	V1 83vb–86ra
3.5	Utrum anima intellectiva sit forma substantialis corporis humani	V1 86r–90v
3.6	Utrum intellectus possibilis sit aliquod ens actu de se aut sit ens in pura potentia receptiva	V1 90vb–94va
3.7	Utrum intellectus sit unus numero in omnibus hominibus	V1 94v–99ra
3.8	Utrum potentia intellectiva sit potentia organica	V1 99r–101r
3.9	Utrum cognitio intellectus possibilis sit necessaria ad intelligendum multitudinem in formis abstractis	V1 101rb–102r
3.10	Utrum intellectiones quibus diversi homines intelligunt unum intelligibile sint diversae numero aut una numero	V1 102rb–104v
3.11	Utrum ex intellectu et specie intelligibili fiat magis unum quam ex materia et forma	V1 104vb–105va

Table D.7: List of questions in Jandun, *Quaestiones super libros De anima*.

Table D.7 – continued

No.	Title	Witnesses
3.12	Utrum anima sensitiva et intellectiva sit una et eadem substantia in homine aut sint diversae formae substantiales	V1 105v–107ra
3.13	Utrum intellectus possibilis possit intelligere suam intellectionem existentem in eo	V1 107r–107v
3.14	Utrum species intelligibilis differat realiter ab intellectione seu intelligere	V1 107vb–109va
3.15	Utrum phantasma sit principium activum speciei intelligibilis	V1 109v–111r
3.16	Utrum species intelligibilis remaneat in intellectu cessante omni intellectione	V1 111rb–112v
3.17	Utrum species intelligibilis sit principium activum intellectionis	V1 112vb–114r
3.18	Utrum scientia sit idem quod species intelligibilis rei scitae	V1 114r–116r
3.19	Utrum quidditas sit primum obiectum intellectus	V1 116rb–117r
3.20	Utrum intellectus noster intelligat substantiam materialem per eius speciem propriam	V1 117rb–119ra
3.21	Utrum anima cogitativa possit cognoscere substantias materiales	V1 119r–119v
3.22	Utrum intellectus possit intelligere singulare seu individuum sensibile	V1 119vb–123r
3.23	Utrum neccesarium sit esse intellectum agentem	V1 123rb–128r
3.24	Utrum intellectus agens sit principium activum speciei intelligibilis	V1 128rb–131v
3.25	Utrum intellectus agens sit aliquid animae nostrae humanae	V1 132r–134v
3.26	Utrum intellectus possibilis humanus sit in qualibet intelligentia qua intelligit aliquid extra se	V1 134vb–135r
3.27	Utrum intellectus possibilis possit intelligere seipsum	V1 135rb–136v
3.28	Utrum intellectus sit perpetuus	V1 136vb–139va
3.29	Utrum intellectus intelligat post mortem	V1 139v–140ra
3.30	Utrum intellectus possibilis semper intelligat intellectum agentem eadem intellectione numero	V1 140ra–140va
3.31	Utrum veritas et falsitas sint in intellectu	V1 140v–141r

Table D.7: List of questions in Jandun, *Quaestiones super libros De anima*.

Table D.7 – continued

No.	Title	Witnesses
3.32	Utrum intellectus possit intelligere plura simul	V1 141rb–142v, V1 279b–282
3.33	Utrum non ens possit intelligi	V1 142vb–144v
3.34	Utrum illud dictum Aristotelis sit verum, scilicet quod anima humana nequaquam sine phantasmate intelligit anima	V1 144vb–146r
3.35	Utrum intellectus practicus et speculativus sint diversae potentiae animae	V1 146r–147ra
3.36	Utrum intellectus humanus possit intelligere substantias abstractas a materia et magnitudine ut sunt illae substantiae quae dicuntur intelligentiae	V1 147r–153ra
3.37	Utrum potentiae animae sint infinitae	V1 153r–153v
3.38	Utrum intellectus et appetitus sint diversae virtutes seu potentiae animae nostrae	V1 153vb–155r
3.39	Utrum appetitus et intellectus practicus sint principia motus localis processivi	V1 155rb–156ra
3.40	Utrum voluntas vel homo per voluntatem possit non velle bonum quod ab intellectu iudicatur esse bonum simpliciter cum intellectus habet tale iudicium secundum actum	V1 156r–156va
3.41	Utrum vivens aliquando sit in tempore status ita quod nec augeatur nec diminuatur	V1 156v–157ra
3.42	Utrum gustus et tactus sint neccesarium omnibus animalibus	V1 157r–157v

Table D.7: List of questions in Jandun, *Quaestiones super libros De anima*.